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

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M. T. CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM

LIBRI QUINQUE.

EX EDITIONIBUS OLIVETI ET ERNESTI.

ACCEDUNT NOTÆ ANGLICÆ.

CURA

C. K. DILLAWAY, A. M.

TOM. I.

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TO

JOSIAH QUINCY, LL. D.,

PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

THESE VOLUMES

ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY

THE EDITOR.

PREFACE.

THE philosophical works of Cicero were composed in the stormy period which drove him to retirement, between the breaking out of the war of Cæsar and Pompey and his own death. They formed a complete course of the philosophy of the Greeks, which has had followers and admirers since the time of Lælius, but has had few expounders. Cicero was the first who had intelligence and enterprise sufficient to exhibit it in all its systems to his countrymen.

The object of his five dissertations contained in the volumes now offered to the public, is to discover the most essential

means of happiness, which he reduces to five — the contempt of death, patience in affliction, firmness under different trials of life, habitual control over the passions, and the persuasion that virtue ought to seek for recompense from itself alone. This philosophy is confessedly borrowed from the Academy and the Portico, but it is highly embellished by his eloquence.

The series of Latin Classics, of which these volumes are a part, now contains six selections from the works of Cicero: they will be followed by his other philosophical writings at such periods as the favor of the public and the editor's other engagements may warrant.

C. K. D.

7 Tremont Row, Boston,
November 1, 1842.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM,

AD

MARCUM BRUTUM,

LIBER PRIMUS.

De contemnendâ Morte.

I. Cum defensionum laboribus, senatoriisque muneribus, aut omnino aut magnâ ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, retuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime, ad ea studia, quæ, retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa, revocavi: et, cum omnium artium, quæ ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapiéntiæ, quæ philosophia dicitur, contineretur; hoc mihi Latinis literis illustrandum putavi: non, quia philosophia Græcis et literis et doctoribus percipi non posset: sed meum semper judicium fuit, omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Græcos, aut, accepta ab illis, fecisse meliora, quæ quidem digna statuissent, in

quibus elaborarent. Nam mores et instituta vitæ, resque domesticas ac familiares, nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius: rem vero publicam nostri majores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. Quid loquar de re militari? in quâ cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplinâ. Jam illa, quæ naturâ, non literis, assecuti sunt, neque cum Græciâ neque ullâ cum gente sunt conferenda. Quæ enim tanta gravitas, quæ tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quæ tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum majoribus nostris comparanda? Doctrinâ Græcia nos, et omni literarum genere, superabat: in quo erat facile vincere non repugnantes. Nam, cum apud Græcos antiquissimum sit e doctis genus poëtarum, si quidem Homerus fuit, et Hesiodus, ante Romam conditam, Archilochus regnante Romulo; serius poëticam nos accepimus: annis enim fere DX post Romam conditam, Livius fabulam dedit, C. Claudio, Cæci filio, M. Tuditano, consulibus, anno ante natum Ennium, qui fuit major natu, quam Plautus et Nævius.

II. Sero igitur a nostris poëtæ vel cogniti vel recepti. Quamquam est in "Originibus," solitos esse in epulis canere convivas ad tibicinem de clarorum hominum virtutibus; honorem tamen

huic generi non fuisse, declarat oratio Catonis, in quâ objecit, ut probrum, M. Nobiliori, quod is in provinciam poëtas duxisset. Duxerat autem consul ille in Ætoliam, ut scimus, Ennium. Quo minus igitur honoris erat poëtis, eo minora studia fuerunt. Nec tamen, siqui magnis ingeniis in eo genere exstiterunt, non satis Græcorum gloriæ responderunt. An censemus, si Fabio, nobilissimo homini, laudi datum esset, quod pingeret, non multos etiam apud nos futuros Polycletos et Parrhasios fuisse? Honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur ad studia gloriâ: jacentque ea semper, quæ apud quosque improbantur. Summam eruditionem Græci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus. Igitur et Epaminondas, princeps (meo judicio) Græciæ, fidibus præclare cecinisse dicitur; Themistoclesque, aliquot ante annos, cum in epulis recusâsset lyram, habitus est indoctior. Ergo in Græciâ musici floruerunt; discebantque id omnes; nec, qui nesciebat, satis excultus doctrinâ putabatur. In summo apud illos honore geometria fuit: itaque nihil mathematicis illustrius. At nos, metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate, hujus artis terminavimus modum.

III. At, contra, oratorem celeriter complexi sumus; nec eum *primo* eruditum, aptum tamen

ad dicendum; post autem eruditum. Nam Galbam, Africanum, Lælium, doctos fuisse traditum est; studiosum autem eum, qui iis ætate anteibat, Catonem; post vero Lepidum, Carbonem, Gracchos; deinde ita magnos nostram ad ætatem, ut non multum, aut nihil omnino, Græcis cederetur. Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen literarum Latinarum; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi.

In quo eo magis nobis est elaborandum, quod multi jam esse Latini libri dicuntur scripti inconsiderate, ab optimis illis quidem viris, sed non satis eruditis. Fieri autem potest, ut recte quis sentiat, et id, quod sentit, polite eloqui non possit. Sed mandare quemquam literis cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec illustrare possit, nec delectatione aliquâ allicere lectorem, hominis est intemperanter abutentis et otio et literis. Itaque suos libros ipsi legunt cum suis; nec quisquam attingit, præter eos qui eamdem licentiam scribendi sibi permitti volunt. Quare, si aliquid oratoriæ [laudis] nostrâ attulimus industriâ, multo studiosius philosophiæ fontes aperiemus, e quibus etiam illa manabant.

IV. Sed, ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio,

scientiâ, copiâ, cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloriâ, docere etiam cœpit adolescentes dicere, et prudentiam cum eloquentiâ jungere; sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere, et in hac majore et uberiore arte versari. Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quæ de maximis quæstionibus copiose posset, ornateque dicere: in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose [operam] dedimus, ut jam etiam scholas, Græcorum more, habere auderemus: ut nuper, tuum post discessum, in Tusculano, cum essent plures mecum familiares, tentavi, quid in eo genere possem. Ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit; sic hæc nunc mihi senilis est declamatio. Ponere jubebam, de quo quis audire vellet: ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam.

Itaque dierum quinque *scholas*, ut Græci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. Fiebat autem ita, ut, cum is, qui audire vellet, dixisset quid sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem: hæc est enim (ut scis) vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. Nam ita facillime, quid verisimillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed, quo commodius disputationes nostræ explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Ergo ita nascetur exordium.

V. *Auditor.* Malum mihi videtur esse mors. *Marcus.* Iisne qui mortui sunt, an iis quibus moriendum est? *Auditor.* Utrisque. *Marcus.* Est miserum igitur, quoniam malum. *Auditor.* Certe. *Marcus.* Ergo et ii quibus evenit jam ut morerentur, et ii quibus eventurum est, miseri. *Auditor.* Mihi ita videtur. *Marcus.* Nemo ergo non miser? *Auditor.* Prorsus nemo. *Marcus.* Et quidem, si tibi constare vis, omnes, quicumque nati sunt eruntve, non solum miseri, sed etiam semper miseri. Nam, si solos eos diceres miseros, quibus moriendum esset, neminem tu quidem eorum, qui viverent, exciperes: moriendum est enim omnibus: esset tamen miseriæ finis in morte. Quoniam autem etiam mortui miseri sunt, in miseriam nascimur sempiternam. Necesse est enim, miseros esse eos qui centum millibus annorum ante occiderunt, vel potius omnes, quicumque nati sunt. *Auditor.* Ita prorsus existimo. *Marcus.* Dic, quæso, num te illa terrent, triceps apud inferos Cerberus, Cocyti fremitus, transvectio Acherontis, mento summam aquam attingens siti enectus Tantalus? num illud, quod

"Sisyphu' versat
Saxum sudans nitendo, neque proficit hilum?"

Fortasse etiam inexorabiles judices, Minos et

Rhadamanthus; apud quos nec te L. Crassus defendet, nec M. Antonius, nec (quoniam apud Græcos judices res agetur) poteris adhibere Demosthenem: tibi ipsi pro te erit maximâ coronâ causa dicenda. Hæc fortasse metuis, et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum.

VI. *Auditor.* Adeone me delirare censes, ut ista esse credam? *Marcus.* An tu hæc non credis? *Auditor.* Minime vero. *Marcus.* Male, hercule, narras. *Auditor.* Cur? quæso. *Marcus.* Quia disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem. *Auditor.* Quis enim non in ejusmodi causâ? aut quid negotii est, hæc poëtarum et pictorum portenta convincere? *Marcus.* Atqui pleni sunt libri contra ista ipsa philosophorum disserentium. *Auditor.* Inepte sane: quis est enim tam excors, quem ista moveant? *Marcus.* Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ulli. *Auditor.* Ita prorsus existimo. *Marcus.* Ubi ergo sunt ii, quos miseros dicis? aut quem locum incolunt? Si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt. *Auditor.* Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto. *Marcus.* Igitur ne esse quidem. *Auditor.* Prorsus isto modo; et tamen miseros ob id ipsum quidem, quia nulli sunt.

Marcus. Jam *mallem* Cerberum metueres,

quam ista tam inconsiderate diceres. *Auditor.* Quî tandem? *Marcus.* Quem esse negas, eumdem esse dicis. Ubi est acumen tuum? cum enim miserum esse dicis, tum eum, qui non sit, dicis esse. *Auditor.* Non sum ita hebes, ut istuc dicam. *Marcus.* Quid dicis igitur? *Auditor.* Miserum esse (verbi causâ) M. Crassum, qui illas fortunas morte dimiserit; miserum Cn. Pompeium, qui tantâ gloriâ sit orbatus; omnes denique miseros, qui hac luce careant. *Marcus.* Revolveris eodem. Sint enim oportet, si miseri sunt: tu autem modo negabas eos esse, qui mortui essent. Si igitur non sunt, nihil possunt esse; ita ne miseri quidem sunt. *Auditor.* Non dico fortasse etiam, quod sentio: nam istuc ipsum, non esse, cum fueris, miserrimum puto. *Marcus.* Quid? miserius, quam omnino nunquam fuisse? Ita, qui nondum nati sunt, miseri jam sunt, quia non sunt: et nos ipsi, si post mortem miseri futuri sumus, miseri fuimus, antequam nati. Ego autem non commemini, antequam sum natus, me miserum. Tu si meliore memoriâ es, velim scire, ecquid de te recordere.

VII. *Auditor.* Ita jocaris, quasi ego dicam eos miseros qui nati non sunt, et non eos qui mortui sunt. *Marcus.* Esse ergo eos dicis. *Auditor.* Immo, quia non sunt, cum fuerint, eo

miseros esse. *Marcus.* Pugnantia te loqui non vides? Quid enim tam pugnat, quam non modo miserum, sed omnino quidquam esse, qui non sit? An tu, egressus portâ Capenâ, cum Calatini, Scipionum, Serviliorum, Metellorum, sepulcra vides, miseros putas illos? *Auditor.* Quoniam me verbo premis, posthac non ita dicam miseros esse, sed tantum, miseros ob id ipsum, quia non sunt. *Marcus.* Non dicis igitur, "Miser est M. Crassus," sed tantum, "Miser M. Crassus." *Auditor.* Ita plane. *Marcus.* Quasi non necesse sit, quidquid isto modo pronunties, id aut esse aut non esse. An tu dialecticis ne imbutus quidem es? In primis enim hoc traditur: Omne pronuntiatum (sic enim mihi in præsentia occurrit, ut appellarem ἀξίωμα: utar post alio, si invenero melius) id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. Cum dicis igitur, "Miser M. Crassus," aut hoc dicis, "Miser est M. Crassus," ut possit judicari, verum id falsumne sit; aut nihil dicis omnino.

Auditor. Age, jam concedo, non esse miseros, qui mortui sunt, quoniam extorsisti, ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne miseros quidem esse posse. Quid? qui vivimus, cum moriendum sit, nonne miseri sumus? Quæ enim potest in vitâ esse jucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogitandum sit, jam jamque esse moriendum?

VIII. *Marcus.* Ecquî ergo intelligis, quantum mali de humanâ conditione dejeceris? *Auditor.* Quonam modo? *Marcus.* Quia, si mori etiam mortuis miserum esset, infinitum quoddam et sempiternum malum haberemus in vitâ. Nunc video calcem, ad quam cum sit decursum, nihil sit præterea extimescendum. Sed tu mihi videris Epicharmi (acuti, nec insulsi hominis, ut Siculi) sententiam sequi. *Auditor.* Quam? non enim novi. *Marcus.* Dicam, si potero, Latine: scis enim me Græce loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere, quam in Græco Latine. *Auditor.* Et recte quidem. Sed quæ tandem est Epicharmi ista sententia? *Marcus.*

"Emori nolo: sed me esse mortuum nihil æstimo."

Auditor. Jam agnosco Græcum: et quoniam coëgisti, ut concederem, qui mortui essent, eos miseros non esse, perfice, si potes, ut ne moriendum quidem esse, miserum putem. *Marcus.* Jam istuc quidem nihil negotii est: sed etiam majora molior. *Auditor.* Quo modo hoc nihil negotii est? aut quæ sunt tandem ista majora? *Marcus.* Quoniam, si post mortem nihil est mali, ne mors quidem est malum; cui proximum tempus est post mortem, in quo mali nihil esse concedis. Ita ne moriendum quidem esse, malum *est. Id est enim,* perveniendum esse ad id, quod

non esse malum confitemur. *Auditor.* Uberius ista, quæso. Hæc enim spinosiora, prius ut confitear, me cogunt, quam ut assentiar. Sed quæ sunt ea, quæ dicis te majora moliri? *Marcus.* Ut doceam, si possim, non modo malum non esse, sed bonum etiam esse, mortem. *Auditor.* Non postulo id quidem; aveo tamen audire. Ut enim non efficias quod vis, tamen, mors ut malum non sit, efficies. Sed nihil te interpellabo. Continentem orationem audire malo. *Marcus.* Quid? si te rogavero aliquid, non respondebis? *Auditor.* Superbum id quidem [esset:] sed, nisi quid necesse erit, malo ne roges.

IX. *Marcus.* Geram tibi morem; et ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa, quæ dixero; sed ut homunculus unus e multis, probabilia conjecturâ sequens. Ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut veri videam similia, non habeo. Certa dicent ii, qui et percipi ea posse dicunt, et se sapientes esse profitentur. *Auditor.* Tu, ut videtur: nos ad audiendum parati sumus.

Marcus. Mors igitur ipsa, quæ videtur notissima res esse, quid sit, primum est videndum. Sunt enim, qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem. Sunt, qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed unâ animum et corpus occi-

dere, animumque cum corpore exstingui. Qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. Quid sit porro ipse animus, aut ubi, aut unde, magna dissensio est. Aliis cor ipsum animus videtur; ex quo excordes, vecordes, concordesque dicuntur: et Nasica ille prudens, bis consul, Corculum, et

"Egregie cordatus homo, catus Æliu' Sextus."

Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. Aliis pars quædam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere. Aliis, nec cor ipsum, placet, nec cerebri quamdam partem, esse animum: sed alii in corde, alii in cerebro, dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum. Animum autem alii animam, ut fere nostri [declarant nomen:] nam et agere animam, et efflare dicimus, et animosos, et bene animatos, et ex animi sententiâ: ipse autem *animus* ab *animâ* dictus est. Zenoni Stoïco animus ignis videtur.

X. Sed hæc quidem, quæ dixi, cor, cerebrum, animam, ignem, vulgo; reliqua fere singuli, ut multi ante veteres. Proxime autem Aristoxenus, musicus, idemque philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quamdam, velut in cantu et fidibus, quæ harmonia dicitur; sic ex corporis totius *naturâ et figurâ*, varios motus cieri, tamquam in

cantu sonos. Hic ab artificio suo non recessit, et tamen dixit aliquid, quod ipsum quale esset, erat multo ante et dictum et explanatum a Platone. Xenocrates animi figuram, et quasi corpus, negavit esse; verum numerum dixit esse, cujus vis (ut jam antea Pythagoræ visum erat) in naturâ maxima esset: ejus doctor Plato triplicem finxit animam; cujus principatum, id est rationem, in capite, sicut in arce, posuit: et duas partes parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas locis disclusit; iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter præcordia, locavit.

Dicæarchus autem, in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum hominum disputantium, primo libro multos loquentes facit: duobus Pherecratem quemdam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum, et hoc esse nomen totum inane: frustraque animalia et animantes appellari; neque in homine inesse animum vel animam, nec in bestiâ: vimque omnem eam, quâ vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis æquabiliter esse fusam, nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quæ nulla sit, nec sit quidquam, nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturæ vigeat et sentiat.

Aristoteles, *longe omnibus* (Platonem semper

excipio) præstans et ingenio et diligentiâ, cum quatuor illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orirentur, quintam quamdam naturam censet esse, e quâ sit mens. Cogitare enim, et providere, et discere, et docere, et invenire aliquid, et tam multa alia, meminisse, amare, odisse, cupere, timere, angi, lætari; hæc, et similia eorum, in horum quatuor generum nullo inesse putat. Quintum genus adhibet, vacans nomine: et sic ipsum animum ἐντελέχειαν appellat novo nomine, quasi quamdam continuatam motionem et perennem.

XI. Nisi quæ me forte fugiunt, hæ sunt fere omnium de animo sententiæ. Democritum enim, magnum quidem illum virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus: nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, deus aliquis viderit: quæ verisimillima, magna quæstio est Utrum igitur inter has sententias dijudicare malumus, an ad propositum redire? *Auditor.* Cuperem equidem utrumque, si posset: sed est difficile confundere. Quare, si, ut ista non disserantur, liberari mortis metu possumus, id agamus. Sin id non potest, nisi hac quæstione *animorum* explicatâ, nunc, si videtur, hoc: illud

alias. *Marcus.* Quod malle te intelligo, id puto esse commodius. Efficiet enim ratio, ut quæcumque vera sit earum sententiarum quas exposui, mors aut malum non sit, aut sit bonum potius. Nam, si cor, aut sanguis, aut cerebrum, est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore. Si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur: si ignis, exstinguetur: si est Aristoxeni harmonia, dissolvetur. Quid de Dicæarcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? His sententiis omnibus, nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest: pariter enim cum vitâ sensus amittitur. Non sentientis autem, nihil est, ullam in partem quod intersit. Reliquorum sententiæ spem afferunt, si tè forte hoc delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in cœlum, quasi in domicilium suum, pervenire.

Auditor. Me vero delectat: idque, primum, ita esse velim: deinde, etiam si non sit, mihi tamen persuaderi velim. *Marcus.* Quid tibi ergo operâ nostrâ opus est? Num eloquentiâ Platonem superare possumus? Evolve diligenter ejus eum librum, qui est de animo: amplius quod desideres, nihil erit. *Auditor.* Feci, mehercule, et quidem sæpius: sed, nescio quo modo, dum lego, assentior: cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cœpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur. *Marcus.* Quid

hoc? dasne aut manere animos post mortem, aut morte ipsâ interire? *Auditor.* Do vero. *Marcus.* Quid, si maneant? *Auditor.* Beatos esse concedo. *Marcus.* Si intereant? *Auditor.* Non esse miseros, quoniam ne sint quidem. Jam istuc, coacti a te, paulo ante concessimus. *Marcus.* Quo modo igitur, aut cur, mortem malum tibi videri dicis, quæ aut beatos nos efficiet, animis manentibus, aut non miseros, sensu carentes?

XII. *Auditor.* Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, animos, si potes, remanere post mortem: tum, si minus id obtinebis, (est enim arduum) docebis, carere omni malo mortem. Ego enim istuc ipsum vereor, ne malum sit, non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse. *Marcus.* Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis possumus (quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum,) et primum quidem omni antiquitate; quæ, quo propius aberat ab ortu et divinâ progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse, quæ erant vera, cernebat.

Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos *cascos* appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum, neque excessu vitæ sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret: idque cum multis aliis rebus, tum e pontificio jure, et cærimoniis sepulcrorum,

intelligi licet; quas maximis ingeniis præditi nec tantâ curâ coluissent, nec violatas tam inexpiabili religione sanxissent, nisi hæsisset in eorum mentibus, mortem non interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quamdam quasi migrationem, commutationemque vitæ, quæ, in claris viris et feminis, dux in cœlum soleret esse; in ceteris humi retineretur, et permaneret tamen. Ex hoc, et nostrorum opinione,

"Romulus in cœlo cum diis agit ævum,"

ut, famæ assentiens, dixit Ennius: et apud Græcos, indeque perlapsus ad nos, et usque ad Oceanum, Hercules, tantus et tam præsens habetur deus. Hinc Liber deus, Semele natus, eâdemque famæ celebritate Tyndaridæ fratres, qui non modo adjutores in prœliis victoriæ populi Romani, sed etiam nuntii, fuisse perhibentur. Quid? Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne, Leucothea nominata a Græcis, Matuta habetur a nostris? Quid? totum prope cœlum (ne plures persequar) nonne humano genere completum est?

XIII. Si vero scrutari vetera, et ex his ea, quæ scriptores Græci prodiderunt, eruere coner; ipsi illi, majorum gentium dii qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in cœlum reperientur. Quære, quorum demonstrantur sepulcra in Græciâ: re-

miniscere, quoniam es initiatus, quæ traduntur mysteriis: tum denique, quam hoc late pateat, intelliges. Sed, qui nondum ea, quæ multis post annis tractari cœpissent, physica didicissent, tantum sibi persuaserant, quantum naturâ admonente cognoverant; rationes et causas rerum non tenebant. Visis quibusdam sæpe movebantur, hisque maxime nocturnis, ut viderentur ii, qui vitâ excesserant, vivere.

Ut porro firmissimum, hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. Multi de diis prava sentiunt; id enim vitioso more effici solet: omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effecit: non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omni autem in re, consensio omnimu gentium lex naturæ putanda est Quis est igitur, qui suorum mortem primum non eo lugeat, quod eos orbatos vitæ commodis arbitretur? Tolle hanc opinionem: luctum sustuleris: nemo enim mœret suo incommodo. Dolent fortasse, et anguntur: sed illa lugubris lamentatio, fletusque mœrens, ex eo est, quod eum, quem dileximus, vitæ commodis privatum arbitramur, idque sentire. Atque hæc ita sentimus naturâ *duce,* nullâ ratione, nullâque doctrinâ.

XIV. Maximum vero argumentum est, naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ sunt, et maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sint. "Serit arbores, quæ alteri seculo prosint" (ut ait Statius in Synephebis,) quid spectans, nisi etiam postera secula ad se pertinere? Ergo arbores seret diligens agricola, quarum adspiciet baccam ipse nunquam; vir magnus leges, instituta, rempublicam, non seret? Quid procreatio liberorum, quid propagatio nominis, quid adoptiones filiorum, quid testamentorum diligentia, quid ipsa sepulcrorum monumenta, quid elogia significant, nisi nos futura etiam cogitare? Quid illud? num dubitas, quin specimen naturæ capi deceat ex optimâ quâque naturâ? Quæ est igitur melior in hominum genere natura, quam eorum qui se natos ad homines juvandos, tutandos, conservandos, arbitrantur? Abiit ad deos Hercules: nunquam abiisset, nisi, cum inter homines esset, eam sibi viam munivisset. Vetera jam ista, et religione omnium consecrata.

XV. Quid, in hac republicâ, tot tantosque viros, ob rempublicam interfectos, cogitâsse arbitramur? iisdemne ut finibus nomen suum, quibus vita, terminaretur? Nemo unquam, sine magnâ spe immortalitatis, se pro patriâ offerret

ad mortem. Licuit esse otioso Themistocli, licuit Epaminondæ; licuit (ne et vetera et externa quæram) mihi: sed, nescio quomodo, inhæret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum: idque in maximis ingeniis, altissimisque animis, et existit maxime, et apparet facillime. Quo quidem demto, quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret? Loquor de principibus. Quid poëtæ? nonne post mortem nobilitari volunt? unde ergo illud?

"Adspicite, o cives, senis Ennii imagini' formam.
Hic vestrûm panxit maxima facta patrum."

Mercedem gloriæ flagitat ab iis, quorum patres affecerat gloriâ. Idemque,

"Nemo me lacrymis decoret, nec funera fletu
Faxit. Cur? volito vivu' per ora virûm."

Sed quid poëtas? Opifices post mortem nobilitari volunt. Quid enim Phidias sui similem speciem inclusit in clypeo Minervæ, cum inscribere non liceret? quid nostri philosophi? Nonne, in his ipsis libris quos scribunt de contemnendâ gloriâ, sua nomina inscribunt?

Quod si omnium consensus naturæ vox est; omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse *aliquid*, quod ad eos pertineat qui vitâ cesserint;

nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et, si, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur (quia naturâ optimâ sunt) cernere naturæ vim maxime; verisimile est, cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid, cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus.

XVI. Sed, ut deos esse naturâ opinamur, qualesque sint, ratione cognoscimus; sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium: quâ in sede maneant, qualesque sint, ratione discendum est. Cujus ignoratio finxit inferos, easque formidines, quas tu contemnere non sine causâ videbare: in terram enim cadentibus corporibus, hisque humo tectis (e quo dictum est *humari*,) sub terrâ censebant reliquam vitam agi mortuorum. Quam eorum opinionem magni errores consecuti sunt; quos auxerunt poëtæ. Frequens enim consessus theatri, in quo sunt mulierculæ et pueri, movetur, audiens tam grande carmen:

"Adsum, atque advenio Acheronte, vix, viâ altâ atque arduâ,
Per speluncas saxis structas asperis, pendentibus,
Maximis: ubi rigida constat crassa caligo inferûm."

Tantumque *valuit error* (qui mihi quidem jam

sublatus videtur,) ut, corpora cremata cum scirent, tamen ea fieri apud inferos fingerent, quæ sine corporibus nec fieri possent, nec intelligi. Animos enim per se ipsos viventes non poterant mente complecti: formam aliquam figuramque quærebant: inde Homeri tota νεκυία: inde ea quæ meus amicus Appius νεκρομαντεῖα faciebat: inde in viciniâ nostrâ Averni lacus,

"Unde animæ excitantur obscurâ umbrâ, aperto ostio
Alti Acherontis, [salso] sanguine, imagines mortuorum."

Has tamen imagines loqui volunt: quod fieri nec sine linguâ, nec sine palato, nec sine faucium laterumve et pulmonum vi et figurâ potest. Nihil enim animo videre poterant: ad oculos omnia referebant. Magni autem est ingenii, sevocare mentem a sensibus, et cogitationem a consuetudine abducere. Itaque credo equidem etiam alios tot seculis [disputâsse de animis:] sed, quod literis exstet proditum, Pherecydes Syrius primum dixit, animos hominum esse sempiternos: antiquus sane; fuit enim, meo regnante gentili. Hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras maxime confirmavit; qui cum, Superbo regnante, in Italiam venisset, tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum honore disciplinæ, tum etiam auctoritate: multaque secula postea

sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur.

XVII. Sed redeo ad antiquos. Rationem illi sententiæ suæ non fere reddebant, nisi quid erat numeris aut descriptionibus explicandum. Platonem ferunt, ut Pythagoreos cognosceret, in Italiam venisse, et didicisse Pythagorea omnia; primumque de animorum æternitate non solum sensisse idem, quod Pythagoram, sed rationem etiam attulisse: quam, nisi quid dicis, prætermittamus; et hanc totam spem immortalitatis relinquamus.

Auditor. An tu, cum me in summam exspectationem adduxeris, deseris? Errare, mehercule, malo cum Platone (quem tu quanti facias, scio, et quem ex tuo ore admiror,) quam cum istis vera sentire. *Marcus.* Macte virtute. Ego enim ipse cum eodem ipso non invitus erraverim. Num igitur dubitamus, [an,] sicut pleraque, sic et hoc? quamquam hoc quidem minime: persuadent enim mathematici, terram, in medio mundo sitam ad universi cœli complexum, quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod κέντρον illi vocant: eam porro naturam esse quatuor omnia gignentium corporum, ut quasi partita habeant inter se et divisa momenta: terrena et humida, suopte nutu et *suo pondere*, ad pares angulos in

terram et in mare ferantur; reliquæ duæ partes, una ignea, altera animalis, ut illæ superiores in medium locum mundi gravitate ferantur et pondere, sic hæ rursum rectis lineis in cœlestem locum subvolent; sive ipsâ naturâ superiora appetente, sive quod a gravioribus leviora naturâ repellantur. Quæ cum constent, perspicuum debet esse, animos, cum e corpore excesserint, sive illi sint animales (id est, spirabiles,) sive ignei, in sublime ferri. Si vero aut numerus quidam sit animus (quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide dicitur,) aut quinta illa, non nominata magis quam non intellecta, natura; multo etiam integriora ac puriora sunt, ut a terrâ longissime se efferant. Horum igitur aliquid animus est, nec tam vegeta mens aut in corde cerebrove, aut in Empedocleo sanguine, demersa jaceat.

XVIII. Dicæarchum vero, cum Aristoxeno æquali et condiscipulo suo, doctos sane homines, omittamus; quorum alter ne condoluisse quidem unquam videtur, qui animum se habere non sentiat; alter ita delectatur suis cantibus, ut eos etiam ad hæc transferre conetur. Harmoniam autem ex intervallis sonorum nôsse possumus, quorum varia compositio etiam harmonias efficit plures: membrorum vero situs, et figura corporis, vacans animo, quam possit harmoniam efficere,

non video. Sed hic quidem, quamvis eruditus sit, sicut est, hæc magistro concedat Aristoteli: canere ipse doceat: bene enim illo proverbio Græcorum præcipitur,

"Quam quisque nôrit artem, in hac se exerceat."

Illam vero funditus ejiciamus individuorum corporum levium et rotundorum concursionem fortuitam; quam tamen Democritus concalefactam et spirabilem (id est, animalem) esse voluit. Is autem animus, qui, si est horum quatuor generum, ex quibus omnia constare dicuntur, ex inflammatâ animâ constat (ut potissimum videri video Panætio,) superiora capessat, necesse est. Nihil enim habent hæc duo genera proni; et supera semper petunt. Ita, sive dissipantur, procul a terris id evenit: sive permanent, et conservant habitum suum, hoc etiam magis necesse est ferantur ad cœlum, et ab his perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hic et concretus aër, qui est terræ proximus. Calidior est enim, vel potius ardentior, animus, quam est hic aër, quem modo dixi crassum atque concretum: quod ex eo sciri potest, quia corpora nostra, terreno principiorum genere confecta, ardore animi concalescunt.

XIX. Accedit, ut eo facilius animus evadat ex hoc aëre, quem sæpe jam appello crassum,

eumque perrumpat, quod nihil est animo velocius; nulla est celeritas, quæ possit cum animi celeritate contendere. Qui si permanet incorruptus, suique similis, necesse est ita feratur, ut penetret et dividat omne cœlum hoc, in quo nubes, imbres, ventique coguntur; quod et humidum et caliginosum est, propter exhalationes terræ. Quam regionem cum superavit animus, naturamque sui similem contigit, et agnovit; junctis ex animâ tenui, et ex ardore solis temperato, ignibus insistit, et finem altius se efferendi facit. Cum enim sui similem et levitatem et calorem adeptus est, tamquam paribus examinatus ponderibus, nullam in partem movetur; eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, cum ad sui similem penetravit, in quo, nullâ re egens, aletur et sustentabitur iisdem rebus, quibus astra sustentantur et aluntur.

Cumque corporis facibus inflammari soleamus ad omnes fere cupiditates, eoque magis incendi, quod iis æmulemur, qui ea habeant quæ nos habere cupiamus; profecto beatiorimus, cum, corporibus relictis, et cupiditatum et æmulationum erimus expertes. Quodque nunc facimus, cum laxati curis sumus, ut spectare aliquid velimus et visere, id multo tum faciemus liberius; totosque nos in contemplandis *rebus perspiciendisque* ponemus, propterea

quod et naturâ inest mentibus nostris insatiabilis quædam cupiditas veri videndi; et oræ ipsæ locorum illorum, quo pervenerimus, quo faciliorem nobis cognitionem rerum cœlestium, eo majorem cognoscendi cupiditatem, dabunt. Hæc enim pulchritudo etiam in terris patriam illam et avitam (ut ait Theophrastus) philosophiam, cognitionis cupiditate incensam, excitavit. Præcipue vero fruentur eâ, qui tum etiam, cum, has terras incolentes, circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis dispicere cupiebant.

XX. Etenim, si nunc aliquid assequi se putant, qui ostium Ponti viderunt, et eas angustias, per quas penetravit ea, quæ est nominata

"Argo, quia Argivi in eâ, delecti viri,
Vecti, petebant pellem inauratam arietis;"

aut ii, qui Oceani freta illa viderunt,

"Europam Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda;"

quod tandem spectaculum fore putamus, cum totam terram contueri licebit, ejusque cum situm, formam, circumscriptionem, tum et habitabiles regiones, et rursum omni cultu, propter vim frigoris aut caloris, vacantes?

Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, quæ videmus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore; sed (ut non solum physici docent, ve-

rum etiam medici, qui ista aperta et patefacta viderunt) viæ quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a sede animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe, aut cogitatione aut aliquâ vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facile intelligi possit, animum et videre et audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi; quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, et adsit. Quid, quod eâdem mente res dissimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum? quæ nunquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur, et is omnium judex solus esset. Atque ea profecto tum multo puriora et dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. Nam nunc quidem, quamquam foramina illa, quæ patent ad animum a corpore, callidissimo artificio natura fabricata est, tamen terrenis concretisque corporibus sunt intersepta quodammodo. Cum autem nihil erit præter animum, nulla res objecta impediet, quominus percipiat, quale quidque sit.

XXI. Quamvis copiose hæc, diceremus, si res postularet, quam multa, quam varia, quanta spectacula animus in locis cœlestibus esset habiturus. Quæ quidem cogitans, soleo sæpe mirari

nonnullorum insolentiam philosophorum, qui naturæ cognitionem admirantur, ejusque inventori et principi gratias exsultantes agunt, eumque venerantur, ut deum: liberatos enim se per eum dicunt gravissimis dominis, terrore sempiterno, et diurno ac nocturno metu. Quo terrore? quo metu? Quæ est anus tam delira, quæ timeat ista, quæ vos videlicet, si physica non didicissetis, timeretis?

"Acherusia templa, alta Orci, pallida
Leti, obnubila, obsita tenebris loca."

Non pudet philosophum in eo gloriari, quod hæc non timeat, et quod falsa esse cognoverit? ex quo intelligi potest, quam acuti naturâ sint, qui hæc sine doctrinâ crediturí fuerint. Præclarum autem nescio quid adepti sunt, quod didicerunt, se, cum tempus mortis venisset, totos esse perituros. Quod ut ita sit, (nihil enim pugno) quid habet ista res aut lætabile aut gloriosum? nec tamen mihi sane quidquam occurrit, cur non Pythagoræ sit et Platonis vera sententia. Ut enim rationem Plato nullam afferret, (vide, quid homini tribuam) ipsâ auctoritate me frangeret. Tot autem rationes attulit, ut velle ceteris, sibi certe persuasisse videatur.

XXII. Sed plurimi contra nituntur, animos

que, quasi capite damnatos, morte multant; neque aliud est quidquam, cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt, qualis animus sit vacans corpore, intelligere, et cogitatione comprehendere. Quasi vero intelligant, qualis sit in ipso corpore; quæ conformatio, quæ magnitudo, qui locus: aut, si jam possent in uno homine cerni omnia quæ nunc tecta sunt, casurusne in conspectum videatur animus; an tanta sit ejus tenuitas, ut fugiat aciem.

Hæc reputent isti, qui negant, animum sine corpore se intelligere posse. Videbunt, quem in ipso corpore intelligant. Mihi quidem, naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, tamquam alienæ domi, quam qualis, cum exierit, et in liberum cœlum, quasi domum suam, venerit. [Si] enim, quod nunquam vidimus, id quale sit, intelligere non possumus, certe et deum ipsum, et divinum animum corpore liberatum, cogitatione complecti non possumus. Dicæarchus quidem, et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi, quid aut qualis esset, intelligentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt.

Est illud quidem vel maximum, animo ipso animum videre: et nimirum hanc habet vim præceptum Apollinis, quo monet, ut se quisque noscat. Non enim, credo, id præcipit, ut mem-

bra nostra, aut staturam figuramve, noscamus: neque nos corpora sumus; neque ego, tibi dicens hoc, corpori tuo dico. Cum igitur, "Nosce te," dicit, hoc dicit, "Nosce animum tuum:" nam corpus quidem quasi vas est, aut aliquod animi receptaculum. Ab animo tuo quidquid agitur, id agitur a te. Hunc igitur nôsse, nisi divinum esset, non esset hoc acrioris cujusdam animi præceptum, sic, ut tributum deo sit: [hoc est, se ipsum posse cognoscere.]

Sed si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet; dic, quæso, ne esse quidem se sciet? ne moveri quidem se? Ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quæ a Socrate est in Phædro explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro "De Republicâ."

XXIII. "Quod semper movetur, æternum est. Quod autem motum affert alicui, quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, quando finem habet motûs, vivendi finem habeat, necesse est. Solum igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia nunquam deseritur a se, nunquam ne moveri quidem desinit. Quinetiam ceteris, quæ moventur, hic fons, hoc principium est movendi. Principii autem nulla est origo: nam e principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nullâ ex re aliâ nasci potest: nec

enim esset principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. Quod si nunquam oritur, ne occidit quidem unquam. Nam principium exstinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur, nec a se aliud creabit; siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. Ita fit, ut motûs principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur. Id autem nec nasci potest, nec mori: vel concidat omne cœlum, omnisque terra consistat, necesse est; nec vim ullam nanciscatur, quâ, ut primo, impulsa moveatur. Cum pateat igitur, æternum id esse quod se ipsum moveat, quis est, qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? Inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo: quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore, et suo: nam hæc est propria natura animi atque vis: quæ si est una ex omnibus, quæ se ipsa semper moveat; neque nata certe est, et æterna est."

Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philosophi, (sic enim ii, qui a Platone et Socrate, et ab eâ familiâ, dissident, appellandi videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum, quam subtiliter conclusum sit, intelligent. Sentit igitur animus se moveri: quod cum sentit, illud unâ sentit, se vi suâ, non alienâ, moveri: nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam a se deseratur: ex quo efficitur æternitas;

nisi quid habes ad hæc. *Auditor.* Ego vero facile sum passus, ne in mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire: ita isti faveo sententiæ.

XXIV. *Marcus.* Quid illa tandem? num leviora censes, quæ declarant inesse in animis hominum divina quædam? quæ si cernerem quemadmodum nasci possent, etiam, quemadmodum interirent, viderem. Nam sanguinem, bilem, pituitam, ossa, nervos, venas, omnem denique membrorum et totius corporis figuram, videor posse dicere, unde concreta, et quo modo facta sint. [Per] animum ipsum, si nihil esset in eo, nisi id, ut per eum viveremus, tam naturâ putarem hominis vitam sustentari, quam vitis, quam arboris: hæc enim etiam dicimus vivere. Item, si nihil haberet animus hominis, nisi ut appeteret aut refugeret, id quoque esset ei commune cum bestiis.

Habet primum memoriam, et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium: quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitæ: nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur "Menon," pusionem quemdam Socrates interrogat quædam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad ea sic ille respondet, ut puer: et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut, gradatim respondens, eodem perveniat, quo si *geometrica* didicisset. Ex quo

effici vult Socrates, ut discere, nihil aliud sit, nisi recordari. Quem locum multo etiam accuratius explicat in eo sermone, quem habuit eo ipso die, quo excessit e vitâ. Docet enim, quemvis, qui omnium rerum rudis esse videatur, bene interroganti respondentem, declarare, se non tum illa discere, sed reminiscendo recognoscere: nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut, a pueris, tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones (quas ἐννοίας vocant) haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset.

Cumque nihil *esset*, ut omnibus locis a Platone disseritur, (nihil enim ille putat *esse*, quod oriatur et intereat; idque solum *esse*, quod semper tale sit, qualem *ideam* appellat ille, nos *speciem*) non potuit animus hæc, in corpore inclusus, agnoscere: cognita attulit: ex quo tam multarum rerum cognitionis admiratio tollitur. Neque ea plane videt animus, cum tam repente in insolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium immigravit: sed, cum se collegit atque recreavit, tum agnoscit illa reminiscendo. Ita nihil aliud est discere, nisi recordari.

Ego autem majore etiam quodam modo memoriam admiror. Quid est enim illud, quo meminimus? aut quam habet vim? aut unde natam? Non quæro, quantâ memoriâ Simonides fuisse

dicatur, quantâ Theodectes, quantâ is, qui a Pyrrho legatus ad senatum est missus, Cineas, quantâ nuper Charmadas, quantâ, qui modo fuit, Scepsius Metrodorus, quantâ noster Hortensius: de communi hominum memoriâ loquor, et eorum maxime, qui in aliquo majore studio et arte versantur; quorum quanta mens sit, difficile est existimare: ita multa meminerunt.

XXV. Quorsum igitur hæc spectat oratio? quæ sit illa vis, et unde, intelligendum puto. Non est certe nec cordis, nec sanguinis, nec cerebri, nec atomorum. Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio: nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire, quod nesciam. Illud, si ullâ aliâ de re obscurâ affirmare possem, sive anima sive ignis sit animus, eum jurarem esse divinum. Quid enim? obsecro te, terrâne tibi, aut hoc nebuloso et caliginoso cœlo, aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriæ? Si, quid sit hoc, non vides, at, quale sit, vides: si ne id quidem, at, quantum sit, profecto vides. Quid igitur? utrum capacitatem aliquam in animo putamus esse, quo, tamquam in aliquod vas, ea, quæ meminimus, infundantur? Absurdum id quidem: qui enim fundus, aut quæ talis animi figura, intelligi potest? aut quæ tanta omnino capacitas? An imprimi, quasi ceram, animum putamus, et memo-

riam esse signatarum rerum in mente vestigia? quæ possunt verborum, quæ rerum ipsarum, esse vestigia? quæ porro tam immensa magnitudo, quæ illa tam multa possit effingere?

Quid? illa vis, quæ tandem est, quæ investigat occulta, quæ inventio atque excogitatio dicitur? ex hacne tibi terrenâ mortalique naturâ et caducâ concreta ea videtur? aut qui primus (quod summæ sapientiæ Pythagoræ visum est) omnibus rebus imposuit nomina? aut qui dissipatos homines congregavit, et ad societatem vitæ convocavit? aut qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis literarum notis terminavit? aut qui errantium stellarum cursus, regressiones, institiones, notavit? Omnes magni: etiam superiores, qui fruges, qui vestitum, qui tecta, qui cultum vitæ, qui præsidia contra feras, invenerunt; a quibus mansuefacti et exculti, a necessariis artificiis ad elegantiora defluximus. Nam et auribus oblectatio magna parta est, inventâ et temperatâ varietate et naturâ sonorum: et astra suspeximus, tum ea, quæ sunt infixa certis locis, tum illa non re, sed vocabulo, errantia: quorum conversiones omnesque motus qui animus vidit, is docuit, similem animum suum ejus esse, qui ea fabricatus esset in cœlo. Nam, cum Archimedes lunæ, solis, quinque errantium, motus in sphæram illigavit, effecit idem, quod ille, qui in Timæo mun-

dum ædificavit, Platonis deus, ut tarditate et celeritate dissimillimos motus una regeret conversio. Quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphærâ quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitari.

XXVI. Mihi vero ne hæc quidem notiora et illustriora carere vi divinâ videntur, ut ego aut poëtam grave plenumque carmen sine cœlesti aliquo mentis instinctu putem fundere, aut eloquentiam sine quâdam vi majore fluere, abundantem sonantibus verbis, uberibusque sententiis. Philosophia vero, omnium mater artium, quid est aliud, nisi, ut Plato ait, donum, ut ego, inventum deorum? Hæc nos primum ad illorum cultum, deinde ad jus hominum, quod situm est in generis humani societate, tum ad modestiam, magnitudinemque animi, erudivit: eademque ab animo, tamquam ab oculis, caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera, infera, prima, ultima, media, videremus.

Prorsus hæc divina mihi videtur vis, quæ tot res efficiat, et tantas. Quid est enim memoria rerum et verborum? quid porro inventio? profecto id, quo nec in deo quidquam majus intelligi potest. Non enim ambrosiâ deos, aut nectare, aut Juventate pocula ministrante, lætari

arbitror: nec Homerum audio, qui Ganymedem a diis raptum ait propter formam, ut Jovi bibere ministraret. Non justa causa, cur Laomedonti tanta fieret injuria. Fingebat hæc Homerus; et humana ad deos transferebat. Divina mallem ad nos. Quæ autem divina? Vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse. Ergo animus, [qui,] ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides audet dicere, deus: et quidem, si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Nam, ut illa natura cœlestis et terrâ vacat et humore, sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est expers. Sin autem est quinta quædam natura ab Aristotele inducta, [primum] hæc et deorum est et animorum.

XXVII. Hanc nos sententiam secuti, his ipsis verbis in "Consolatione" hæc expressimus: "Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest: nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terrâ natum atque fictum esse videatur; nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut flabile, aut igneum. His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis, habeat; quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia; quæ sola divina sunt. Nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a deo. Singularis

est igitur quædam natura atque vis animi, sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita, quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est; ob eamque rem, æternum sit, necesse est. Nec vero deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omniaque sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno." Hoc e genere, atque eâdem e naturâ, est humana mens.

XXVIII. *Auditor.* Ubi igitur, aut qualis, est ista mens? *Marcus.* Ubi tua, aut qualis? potesne dicere? An, si omnia ad intelligendum non habeo, quæ habere vellem, ne iis quidem, quæ habeo, mihi per te uti licebit? Non valet tantum animus, ut se ipse videat: at, ut oculus, sic animus, se non videns, alia cernit. Non videt autem, quod minimum est, formam suam. Fortasse; quamquam id quoque: sed relinquamus: vim certe, sagacitatem, memoriam, motum, celeritatem videt. Hæc magna, hæc divina, hæc sempiterna sunt. Quâ facie quidem sit, aut ubi habitet, ne quærendum quidem est.

Ut, cum videmus speciem primum, candoremque cœli; deinde conversionis celeritatem tantam, quantam cogitare non possumus; tum

vicissitudines dierum atque noctium, commutationesque temporum quadripartitas, ad maturitatem frugum et ad temperationem corporum aptas, eorumque omnium moderatorem et ducem solem; lunamque, accretione et diminutione luminis, quasi fastorum notis signantem dies; tum in eodem orbe in XII. partes distributo, quinque stellas ferri, eosdem cursus constantissime servantes, disparibus inter se motibus, nocturnamque cœli formam undique sideribus ornatam; tum globum terræ eminentem e mari, fixum, in medio mundi universi loco; duabus oris distantibus habitabilem, et cultum; quarum altera, quam nos incolimus, sub axe posita ad stellas septem, unde

"Horrifer
Aquilonis stridor gelidas molitur nives;"

altera Australis, ignota nobis (quam vocant Græci ἀντίχθονα); ceteras partes incultas, quod aut frigore rigeant, aut urantur calore; hîc autem, ubi habitamus, non intermittit, suo tempore,

"Cœlum mitescere, arbores frondescere,
Vites lætificæ pampinis pubescere,
Rami baccarum ubertate incurvescere,
Segetes largiri fruges, florere omnia,
Fontes scatere, herbis prata convestirier;"

tum multitudinem pecudum, partim ad vesdum, partim ad cultus agrorum, partim ad

hendum, partim ad corpora vestienda; hominemque ipsum quasi contemplatorem cœli ac deorum, ipsorumque cultorem; atque hominis utilitati agros omnes et maria parentia.

XXIX. Hæc igitur, et alia innumerabilia, cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt (ut Platoni videtur), vel, si semper fuerint (ut Aristoteli placet), moderator tanti operis et muneris? Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non vides; tamen ut deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic, ex memoriâ rerum, et inventione, et celeritate motûs, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscito.

In quo igitur loco est? Credo equidem in capite: et, cur credam, afferre possum: sed alias: nunc ubi ubi sit animus, certe quidem in te est. Quæ est ei natura? Propria (puto,) et sua: sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem; nihil ad id, de quo agimus. Illud modo videto, ut deum nôris, etsi ignores et locum et faciem, sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiam si ejus ignores et locum et formam. In animi autem cognitione, dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec

secerni, nec dividi, nec discerpi, nec distrahi, potest; nec interire igitur: est enim interitus quasi discessus, et secretio ac diremtus earum partium, quæ, ante interitum, junctione aliquâ tenebantur.

His et talibus rationibus adductus, Socrates nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit: adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbiâ: et supremo vitæ die, de hoc ipso multa disseruit; et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi e custodiâ, noluit: et cum pæne in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in cœlum videretur ascendere.

XXX. Ita enim censebat, ita-que disseruit, duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium: nam, qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent, et se totos libidinibus dedidissent, quibus cæcati, vel domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent, vel republicâ violandâ fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent, iis devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum: qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocâssent, essentque in *corporibus humanis* vitam imitati deorum; his

ad illos, a quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere. Itaque commemorat, ut cycnis (qui non sine causâ Apollini dicati sint, sed quod ab eo divinationem habere videantur, quâ providentes quid in morte boni sit, cum cantu et voluptate moriantur), sic omnibus et bonis et doctis esse faciendum. Nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare posset, nisi idem nobis accideret, diligenter de animo cogitantibus, quod iis sæpe usu venit, qui cum ācriter oculis deficientem solem intuerentur, ut aspectum omnino amitterent; sic mentis acies, seipsam intuens, nonnunquam hebescit; ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam amittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, hæsitans, multa adversa [revertens], tamquam [ratis] in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio.

Sed hæc et veterā, et a Græcis. Cato autem sic abiit e vitâ, ut causam moriendi nactum se esse gauderet. Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis deus, injussu hinc nos suo demigrare. Cum vero causam justam deus ipse dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni, sæpe multis; næ ille, medius fidius, vir sapiens, lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit. Nec tamen illa vincla carceris ruperit: leges enim vetant. Sed, tamquam a magistratu aut ab aliquâ potestate legitimâ, sic a *deo evocatus* atque emissus, exierit.

Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est.

XXXI. Nam quid aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, id est, a corpore, cum a re familiari, quæ est ministra et famula corporis, cum a republicâ, cum a negotio omni, sevocamus animum? quid, inquam, tum agimus, nisi animum ad seipsum advocamus, secum esse cogimus, maximeque a corpore abducimus? Secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud est, quam emori discere. Quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede; disjungamusque nos a corporibus; id est, consuescamus mori. Hoc et, dum erimus in terris, erit illi cœlesti vitæ simile: et, cum illuc ex his vinculis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum: (nam qui in compedibus corporis semper fuerunt, etiam cum soluti sunt, tardius ingrediuntur, ut ii, qui ferro vincti multos annos fuerunt) quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus. Nam hæc quidem vita mors est: quam lamentari possem, si liberet.

Auditor. Satis quidem tu in "Consolatione" es lamentatus: quam cum lego, nihil malo, quam has res relinquere; his vero modo auditis, multo magis. *Marcus.* Veniet tempus, et quidem celeriter, et sive retractabis, sive properabis. Volat *enim ætas.* Tantum autem abest [ab eo], ut

malum mors sit (quod tibi dudum videbatur), ut verear, ne homini nihil sit non malum aliud certe, sed nihil bonum aliud potius: si quidem vel dii ipsi, vel cum diis, futuri sumus.

Auditor. Quid refert? adsunt enim, qui hæc non probent. *Marcus.* Ego autem nunquam ita te ex hoc sermone dimittam, ullâ uti ratione mors tibi videri malum possit.

Auditor. Quî potest, cum ista cognoverim? *Marcus.* Quî possit, rogas? Catervæ veniunt contra dicentium, non solum Epicureorum, quos equidem non despicio; sed, nescio quo modo, doctissimus quisque contemnit. Acerrime autem, deliciæ meæ, Dicæarchus contra hanc immortalitatem disseruit. Is enim tres libros scripsit, qui Lesbiaci vocantur, quod Mitylenis sermo habetur; in quibus vult efficere, animos esse mortales. Stoïci autem usuram nobis largiuntur, tamquam cornicibus: diu mansuros aiunt animos; semper, negant.

XXXII. Num vis igitur audire, cur, etiam si ita sit, mors tamen non sit in malis? *Auditor.* Ut videtur: sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet. *Marcus.* Laudo id quidem: etsi nihil [nimis] oportet confidere: movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso: labamus, mutamusque sententiam, clarioribus etiam in rebus. In his

est enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati. *Auditor.* Sane quidem: sed, ne accidat, providebo.

Marcus. Num quid igitur est causæ, quin amicos nostros Stoïcos dimittamus; eos dico, qui aiunt animos manere, e corpore cum excesserint, sed non semper? *Auditor.* Istos vero: qui, quod totâ in hac causâ difficillimum est, suscipiant, posse animum manere corpore vacantem: illud autem, quod non modo facile ad credendum est, sed, eo concesso quod volunt, consequens, id certe non dant, ut, cum diu permanserit, ne intereat. *Marcus.* Bene reprehendis: et se isto modo res habet. Credamus igitur Panætio, a Platone suo dissentienti? Quem enim omnibus locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum philosophorum appellat, hujus hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat. Vult enim, (quod nemo negat) quidquid natum sit, interire: nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo qui procreantur; quæ etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus, appareat. Alteram autem affert rationem: nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id ægrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum: dolere autem animos: ergo etiam *interire.*

XXXIII. Hæc refelli possunt. Sunt enim ignorantis, cum de æternitate animorum dicatur, de mente dici, quæ omni turbido motu semper vacet, non de partibus iis, in quibus ægritudines, iræ, libidinesque, versentur; quas is, contra quem hæc dicuntur, semotas a mente, et disclusas putat. Jam similitudo magis apparet in bestiis, quarum animi sunt rationis expertes. Hominum autem similitudo in corporum figurâ magis exstat: et ipsi animi, magni refert, quali in corpore locati sint. Multa enim e corpore exsistunt, quæ acuant mentem; multa, quæ obtundant. Aristoteles quidem ait, omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse: ut ego me tardiorem esse non moleste feram. Enumerat multos: idque quasi constet, rationem, cur ita fiat, affert. Quod si tanta vis est ad habitum mentis in iis quæ gignuntur in corpore (ea sunt autem, quæcumque sunt, quæ similitudinem faciant), nihil necessitatis affert, cur nascatur animi similitudo.

Omitto dissimilitudines. Vellem, adesse posset Panætius. Vixit cum Africano. Quærerem ex eo, cujus suorum similis fuisset Africani fratris nepos? facie, patris, vitâ, omnium perditorum ita similis, ut esset facile deterrimus. Cujus etiam similis, P. Crassi, et sapientis et eloquentis et primi hominis, nepos, multorumque aliorum virorum clarorum, quos nihil attinet no-

minare, nepotes et filii? Sed quid agimus? Oblitine sumus, hoc nunc nobis esse propositum, cum satis de æternitate dixissemus, ne, si interirent quidem animi, quidquam mali esse in mor-
5 te? *Auditor.* Ego vero memineram: sed te de æternitate dicentem aberrare a proposito facile patiebar.

XXXIV. *Marcus.* Video te alte spectare, et velle in cœlum migrare. *Auditor.* Spero fore,
10 ut contingat id nobis. Sed fac, ut isti volunt, animos non remanere post mortem: video nos, si ita sit, privari spe beatioris vitæ. *Marcus.* Mali vero quid affert ista sententia? Fac enim sic animum interire, ut corpus: num igitur ali-
15 quis dolor, aut omnino post mortem sensus, in corpore est? Nemo id quidem dicit: etsi Democritum insimulat Epicurus, Democritici negant. Ne in animo quidem igitur sensus remanet: ipse enim nusquam est. Ubi igitur malum
20 est? quoniam nihil tertium est: an, quoniam ipse animi discessus a corpore non fit sine dolore? Ut credam ita esse, quam est id exiguum! et falsum esse arbitror: et fit plerumque sine sensu; nonnunquam etiam cum voluptate: to-
25 tumque hoc leve est, qualecumque est. Fit enim ad punctum temporis.

Auditor. Illud angit, vel potius excruciat, dis-

cessus ab omnibus iis quæ sunt bona in vitâ. *Marcus.* Vide, ne a malis dici verius possit. Quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? Vere et jure possum: sed quid necesse est, cum id agam, ne post mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem? Fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmetipsos, quantum potuimus, consolati sumus. A malis igitur mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si quærimus. Hoc quidem a Cyrenaïco Hegesiâ sic copiose disputatur, ut is a rege Ptolemæo prohibitus esse dicatur illa in scholis dicere, quod multi, his auditis, mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent. Callimachi quidem epigramma in Ambraciotam Cleombrotum est, quem ait, cum nihil ei accidisset adversi, e muro se in mare abjecisse, lecto Platonis libro. Ejus autem, quem dixi, Hegesiæ liber est, *Ἀποκαρτερῶν*, quod a vitâ quidam per inediam discedens, revocatur ab amicis: quibus respondens, vitæ humanæ enumerat incommoda. Possem id facere, etsi minus quam ille, qui omnino vivere expedire nemini putat. Mitto alios: etiamne nobis expedit, qui, et domesticis et forensibus solatiis ornamentisque privati, certe, si ante occidissimus, mors nos a malis, non a bonis, abstraxisset?

XXXV. Sit igitur aliquis, qui nihil mali ha-

beat, nullum a fortunâ vulnus acceperit. Metellus ille honoratis quatuor filiis: at quinquaginta Priamus; e quibus, septem et decem justâ uxore natis. In utroque eamdem habuit fortuna potestatem; sed usa in altero est. Metellum enim multi filii, filiæ, nepotes, neptes, in rogum imposuerunt: Priamum, tantâ progenie orbatum, cum in aram confugisset, hostilis manus interemit. Hic si, vivis filiis, incolumi regno, occidisset,

> "Adstante ope barbaricâ,
> Tectis cælatis, laqueatis;"

utrum tandem a bonis an a malis discessisset? Tum profecto videretur a bonis. At certe ei melius evenisset; nec tam flebiliter illa canerentur,

> "Hæc omnia vidi inflammari,
> Priamo vi vitam evitari,
> Jovis aram sanguine turpari."

Quasi vero istâ vi quidquam tum potuerit ei melius accidere. Quod si ante occidisset, tamen [eventum] omnino amisisset: hoc autem tempore sensum malorum amisit. Pompeio nostro familiari, cum graviter ægrotâsset Neapoli, melius est factum? Coronati Neapolitani fuerunt; nimirum etiam Puteolani; vulgo ex oppidis *publice* gratulabantur. Ineptum sane negotium,

et Græculum, sed tamen fortunatum. Utrum igitur, si tum esset exstinctus, a bonis rebus an a malis discessisset? Certe a miseris. Non enim cum socero bellum gessisset; non imparatus arma sumsisset; non domum reliquisset; non ex Italiâ fugisset; non, exercitu amisso, nudus in servorum ferrum et manus incidisset: non liberi defleti; non fortunæ omnes a victoribus possiderentur. Qui, si mortem tum obîsset, in amplissimis fortunis occidisset, is, propagatione vitæ, quot, quantas, quam incredibiles, hausit calamitates!

XXXVI. Hæc morte effugiuntur, etiam si non evenerint, tamen quia possunt evenire. Sed homines ea sibi accidere posse non cogitant. Metelli sperat sibi quisque fortunam, perinde quasi aut plures fortunati sint quam infelices; aut certi quidquam sit in rebus humanis; aut sperare sit prudentius, quam timere.

Sed hoc ipsum concedatur, bonis rebus homines morte privari: ergo etiam carere mortuos vitæ commodis, idque esse miserum. Certe, ita dicant, necesse est. An potest is, qui non est, re ullâ carere? triste enim est nomen ipsum carendi, quia subjicitur hæc vis: habuit, non habet: desiderat, requirit, indiget. Opinor, hæc incommoda sunt *carentis*. Caret oculis, odiosa

cæcitas; liberis, orbitas. Valet hoc in vivis: mortuorum autem, non modo vitæ commodis, sed ne vitâ quidem ipsâ, quisquam caret. De mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt. Nos, qui sumus, num, aut si cornibus caremus aut pennis, sit, qui id dixerit? Certe nemo. Quid ita? Quia, cum id non habeas, quod tibi nec usu nec naturâ sit aptum, non careas, etiam si sentias te non habere. Hoc premendum etiam atque etiam est argumentum, confirmato illo, de quo, si mortales animi sunt, dubitare non possumus, quin tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima quidem suspicio sensûs relinquatur. Hoc igitur probe stabilito et fixo, illud excutiendum est, ut sciatur, quid sit carere, ne relinquatur aliquid erroris in verbo. Carere igitur hoc significat, egere eo, quod habere velis. Inest enim velle in carendo, nisi cum sic, tamquam in febri, dicitur, aliâ quâdam notione verbi. Dicitur enim alio modo etiam carere, cum aliquid non habeas, et non habere te sentias, etiam si id facile patiare. Carere autem malo, id non dicitur: nec enim esset dolendum. Dicitur illud, bono carere; quod est malum. Sed ne vivus quidem bono caret, si eo non indiget: sed in vivo intelligi tamen potest, regno carere: dici autem hoc in te satis subtiliter non potest: potuisset in Tarquinio, cum regno esset expulsus. At in mor-

tuo ne intelligi quidem potest. Carere enim, sentientis est; nec sensus in mortuo: ne carere quidem igitur in mortuo est. Quamquam quid opus est in hoc philosophari, cum rem non magnopere philosophiâ egere videamus?

XXXVII. Quoties non modo ductores nostri, sed universi etiam exercitus, ad non dubiam mortem concurrerunt! quæ quidem si timeretur, non L. Brutus, arcens eum reditu tyrannum quem ipse expulerat, in prœlio concidisset: non cum Latinis decertans pater Decius, cum Etruscis filius, cum Pyrrho nepos, se hostium telis objecissent: non uno bello pro patriâ cadentes Scipiones Hispania vidisset, Paulum et Geminum Cannæ, Venusia Marcellum, Latini Albinum, Lucani Gracchum. Num quis horum miser hodie? Ne tum quidem post spiritum extremum: nec enim potest esse miser quisquam, sensu peremto. At id ipsum odiosum est, sine sensu esse. Odiosum, si id esset carere. Cum vero perspicuum sit, nihil posse in eo esse qui ipse non sit; quid potest esse in eo odiosum, qui nec careat nec sentiat? Quamquam hoc quidem nimis sæpe; sed eo, quod in hoc inest omnis animi contractio ex metu mortis. Qui enim satis viderit (id, quod est luce clarius), animo et corpore consumto, totoque animante

deleto, et facto interitu universo, illud, animal quod fuerit, factum esse nihil, is plane perspiciet, inter Hippocentaurum, qui nunquam fuerit, et regem Agamemnonem, nihil interesse: nec plu-
5 ris nunc facere M. Camillum hoc civile bellum, quam ego, illo vivo, fecerim Romam captam.

Cur igitur et Camillus doleret, si hæc, post trecentos et quinquaginta fere annos, eventura putaret, et ego doleam, si, ad decem millia an-
10 norum, gentem aliquam urbe nostrâ potituram putem? Quia tanta caritas patriæ est, ut eam non sensu nostro, sed salute ipsius, metiamur.

XXXVIII. Itaque non deterret sapientem mors (quæ propter incertos casus quotidie im-
15 minet, propter brevitatem vitæ nunquam longe potest abesse), quo minus, in omne tempus, reipublicæ suisque consulat, et posteritatem ipsam, cujus sensum habiturus non sit, ad se putet pertinere. Quare licet, etiam mortalem esse
20 animum judicantem æterna moliri, non gloriæ cupiditate, quam sensurus non sis, sed virtutis, quam necessario gloria, etiam si tu id non agas, consequatur. Natura vero sic se habet, ut, quo modo initium nobis rerum omnium ortus noster
25 afferat, sic exitum mors. Ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit. *In quo quid* potest esse mali, cum mors nec ad

vivos pertineat nec ad mortuos? Alteri nulli sunt, alteros non attingit. Quam qui leviorem faciunt, somni simillimam volunt esse: quasi vero quisquam ita nonaginta annos velit vivere, ut, cum sexaginta confecerit, reliquos dormiat. Ne sues quidem id velint, non modo ipse. Endymion vero, si fabulas audire volumus, nescio quando, in Latmo obdormivit, qui est mons Cariæ. Nondum, opinor, est experrectus. Num igitur eum curare censes, cum Luna laboret, a quâ consopitus putatur, ut eum dormientem oscularetur? Quid curet autem, qui ne sentit quidem? Habes somnum imaginem mortis, eamque quotidie induis. Et dubitas, quin sensus in morte nullus sit, cum in ejus simulacro videas esse nullum sensum?

XXXIX. Pellantur ergo istæ ineptiæ pæne aniles, ante tempus mori, miserum esse. Quod tandem tempus? Naturæne? At ea quidem dedit usuram vitæ, tamquam pecuniæ, nullâ præstitutâ die. Quid est igitur, quod querare, si repetit, cum vult? eâ enim conditione acceperas. Iidem, si puer parvus occidit, æquo animo ferendum putant: si vero in cunis, ne querendum quidem. Atqui ab hoc acerbius exegit natura, quod dederat. Nondum gustaverat, inquiunt, vitæ suavitatem: hic autem jam sperabat magna, quibus frui cœperat. At id quidem ipsum in

ceteris rebus melius putatur, aliquam partem, quam nullam, attingere: cur in vitâ secus? Quamquam non male ait Callimachus, multo sæpius lacrymâsse Priamum, quam Troïlum. Eorum autem, qui exactâ ætate moriuntur, fortuna laudatur. Cur? nam, reor, nullis, si vita longior daretur, posset esse jucundior. Nihil est enim profecto homini prudentiâ dulcius, quam, ut cetera auferat, affert certe senectus. Quæ vero ætas longa est? aut quid omnino homini longum? Nonne modo pueros, modo adolescentes, in cursu, a tergo insequens, nec opinantes assecuta est senectus? Sed, quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum ducimus. Omnia ista, perinde ut cuique data sunt, pro ratâ parte, [a vitâ,] aut longa aut brevia dicuntur. Apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europæ parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles ait bestiolas quasdam nasci, quæ unum diem vivant. Ex his igitur, horâ octavâ quæ mortua est, provecta ætate mortua est: quæ vero occidente sole, decrepita; eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. Confer nostram longissimam ætatem cum æternitate; in eâdem propemodum brevitate, quâ illæ bestiolæ, reperiemur.

XL. Contemnamus igitur omnes [illegible]
(quod enim levius huic levitati [illegible]

nam?) totamque vim bene vivendi in animi robore ac magnitudine, et in omnium rerum humanarum contemtione ac despicientiâ, et in omni virtute, ponamus. Nam nunc quidem cogitationibus [molestissimis effeminamur,] ut, si ante mors adventet quam Chaldæorum promissa consecuti sumus, spoliati magnis quibusdam bonis, illusi, destitutique, videamur. Quod si exspectando et desiderando pendemus animis, cruciamur, angimur. Pro dii immortales! quam iter illud jucundum esse debet, quo confecto, nulla reliqua cura, nulla sollicitudo futura sit! Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo est! Etsi enim flemus, cum legimus, tamen non miserabiliter vir clarus emoritur; qui cum, conjectus in carcerem triginta jussu tyrannorum, venenum, ut sitiens, obduxisset, reliquum sic e poculo ejecit, ut id resonaret; quo sonitu reddito, arridens, "Propino," inquit, "hoc pulchro Critiæ," qui in eum fuerat teterrimus. Græci enim in conviviis solent nominare, cui poculum tradituri sint. Lusit vir egregius extremo spiritu, cum jam præcordiis conceptam mortem contineret: vereque ei, cui venenum præbiberat, mortem est eam auguratus, quæ brevi consecuta est. Quis hanc animi maximi æquitatem in ipsâ morte laudaret, si mortem malum judicaret? Vadit in eumdem carcerem,

atque in eumdem paucis post annis scyphum Socrates, eodem scelere judicium, quo tyranno rum, Theramenes. Quæ est igitur ejus oratio quâ fecit eum Plato usum apud judices, jan morte multatum?

XLI. "Magna me," inquit, "spes tenet, ju dices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mor tem. Necesse est enim, sit alterum de duobus ut aut sensus omnino omnes mors auferat, aut i alium quemdam locum ex his locis morte mi gretur. Quamobrem, sive sensus exstinguitur morsque ei somno similis est, qui nonnunquam etiam sine visis somniorum, placatissimam quie tem affert; dii boni! quid lucri est mori! au quam multi dies reperiri possunt, qui tali noct anteponantur! cui si similis futura est perpetuita omnis consequentis temporis, quis me beatior Sin vera sunt, quæ dicuntur, migrationem ess mortem in eas oras, quas, qui e vitâ excesserint incolunt; id multo jam beatius est, te, cum a iis, qui se judicum numero haberi velint, evase ris, ad eos venire, qui vere judices appellentur Minöem, Rhadamanthum, Æacum, Triptole mum; convenireque eos, qui juste et cum fid vixerint. Hæc peregrinatio mediocris vobi videri potest? Ut vero colloqui cum Orpheo *Musæo, Homero*, Hesiodo, liceat, quanti tandem

æstimatis? Equidem sæpe emori, si fieri posset, vellem, ut ea, quæ dico, mihi liceret invenire. Quantâ delectatione autem afficerer, cum Palamedem, cum Ajacem, cum alios, judicio iniquo circumventos, convenirem! tentarem etiam summi regis, qui maximas copias duxit ad Trojam, et Ulyssi, Sisyphique prudentiam: nec ob eam rem, cum hæc exquirerem, sicut hîc faciebam, capite damnarer. Ne vos quidem, judices, ii, qui me absolvistis, mortem timueritis. Nec enim cuiquam bono mali quidquam evenire potest, nec vivo, nec mortuo: nec unquam ejus res a diis immortalibus negligentur. Nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuito. Nec vero ego iis, a quibus accusatus sum, aut a quibus condemnatus, habeo quod succenseam, nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt." Et hæc quidem hoc modo: nihil autem melius extremo: "Sed tempus est," inquit, "jam hinc abire me, ut moriar; vos, ut vitam agatis. Utrum autem sit melius, dii immortales sciunt: hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem."

XLII. Næ ego haud paulo hunc animum malim, quam eorum omnium fortunas, qui de hoc judicaverunt. Etsi quod (præter deos) negat scire quemquam, id scit ipse, utrum melius sit: nam dixit ante: sed suum illud, nihil ut affirmet,

tenet ad extremum. Nos autem teneamus, u
nihil censeamus esse malum, quod sit a natur
datum omnibus: intelligamusque, si mors malu
sit, esse sempiternum malum. Nam vitæ mis
ræ mors finis esse videtur: mortis, si est misera
finis esse nullus potest. Sed quid ego Socrate
aut Theramenem, præstantes viros virtutis e
sapientiæ gloriâ, commemoro, cum Lacedæmo
nius quidam, cujus ne nomen quidem proditu
est, mortem tantopere contemserit, ut, cum a
eam duceretur, damnatus ab Ephoris, et esse
vultu hilari atque læto, dixissetque ei quida
inimicus, "Contemnisne leges Lycurgi?" re
sponderit, "Ego vero illi maximam gratiam ha
beo, qui me eâ pœnâ multaverit, quam, sin
mutuatione et sine versurâ, possem dissolvere."
O virum Spartâ dignum! ut mihi quidem, qu
tam magno animo fuerit, innocens damnatus ess
videatur.

Tales innumerabiles nostra civitas tulit. Se
quid dŭces et principes nominem, cum legione
scribat Cato sæpe alacres in eum locum profec
tas, unde redituras se non arbitrarentur? Par
animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt
in quos Simonides:

"Dic, hospes, Spartæ, nos te hîc vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur."

Quid ille dux Leonidas dicit? "Pergite animo forti, Lacedæmonii: hodie apud inferos fortasse cœnabimus." Fuit hæc gens fortis, dum Lycurgi leges vigebant: e quibus unus, cum Perses hostis in colloquio dixisset glorians, "Solem, præ jaculorum multitudine et sagittarum, non videbitis." "In umbrâ," inquit, "igitur pugnabimus." Viros commemoro: qualis tandem Lacæna? quæ cum filium in prœlium misisset, et interfectum audîsset, "Idcirco," inquit, "genueram, ut esset, qui pro patriâ mortem non dubitaret occumbere."

XLIII. Esto: fortes et duri Spartiatæ: magnam habet vim reipublicæ disciplina. Quid? Cyrenæum Theodorum, philosophum non ignobilem, nonne miramur? cui cum Lysimachus rex crucem minaretur, "Istis," quæso," inquit, "ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis: Theodori quidem nihil interest, humine an sublime putrescat."

Cujus hoc dicto admoneor, ut aliquid etiam de humatione et sepulturâ dicendum existimem: rem non difficilem, iis præsertim cognitis, quæ [de nihil sentiendo] paulo ante dicta sunt. De quâ Socrates quidem quid senserit, apparet in eo libro, in quo moritur; de quo jam tam multa diximus. Cum enim de immortalitate animorum

disputavisset, et jam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone, quemadmodum sepeliri vellet, "Multam vero," inquit, "operam, amici, frustra consumsi. Critoni enim nostro non persuasi, me hinc avolaturum, neque quidquam mei relicturum. Verumtamen, Crito, si me assequi potueris, aut sicubi nactus eris, ut tibi videbitur, sepelito. Sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrûm, cum hinc excessero, consequetur." Præclare id quidem, qui et amico permiserit, et se ostenderit de hoc toto genere nihil laborare. Durior Diogenes, et id quidem sentiens, sed, ut Cynicus, asperius, projici se jussit inhumatum. Tum amici, "Volucribusne, et feris?" "Minime vero," inquit: "sed bacillum propter me, quo abigam, ponitote." "Quî poteris?" illi: "non enim senties." "Quid igitur mihi ferarum laniatus oberit, nihil sentienti?" Præclare Anaxagoras, qui cum Lampsaci moreretur, quærentibus amicis, velletne Clazomenas in patriam, si quid ei accidisset, auferri; "Nihil necesse est," inquit: "undique enim ad inferos tantumdem viæ est." Totâque de ratione humationis unum tenendum est, ad corpus illam pertinere, sive occiderit animus, sive vigeat. In corpore autem, perspicuum est, vel exstincto animo vel elapso, nullum residere sensum.

XLIV. Sed plena errorum sunt omnia. Trahit Hectorem, ad currum religatum, Achilles: lacerari eum, et sentire, (credo) putat. Ergo hic ulciscitur, ut quidem sibi videtur. At illa, sicut acerbissimam rem, mœret:

"Vidi, videre quod me passa ægerrime,
Hectorem quadrijugo curru raptarier."

Quem Hectorem? aut quamdiu ille erit Hector? Melius Accius, et aliquando sapiens Achilles,

"Immo enimvero corpus Priamo reddidi: Hectorem abstuli."

Non igitur Hectora traxisti, sed corpus, quod fuerat Hectoris. Ecce alius exoritur e terrâ, qui matrem dormire non sinat:

"Mater, te appello, quæ curam somno suspensam levas,
Neque te mei miseret: surge, et sepeli natum."

Hæc cum pressis et flebilibus modis, qui totis theatris mœstitiam inferant, concinuntur; difficile est, non eos, qui inhumati sint, miseros judicare:

"prius quam feræ, volucresque".....

Metuit, ne laceratis membris minus bene utatur: ne combustis, non extimescit.

"Heu! relliquias semiassi regis, denudatis ossibus,
Per terram, *sanie delibutas*, fœde divexarier!"

Non intelligo, quid metuat, cum tam bonos sep tenarios fundat ad tibiam. Tenendum est igitu nihil curandum esse post mortem, cum mul inimicos etiam mortuos pœniantur. Exsecratu luculentis sane versibus, apud Ennium Thyeste primum ut naufragio pereat Atreus. Duru hoc sane: talis enim interitus non est sine gra sensu. Illa inania:

"Ipse summis saxis fixus asperis, evisceratus,
Latere pendens, saxa spargens tabo, sanie et sanguin atro."

Non ipsa saxa magis sensu omni vacabunt, qua ille, latere pendens, cui se hic cruciatum cens optare. Quæ essent dura, si sentiret, nulla sin sensu sunt. Illud vero perquam inane:

"Neque sepulcrum, quo recipiatur, habeat, portum co poris:
Ubi, remissâ humanâ vitâ, corpus requiescat a malis."

Vides, quanto hæc in errore versentur? Portu esse corporis, et requiescere in sepulcro put mortuum. Magna culpa Pelopis, qui non erud erit filium, nec docuerit, quâtenus esset quidqu curandum.

XLV. Sed quid singulorum opiniones an madvertam, nationum varios errores perspicer *cum liceat?* Condiunt Ægyptii mortuos, et e

domi servant: Persæ etiam cerâ circumlitos condunt, ut quam maxime permaneant diuturna corpora. Magorum mos est, non humare corpora suorum, nisi a feris sint ante laniata. In Hyrcaniâ plebs publicos alit canes; optimates, domesticos: nobile autem genus canum illud scimus esse: sed pro suâ quisque facultate parat, a quibus lanietur: eamque optimam illi esse censent sepulturam. Permulta alia colligit Chrysippus, ut est in omni historiâ curiosus: sed ita tetra sunt quædam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio. Totus igitur hic locus est contemnendus in nobis, non negligendus in nostris; ita tamen, ut mortuorum corpora nihil sentire sentiamus. Quantum autem consuetudini famæque dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut intelligant, nihil ad mortuos pertinere.

Sed profecto mors tum æquissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. Nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectæ perfecto functus est munere. Multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt: quam utinam potuissem obire! Nihil enim jam acquirebatur: cumulata erant officia vitæ: cum fortunâ bella restabant. Quare, si ipsa ratio minus perficiet, ut mortem negligere possimus; at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur. Quamquam enim sensus abierit, tamen summa

et propriis bonis et laudis et gloriæ, quamvis no sentiant, mortui non carent. Etsi enim nihil i se habeat gloria, cur expetatur, tamen virtuten tamquam umbra, sequitur. Verum multitudin judicium de bonis, si quando est, magis lauda dum est, quam illi ob eam rem beati.

XLVI. Non possum autem dicere (quoqu modo hoc accipiatur) Lycurgum, Solonem, l gum et publicæ disciplinæ carere gloriâ; Th mistoclem, Epaminondam, bellicæ virtutis. An enim Salaminam ipsam Neptunus obruet, qua Salaminii tropæi memoriam; priusque Bœoti Leuctra tollentur, quam pugnæ Leuctricæ glori Multo autem tardius fama deseret Curium, F bricium, Calatinum, duo Scipiones, duo Afric nos, Maximum, Marcellum, Paulum, Catonen Lælium, innumerabiles alios; quorum similitu dinem aliquam qui arripuerit, non eam fam populari, sed verâ bonorum laude metiens, fiden animo, si ita res fert, gradietur ad mortem; i quâ aut summum bonum, aut nullum malun esse cognovimus: secundis vero suis rebus vol etiam mori: non enim tam cumulus bonoru jucundus esse potest, quam molesta decessio.

Hanc sententiam significare videtur Lacon illa vox, qui, cum Rhodius Diagoras, Olympi *nices nobilis*, uno die duo filios victores Olyn

piæ vidisset, accessit ad senem, et gratulatus, "Morere, Diagora," inquit: "non enim in cœlum adscensurus es." Magna hæc et nimium fortasse Græci putant, vel tum potius putabant; isque, qui hoc Diagoræ dixit, permagnum existimans, tres Olympionicas unâ e domo prodire, cunctari illum diutius in vitâ, fortunæ objectum, inutile putabat ipsi.

Ego autem, tibi quidem quod satis esset, paucis verbis ut mihi videbar, responderam: concesseras enim, nullo in malo mortuos esse. Sed ob eam causam contendi, ut plura dicerem, quod in desiderio et luctu hæc est consolatio maxima. Nostrum enim, et nostrâ causâ susceptum, dolorem modice ferre debemus, ne nosmetipsi amare videamur. Illa suspicio intolerabili dolore cruciat, si opinamur eos, quibus orbati sumus, esse cum aliquo sensu in iis malis, quibus vulgo opinantur. Hanc excutere opinionem mihimet volui radicitus; eoque fui fortasse longior.

XLVII. *Auditor.* Tu longior? non mihi quidem: prior enim pars orationis tuæ faciebat, ut mori cuperem: posterior, ut modo non nollem, modo non laborarem. Omni autem oratione illud certe perfectum est, ut mortem non ducerem in malis.

Marcus. Num igitur etiam rhetorum epilogum

desideramus? an jam hanc artem plane relinquimus? *Auditor.* Tu vero istam ne reliqueris, quam semper ornâsti; et quidem jure: illa enim te (verum si loqui volumus) ornaverat. Sed quinam est iste epilogus? aveo enim audire, quidquid est.

Marcus. Deorum immortalium judicia solent in scholis proferre de morte, nec vero ea fingere ipsi, sed Herodoto auctore, aliisque pluribus. Primum Argiæ sacerdotis Cleobis et Biton filii prædicantur. Nota fabula est: cum enim illam ad sollenne et statum sacrificium curru vehi jus esset, satis longe ab oppido ad fanum, morarenturque jumenta; tunc juvenes ii, quos modo nominavi, veste positâ, corpora oleo perunxerunt: ad jugum accesserunt. Ita sacerdos advecta in fanum, cum currus esset ductus a filiis, precata a deâ dicitur, ut illis præmium daret pro pietate, quod maximum homini dari posset a deo: post epulatos cum matre adolescentes somno se dedisse, mane inventos esse mortuos.

Simili precatione Trophonius et Agamedes usi dicuntur; qui, cum Apollini Delphis templum exædificavissent, venerantes deum, petierunt mercedem non parvam quidem operis et laboris sui, nihil certi, sed quod esset optimum homini. Quibus Apollo se id daturum ostendit post ejus *diei diem tertium*: qui ut illuxit, mortui sunt re-

perti. Judicavisse deum dicunt, et eum quidem deum, cui reliqui dii concessissent, ut præter ceteros divinaret.

XLVIII. Affertur etiam de Sileno fabella quædam; qui cum a Midâ captus esset, hoc ei muneris pro suâ missione dedisse scribitur; docuisse regem, non nasci homini longe optimum esse; proximum autem, quam primum mori. Quâ est sententiâ in Cresphonte usus Euripides:

"Nam nos decebat, [cœtu celebrantes] domum,
Lugere, ubi esset aliquis in lucem editus,
Humanæ vitæ varia reputantes mala;
At, qui labores morte finisset graves,
Hunc omni amicos laude et lætitiâ exsequi."

Simile quiddam est in "Consolatione" Crantoris: ait enim, Terinæum quemdam Elysium, cum graviter filii mortem mœreret, venisse in Psychomantium, quærentem, quæ fuisset tantæ calamitatis causa: huic in tabellis tres hujusmodi versiculos datos:

"Ignaris homines in vitâ mentibus errant:
Euthynous potitur fatorum munere, leto.
Sic fuit utilius finiri ipsique, tibique."

His et talibus auctoribus usi, confirmant, causam rebus a diis immortalibus judicatam. Alcidamas quidam, *rhetor antiquus*, in primis nobilis,

scripsit etiam laudationem mortis, quæ constat ex enumeratione humanorum malorum. Cui rationes eæ, quæ exquisitius a philosophis colliguntur, defuerunt, ubertas orationis non defuit. Claræ vero mortes pro patriâ oppetitæ, non solum gloriosæ rhetoribus, sed etiam beatæ, videri solent. Repetunt ab Erechtheo, cujus etiam filiæ cupide mortem expetiverunt pro vitâ civium: Codrum, qui se in medios immisit hostes, veste famulari, ne posset agnosci, si esset ornatu regio; quod oraculum erat datum, si rex interfectus esset, victrices Athenas fore. Menœceus vero nŏn prætermittitur, qui, oraculo edito, largitus est patriæ suum sanguinem. Iphigenia Aulide duci se immolandam jubet, ut hostium sanguis eliciatur suo. Veniunt inde ad propiora.

XLIX. Harmodius in ore, et Aristogiton, Lacedæmonius Leonidas, Thebanus Epaminondas, vigent. Nostros non nôrunt; quos enumerare longum est; ita sunt multi, quibus videmus optabiles mortes fuisse cum gloriâ.

Quæ cum ita sint, magnâ tamen eloquentiâ est utendum, atque ita, velut superiore e loco, concionandum, ut homines mortem vel optare incipiant, vel certe timere desistant. Nam, si *supremus* ille dies non exstinctionem, sed com-

mutationem affert loci, quid optabilius? Sin autem perimit ac delet omnino, quid melius, quam in mediis vitæ laboribus obdormiscere, et ita conniventem somno consopiri sempiterno? Quod si fiat, melior Ennii, quam Solonis oratio. Hic enim noster:

"Nemo me lacrymis decoret," (inquit) "nec funera fletu
Faxit."

At vero sapiens ille:

"Mors mea ne careat lacrymis: linquamus amicis
Mœrorem, ut celebrent funera cum gemitu."

Nos vero, si quid tale acciderit, ut a deo denuntiatum videatur ut exeamus e vitâ, læti, et agentes gratias, pareamus; emittique nos e custodiâ, et levari vinculis, arbitremur, ut aut in æternam et plane in nostram domum remigremus, aut omni sensu molestiâque careamus. Sin autem nihil denuntiabitur, eo tamen simus animo, ut horribilem illum diem aliis, nobis faustum putemus; nihilque in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a diis immortalibus, vel a naturâ, parente omnium, constitutum. Non enim temere nec fortuito sati et creati sumus: sed profecto fuit quædam vis, quæ generi consúleret humano: nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod, cum exantlavisset omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis malum sempi-

ternum. Portum potius paratum nobis et perfugium putemus. Quo utinam velis passis pervehi liceat! sin reflantibus ventis rejiciemur, tamen eodem paulo tardius referamur, necesse est. Quod autem omnibus necesse est, idne miserum esse uni potest? Habes epilogum, nequid prætermissum aut relictum putes. *Auditor.* Ego vero: et quidem fecit etiam iste me epilogus firmiorem. *Marcus.* Optime, inquam. Sed nunc quidem valetudini tribuamus aliquid. Cras autem, et quot dies erimus in Tusculano, agamus hæc, et ea potissimum, quæ levationem habeant ægritudinum, formidinum, cupiditatum: qui omni e philosophiâ est fructus uberrimus.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM,

AD

MARCUM BRUTUM,

LIBER SECUNDUS.

De tolerando Dolore.

I. Neoptolemus quidem, apud Ennium, philosophari sibi ait necesse esse, sed paucis; nam omnino haud placere. Ego autem, Brute, necesse mihi quidem esse arbitror philosophari: nam quid possum, præsertim nihil agens, agere melius? sed non paucis, ut ille. Difficile est enim, in philosophiâ pauca esse ei nota, cui non sint aut pleraque, aut omnia. Nam nec pauca, nisi e multis, eligi possunt; nec, qui pauca perceperit, non idem reliqua eodem studio persequetur. Sed, in vitâ tamen occupatâ, atque, ut Neoptolemi tum erat, militari, pauca ipsa multum sæpe prosunt, et ferunt fructus, si non tantos, quanti ex universâ philosophiâ percipi

possunt, tamen eos, quibus, aliquâ ex parte, interdum aut cupiditate aut ægritudine aut metu liberemur: velut ex eâ disputatione, quæ mihi nuper habita est in Tusculano, magna videbatur mortis effecta contemtio; quæ non minimum valet ad animum metu liberandum. Nam qui id, quod vitari non potest, metuit, is vivere animo quieto nullo modo potest: sed qui, non modo quia necesse est mori, verum etiam quia nihil habet mors quod sit horrendum, mortem non timet, magnum is sibi præsidium ad beatam vitam comparat.

Quamquam non sumus ignari, multos studiose contra esse dicturos; quod vitare nullo modo potuimus, nisi nihil omnino scriberemus. Etenim, si orationes, quas nos multitudinis judicio probari volebamus (popularis est enim illa facultas; et effectus eloquentiæ est audientium approbatio) sed si reperiebantur nonnulli, qui nihil laudarent, nisi quod se imitari posse confiderent, quemque sperandi sibi, eumdem et bene dicendi finem proponerent; et, cum obruerentur copiâ sententiarum atque verborum, jejunitatem et famem se malle, quam ubertatem et copiam, dicerent (unde erat exortum genus Atticorum, iis ipsis, qui id sequi se profitebantur, ignotum; qui jam conticuêre, pæne ab ipso foro irrisi); quid *futurum* putamus, cum, adjutore populo, quo

utebamur antea, nunc minime nos uti posse videamus? Est enim philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa: ut vel, si quis universam velit vituperare, secundo id populo facere possit; vel, si in eam, quam nos maxime sequimur, conetur invadere, magna habere possit auxilia a reliquorum philosophorum disciplinis.

II. Nos autem universæ philosophiæ vituperatoribus respondimus in Hortensio: pro Academiâ autem quæ dicenda essent, satis accurate in Academicis quatuor libris explicata arbitramur. Sed tamen tantum abest, ut scribi contra nos nolimus, ut id etiam maxime optemus. In ipsâ enim Græciâ philosophia tanto in honore nunquam fuisset, nisi doctissimorum contentionibus dissensionibusque viguisset.

Quamobrem hortor omnes, qui facere id possunt, ut hujus quoque generis laudem jam languenti Græciæ eripiant, et perferant in hanc urbem, sicut reliquas omnes, quæ quidem erant expetendæ, studio atque industriâ suâ majores nostri transtulerunt. Atque oratorum quidem laus, ita ducta ab humili, venit ad summum, ut jam (quod natura fert in omnibus fere rebus) senescat, brevique tempore ad nihilum ventura

videatur. Philosophia nascatur Latinis quidem literis ex his temporibus; eamque nos adjuvemus; nosque ipsos redargui refellique patiamur: quod ii ferunt animo iniquo, qui certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis quasi addicti et consecrati sunt, eâque necessitate constricti, ut, etiam quæ non probare soleant, ea cogantur, constantiæ causâ, defendere. Nos, qui sequimur probabilia, nec, ultra id quod verisimile occurrerit, progredi possumus, et refellere sine pertinaciâ, et refelli sine iracundiâ, parati sumus.

Quod si hæc studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem Græcis egebimus, in quibus multitudo infinita librorum est, propter eorum multitudinem qui scripserunt; eadem enim dicuntur a multis; ex quo libris omnia referserunt: quod accidet etiam nostris, si ad hæc studia plures confluxerint: sed eos, si possumus, excitemus, qui, liberaliter eruditi, adhibitâ etiam disserendi elegantiâ, ratione et viâ philosophantur.

III. Est enim quoddam genus eorum, qui se philosophos appellari volunt, quorum dicuntur esse Latini sane multi libri; quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos nunquam legerim; sed, quia profitentur ipsi illi qui eos scribunt, se ne*que distincte* neque distribute neque eleganter ne-

que ornate scribere; lectionem sine ullâ delectatione negligo. Quid enim dicant et quid sentiant ii qui sunt ab eâ disciplinâ, nemo mediocriter quidem doctus ignorat. Quamobrem, quoniam, quemadmodum dicant, ipsi non laborant; cur legendi sint, nisi ipsis inter se qui idem sentiunt, non intelligo. Nam, ut Platonem reliquosque Socraticos, et deinceps eos qui ab his profecti sunt, legunt omnes, etiam qui illa aut non approbant, aut non studiosissime consectantur; Epicurum autem, et Metrodorum, non fere præter suos quisquam in manus sumit; sic hos Latinos ii soli legant, qui illa recte dici putant. Nobis autem videtur, quidquid literis mandetur, id commendari omnium eruditorum lectioni decere: nec, si ipsi minus consequi possumus, idcirco minus id ita faciendum esse sentimus.

Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiæque consuetudo, de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi, non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in unâquâque re verisimile esset, inveniri: sed etiam quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio; quâ princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. Nostrâ autem memoriâ Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum præcepta tradere, alio philosophorum. Ad quam nos consuetudinem a fami-

liaribus nostris adducti, in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumsimus. Itaque, cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus (sicut pridie feceramus), post meridiem in Academiam descendimus: in quâ disputationem habitam, non quasi narrantes, exponimus, sed eisdem fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est.

IV. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum sermo ille nobis institutus, et a tali quodam inductus exordio. *Auditor.* Dici non potest, quam sim hesternâ disputatione tuâ delectatus, vel potius adjutus. Etsi enim mihi sum conscius, nunquam me nimis cupidum fuisse vitæ; tamen objiciebatur interdum animo metus quidam et dolor, cogitanti, fore aliquando finem hujus lucis, et amissionem omnium vitæ commodorum. Hoc genere molestiæ sic (mihi crede) sum liberatus, ut nihil minus curandum putem.

Marcus. Minime mirum id quidem. Nam efficit hoc philosophia: medetur animis, inanes sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores. Sed hæc ejus vis non idem potest apud omnes: tamen valet multum, cum est idoneam complexa naturam. Fortes enim non modo fortuna adjuvat, ut est in vetere proverbio, sed multo *magis ratio,* quæ quibusdam quasi præceptis

confirmat vim fortitudinis. Te natura excelsum quemdam videlicet, et altum, et humana despicientem, genuit: itaque facile in animo forti contra mortem habita insedit oratio. Sed hæc eadem num censes apud eos ipsos valere, nisi admodum paucos, a quibus inventa, disputata, conscripta sunt? Quotus enim quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vitâ constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam suam, non ostentationem scientiæ, sed legem vitæ, putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis suis pareat? Videre licet alios tantâ levitate et jactatione, iis ut fuerit non didicisse melius; alios pecuniæ cupidos, gloriæ nonnullos, multos libidinum servos; ut cum eorum vitâ mirabiliter pugnet oratio: quod quidem mihi videtur esse turpissimum. Ut enim, si, grammaticum se professus, quispiam barbare loquatur, aut si absurde canat is, qui se haberi velit musicum, hoc turpior sit, quod in eo ipso peccet, cujus profiteatur scientiam; sic philosophus, in ratione vitæ peccans, hoc turpior est, quod in officio, cujus magister esse vult, labitur, artemque vitæ professus, delinquit in vitâ. *Auditor.* Nonne verendum igitur, si est ita, ut dicis, ne philosophiam falsâ gloriâ exornes? Quod est enim majus argumentum, nihil eam prodesse,

quam quosdam perfectos philosophos turpite vivere?

Marcus. Nullum vero id quidem argumentu est. Nam, ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt, q coluntur, (falsumque illud [ac improbe],

"Etsi in segetem sunt deteriorem datæ
Fruges, tamen ipsæ suâpte naturâ enitent")

sic animi non omnes culti fructum ferunt. A que, (ut in eodem simili verser) ut ager, quan vis fertilis, sine culturâ fructuosus esse no potest; sic sine doctrinâ animus: ita est utraqu res sine alterâ debilis. Cultura autem anin philosophia est. Hæc extrahit vitia radicitus, præparat animos ad satus accipiendos; eaqu mandat his, et, ut ita dicam, serit, quæ adul fructus uberrimos ferant. Agamus igitur, cœpimus: dic, si vis, de quo disputari velis.

V. *Auditor.* Dolorem existimo maximum m lorum omnium. *Marcus.* Etiamne majus, qua dedecus? *Auditor.* Non audeo id dicere qu dem; et me pudet tam cito de sententiâ es dejectum. *Marcus.* Magis esset pudendum, in sententiâ permaneres. Quid enim minus e dignum, quam tibi pejus quidquam videri ded core, flagitio, turpitudine? quæ ut effugias, qu

est, non modo non recusandus, sed non ultro appetendus, subeundus, excipiendus dolor? *Auditor.* Ita prorsus existimo: quare, ne sit sane summum malum dolor: malum certe est. *Marcus.* Videsne igitur, quantum, breviter admonitus, de doloris terrore dejeceris? *Auditor.* Video plane: sed plus desidero. *Marcus.* Experiar equidem: sed magna res est; animoque mihi opus est non repugnante. *Auditor.* Habebis id quidem. Ut enim heri feci, sic nunc rationem, quo ea me cumque ducet, sequar.

VI. *Marcus.* Primum igitur de imbecillitate multorum, et de variis disciplinis philosophorum, loquar; quorum princeps et auctoritate et antiquitate, Socraticus Aristippus, non dubitavit summum malum dolorem dicere. Deinde, ad hanc enervatam muliebremque sententiam, satis docilem se Epicurus præbuit. Hunc post, Rhodius Hieronymus, dolore vacare, summum bonum dixit: tantum in dolore duxit mali. Ceteri, præter Zenonem, Aristonem, Pyrrhonem, idem fere, quod modu tu: malum illud quidem, sed alia pejora.

Ergo, id quod natura ipsa et quædam generosa virtus statim respuit, ne dolorem summum malum diceres, oppositoque dedecore sententiâ depellerere, in eo magistra vitæ philosophia tot

secula permanet. Quod huic officium, quae laus, quod decus erit tanti, quod adipisci cum dolore corporis velit, qui dolorem summum malum sibi esse persuaserit? Quam porro quis ignominiam, quam turpitudinem non pertulerit, ut effugiat dolorem, si id summum malum esse decreverit? Quis autem non miser, non modo tunc, cum premetur summis doloribus, si in his est summum malum, sed etiam cum sciet id sibi posse evenire? et quis est, cui non possit? Ita fit, ut omnino nemo esse possit beatus. Metrodorus quidem eum perfecte putat beatum, cui corpus bene constitutum sit, et exploratum, ita semper fore. Quis autem est iste, cui id explo-ratum possit esse?

VII. Epicurus vero ea dicit, ut mihi quidem risus captare videatur: affirmat enim quodam loco, "Si uratur sapiens, si crucietur ....." exspectas fortasse, dum dicat, "Patietur, perferet, non succumbet." Magna, mehercule, laus, et eo ipso, per quem juravi, Hercule digna; sed Epicuro, homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis. In Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet, "Quam suave est hoc! quam hoc non curo!" Suave etiam? an parum est, si non amarum? At id quidem illi ipsi, qui dolorem malum esse negant, non *solent dicere*, cuiquam suave esse cruciari. As-

perum, difficile, odiosum, contra naturam, dicunt, nec tamen malum. Hic, qui non solum hoc malum dicit, sed malorum omnium extremum, sapientem censet id suave dicturum! Ego a te non postulo, ut dolorem eisdem verbis affi- cias, quibus Epicurus voluptatem, homo (ut scis) voluptarius. Ille dixerit sane idem in Phalaridis tauro, quod, si esset in lectulo: ego tantam vim non tribuo sapienti contra dolorem. Sit fortis in perferendo; officio satis est: ut lætetur etiam, non postulo. Tristis enim res est sine dubio, aspera, amara, inimica naturæ, ad patiendum tolerandumque difficilis. Adspice Philoctetam, cui concedendum est gementi: ipsum enim Herculem viderat in Œtâ magnitudine dolorum ejulantem. Nihil igitur hunc virum sagittæ, quas ab Hercule acceperat, tum consolantur; cum

"E viperino morsu, venæ viscerum,
Veneno imbutæ, tetros cruciatus cient."

Itaque exclamat, auxilium expetens, mori cupiens:

"Heu! quis salsis fluctibu' mandet
Me ex sublimi vertice saxi?
Jamjam absumor; conficit animam
[Vis] vulneris, ulceris æstus."

Difficile dictu videtur, eum non in malo esse, et magno quidem, qui ita clamare cogatur.

VIII. Sed videamus Herculem ipsum, qui tum dolore frangebatur, cum immortalitatem ipsâ morte quærebat. Quas hic voces, apud Sophoclem in Trachiniis, edit? cui cum Deïanira sanguine centauri tinctam tunicam induisset, inhæsissetque ea visceribus, ait ille:

"O multa dictu gravia, perpessu aspera,
Quæ corpore exantlavi, atque animo pertuli!
Nec mihi Junonis terror implacabilis,
Nec tantum invexit tristis Eurystheus mali,
Quantum una vecors, Œnei partu edita.
Hæc me irretivit veste furiali inscium,
Quæ, lateri inhærens, morsu lacerat viscera,
Urgensque graviter pulmonum haurit spiritus.
Jam decolorem sanguinem omnem exsorbuit:
Sic corpus clade horribili absumtum extabuit.
Ipse illigatus peste interimor textili.
Hos non hostilis dextra, non terrâ edita
Moles gigantûm, non biformato impetu
Centaurus ictus corpori infixit meo,
Non Graia vis, non barbara ulla immanitas,
Non sæva terris gens relegata ultimis,
Quas peragrans, undique omnem hinc feritatem expuli:
Sed femineâ vi, femineâ interimor manu.
O nate! vere hoc nomen usurpa patri,
Nec me occidentem matris superet caritas.
Huc arripe ad me manibus abstractam piis.
Jam cernam, mene an illam potiorem putes.
Perge, aude, nate, illacryma patris pestibus:
Miserere. Gentes nostras flebunt miserias.
Heu! virginalem me ore ploratum edere,

Quem vidit nemo ulli ingemiscentem malo?
Sic feminata virtus afflicta occidit.

IX. Accede, nate, assiste: miserandum adspice
Evisceratum corpus lacerati patris.
Videte cunoti: tuque, cœlestûm sator,
Jace, obsecro, in me vim coruscam fulminis.
Nunc, nunc dolorum anxiferi torquent vertices:
Nunc serpit ardor. O ante victrices manus!
O pectora! o terga! o lacertorum tori!
Vestrone pressu quondam Nemeæus leo
Frendens efflavit graviter extremum halitum?
Hæc dextra Lernam tetram, mactatâ excetrâ,
Placavit: hæc bicorporem afflixit manum:
Erymanthiam hæc vastificam abjecit belluam:
Hæc a Tartareâ tenebricâ abstractum plagâ
Tricipitem eduxit Hydrâ generatum canem;
Hæc interemit tortu multiplicabili
Draconem, auriferam obtutu observantem arborem.
Multa alia victrix nostra lustravit manus;
Nec quisquam e nostris spolia cepit laudibus."

Possumusne nos contemnere dolorem, cum ipsum Herculem tam intoleranter dolere videamus?

X. Veniat Æschylus, non poëta solum, sed etiam Pythagoreus: sic enim accepimus. Quo modo fert apud eum Prometheus dolorem, quem excipit ob furtum Lemnium?

["Unde ignem cluet mortalibus,
Clam divis,] doctu' Prometheus

Clepsisse dolo, pœnasque Jovi
Fato expendisse supremo."

Has igitur pœnas pendens, affixus ad Caucasum, hæc dicit,

"Titanum soboles, socia nostri sanguinis,
Generata cœlo, adspicite religatum asperis
Vinctumque saxis, navem ut horrisono freto,
Noctem paventes, timidi annectunt navitæ.
Saturnius me sic infixit Jupiter,
Jovisque numen Mulcibri adscivit manus.
Hos ille cuneos fabricâ crudeli inserens,
Perrupit artus: quâ miser sollertiâ
Transverberatus, castrum hoc Furiarum incolo.
Jam tertio me quoque funesto die,
Tristi advolatu, aduncis lacerans unguibus,
Jovis satelles pastu dilaniat fero.
Tum jecore opimo farta et satiata affatim,
Clangorem fundit vastum, et sublime avolans,
Pinnatâ caudâ nostrum adulat sanguinem.
Cum vero adesum inflatu renovatum est jecur,
Tum rursus tetros avida se ad pastus refert.
Sic hanc custodem mœsti cruciatûs alo:
Quæ me perenni vivum fœdat miseriâ.
Namque, ut videtis, vinclis constrictus Jovis,
Arcere nequeo diram volucrem a pectore.
Sic, me ipse viduus, pestes excipio anxias,
Amore mortis terminum anquirens mali.
Sed longe a leto numine aspellor Jovis.
Atque hæc vetusta, seclis glomerata horridis,
Luctifica clades nostro infixa est corpori:
E quo liquatæ solis ardore excidunt
Guttæ, quæ saxa assidue instillant Caucasi."

XI. Vix igitur posse videmur ita affectum non miserum dicere; et, si hunc miserum, certe dolorem, malum. *Auditor.* Tu quidem adhuc meam causam agis: sed hoc mox videro. Interea unde isti versus? non enim agnosco. *Marcus.* Dicam, hercule: etenim recte requiris. Videsne abundare me otio? *Auditor.* Quid tum? *Marcus.* Fuisti sæpe, credo, cum Athenis esses, in scholis philosophorum. *Auditor.* Vero, ac libenter quidem. *Marcus.* Animadvertebas igitur, etsi tum nemo erat admodum copiosus, verumtamen versus ab his admisceri orationi. *Auditor.* Ac multos quidem a Dionysio Stoïco. *Marcus.* Probe dicis: sed is quasi dictata, nullo delectu, nullâ elegantiâ. Philo noster [et proprium numerum], et lecta poëmata, et loco adjungebat. Itaque, postquam adamavi hanc quasi senilem declamationem, studiose equidem utor nostris poëtis: sed, sicubi illi defecerunt, verti [ipse] multa de Græcis, ne quo ornamento, in hoc genere disputationis, careret Latina oratio.

Sed videsne, poëtæ quid mali afferant? Lamentantes inducunt fortissimos viros: molliunt animos nostros: ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non legantur modo, sed etiam ediscantur. Sic, ad malam domesticam disciplinam, vitamque umbratilem et delicatam, cum accesserunt etiam poëtæ, nervos omnis virtutis elidunt. Recte

igitur a Platone [educuntur] ex eâ civitate, quam finxit ille, cum mores optimos, et optimum reipublicæ statum, exquireret. At vero nos, docti scilicet a Græciâ, hæc et a pueritiâ legimus et discimus: hanc eruditionem liberalem et doctrinam putamus.

XII. Sed quid poëtis irascimur? Virtutis magistri, philosophi inventi sunt, qui summum malum dolorem dicerent. At tu adolescens, cum id tibi paulo ante dixisses videri, rogatus a me, etiamne majus quam dedecus, verbo de sententiâ destitisti. Roga hoc idem Epicurum: majus dicet esse malum mediocrem dolorem, quam maximum dedecus: in ipso enim dedecore mali nihil esse, nisi sequantur dolores. Quis igitur Epicurum sequitur dolor, cum hoc ipsum dicit, summum malum esse dolorem, quo dedecus majus a philosopho nullum exspecto? Quare satis mihi dedisti, cum respondisti, majus tibi videri malum dedecus, quam dolorem. Hoc ipsum enim si tenebis, intelliges, quam sit obsistendum dolori. Nec tam quærendum est, dolor malumne sit, quam firmandus animus ad dolorem ferendum.

Concludunt ratiunculas Stoïci, cur non sit malum: quasi de verbo, non de re, laboretur. *Quid me decipis*, Zeno? nam cum id, quod mihi

horribile videtur, tu omnino malum esse negas, capior; et scire cupio, quo modo id, quod ego miserrimum existimem, ne malum quidem sit. Nihil est, inquit, malum, nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est. Ad ineptias redis. Illud enim, quod me angebat, non eximis. Scio dolorem non esse nequitiam: desine id me docere; hoc doce, doleam, necne, nihil interesse. Nunquam quidquam, inquit, ad beate quidem vivendum, quod est in unâ virtute positum: sed est tamen rejiciendum. Cur? Asperum est, contra naturam, difficile perpessu, triste, durum.

XIII. Hæc est copia verborum, quod omnes uno verbo malum appellamus, id tot modis posse dicere. Definis tu mihi, non tollis, dolorem, cum dicis asperum, contra naturam, vix quod ferri tolerarique possit: nec mentiris; sed re succumbere non oportebat, verbis gloriantem, dum nihil bonum, nisi quod honestum; nihil malum, nisi quod turpe. Optare hoc quidem est, non docere. Illud et melius et verius: omnia, quæ natura adspernetur, in malis esse; quæ adsciscat, in bonis. Hoc posito, et verborum concertatione sublatâ, tantum tamen excellet illud, quod recte amplexantur isti, quod honestum, quod rectum, quod decorum appellamus, quod idem interdum virtutis nomine am-

plectimur, ut omnia præterea, quæ bona corporis et fortunæ putantur, perexigua et minuta videantur: ne malum quidem ullum, nec, si in unum locum collata omnia sint, cum turpitudinis malo comparanda.

Quare, si, ut initio concessisti, turpitudo pejus est quam dolor, nihil est plane dolor: nam, dum tibi turpe nec dignum viro videbitur, gemere, ejulare, lamentari, frangi, debilitari dolore; tum honestas, tum dignitas, tum decus aderit: tuque, in ea intuens, te continebis. Cedet profecto virtuti dolor, et animi inductione languescet: aut enim nulla virtus est, aut contemnendus omnis dolor. Prudentiamne vis esse, sine quâ ne intelligi quidem ulla virtus potest? Quid ergo ea? Patieturne te quidquam facere, nihil proficientem, et laborantem? An temperantia sinet te immoderate facere quidquam? An coli justitia poterit ab homine propter vim doloris enuntiante commissa, prodente conscios, multa officia relinquente? Quid? fortitudini, comitibusque ejus, magnitudini animi, gravitati, patientiæ, rerum humanarum despicientiæ, quo modo respondebis? Afflictusne, et jacens, et lamentabili voce deplorans, audies, "O virum fortem?" Te vero ita affectum ne virum quidem dixerit quisquam. Amittenda igitur fortitudo est, aut sepeliendus *dolor.*

XIV. Ecquid scis igitur, si quid de Corinthiis tuis amiseris, posse habere te reliquam supellectilem salvam; virtutem autem si unam amiseris, (etsi amitti non potest virtus) sed si unam confessus fueris te non habere, nullam te esse habiturum? Num igitur fortem virum, num magno animo, num patientem, num gravem, num humana contemnentem, potes dicere aut Prometheum aut Philoctetam illum? a te enim malo discedere. Sed ille certe non fortis, qui jacet

> ..... "in [lecto] humido,
> Quod ejulatu, questu, gemitu, fremitibus,
> Resonando, mutum, flebiles voces refert."

Non ego dolorem dolorem esse nego: cur enim fortitudo desideraretur? Sed eum opprimi dico patientiâ, si modo est aliqua patientia. Si nulla est, quid exornamus philosophiam? aut quid ejus nomine gloriosi sumus? Pungit dolor. Vel fodiat, sane. Si nudus es, da jugulum: sin tectus Vulcaniis armis, id est, fortitudine, resiste. Hæc enim te, nisi ita facies, custos dignitatis, relinquet et deseret.

Cretum quidem leges (quas sive Jupiter, sive Minos sanxit, de Jovis quidem sententiâ, ut poetæ ferunt), itemque Lycurgi, laboribus erudiunt juventutem, venando, currendo, esuriendo, siti-

endo, algendo, æstuando. Spartæ vero pueri ad aram sic verberibus accipiuntur, ut multus e visceribus sanguis exeat; nonnunquam etiam (ut, cum ibi essem, audiebam) ad necem: quorum non modo nemo exclamavit unquam, sed ne ingemuit quidem. Quid ergo? Hoc pueri possunt, viri non poterunt? et mos valet, ratio non valebit?

XV. Interest aliquid inter laborem et dolorem. Sunt finitima omnino; sed tamen differt aliquid. Labor est functio quædam, vel animi vel corporis, gravioris operis et muneris; dolor autem, motus asper in corpore, alienus a sensibus. Hæc duo Græci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant [πόνον.] Itaque industrios homines, illi studiosos, vel potius amantes, doloris appellant, nos, commodius, laboriosos. Aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere. O verborum inops interdum, quibus abundare te semper putas, Græcia! Aliud, inquam, est dolere, aliud laborare. Cum varices secabantur C. Mario, dolebat: cum æstu magno ducebat agmen, laborabat: est inter hæc tamen quædam similitudo: consuetudo enim laborum perpessionem dolorum efficit faciliorem. Itaque illi, qui Græciæ formam rerum publicarum dede-

runt, corpora juvenum firmari labore voluerunt: quod Spartiatæ etiam in feminas transtulerunt; quæ, ceteris in urbibus, mollissimo cultu, parietum umbris occuluntur. Illi autem voluerunt

"Nihil horum simile esse apud Lacænas virgines; Quibu' magi' palæstra, Eurotas, sol, pulvis, labos, Militia studio est, quam [fertilitas] barbara."

Ergo his laboriosis exercitationibus et dolor intercurrit nonnunquam. Impelluntur, feriuntur, abjiciuntur, cadunt: et ipse labor quasi callum quoddam obducit dolori.

XVI. Militiæ vero (nostram dico, non Spartiatarum, quorum procedit mora ad tibiam, nec adhibetur ulla sine anapæstis pedibus hortatio) nostri exercitus primum unde nomen habeant, vides: deinde qui labor, et quantus agminis; ferre plus dimidiati mensis cibaria; ferre, si quid ad usum velint; ferre vallum: nam scutum, gladium, galeam, in onere nostri milites non plus numerant, quam humeros, lacertos, manus. Arma enim membra militis esse dicunt: quæ quidem ita geruntur apte, ut, si usus ferat, abjectis oneribus, expeditis armis, ut membris, pugnare possint. Quid exercitatio legionum? quid? ille cursus, concursus, clamor, quanti laboris est! Ex hoc ille animus in prœliis paratus ad vulnera. Adduc pari animo inexercitatum

militem: mulier videbitur: cur? Tantum inter est inter novum et veterem exercitum, quantum experti sumus. Ætas tironum plerumque melior sed ferre laborem, contemnere vulnus, consuetudo docet. Quin etiam videmus ex acie efferri sæpe saucios; et quidem rudem illum et inexercitatum, quamvis levi ictu, ploratus turpissimos edere: at vero ille exercitatus et vetus, ob eamque rem fortior, medicum modo requirens, a quo obligetur,

"O Patrocle, (inquit) ad vos adveniens, auxilium et vestras manus peto,
Priusquam oppetam malam pestem, mandatam hostili manu:
Neque sanguis ullo potis est pacto profluens consistere
Si quâ sapientiâ magis vestrâ devitari mors potest.
Namque Æsclapii liberorum saucii opplent porticus:
Non potest accedi."

XVII. Certe Eurypylus hic quidem est: hominem exercitatum! [ubi tantum luctus continuatur?] Vide, quam non flebiliter respondeat rationem etiam afferat, cur æquo animo sibi ferendum sit:

..... "Qui alteri exitium parat,
Eum scire oportet sibi paratam pestem, ut participe parem."

Abducet Patrocles, (credo) ut collocet in cubili *ut vulnus obliget*, si quidem homo esset. [Sed

nihil [vidi] minus; quærit enim, quid actum sit.

" Eloquere, res Argivûm prœlio ut se sustinet."

Non potest effari tantum dictis, quantum factis suppetit laboris.

" Quiesce igitur, et vulnus alliga.'

Etiam si Eurypylus posset, non posset Æsopus.

..... " ubi fortuna Hectoris
Nostram acrem aciem inclinatam " .....

et cetera explicat in dolore. Sic est enim intemperans militaris in forti viro gloria. Ergo hæc veteranus miles facere poterit; doctus vir sapiensque non poterit? Ille vero melius, ac non paulo quidem.

Sed de consuetudine adhuc exercitationis loquor; nondum de ratione et sapientiâ. Aniculæ sæpe inediam biduum aut triduum ferunt: subduc cibum unum diem athletæ: Jovem Olympium, eum ipsum, cui se exercebit, implorabit: ferre non posse clamabit. Consuetudinis magna vis est. Pernoctant venatores in nive: in montibus uri se patiuntur. Inde pugiles, cæstibus contusi, ne ingemiscunt quidem. Sed quid hos, quibus Olympiorum victoria consulatus ille antiquus videtur? Gladiatores, aut perditi homines aut barbari, quas plagas perferunt? Quo modo illi, qui bene instituti sunt, accipere plagam ma-

lust, quam turpiter vitare? quam sæpe apparet, nihil eos malle, quam vel domino satisfacere, vel populo? Mittunt etiam, vulneribus confecti, ad dominos, qui quærant, quid velint: si satisfactum iis non sit, se velle decumbere. Quis mediocris gladiator ingemuit? quis vultum mutavit unquam? quis non modo stetit, verum etiam decubuit, turpiter? Quis, cum decubuisset, ferrum recipere jussus, collum contraxit? Tantum exercitatio, meditatio, consuetudo valet. Ergo hoc poterit

" Samnis, spurcus homo, vitâ illâ dignu' locoque; "

vir natus ad gloriam, ullam partem animi tam mollem habebit, quam non meditatione et ratione corroboret? Crudele gladiatorum spectaculum, et inhumanum, nonnullis videri solet: et haud scio an ita sit, ut nunc fit. Cum vero sontes ferro depugnabant, auribus fortasse multæ, oculis quidem nulla poterat esse fortior contra dolorem et mortem disciplina.

XVIII. De exercitatione, et consuetudine, et commentatione dixi. Agesis, nunc de ratione videamus; nisi quid vis ad hæc. *Auditor.* Egone ut te interpellem? ne hoc quidem vellem: ita me ad credendum tua ducit oratio. *Marcus.* *Sitne igitur* malum dolere, necne, Stoïci vide-

rint, qui contortulis quibusdam ac minutis conclusiunculis, nec ad sensus permanantibus, effici volunt, non esse malum dolorem. Ego illud, quidquid sit, tantum esse, quantum videatur, non puto: falsâque ejus visione et specie moveri homines dico vehementius, doloremque [ejus] omnem esse tolerabilem. Unde igitur ordiar? An eadem breviter attingam, quæ modo dixi, quo facilius oratio progredi possit longius?

Inter omnes igitur hoc constat, nec doctos homines solum, sed etiam indoctos, virorum esse fortium, et magnanimorum, et patientium, et humana vincentium, toleranter dolorem pati. Nec vero quisquam fuit, qui eum, qui ita pateretur, non laudandum putaret. Quod ergo et postulatur a fortibus, et laudatur cum fit, id aut extimescere veniens, aut non ferre præsens, nonne turpe est? Atqui vide, ne, cum omnes rectæ animi affectiones *virtutes* appellentur, non sit hoc proprium nomen omnium: sed ab eâ, quæ una ceteris excellebat, omnes nominatæ sint. Appellata est enim ex *viro virtus:* viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo: cujus munera duo sunt maxima, mortis dolorisque contemtio. Utendum est igitur his, si virtutis compotes, vel potius si viri, volumus esse, quoniam a viris virtus nomen est mutuata.

XIX. Quæres fortasse, quo modo: et recte: talem enim medicinam philosophia profitetur. Venit Epicurus, homo minime malus, vel potius vir optimus, tantum monet, quantum intelligit: "Neglige," inquit, "dolorem." Quis hoc dicit? Idem, qui dolorem summum malum. Vix satis constanter. Audiamus. "Si summus dolor est," inquit, "necesse est brevem esse." Iterandum eadem ista mihi: non enim satis inelligo, quid summum dicas esse, quid breve. "Summum, quo nihil sit superius: breve, quo nihil brevius." Contemno magnitudinem doloris, a quâ me brevitas temporis vindicabit ante pæne, quam venerit: sed, si est tantus dolor, quantus Philoctetæ? Bene sane: magnus mihi quidem videtur, sed tamen non summus: nihil enim dolet, nisi pes. Possunt oculi: potest caput, latera, pulmones: possunt omnia. Longe igitur abest a summo dolore. "Ergo," inquit, "dolor diuturnus habet lætitiæ plus, quam molestiæ."

Nunc ego non possum, tantum hominem nihil sapere dicere: sed nos ab eo derideri puto. Ego summum dolorem (summum autem dico, etiam si decem atomis est major alius) non continuo dico esse brevem: multosque possum bonos viros nominare, qui complures annos doloribus podagræ crucientur maximis. Sed homo catus *nunquam* terminat nec magnitudinis nec diutur-

nitatis modum, ut sciam, quid summum dicat in dolore, quid breve in tempore. Omittamus hunc igitur, nihil prorsus dicentem: cogamusque confiteri, non esse ab eo doloris remedia quærenda, qui dolorem malorum omnium maximum dixerit; quamvis idem forticulum se, in torminibus, et in stranguriâ suâ, præbeat. Aliunde igitur est quærenda medicina, et maxime quidem (si, quid maxime consentaneum sit, quærimus) ab iis, quibus, quod honestum sit, summum bonum; quod turpe, summum videtur malum. His tu præsentibus gemere, et te jactare, non audebis profecto: loquetur enim eorum voce virtus ipsa tecum.

XX. Tune, cum pueros Lacedæmone, adolescentes Olympiæ, barbaros in arenâ, videris excipientes gravissimas plagas, et ferentes silentio, si te forte dolor aliquis pervellerit, exclamabis, ut mulier? non constanter et sedate feres? Fieri non potest: natura non patitur. Audio. Pueri ferunt, gloriâ ducti; ferunt pudore alii, multi metu; et tamen veremur, ut hoc, quod a tam multis, et quod tot locis perferatur, natura patiatur? Illa vero non modo patitur, verum etiam postulat. Nihil enim habet præstantius, nihil quod magis expetat, quam honestum, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus. Hisce ego pluribus nominibus unam rem declarari

volo; sed utor, ut quam maxime significem, pluribus. Volo autem dicere, illud homini longe optimum esse, quod ipsum sit optandum per se, a virtute profectum, vel in ipsâ virtute situm, suâ sponte laudabile: quod quidem citius dixerim solum, quam non summum bonum. Atque, ut hæc de honesto, sic de turpi contraria: nihil tam tetrum, nihil tam adspernandum, nihil homine indignius.

Quod si tibi persuasum est, (principio enim dixisti, plus in dedecore mali tibi videri, quam in dolore) reliquum est, ut tute tibi imperes: quamquam hoc nescio quo modo dicatur, quasi duo simus, ut alter imperet, alter pareat: non inscite tamen dicitur.

XXI. Est enim animus in partes tributus duas, quarum altera rationis est particeps, altera expers. Cum igitur præcipitur, ut nobismetipsi imperemus, hoc præcipitur, ut ratio coërceat temeritatem. Est in animis omnium fere naturâ molle quiddam, demissum, humile, enervatum quodammodo, et languidum, [senile.] Si nihil aliud, nihil esset homine deformius. Sed præsto est domina omnium et regina, ratio, quæ, connixa per se, et progressa longius, fit perfecta virtus. Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi quæ *obedire debet*, id videndum est viro. Quonam

modo? inquies. Velut dominus servo, velut imperator militi, velut parens filio. Si turpissime se illa pars animi geret, quam dixi esse mollem, si se lamentis muliebriter, lacrymisque dedet, vinciatur et constringatur amicorum propinquorumque custodiis. Sæpe enim vidimus fractos pudore, qui ratione nullâ vincerentur. Ergo hos quidem, ut famulos, vinclis prope ac custodiâ coërceamus. Qui autem erunt firmiores, nec tamen robustissimi, hos admonitu oportebit, ut bonos milites, revocatos, dignitatem tueri. Non nimis in Niptris ille sapientissimus Græciæ saucius lamentatur, vel modice potius:

"Pedetentim" (inquit) "ite, et sedato nisu, ne succussu arripiat major dolor."

Pacuvius hæc melius, quam Sophocles. Apud illum enim perquam flebiliter Ulysses lamentatur in vulnere: tamen huic leviter gementi, illi ipsi qui ferunt saucium, personæ gravitatem intuentes, non dubitârunt dicere:

"Tu quoque, Ulysses, quamquam graviter cernimus ictum,
Nimis pæne animo es molli; qui, consuetus in armis ævum agere".....

Intelligit poëta prudens, ferendi doloris consuetudinem esse non contemnendam magistram. Atque ille non immoderate magno in dolore:

"Retinete, tenete, opprimite,
Ulcus nudate. Heu miserum me! excrucior."

Incipit labi: deinde illico desinit,

"Operite, abscedite, jamjam mittite.
Nam attrectatu et quassu sævum amplificatis dolorem."

Videsne, ut obmutuerit, non sedatus corporis, sed castigatus animi, dolor? Itaque in extremis Niptris alios quoque objurgat, idque moriens:

"Conqueri fortunam adversam, non lamentari, decet.
Id viri est officium: fletus muliebri ingenio additus."

Hujus animi pars illa mollior rationi sic paruit, ut severo imperatori miles pudens.

XXII. In quo vero erit perfecta sapientia (quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus neminem: sed philosophorum sententiis, qualis futurus sit, si modo aliquando fuerit, exponitur) is igitur, si ea ratio, quæ erit in eo perfecta atque absoluta, sic illi parti imperabit inferiori, ut justus parens probis filiis; nutu, quod volet, conficiet, nullo labore, nullâ molestiâ. Eriget ipse se, suscitabit, instruet, armabit; ut, tamquam hosti, sic obsistat dolori. Quæ sunt ista arma? Contentio, confirmatio, sermoque intimus, cum ipse secum, "Cave turpe quidquam, languidum, non virile."

Obversentur species honesta [illegible]. Zeno

proponatur Eleates, qui perpessus est omnia potius, quam conscios delendæ tyrannidis indicaret. De Anaxarcho Democritio cogitetur, qui, cum Cypri in manus Nicocreontis regis incidisset, nullum genus supplicii deprecatus est, neque recusavit. Calanus Indus, indoctus ac barbarus, in radicibus Caucasi natus, suâ voluntate vivus combustus est. Nos, si pes condoluit, si dens, si tactum dolore corpus, ferre non possumus. Opinio est enim quædam effeminata ac levis, nec in dolore magis quam in voluptate; quâ cum liquescimus, fluimusque mollitiâ, apis aculeum sine clamore ferre non possumus.

At vero C. Marius, rusticanus vir, sed plane vir, cum secaretur, ut supra dixi, principio vetuit se alligari: nec quisquam ante Marium solutus dicitur esse sectus. Cur ergo postea alii? Valuit auctoritas. Videsne igitur, opinionis esse, non naturæ, malum? Et tamen fuisse acrem morsum doloris, idem Marius ostendit: crus enim alterum non præbuit. Ita et tulit dolorem, ut vir, et, ut homo, majorem ferre sine causâ necessariâ noluit. Totum igitur in eo est, ut tibi imperes. Ostendi autem, quod esset imperandi genus; atque hæc cogitatio, quid patientiâ, quid fortitudine, quid magnitudine animi dignissimum sit, non solum animum comprimit, sed ipsum etiam dolorem, *nescio quo* pacto, mitiorem facit.

XXIII. Ut enim fit in prœlio, ut ignavus miles ac timidus, simul ac viderit hostem, abjecto scuto fugiat, quantum possit, ob eamque causam pereat nonnunquam, etiam integro corpore, cum ei, qui steterit, nihil tale evenerit; sic, qui doloris speciem ferre non possunt, abjiciunt se, atque ita afflicti et exanimati jacent: qui autem restiterunt, discedunt sæpissime superiores. Sunt enim quædam animi similitudines cum corpore. Ut onera contentis corporibus facilius feruntur, remissis opprimunt; simillime animus intentione suâ depellit pressum omnem ponderum; remissione autem sic urgetur, ut se nequeat extollere. Et, si verum quærimus, in omnibus officiis persequendis animi est adhibenda contentio. Ea est sola officii tamquam custodia. Sed hoc quidem in dolore maxime est providendum, ne quid abjecte, ne quid timide, ne quid ignave, ne quid serviliter, muliebriterve faciamus. In primisque refutetur ac rejiciatur Philoctetæus ille clamor. Ingemiscere nonnunquam viro concessum est, idque raro: ejulatus ne mulieri quidem: et hic nimirum est lessus, quem duodecim tabulæ in funeribus adhiberi vetuerunt. Nec vero unquam ne ingemiscit quidem vir fortis ac sapiens, nisi forte ut se intendat ad firmitatem, ut in stadio cursores exclamant, quam maxime possunt. *Faciunt idem,* cum exercentur, athletæ: pugiles

vero, etiam cum feriunt adversarium, in jactandis cæstibus ingemiscunt; non, quod doleant, animove succumbant, sed quia profundendâ voce omne corpus intenditur, venitque plaga vehementior.

XXIV. Quid? qui volunt exclamare majus, num satis habent latera, fauces, linguam intendere, e quibus ejici vocem, et fundi videmus? Toto corpore, atque omnibus ungulis, ut dicitur, contentioni vocis asserviunt. Genu, mehercule, M. Antonium vidi, cum contente pro se ipse lege Variâ diceret, terram tangere. Ut enim balistæ lapidum, et reliqua tormenta telorum, eo graviores emissiones habent, quo sunt contenta atque adducta vehementius; sic vox, sic cursus, sic plaga, hoc gravior, quo est missa contentius. Cujus contentionis cum tanta vis sit, si gemitus in dolore ad confirmandum animum valebit, utemur. Sin erit ille gemitus lamentabilis, si imbecillus, si abjectus, si flebilis; ei qui se dederit, vix eum virum dixerim. Qui quidem gemitus si levationis aliquid afferret, tamen videremus, quid esset fortis et animosi viri. Cum vero nihil imminuat doloris cur frustra turpes esse volumus? quid est enim fletu muliebri viro turpius?

Atque hoc præceptum, quod de dolore datur, patet latius. Omnibus enim rebus, non solum

dolori, simili contentione animi resistendum est. Ira exardescit? libido concitatur? In eamdem arcem confugiendum est: eadem sunt arma sumenda. Sed, quoniam de dolore loquimur, illa omittamus. Ad ferendum igitur dolorem placide et sedate, plurimum proficit, toto pectore (ut dicitur) cogitare, quam id honestum sit. Sumus enim naturâ, ut ante dixi, (dicendum est enim sæpius) studiosissimi, appetentissimique honestatis; cujus si quasi lumen aliquod adspexerimus, nihil est, quod, ut eo potiamur, non parati simus et ferre et perpeti. Ex hoc cursu atque impetu animorum ad veram laudem atque honestatem, illa pericula adeuntur in prœliis. Non sentiunt viri fortes in acie vulnera; vel, si sentiunt, se mori malunt, quam tantillum modo de dignitatis gradu demoveri. Fulgentes gladios hostium videbant Decii, cum in aciem eorum irruebant. His levabat omnem vulnerum metum nobilitas mortis, et gloria. Num tu ingemuisse Epaminondam putas, cum, unâ cum sanguine, vitam effluere sentiret? imperantem enim patriam Lacedæmoniis relinquebat, quam acceperat servientem: hæc sunt solatia, hæc fomenta summorum dolorum.

XXV. Dices, quid in pace? quid domi? quid in lectulo? Ad philosophos me revocas, qui in

aciem non sæpe prodeunt. E quibus homo sane levis Heracleotes Dionysius, cum a Zenone fortis esse didicisset, a dolore deductus est. Nam, cum ex renibus laboraret, ipso in ejulatu clamitabat, falsa esse illa, quæ antea de dolore ipse sensisset. Quem cum Cleanthes condiscipulus rogaret, quænam ratio eum de sententiâ deduxisset, respondit, Quia, cum tantum operæ philosophiæ dedissem, dolorem tamen ferre non possem, satis esset argumenti, malum esse dolorem: plurimos autem annos in philosophiâ consumsi, nec ferre possum: malum est igitur dolor. Tum Cleanthem, cum pede terram percussisset, versum ex Epigonis ferunt dixisse:

"Audisne hæc, Amphiarae, sub terram abdite?"

Zenonem significabat, a quo illum degenerare dolebat.

At non noster Posidonius; quem et ipse sæpe vidi; et id dicam, quod solebat narrare Pompeius: se, cum Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syriâ, audire voluisse Posidonium: sed, cum audivisset, eum graviter esse ægrum, quod vehementer ejus artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere: quem ut vidisset, et salutavisset, honorificisque verbis prosecutus esset, molesteque se dixisset ferre, quod eum non posset audire; at ille, Tu vero, inquit, potes:

nec committam, ut dolor corporis efficiat, ut frustra tantus vir ad me venerit. Itaque narrabat, eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, Nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum esset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, sæpe dixisse, "Nihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse confitebor malum."

Omninoque omnes clari et nobilitati labores contemnendo fiunt etiam tolerabiles.

XXVI. Videmusne, ut apud magistros eorum ludorum, qui Gymnici nominantur, magnus honos sit, nullum ab iis, qui in id certamen descendant, devitari dolorem? Apud quos autem venandi et equitandi laus viget, qui hanc petessunt, nullum fugiunt dolorem. Quid de nostris ambitionibus, quid de cupiditate honorum, loquar? Quæ flamma est, per quam non cucurrerint ii, qui hæc olim punctis singulis colligebant? Itaque semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophontem in manibus habebat; cujus in primis laudabat illud, quod diceret, eosdem labores non esse æque graves imperatori et militi, quod ipse honos laborem leviorem faceret imperatorium.

Sed tamen hoc evenit, ut in vulgus insipientium opinio valeat honestatis, cum ipsam videre

non possint. Itaque famâ et multitudinis judicio moventur, cum id honestum putent, quod a plerisque laudetur. Te autem, si in oculis sis multitudinis, tamen ejus judicio stare nolim, nec, quod illa putet, idem putare pulcherrimum. Tuo tibi judicio est utendum. Tibi si recta probanti placebis, tum non modo tu te viceris (quod paulo ante præcipiebam), sed omnes, et omnia.

Hoc igitur tibi propone: amplitudinem et quasi quamdam exaggerationem quam altissimam animi, quæ maxime eminet contemnendis et despiciendis doloribus, unam esse omnium rem pulcherrimam, eoque pulchriorem, si vacet populo, neque plausum captans, se tantum ipsa delectet.

Quinetiam mihi quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quæ sine venditatione, et sine populo teste, fiunt: non quo fugiendus sit (omnia enim benefacta in luce se collocari volunt): sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti conscientiâ majus est.

XXVII. Atque in primis meditemur illud, ut hæc patientia dolorum, quam sæpe jam animi intentione dixi esse firmandam, in omni genere se æquabilem præbeat. Sæpe enim multi, qui, aut propter victoriæ cupiditatem, aut propter gloriæ amorem, aut etiam ut jus suum et libertatem tenerent, vulnera exceperunt fortiter, et tu-

lerunt; iidem, omissâ contentione, dolorem morbi ferre non possunt. Neque enim illum, quem facile tulerant, ratione aut sapientiâ tulerant; sed studio potius, et gloriâ. Itaque barbari quidam et immanes ferro decertare acerrime possunt, ægrotare viriliter non queunt. Græci autem homines, non satis animosi, prudentes, ut est captus hominum, satis, hostem adspicere non possunt; iidem morbos toleranter atque humane ferunt. At Cimbri et Celtiberi in prœliis exsultant; lamentantur in morbo: nihil enim potest esse æquabile, quod non a certâ ratione proficiscatur.

Sed, cum videas, eos, qui aut studio aut opinione ducantur, in eo persequendo atque adipiscendo, dolore non frangi; debeas existimare aut non esse malum dolorem, aut, etiamsi, quidquid asperum alienumque naturâ sit, id appellari placeat malum, tantulum tamen esse, ut a virtute ita obruatur, ut nusquam appareat. Quæ meditare, quæso, dies et noctes. Latius enim manabit hæc ratio; et aliquanto majorem locum, quam de uno dolore, occupabit. Nam, si omnia, fugiendæ turpitudinis adipiscendæque honestatis causâ, facie-mus, non modo stimulos doloris, sed etiam fulmina fortunæ, contemnamus licebit, præsertim cum paratum sit illud ex hesternâ disputatione *perfugium*. Ut enim, si cui naviganti, quem

prædones insequantur, deus quis dixerit, Ejice te de navi: præsto est, qui excipiat, vel delphinus, ut Arionem Methymnæum; vel equi Pelopis illi Neptunii, qui per undas currus suspensos rapuisse dicuntur, excipient te, et, quo velis, perferent; omnem omittat timorem; sic, urgentibus asperis et odiosis doloribus, si tanti sint, ut ferendi non sint, quo sit confugiendum, vides.

Hæc fere hoc tempore putavi esse dicenda. Sed tu fortasse in sententiâ permanes. *Auditor.* Minime vero: meque biduo duarum rerum, quas maxime timebam, spero liberatum metu. *Marcus.* Cras ergo ad clepsydram: sic enim dicimus: et tibi hoc video non posse deberi. *Auditor.* It prorsus: et illud quidem ante meridiem, hoc eodem tempore. *Marcus.* Sic faciemus; tuisque optimis studiis obsequemur.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM,

AD

MARCUM BRUTUM,

LIBER TERTIUS.

De Ægritudine leniendâ.

I. QUIDNAM esse, Brute, causæ putem, cur, cum constemus ex animo et corpore, corporis curandi tuendique [causâ] quæsita sit ars, [ejusque utilitas] deorum immortalium inventioni consecrata; animi autem medicina nec tam desiderata sit, antequam inventa, nec tam culta, posteaquam cognita est, nec tam multis grata et probata, pluribus etiam suspecta et invisa? An, quod corporis gravitatem et dolorem animo judicamus, animi morbum corpore non sentimus? Ita fit, ut animus de se ipse tum judicet, cum id ipsum, quo judicatur, ægrotet.

Quod si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam *ipsam intueri* et perspicere, eâdemque optimâ

duce cursum vitæ conficere, possemus; haud erat sane, quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam requireret. Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter, malis moribus opinionibusque depravati, sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat. Sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum; quæ si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. Nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summâ opinionum perversitate versamur; ut pæne cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. Cum vero, parentibus redditi, [demum] magistris traditi sumus, tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, et opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa, cedat.

II. Accedunt etiam poëtæ; qui, cum magnam speciem doctrinæ sapientiæque præ se tulerunt, audiuntur, leguntur, ediscuntur, et inhærescunt penitus in mentibus. Cum vero eodem, quasi maximus quidam magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate, a naturâque desciscimus; ut nobis optimam naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil præstantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloriâ, judicaverunt; ad

quam fertur optimus quisque; veramque illam honestatem expetens, quam unam natura maxime inquirit, in summâ inanitate versatur; consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem [virtutis], sed adumbratam imaginem gloriæ. Est enim gloria solida quædam res et expressa, non adumbrata. Ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta vox bene judicantium de excellente virtute. Ea virtuti resonat, tamquam imago: quæ, quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est bonis viris repudianda.

Illa autem, quæ se ejus imitatricem esse vult, temeraria atque inconsiderata, et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix, fama popularis, simulatione honestatis formam ejus pulchritudinemque corrumpit. Quâ cæcitate homines, cum quædam etiam præclara cuperent, eaque nescirent nec ubi nec qualia essent, funditus alii everterunt suas civitates; alii ipsi occiderunt. Atque hi quidem, optima petentes, non tam voluntate, quam cursûs errore, falluntur. Quid? qui pecuniæ cupiditate, qui voluptatum libidine feruntur; quorumque ita perturbantur animi, ut non multum absint ab insaniâ, quod insipientibus continget omnibus; his nullane est adhibenda curatio? utrum, quod minus noceant animi ægrotationes, quam corporis? an, quod corpora curari possint, *animorum* medicina nulla sit?

III. At et morbi perniciosiores pluresque sunt animi quam corporis. Hi enim ipsi odiosi sunt quod ad animum pertinent, eumque sollicitant: animusque æger, ut ait Ennius, "semper errat, neque pati, neque perpeti potest: cupere nunquam desinit." Quibus duobus morbis (ut omittam alios), ægritudine et cupiditate, qui tandem possunt in corpore esse graviores? Quî vero probari potest, ut sibi mederi animus non possit, cum ipsam medicinam corporis animus invenerit, cumque ad corporum sanationem multum ipsa corpora et naturâ valeant, nec omnes, qui curari se passi sunt, continuo etiam convalescant: animi autem, qui sanari voluerint, præceptisque sapientium paruerint, sine ullâ dubitatione sanentur? Est profecto animi medicina, philosophia, cujus auxilium non, ut in corporis morbis, petendum est foris: omnibusque opibus, viribusque, ut nosmetipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est. Quamquam de universâ philosophiâ, quantopere expetenda esset et colenda, satis (ut arbitror) dictum est in Hortensio. De maximis autem rebus nihil fere intermisimus posteà nec disputare nec scribere. His autem libris exposita sunt ea, quæ a nobis cum familiaribus nostris in Tusculano erant disputata. Sed, quoniam, duobus superioribus, de morte et de dolore dictum est, tertius dies disputationis hoc tertium volumen

efficiet. Ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus, inclinato jam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, causam disserendi. Tum res acta sic est.

IV. *Auditor.* Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem ægritudo. *Marcus.* Num reliquæ quoque perturbationes animi, formidines, libidines, iracundiæ? hæc enim ferę sunt ejusmodi, quæ Græci *Πάθη* appellant; ego poteram *Morbos;* et id verbum esset e verbo: sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet: nam misereri, invidere, gestire, lætari, hæc omnia *Morbos* Græci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantes: nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi, recte, ut opinor, *Perturbationes* dixerimus: morbos autem non satis usitate: nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. *Auditor.* Mihi vero isto modo. *Marcus.* Hæccine igitur cadere in sapientem putas? *Auditor.* Prorsus existimo. *Marcus.* Næ ista gloriosa sapientia non magno æstimanda est, siquidem non multum differt ab insaniâ? *Auditor.* Quid? tibi omnisne animi commotio videtur insania? *Marcus.* Non mihi quidem soli: sed (id, quod admirari sæpe soleo) majoribus quoque nostris hoc ita visum intelligo multis seculis ante Socratem, a quo hæc omnis, quæ est de vitâ et de moribus, philosophia manavit. *Auditor.* Quonam tandem

modo? *Marcus.* Quia nomen insaniæ significat mentis ægrotationem et morbum, [id est, insanitatem et ægritudinem animi, quam appellârunt insaniam]. Omnes autem perturbationes animi, morbos philosophi appellant; negantque, stultum quemquam his morbis vacare: qui autem in morbo sunt, sani non sunt: [et] omnium insipientium animi in morbo sunt: omnes insipientes igitur insaniunt. Sanitatem enim animorum positam in tranquillitate quâdam constantiâque censebant: his rebus mentem vacuam appellârunt insanam, propterea quod, in perturbato animo, sicut in corpore, sanitas esse non posset.

V. Nec minus illud acute, quod animi affectionem, lumine mentis carentem, nominaverunt amentiam, eamdemque dementiam: ex quo intelligendum est, eos, qui hæc rebus nomina posuerunt, sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter Stoïci retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos. Qui enim animus est in aliquo morbo, (morbos autem hos perturbatos motus, ut modo dixi, philosophi appellant) non magis est sanus, quam id corpus quod in morbo est. Ita fit, ut sapientia sanitas sit animi; insipientia autem, quasi insanitas quædam [quæ est insania], eademque dementia. Multoque melius hæc no-

tata sunt verbis Latinis, quam Græcis; quod aliis quoque multis locis reperietur. Sed id alias: nunc, quod instat.

Totum igitur id, quod quærimus, quid et quale sit, verbi vis ipsa declarat. Eos enim sanos quoniam intelligi necesse est, quorum mens motu, quasi morbo, perturbata nullo sit; qui contra affecti sunt, hos insanos appellari necesse est. Itaque nihil melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum "exîsse ex potestate" dicimus eos, qui effrenati feruntur aut libidine aut iracundiâ: quamquam ipsa iracundia libîdinis est pars: sic enim definitur iracundia, ulciscendi libido. Qui igitur exîsse ex potestate dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non sunt in potestate mentis, cui regnum totius animi a naturâ tributum est. Græci autem *Μανίαν* unde appellent, non facile dixerim. Eam tamen ipsam distinguimus nos melius, quam illi. Hanc enim insaniam, quæ, juncta stultitiæ, patet latius, a furore disjungimus. Græci volunt illi quidem; sed parum valent verbo: quem nos furorem, *Μελαγχολίαν* illi vocant: quasi vero atrâ bili solum mens, ac non sæpe vel iracundiâ graviore, vel timore, vel dolore, moveatur. Quo genere Athamantem, Alcmæonem, Ajacem, Orestem, furere dicimus. Qui ita sit affectus, eum dominum esse rerum *suarum vetant* duodecim tabulæ: itaque non est

scriptum, "si insanus," sed "si furiosus esse incipit." [Insaniam] enim censuerunt (id est, inconstantiam sanitate vacantem) posse tamen tueri mediocritatem officiorum, et vitæ communem cultum atque usitatum. Furorem autem esse rati sunt, mentis ad omnia cæcitatem: quod cum majus esse videatur quam insania, tamen ejusmodi est, ut furor in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania. Sed hæc alia quæstio est. Nos ad propositum revertamur.

VI. Cadere, opinor, in sapientem ægritudinem tibi dixisti videri. *Auditor.* Et vero ita existimo. *Marcus.* Humanum id quidem, quod ita existimas: non enim silice nati sumus. Sed est naturâ fere in animis tenerum quiddam atque molle, quod ægritudine, quasi tempestate, quatiatur. Nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostrâ Academiâ vel in primis fuit nobilis, "Minime," inquit, "assentior iis, qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magnopere laudant, quæ nec potest ulla esse, nec debet. Ne ægrotus sim, inquit: sed, si fuerim, sensus [adsit,] sive secetur quid, sive avellatur a corpore: nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magnâ mercede contingit, immanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore." Sed videamus, ne hæc oratio sit hominum assentantium nostræ imbecillitati, et indulgentium mollitudini.

autem audeamus non solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnes radicum fibras evellere. Tamen aliquid relinquetur fortasse: ita sunt altæ stirpes stultitiæ. Sed relinquetur id solum, quod erit necessarium. Illud quidem sic habeto, nisi sanatus animus sit, (quod sine philosophiâ fieri non potest) finem miseriarum nullum fore. Quamobrem, quoniam cœpimus, tradamus nos ei curandos. Sanabimur, si volemus. Et progrediar quidem longius: non enim de ægritudine solum, quamquam id quidem primum, sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione, morbo, ut Græci volunt, explicabo. Et primo, si placet, Stoïcorum more agamus, qui breviter adstringere solent argumenta; deinde nostro instituto vagabimur.

VII. Qui fortis est, idem est fidens: (quoniam confidens, malâ consuetudine loquendi, in vitio ponitur, ductum verbum a confidendo, quod laudis est.) Qui autem est fidens, is profecto non extimescit: discrepat enim a timendo confidere. Atque in quem cadit ægritudo, in eumdem timor: quarum enim rerum præsentiâ sumus in ægritudine, easdem impendentes et venientes timemus. Ita fit, ut fortitudini ægritudo repugnet. Verisimile est igitur, in quem cadat ægritudo, cadere in eumdem timorem, et infractionem

quamdam animi, et demissionem. Quæ in quem cadunt, in eumdem cadit, ut serviat, ut victum se quandoque esse fateatur: quæ qui recipit, recipiat idem necesse est timiditatem et ignaviam. Non cadunt autem hæc in virum fortem: igitur ne ægritudo quidem. At nemo sapiens, nisi fortis. Non cadit ergo in sapientem ægritudo.

Præterea necesse est, qui fortis sit, eumdem esse magni animi: qui magni animi sit, invictum; qui invictus sit, eum res humanas despicere, atque infra se positas arbitrari. Despicere autem nemo potest eas res, propter quas ægritudine affici potest. Ex quo efficitur, fortem virum ægritudine nunquam affici. Omnes autem sapientes, fortes: non cadit igitur in sapientem ægritudo. Et, quemadmodum oculus conturbatus non est probe affectus ad suum munus fungendum; et reliquæ partes, totumve corpus statu cum est motum, deest officio suo et muneri; sic conturbatus animus non est aptus ad exsequendum munus suum. Munus autem animi est ratione bene uti: et sapientis animus ita semper affectus est, ut ratione optime utatur: nunquam igitur est perturbatus. At ægritudo perturbatio est animi: semper igitur eâ sapiens vacabit.

VIII. Veri etiam simile illud est, qui sit temperans, quem Græci σώφρονα appellant, eamque

virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, nonnunquam etiam modestiam: sed haud scio, an recte ea virtus, frugalitas appellari possit, quod angustius apud Græcos valet, qui frugi homines χρησίμους appellant, id est, tantummodo utiles: at illud est latius. Omnem enim abstinentiam, omnem innocentiam, (quæ apud Græcos usitatum nomen nullum habet, sed habere potest ἀβλάβειαν: nam est innocentia affectio talis animi, quæ noceat nemini) reliquas etiam virtutes frugalitas continet. Quæ nisi tanta esset, et s iis angustiis, quibus plerique putant, teneretur nunquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tantoper laudatum. Sed, quia nec qui, propter metum præsidium reliquit, quod est ignaviæ; nec qui propter avaritiam, clam depositum non reddidit quod est injustitiæ; nec qui, propter temerita tem, male rem gessit, quod est stultitiæ, frug appellari solet; eo tres virtutes, fortitudinem justitiam, prudentiam, frugalitas est complexa etsi hoc quidem commune est virtutum. Omne enim inter se nexæ et jugatæ sunt. Reliquun igitur est, quarta virtus ut sit ipsa frugalitas Ejus enim videtur esse proprium, motus anim appetentis regere et sedare, semperque adversan tem libidini, moderatam in omni re servare con stantiam: cui contrarium vitium nequitia dicitur

Frugalitas, ut opinor, a *fruge*, quâ nihil melius e terrâ: *nequitia* (etsi hoc erit fortasse durius: sed tentemus: lusisse putemur, si nil sit) ab eo, quod *nequidquam* est in tali homine; ex quo idem, *nihili* dicitur. Qui sit frugi igitur, vel, si mavis, moderatus et temperans, eum necesse est esse constantem; qui autem constans, quietum; qui quietus, perturbatione omni vacuum: ergo etiam ægritudine. Et sunt illa sapientis: aberit igitur a sapiente ægritudo.

IX. Itaque non inscite Heracleotes Dionysius ad ea disputat, quæ apud Homerum Achilles queritur, hoc, ut opinor, modo,

"Corque meum penitus turgescit tristibus iris,
Cum decore atque omni me orbatum laude recordor."

Num manus affecta recte est, cum in tumore est? aut num aliquodpiam membrum, tumidum ac turgidum, non vitiose se habet? Sic igitur inflatus et tumens animus in vitio est. Sapientis autem animus semper vacat vitio; nunquam turgescit; nunquam tumet. At irati animus ejusmodi est: nunquam igitur sapiens irascitur. Nam si irascitur, etiam concupiscit: proprium est enim irati, cupere, a quo læsus videatur, ei quam maximum dolorem inurere. Qui autem id concupierit, eum necesse est, si id consecutus

sit, magnopere lætari. Ex quo fit, ut alieno malo gaudeat: quod quoniam non cadit in sapientem, ne ut irascatur quidem cadit. Sin autem caderet in sapientem ægritudo, caderet etiam iracundia: quâ quoniam vacat, ægritudine etiam vacabit. Etenim, si sapiens in ægritudinem incidere posset, posset etiam in misericordiam; posset in invidentiam. Non dixi *invidiam*, quæ tum est, cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem *invidentia* recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ambiguum nomen invidiæ; quod verbum ductum est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Menalippo,

" Quisnam florem liberûm invidit meûm? '

Male Latine videtur, sed præclare, Accius: ut enim videre, sic invidere, *florem* rectius, quam *flori*. Nos consuetudine prohibemur: poëta jus suum tenuit, et dixit audacius.

X. Cadit igitur in eumdem et misereri, et invidere: nam qui dolet rebus alicujus adversis, idem alicujus etiam secundis [dolet;] ut Theophrastus, interitum deplorans Callisthenis sodalis sui, rebus Alexandri prosperis angitur: itaque dicit Callisthenem incidisse in hominem summâ potentiâ, summâque fortunâ, sed ignarum, quemadmodum rebus secundis uti conveniret. Atqui quemadmodum misericordia ægritudo est ex

alterius rebus adversis, sic invidentia ægritudo est ex alterius rebus secundis. In quem igitur cadit misereri, in eumdem etiam invidere. Non cadit autem invidere in sapientem: ergo ne misereri quidem. Quod si ægre ferre sapiens soleret, misereri etiam soleret. Abest ergo a sapiente ægritudo.

Hæc sic dicuntur a Stoïcis, concludunturque contortius. Sed latius aliquanto dicenda sunt, et diffusius: sententiis tamen utendum eorum potissimum, qui maxime forti, et, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione atque sententiâ. Nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, (quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius) mediocritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Nam, ut corpus, etiam si mediocriter ægrum est, sanum non est; sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate.

Itaque præclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam, sollicitudinem, angorem, propter similitudinem corporum ægrorum, ægritudinem nominaverunt. Hoc propemodum verbo Græci omnem animi perturbationem appellant. Vocant enim πάθος, id est, morbum, quicumque est motus in animo turbidus. Nos melius: ægris enim cor-

poribus simillima est animi ægritudo: at non similis ægrotationis est libido, non immoderata lætitia, quæ est voluptas animi elata et gestiens. Ipse etiam metus non est morbi admodum simi-
5 lis, quamquam ægritudini est finitimus, sed proprie, ut ægrotatio in corpore, sic ægritudo in animo, nomen habet non sejunctum a dolore. Doloris igitur hujus origo nobis explicanda est, id est, causa efficiens ægritudinem in animo,
10 tamquam ægrotationem in corpore. Nam, ut medici, causâ morbi inventâ, curationem esse inventam putant; sic nos, causâ ægritudinis repertâ, medendi facultatem reperiemus.

XI. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec
15 vero ægritudinis solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum; quæ sunt genere quatuor, partibus plures. Nam, cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus, vel rationis expers, vel rationem adspernans, vel rationi non obediens,
20 isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur; bifariam quatuor perturbationes æqualiter distributæ sunt. Nam duæ sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est, præter modum elata lætitia, opinione præsentis magni
25 alicujus boni; altera cupiditas, quæ recte vel libido dici potest; quæ est immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni, rationi non obtemperans.

Ergo hæc duo genera, voluptas gestiens, et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut duo reliqua, metus et ægritudo, malorum. Nam et metus opinio est magni mali impendentis; et ægritudo est opinio magni mali præsentis; et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum videatur esse angi: id autem est, ut is, qui doleat, oportere opinetur se dolere. His autem perturbationibus, quas in vitam hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias immittit atque incitat, omnibus viribus atque opibus repugnandum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est, vitæ, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed ceteras alias; nunc ægritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. Id enim sit propositum; quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti; quod ego nullo modo existimo. Tetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni contentione, velis (ut ita dicam) remisque fugienda.

XII. Qualis enim tibi ille videtur Tantalo prognatus, Pelope natus, qui quondam a socero Œnomao rege Hippodamiam "raptis nactus est nuptiis?" Jovis iste quidem pronepos; tamne ergo abjectus, tamque fractus?

"Nolite," (inquit) "hospites, ad me adire illico istic;
Ne contagio mea bonis, umbrave, obsit:
Tanta vis sceleris in corpore hæret."

Tu te, Thyesta, damnabis, orbabisque luce, propter vim sceleris alieni? Quid? illum filium Solis nonne patris ipsius luce indignum putas?

"Refugêre oculi: corpus macie extabuit:
Lacrymæ peredêre humore exsangues genas:
Situ nidoris barba pœdore horrida,
Atque intonsa, infuscat pectus illuvie scabrum."

Hæc mala, o stultissime Æeta, ipse tibi addidisti; (non inerant in his, quæ tibi casus invexerat) et quidem inveterato malo, cum tumor animi resedisset. [Est autem ægritudo, ut docebo, in opinione mali recentis.] Sed mœres videlicet regni desiderio, non filiæ: illam enim oderas, et jure fortasse; regno non æquo animo carebas. Est autem impudens luctus mœrore se conficientis, quod imperare non liceat liberis. Dionysius quidem tyrannus, Syracusis expulsus, Corinthi pueros docebat: usque eo imperio carere non poterat. Tarquinio vero quid impudentius, qui bellum gereret cum iis, qui ejus non tulerant superbiam? Is, cum restitui in regnum nec Veientium nec Latinorum armis potuisset, Cumas se contulisse dicitur; inque eâ urbe senio et ægritudine esse confectus.

XIII. Hoc tu igitur censes sapienti accidere *posse, ut* ægritudine opprimatur, id est, miseriâ?

Nam, cum omnis perturbatio miseria est, tum carnificina est ægritudo. Habet ardorem libido, levitatem lætitia gestiens, humilitatem metus: sed ægritudo majora quædam, tabem, cruciatum, afflictationem, fœditatem: lacerat, exest animum, planeque conficit. Hanc nisi exuimus sic, ut abjiciamus, miseriâ carere non possumus.

Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum ægritudinem exsistere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet, opinionem mali ægritudinem esse naturâ, ut quicumque intueatur in aliquod majus malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in ægritudine. Cyrenaïci non omni malo ægritudinem effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. Est id quidem non mediocre ad ægritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. Ex hoc et illa jure laudantur:

"Ego, cum genui, tum moriturum scivi, et ei rei sustuli.
Præterea ad Trojam cum misi ob defendendam Græciam,
Sciebam me in mortiferum bellum, non in epulas, mittere."

XIV. Hæc igitur præmeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quæ venientia longe ante videris. Itaque apud Euripidem a

Theseo dicta laudantur. (Licet enim, ut sæpe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere.)

" Nam, qui hæc audita a docto meminissem viro,
Futuras mecum commentabar miserias.
Aut mortem acerbam, aut exsilii mœstam fugam,
Aut semper aliquam molem meditabar mali;
Ut, siqua invecta diritas casu foret,
Ne me imparatum cura laceraret repens."

Quod autem Theseus a docto se audîsse dicit, id de seipso loquitur Euripides. Fuerat enim auditor Anaxagoræ; quem ferunt, nuntiatâ morte filii, dixisse, " Sciebam me genuisse mortalem." Quæ vox declarat, iis esse hæc acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata. Ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quæ mala putentur, sint improvisa graviora. Itaque, quamquam non hæc una rès efficit maximam ægritudinem; tamen, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et præparatio ad minuendum dolorem; sint semper omnia homini humana meditata. Et nimirum hæc est illa præstans et divîna sapientia, et præceptas penitus et pertractatas humanas res habere; nihil admirari, cum acciderit; nihil, antequam evenerit, non evenire posse arbitrari.

" Quamobrem omnes, cum secundæ res sunt maximum maxime
Meditari secum oportet, quo pacto advorsam æruminam ferant.

Pericla, damna, peregre rediens, semper secum cogitet,
Aut filii peccatum, aut uxoris mortem, aut morbum filiæ:
Communia esse hæc; ne quid horum unquam accidat animo novum:
Quidquid præter spem eveniat, omne id deputare esse in lucro."

XV. Ergo hoc Terentius, a philosophiâ sumtum, cum tam commode dixerit, nos, e quorum fontibus id haustum est, non et dicemus hoc melius, et constantius sentiemus? Hic est enim ille vultus semper idem, quem dicitur Xanthippe prædicare solita in viro suo fuisse Socrate; eodem semper se vidisse exeuntem illum domo, et revertentem. Nec vero ea frons erat, quæ M. Crassi illius veteris, quem semel ait in omni vitâ risisse Lucilius; sed tranquilla, et serena: sic enim accepimus. Jure autem erat semper idem vultus, cum mentis, a quâ is fingitur, nulla fieret mutatio. Quare accipio equidem a Cyrenaïcis hæc arma contra casus et eventus, quibus eorum advenientes impetus diuturnâ præmeditatione frangantur: simulque judico, malum illud opinionis esse, non naturæ.

Si enim in re essent, cur fierent provisa leviora? Sed est, iisdem de rebus quod dici possit subtilius, si prius Epicuri sententiam viderimus;

qui censet, necesse esse omnes in ægritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et exspectata sint, sive inveteraverint: nam neque vetustate minui mala, nec fieri præmeditata leviora: stultamque etiam esse meditationem futuri mali, aut fortasse ne futuri quidem: satis esse odiosum malum omne, cum venisset: qui autem semper cogitavisset accidere posse aliquid adversi, ei fieri illud sempiternum malum: si vero ne futurum quidem sit, frustra suscipi miseriam voluntariam: ita semper angi, aut accipiendo aut cogitando malo. Levationem autem ægritudinis in duabus rebus ponit, avocatione a cogitandâ molestiâ, et revocatione ad contemplandas voluptates. Parere enim censet animum rationi posse, et, quo illa ducat, sequi. Vetat igitur [ratio] intueri molestias: abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus [hebetem] aciem ad miserias contemplandas; a quibus cum cecinit receptui, impellit rursum et incitat ad conspiciendas, totâque mente contrectandas, varias voluptates, quibus ille, et præteritarum memoriâ, et spe consequentium, sapientis vitam refertam putat. Hæc nostro more nos diximus: Epicurei dicunt suo. Sed, quæ dicant, videamus; quo modo, negligamus.

XVI. Principio, male reprehendunt præme-

ditationem rerum futurarum. Nihil est enim, quod tam obtundat levetque ægritudinem, quam perpetua in omni vitâ cogitatio, nihil esse, quod accidere non possit; quam meditatio conditionis humanæ; quam vitæ lex, commentatioque parendi; quæ non hoc affert, ut semper mœreamus, sed ut nunquam. Neque enim, qui rerum naturam, qui vitæ varietatem, qui imbecillitatem generis humani cogitat, mœret cum hæc cogitat; sed tum vel maxime sapientiæ fungitur munere. Utrumque enim consequitur, ut et, considerandis rebus humanis, proprio philosophiæ fungatur officio, et adversis casibus triplici consolatione sanetur: primum, quod posse accidere diu cogitavit; quæ cogitatio una maxime molestias omnes extenuat et diluit; deinde, quod humana ferenda intelligit; postremo, quod videt malum nullum esse, nisi culpam; culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine non potuerit præstari, evenerit. Nam revocatio illa, quam affers, cum a contuendis nos malis avocas, nulla est. Non est enim in nostrâ potestate, fodicantibus iis rebus quas malas esse opinemur, dissimulatio, vel oblivio. Lacerant; vexant; stimulos admovent; ignes adhibent; respirare non sinunt. Et tu oblivisci jubes, quod contra naturam est? Quod a naturâ datum est, auxilium extorques inveterati doloris? Est enim tarda illa quidem medicina,

sed tamen magna, quam affert longinquitas et dies. Jubes me bona cogitare, oblivisci malorum. Diceres aliquid, et magno quidem philosopho dignum, si ea bona sentires esse, quæ essent homine dignissima.

NOTES.

BOOK I.

Page 7. *Line* 2. *Tusculanarum.* In the sixty-second year of Cicero's age, he published his Tusculan Disputations, in five books, upon as many different questions in philosophy, the most important and useful to the happiness of human life. The first teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to look upon it as a blessing, rather than an evil; the second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude; the third, to appease all our complaints and uneasiness under the accidents of life; the fourth, to moderate all our other passions; and the fifth, to evince the sufficiency of virtue to make man happy. It was his custom, in the opportunities of his leisure, to take some friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative, tending to improve the mind and en-

large the understanding. In this manner he spent five days at his Tusculan villa, (see page 11,) in discussing with his friends the several questions just mentioned.

7. 3. *Brute;* Marcus Junius Brutus, an illustrious Roman descended from L. Junius Brutus. His accomplishments as a scholar and an orator are sufficiently attested by Cicero, who has introduced him as one of the speakers in his dialogue *De Claris Oratoribus*, and addressed to him his treatise entitled *Orator.*

7. 5. *Remissa temporibus;* referring to the period of the civil wars. Ennius says of it, "*Tollitur e medio sapientia, vi geritur res.*" The duties of Cicero as an advocate and senator during that time were necessarily arduous and engrossing.

7. 8. *Philosophia.* The general purpose of Cicero's philosophical works was, to give a history of the ancient philosophy, rather than any account of his own; to explain to his fellow-citizens, in their own language, whatever the philosophers, of all sects and in all ages, had taught on every important question, in order to enlarge their minds and reform their morals; and to employ himself the most usefully to his country, at a time when arms and superior force had deprived him of the power of serving it in any other way. This he declares in his treatises *De Finibus*, and *De Naturâ Deorum;* in his Tusculan Disputations; and in his book on the Academic Philosophy; in all which he sometimes takes upon

himself the part of a Stoic, sometimes of an Epicurean, sometimes of a Peripatetic, for the sake of explaining, with more authority, the different doctrines of each sect. As he assumes the person of the one to confute the other, so, in his proper character of an Academic, he sometimes disputes against them all, while the unwary reader, not reflecting on the nature of the dialogues, takes Cicero still for the perpetual speaker, and, under that mistake, often quotes a sentiment for his, that was delivered by him only in order to be confuted.

7. 12. *Nostros aut invenisse.* In his *Brutus*, our author gives as a reason for this assertion, *non quod res ita sit, sed ut suos accendat et hortetur.* Those who read carefully the writings of Roman authors, will readily perceive how much such men as Cicero, Pliny, Varro, Livy, and Cæsar, contributed to the honor of their country.

8. 16. *Antiquissimum genus poëtarum.* Before the invention of letters, all the people of the earth had, probably, no other method of transmitting to their descendants the principles of their worship, their religious ceremonies, their laws, and the renowned actions of their sages and heroes, than by poetry; which included all these objects in a kind of hymns, that fathers sang to their children, in order to engrave them indelibly upon their hearts. History not only informs us that Moses and Miriam, the first authors that are known to mankind, sang, on the banks of the Red Sea, a song of divine praise,

to celebrate the deliverance which God had granted to the people of Israel by opening a passage to them through the waters, but it has also transmitted to us the song itself, which is at once the most ancient monument, and a masterpiece of poetic composition. The Greeks, a people the most ingenious, the most animated, and, in every sense, the most accomplished, that the world ever produced, strove to ravish from the Hebrews the gift of poetry bestowed upon them by the Author of all nature, that they might ascribe it to their false deities. According to their ingenious fictions, Apollo became the god of poetry, and dwelt on the hills of Phocis, Parnassus, and Helicon, whose feet were washed by the waters of Hippocrene, of which each mortal that ever drank was seized with a sacred delirium. The immortal swans floated on its waves. Apollo was accompanied by the Muses, those nine learned sisters, the daughters of Memory; and he was constantly attended by the Graces. Pegasus, his winged courser, transported him into all the regions of the universe. With these happy emblems we, at this day, embellish our poetry.

The literary annals of all nations afford vestiges of poetry from the remotest ages. They are found among the most savage of the ancient barbarians, and the most desolate of all the Americans. Tacitus mentions the verses and the hymns of the Germans, at the time when that rough people yet inhabited the woods, and while their manners were still savage.

8. 17. *Si quidem Homerus.* He was born about 160 years after the destruction of Troy, and lived to the age of 104. So says Salianus: some think differently. Hesiod is generally supposed to have been a contemporary with Homer, but Salianus thinks the era in which he flourished was a century later. See note 85. 24. vol. II.

8. 18. *Archilochus.* A Greek poet and musician. Cicero ranks him with the poets of the first class. Horace professes to have imitated him as to his style and manner, but not in his malignity. The satires of Archilochus were not only unjustifiably severe, but offensively licentious and indecent; on this account his poems were prohibited at Sparta as being more likely to corrupt the hearts and manners of young people than to be useful in cultivating their understandings.

8. 18. *Regnante Romulo.* Nepos and many others think he flourished about a century after Romulus. According to Herodotus, he was contemporary with Candaules and Gyges, kings of Lydia, who flourished about the 14th Olympiad, or 724 years before Christ.

8. 20. *Livius.* A Latin poet, a slave by condition, who after being manumitted was called L. Livius Andronicus. Fragments of his works are still extant.

8. 22. *Qui.* Unless our author is mistaken in his chronology here, the relative refers to Livius;

for it is generally admitted that Nævius was older than Ennius.

8. 24. *Nævius.* This ancient poet and historian was a native of Campania, and served in the first Punic war, of which he wrote a history in Saturnian verse. His first comedy, which was performed about the year 235 or 228 B. C. gave offence to some of the leading men at Rome, and on account of it he was thrown into prison. Only fragments of his works are extant.

8. 26. *Originibus.* The title of a historical work by the elder Cato. Cicero in his "Brutus," says of it: *Origines Catonis quem florem, aut quod lumen eloquentiæ non habent!*

9. 1. *Catonis.* Marcus Porcius Cato, called the Censor, was born at Tusculum, B. C. 235. He composed a variety of works, of which the principal was a history of the Roman affairs, and of the origin of all the cities of Italy; from that circumstance entitled "Origines."

9. 4. *Ennium.* Quintus Ennius, an ancient poet, born at Rudiæ, a city of Calabria. He is said to have been the father of epic or heroic poetry among the Latins, though the Greek was his mother tongue. He was distinguished by that rustic vigor which is the usual characteristic of genius in an unpolished age. Thus Ovid represents him:

Ennius ingenio maximus, arte rudis.

Lucretius mentions his having brought the muse to

Latium; and Virgil has transcribed into his work many whole or half lines from Ennius, thus testifying his esteem of him. Only fragments of his works remain.

9. 8. *Fabio.* C. Fabius Pictor.

9. 10. *Polycletos.* Polycletus, according to Pliny, Quintilian, and Cicero in his "Brutus," was an eminent statuary who flourished B. C. 432. From this passage we may infer that he was also a painter.

9. 16. *Fidibus cecinisse;* "to play on the lyre." Cicero (De Div. II. 50.) directly contrasts vocal and instrumental music: *Si velim canere vel voce, vel fidibus,* "if I wish to sing, or to play on the lyre."

9. 17. *Themistocles.* See Plutarch's lives of Themistocles and Cimon.

9. 22. *Geometria fuit.* The science of geometry originated with the Egyptians; that of arithmetic with the Phœnicians.

10. 2. *Africanum.* The younger.

10. 4. *Lepidum.* M. Æmilius Lepidus, whom our author in his "Brutus" calls *scriptor sane bonus, in quo Latinorum omnium primo, et lenitas Græcorum apparuerit, et verborum comprehensio cum artifice stylo. Carbonem.* Caius Papirius Carbo. An eloquent but seditious man. Cicero says that his orations were *nondum satis splendidas verbis, sed acutas, prudentiæque plenissimas.*

10. 4. *Gracchos.* Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, of the Sempronian family. Both were distinguished

for eloquence, were elected tribunes, strenuously advocated the agrarian laws, and perished by violence. Their names were fondly cherished by the people, statues were erected to their memory, and the places on which they were killed, were consecrated by religious rites to their manes. Caius has been generally considered as less pure in his intentions, and less moderate in his plans, than Tiberius.

10. 13. *Latini libri . . . eruditis.* He alludes to Amafanius and others of the school of Epicurus. See also Lib. iv. 3.

10. 26. *Illa;* sc. *disponere, illustrare, et delectatione afficere lectorem.* Perhaps *illa manabat* is the correct reading, in which case *illa* would refer to *oratoriæ laudis.*

11. 1. *Isocratis rhetoris gloriâ.* See Cic. de Oratore, II. 35. Isocrates was a celebrated rhetorician, born at Athens about 436 B. C. His style is pure, sweet and flowing; he was exceedingly attentive to the harmony of his periods, and is considered by Cicero to have been the first who introduced into Greek prose that melody of which it is susceptible. He spent much time in polishing his compositions; his panegyric on Athens is said to have cost him ten years' labor. Twenty-one of his discourses remain.

11. 9. *Operam.* This word is omitted in many good editions. There is, however, authority for such a use of it in the Casina of Plautus: *Benigne ut operam detis ad nostrum gregem.*

11. 10. *Scholas;* "disputations," in which sense the word often occurs in the present work.

11. 17. *Sedens.* After the manner of Socrates. *Ambulans.* As was the custom of Aristotle.

12. 1. *Malum mihi videtur.* Some commentators think that Cicero and Pomponius are the interlocutors in this dialogue: and that the letter M. signifies Marcus, and A. Atticus; they infer this from the occurrence of the following passage: *Licuit esse otioso Themistocli, licuit Epaminondæ, licuit, ne vetera et externa quæram, mihi,* &c.

12. 14. *Miseriæ finis in morte.* Lucan says:

> . . . *Mors ultima pœna est*
> *Nec metuenda viris.*

Aristotle, in his Ethics, conveys the same idea.

13. 1. *L. Crassus.* A distinguished Roman orator, born B. C. about 140. He was brought into notice principally by the part he took in the punishment of Papirius Carbo. Cicero says of him, "his language was accurate and elegant, without being too studied. He had wonderful clearness of argument and illustration, as well on subjects of civil law, as of common equity. As Scævola was the most eloquent of lawyers, so Crassus was accounted the best lawyer among the eloquent."

13. 2. *Quoniam.* If this word be the correct reading, the sentence is elliptical; but there are two manuscripts having *quanquam,* which is probably the right word.

13. 4. *Maximâ coronâ;* "before a very great assembly."

14. 7. *Crassum.* M. Licinius Crassus, said to have been the wealthiest of the Romans. When the gladiators with Spartacus at their head, had spread an universal alarm in Italy, Crassus was sent against them. A battle was fought, in which he slaughtered 12,000 of the slaves, and by this decisive blow soon put an end to the war, and was honored with an ovation at his return. He was soon after made consul with Pompey, A. U. 683. He was afterwards censor, and formed the first triumvirate with Pompey and Cæsar. See also note 141. 18. vol. 2.

15. 4. *Egressus.* The Romans prohibited the burning or burial of the dead in the city, both from a sacred and a civil consideration—that the priests might not be contaminated by seeing or touching a dead body; and that houses might not be endangered by the frequency of funeral fires. Val. Publicola and a few other distinguished men appear to have been buried in the city.

15. 4. *Portâ Capenâ.* One of the gates of Rome, which led towards Capua: it was sometimes called *triumphalis*, because those who rode in triumph, passed through it: it was also called *fontinalis*, from the great number of springs that were near it, which occasioned the building of the aqueducts, by which the water was carried by pipes *into the city*; hence Juvenal calls it *madidam Capenam.*

15. 4. *Calatini.* A. Attilius Calatinus. He was twice consul, also censor and dictator. It is said that his appointment to the last of these offices was announced to him while he was sowing with his own hand the field which he occupied as a plebeian, from whence he derived the name of Seranus.

16. 6. *Calcem;* "a goal or limit."

16. 8. *Epicharmi.* Authors are not agreed as to the place of his birth; probably it was the island of Cos. He flourished in the fifth century B. C., and became a disciple of the Pythagorean school. Being prevented by the tyranny of Hiero from assuming the public profession of philosophy, he applied himself to the study of dramatic poetry, and offended the Pythagoreans by introducing the precepts of their master upon the stage. Amongst his other writings, were commentaries upon physical and medical subjects.

16. 8. *Acuti, nec insulsi hominis, ut Siculi.* The Sicilians were distinguished for wit and intelligence; of the former quality Cicero speaks in his dialogues *De Oratore,* (II. 54.) *Inveni autem ridicula et salsa multa Græcorum; nam et Siculi in eo genere, et Rhodii, et Byzantii, et præter ceteros Attici, excellunt.* Epicharmus went to Sicily when scarcely three months old; hence he is here called a Sicilian.

17. 12. *Superbum.* Cicero uses this word in a similar connection in one of his epistles: *Partim superbum te esse dicunt quod nihil respondeas, partim contumeliosum, quod male* respondeas.

17. 14. *Geram . . . sequens.* Cicero was an Academic: and though he believed in a future state, was fond of the opinion and declared himself resolved never to part with it, yet he believed it as probable only, not as certain.

18. 15. *Pythius.* Some derive this word from πυνθάνεσθαι. to inquire, because he came to Apollo to consult the oracle: others from πυθέσθαι, to decay, because nothing flourishes without the heat of the sun, i. e. Apollo: others from the town of Delphi which was also called Pytho; or from the serpent Python, killed by Apollo.

18. 25. *Sunt qui discessum.* The Platonists. *Sunt qui nullum.* The Epicureans.

18. 3. *Alii diu permanere.* The Stoics. *Alii semper.* The Platonists.

18. 5. *Aliis cor ipsum.* This was the common opinion of the Romans in the time of Cicero.

18. 7. *Nasica ille prudens.* Publius Scipio Nasica, son of that Nasica whom the senate called "*virum optimum.*"

18. 8. *Egregie . . catus Æliu' Sextus.* A quotation from the poet Ennius. Pearce thinks the word *catus* should begin with a capital letter, because it was the cognomen of Sextus Ælius Catus, and passed from him into the family of the Ælii. Pliny, (*Nat. Hist.* vii. 31.) says, *Reliquis animi bonis præstitere ceteros mortales sapientiâ; ob id Cati, et Corculi apud Romanos cognominati.*

18. 9. Empedocles. A native of Agrigentum in

Sicily. He was a scholar of Pythagoras, distinguished for his knowledge in every department of science and philosophy, as poet, orator, historian and physician. He adopted the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration of souls, and wrote a poem on the subject which the ancients have highly praised. The accounts of his death are various and contradictory. Some authors affirm, that thinking to pass himself for a deity, and to persuade people that he had been taken up directly into heaven, he ascended Ætna in the night, and threw himself into the burning crater, imagining that his death would remain forever concealed from mortals, but that the treacherous mountain threw up one of his brazen sandals, and thus exposed the folly of the visionary, who disdained to be thought a man.

. . . . . *Deus immortalis haberi*
Dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Ætnam
Insiluit.

Hor. Ars. Poet. V. 465.

18. 9. *Empedocles . . . . . tenere:* "Empedocles thinks that the soul is the blood diffused through the heart: to others a certain part of the brain appears to be the soul." *Animi principatum tenere,* means to hold the power or office of the soul, that is, to be the soul. *Cordi suffusum.* In accordance with this opinion, Virgil says, *Purpuream vomit ille animam:* Æ. ix. 349.

18. 20. *Sed . . . dicitur:* "but what I have said

respecting the heart's blood, the brain, the soul and fire, are common opinions: the rest individuals entertain, as did many of the ancients before them." Bentley thinks the reading should be: *Sed hæc quæ dixi . . . . vulgo: reliqua fere singuli: ut multo ante veteres, proxime autem Aristoxenus*, &c. Another commentator inserts the word *sanguinem* after *cor*, because it occurs in the corresponding sentence, page 21.

18. 22. *Aristoxenus.* The most ancient Greek writer on the subject of music that has come down to us. He is said by Suidas to have written 452 different works, among which, those on music were the most esteemed: his writings upon other subjects are frequently quoted by ancient authors, notwithstanding Cicero, and some others say that he was a bad philosopher, and had nothing in his head but music.

19. 1. *Ab artificio*, i. e. from his musical art.

19. 3. *A Platone.* In his work "*De Republicâ*," and in his "*Phædon.*" The writings of this author are all in the way of dialogue, in which he seems to deliver nothing from himself, but everything as the sentiments and opinions of others—of Socrates chiefly, of Timæus, &c. He does not mention himself anywhere except once in his Phædon, and another time in his Apology for Socrates. His style, as Aristotle observes, is betwixt prose and verse; on which account some have not scrupled *to rank him* with the poets. There is a better rea-

son for doing so than the elevation and grandeur of his style; his matter is oftentimes the offspring of imagination, instead of doctrines or truths deduced from nature. See also note 29. 6.

19. 4. *Xenocrates.* A German philosopher, born at Chalcedon, B. C. 396. His philosophic tenets were Platonic; but in his lectures he adopted the language of the Pythagoreans. In his system, unity and diversity were principles in nature, or gods; the former being the father, and the latter the mother of the universe. The heavens he represented as divine, and the stars as celestial gods: besides these divinities, he taught that there are terrestrial demons, of a middle order, between gods and men, partaking of the nature of both mind and body, and like human beings, capable of passion and liable to diversities of character. He probably conceived with Plato, that the superior divinities were ideas or intelligible forms, proceeding immediately from the supreme deity; and the inferior gods or demons, to be derived from the soul of the world, and like that principle, compounded of a simple and a divisable substance, or of that which always remains the same, and that which is liable to change. See *Cicero de Nat. Deorum*, I. 13.

19. 4. *Xenocrates .... esset.* Lucullus has expressed this opinion of Xenocrates in a few words: *An ut Xenocrates, mens nullo corpore.*

19. 13. *Dicæarchus.* A native of Messene, in Sicily, and a follower of Aristotle. He acquired

distinction by his philosophical disputations, and historical writings. Cicero speaks of him as a learned and eloquent writer. His tenets were, that there is no such thing as mind, or soul, either in man or beast; that the principle by which animals perceive and act, is equally diffused through the body, is inseparable from it, and expires with it: that the human race always existed; that it is impossible to foretell future events; and that the knowledge of them would be a misfortune. He was an eminent geographer, and took great pains to measure the height of mountains, and to construct accurate maps of countries.

19. 16. *Pherecratem quemdam.* No mention is anywhere made of him. Suidas speaks of another Pherecrates, a comic poet of Athens.

20. 2. *Quatuor illa genera.* Aristotle taught that besides the four elements of the material world, whence all other things were supposed to draw their being, there was a fifth essence, or nature, peculiar to God and the soul, which had nothing in it that was common to any of the rest. This opinion Cicero followed and illustrated with his usual perspicuity. See Sec. 27 of this volume.

20. 10. *Ἐντελέχειαν.* Aristotle defined the mind to be that principle by which we live, perceive, and understand. When he attempted to form an abstract conception of this principle, he was perplexed; and he was so unacquainted with the nature of this substance, or so undecided in his

opinion, or perhaps so anxious to conceal it, that he recurs to the use of a term which merely expresses the confused idea which he had formed to himself from observing its operations, and called ἐντελέχεια, denoting some unknown source of sensitive and rational life in certain organized bodies. It does not appear from the writings of Aristotle, whether he thought the soul of man mortal or immortal; but the former appears most probable, from his notion of the nature and origin of the soul, which he conceived to be an intellectual power, externally transmitted into the human body from an eternal intelligence, the common source of rationality to mankind. To ascertain the precise meaning of ἐντελέχεια has very much troubled the metaphysicians and critics. In a story told by Pietro Crinito, it is said that Ermolao Barbaro, patriarch of Aquileia in the fifteenth century, a zealous cultivator of the Aristotelian philosophy, and who translated many works of the Stagyrite into Latin, was so anxious to find out the meaning of this vexatious word, that he held a conference with the principle of evil himself, to draw from him, if possible, the important secret. Whether the question put was of too puzzling a nature, or it was thought unsafe to gratify such extraordinary curiosity, we are unable to say; but the fact seems to have been, that the venerable patriarch returned from the interview no wiser than he went to it.

20. 14. *Democritum.* A celebrated philosopher

of the Eleatic sect, born at Abdera, a town of Thrace, B. C. 460. His patrimony being ample, he travelled into distant countries in pursuit of knowledge; first visiting Egypt to learn geometry of the Egyptian priests; then Ethiopia, to converse with the gymnosophists of that country. From thence he passed into Asia, where he resided some time among the Persian magi. He was also instructed in the doctrines of the Pythagorean school, and became a disciple of Leucippus, from whom he learned the system of atoms and a vacuum. After his return to Abdera, he excited much admiration among its ignorant inhabitants. Of his knowledge of natural philosophy, he artfully availed himself for predicting unexpected changes in the weather, so that his fellow citizens conceived that he possessed the faculty of predicting future events; and thus deluded, they distinguished him by the appellation of "wisdom," regarded him as a being more than mortal, and entrusted him with the direction of their public affairs. Preferring, however, a contemplative and studious, to a political and active life, he declined the public honors assigned to him, and spent the residue of his days in solitude. Many marvellous tales are related concerning him during his retreat from the world, but as these are fabulous, it is needless to recite them. We may, nevertheless, deduce this inference from them, that Democritus was a man of sublime genius, and *penetrating* judgment, who, by much observation

and study, became an eminent master of speculative and physical science; and like Roger Bacon at a later period, he astonished and imposed upon his credulous countrymen.

20. 18. *Atomorum.* The atomical philosophy, or doctrine of atoms, was a system which from the hypothesis that atoms are endued with gravity and motion, accounted for the origin and formation of things. This philosophy was first broached by Moschus, some time before the Trojan war, but was much cultivated and improved by Epicurus, whence it is denominated the Epicurean philosophy.

21. 23. *Librum qui est de animo.* His "Phædon."

22. 17. *Auctoribus . . . . . plurimum:* "we have the best authority in support of the opinion you wish to have established, a circumstance which ought to have, and generally has great weight in all cases."

22. 24. *Cascos appellat Ennius.* In the following verse which Varro (VI.) commends:

Quam primum Casci populi genuere Latini.

Hieronymus, (Epist. 42) says: *Rudes illi Italiæ homines, quos cascos Ennius vocat.*

23. 2. *Nec . . . . sanxissent;* "nor would they have guarded against the violation of these ceremonies by treating it [the violation] as a religious offence admitting of no expiation, unless,"

&c. *Religio* and *sancire* are often used in phrases which are entirely idiomatic, and, as in the present instance, cannot be translated literally.

23. 7. *Dux in cœlum.* It was a dogma of Plato, that illustrious men were carried to heaven, and that the indolent and obscure remained upon earth. The Stoics taught something similar.

23. 8. *Retineretur et permaneret.* Three old copies have *retineret* and *permaneret;* but the present is probably the true reading: these words are to be referred to *vita.* The meaning is, that the souls of the wicked are retained upon earth, where they remain forever.

23. 10. *Romulus . . . . . ævum.* Manutius and Fulv. Ursinus give this quotation thus:

> *Romulus in cœlo cum dis genitalibus ævum*
> *Degit.*

23. 15. *Tyndaridæ fratres.* Castor and Pollux. *Qui . . . . perhibentur.* This is said to have happened frequently. Cicero probably refers here more particularly to the Macedonian war in which Perses was conquered.

23. 24. *Majorum gentium dii.* Called also *Consentes dii;* the twelve highest gods, who formed as it were, the council of the gods. They are enumerated in the following verses of Ennius:

> *Juno, Vesta, Ceres, Diana, Minerva, Venus, Mars,*
> *Mercurius, Jovi' (h. e. Jupiter,) Neptunus, Volcanus, Apollo.*

Cicero probably uses the words metaphorically;

for the hundred senators whom Romulus elected, were called "*majorum gentium*," and the hundred chosen by Tarquinius Priscus, "*minorum gentium*."

23. 26. *Reminiscere . . . . . mysteriis;* "recollect, since you have begun to be imbued with the knowledge of sacred things, what is delivered in the mysteries of our religion."

24. 10. *Ut porro firmissimum.* As there is no particle such as *ita* or *sic* in this sentence, Lambin thinks the reading should be *at porro*, &c. Buherius, to whose acuteness and learning the Tusculan Disputations and the treatise *De Naturâ Deorum* are much indebted, reads *et porro firmissimum.* Pearce thinks no change necessary in the present reading, but that the construction of the sentence should be, *hoc porro videtur afferri ut firmissimum*, i. e. *tamquam firmissimum.*

24. 16. *Collocutio hominum aut consensus* [*ex collocutione*].

25. 5. *Ut ait Statius.* Statius Cæcilius, a Latin comic poet, the contemporary and friend of Ennius, was a native of Milan, and lived at Rome in a servile condition, about the year 177 B. C. As a writer of comedy he was eminent, though Cicero finds fault with his Latinity. Horace contrasts him with Terence; the former, he says, excels in gravity, the latter in art.

25. 25. *Iisdemne . . . . terminaretur;* "did they think that their fame," &c.

26. 12. *Adspicite . . . . . patrum.* This epitaph

of Ennius was written by that poet himself. He died during the consulship of Q. Martius and Cn. Servilius, at the age of about 70. The cause of his death was the gout, which he had contracted by too great indulgence in drinking. He was buried in the monument of Scipio, in the Appian way, whence Ovid says of him:

Ennius emeruit, Calabris in montibus ortus,
Contiguus poni, Scipio magne, tibi.

See also note 9. 4. of this volume.

26. 19. *Phidias.* An Athenian; the most celebrated sculptor of antiquity. Pliny places him in the 83d Olympiad. His reputation was so high at Athens, that Pericles regarded him as his particular friend, and appointed him superintendent of all the public edifices with which that city was decorated. One of his greatest performances was a collossal statue of Minerva of the Parthenon. The figure of the goddess stood upright, armed, one hand grasping a spear, the other holding an image of victory; at her feet lay a shield covered with the most beautiful sculpture, representing on the convex the Amazonian war, the Athenian leader being a portrait of Pericles: on the concave were seen the giants warring against heaven. On the golden sandals, with exquisite delicacy, was portrayed the battle of the Centaurs. In the figure itself, the nude was of ivory, the robes and ornaments of gold. Writers never speak of this illustrious monument of skill without rapture; yet what has rendered

the artist immortal, proved at that time his ruin; he had carved upon the shield of the goddess his own portrait as well as that of Pericles; and this was, by those who envied him, made a crime in Phidias, and caused his banishment. See also *Cicero de Oratore*, II. 17.

26. 20. *Inscribere non liceret.* A similar thing was done by C. Fabius Pictor, who, when painting the walls of the temples of safety which C. Junius Bubulcus had dedicated, inscribed his own name upon them. Pliny (H. N. Præf.) says '*Pingendi fingendique conditores invenies absoluta opera .... pendenti titulo inscripsisse, ut Apelles faciebat aut Polycletus.*

27. 13. *Formidines.* Not fears, but the causes of them, such as phantoms.

27. 21. *Grande;* "pompous." The most remarkable thing about the verses which follow, seems to be the frequent recurrence of the letters *a*, and *s*. The author is not known.

28. 3. *Sine corporibus.* Alluding to the torments and other kinds of punishment supposed to be inflicted in the infernal regions.

28. 6. *Tota νεκυία*; or *mortuaria.* In allusion to that part of the Odyssey (XI.) in which Ulysses is represented to have visited the infernal regions, and to have held converse with the shades.

28. 8. *In vicinià nostrâ.* Not far from Arpinum, the birth place of Cicero. *Averni.* From *a* privative, and ὄρνις, so called because birds could not

fly over it on account of the poisonous vapor it sent forth. Strabo, however, thinks the account fabulous, and that the lake was a very clear one.

28. 10. *Acherontis.* A river of the infernal regions. The poets consider it the son of Titan and the Earth, and say that he was banished to hell by Jupiter for furnishing the Titans with water in the war against the gods.

28. 22. *Meo regnante gentili;* i. e. in the reign of Servius Tullius, the sixth king of Rome.

29. 4. *Quid erat numeris.* The most probable explanation of the Pythagoric doctrine of numbers is, that they were used as symbolical representations of the first principles and forms of nature, and particularly of those eternal and immutable essences to which Plato afterwards gave the name of ideas. Not being able, or not choosing to explain in simple language the abstract notions of principles and forms, Pythagoras used numbers as geometricians use diagrams—to assist the conceptions of scholars. Conceiving some analogy between numbers and the intelligent forms which subsist in the divine mind, he made the former a symbol of the latter. As numbers proceed from unity or the *monad*, as a simple root, whence they branch out into various combinations, and assume new properties in their progress, so he conceived the different forms of nature to recede, at different distances, from their common source, the pure and simple essence of *deity, and* at every degree of distance to assume

certain properties in some measure analogous to those of number: hence he concluded that the origin of things, their emanation from the first being, and their subsequent progression through various orders, if not capable of a perfectly clear explanation, might however be illustrated by symbols and resemblances borrowed from numbers.

29. 5. *Descriptionibus.* Ernesti explains this word to mean here geometrical figures. Our author says that the Pythagoreans did not often state the ground of their opinions, unless it was explicable by *numbers* or *diagrams*, that is, by arithmetic or geometry.

29. 6. *Platonem ferunt.* In his twentieth year he was a pupil of Socrates; afterwards of Cratylus and Hermogenes. He then went to Euclid at Megara, and from him to Theodorus the mathematician; afterwards to the priests of Egypt, and from them to the Pythagoreans in Italy; finally, returning to Athens, he became a teacher in the academy. The ancients thought more highly of Plato than of all their other philosophers: they always called him the *Divine Plato*, and seemed resolved that his descent should be more than human. Cicero, as an evidence of his adoration of Plato, tells us that he was justly called by Panætius, the *most wise*, the *most sacred*, the *Homer of Philosophers*, and thinks that if Jupiter had spoken Greek, he would have spoken in Plato's language; and made him so implicitly his guide in wisdom and philosophy, as to

declare that he had rather err with Plato than be right with any one else. See also note 19. 3.

29. 19. [*An.*] This particle mutilates the sentence. Bentley and some other commentators reject it.

30. 10. *Sublime ferri.* Hence it follows, that they consider the soul corporeal, being one of the elements.

30. 12. *Aut quinta illa .... natura.* This was the opinion of Aristotle.

30. 15. *Horum .... jaceat;* "the same, therefore, is some one of these [principles]; nor does a mind so active in its nature, lie immersed in the heart, or the brain, or according to Empedocles, in the blood." For *est* in the 15th line, Buherius substituted *esto* as the probable reading, because the consequence implied in *horum igitur aliquid animus est*, does not necessarily follow from what has been said before.

30. 17. *Empedocleo sanguine.* Empedocles is said, (page 18.) to have taught that the soul is blood diffused through the heart.

30. 21. *Qui ... sentiat.* In this reading, Cicero does not tell us why Dicæarchus was not affected by grief; for he might not have perceived that he had a soul and yet have grieved. Pearce therefore thinks that Cicero wrote *quia animum se habere non sentiat*, that this may be the reason why Dicæarchus was not subject to grief.

30. 22. *Alter ita delectatur.* Aristoxenus, who

was commonly called the musician. See note 18. 22.

31. 9. *Et spirabilem.* Cicero speaks of them in his treatise *De Nat. Deorum*, I. 24. See also note 20. 18. of this volume.

32. 17. *Sustentabitur . . . aluntur.* The ancients supposed the stars to be animated and supported by the vapors which are exhaled by the sun from the earth and waters. See *Cic. de Nat. Deorum*, II. 46.

32. 21. *Iis æmulemur.* This verb is generally joined with the accusative, this being the only instance in Cicero where it governs the dative. We find in Quintilian, (X. 1.) *nam et consummati jam patroni veteribus æmulantur.*

33. 13. *Ostium Ponti.* Commonly called the mouth of the Euxine sea, or the Thracian Bosphorus.

33. 15. *Argo . . . . arietis.* These are the lines of Ennius, borrowed by him from the Medea of Euripides. Cicero has somewhat changed them: for in Priscian and other writers, we find the quotation thus:

Argo, qua vecti Argivi, delecti viri
Petebant illam pellem inauratam arietis.

33. 16. *Inauratam arietis.* The Argonautic expedition is one of the most memorable transactions of antiquity, and references to it are interspersed in most of the writings of the ancients. The Greek writers tell us that the intention of this armament was to bring back a golden fleece which

was detained by Æetes, king of Colchis. It was the fleece of the ram on which Phrixus and Helle fled to avoid the anger of Ino. Upon his arrival at Colchis, Phrixus sacrificed it to Mars, in whose temple the fleece was suspended. This fable has been explained thus: Phrixus flying with his sister Helle from the rage of their stepmother Ino, the daughter of Cadmus, went on board a ship whose ensign was a golden ram, and sailed to Colchis. Helle was drowned by the way, in that sea called from her the Hellespont, now the Dardanelles. This, it is said, was the ground of the poetical fable, that a ram with a golden fleece swam away with them to Colchis; and that Argonauts undertook their famous expedition in order to regain that fleece.

33. 18. *Europam . . . . . unda.* The author of this line is not known. The same quotation occurs in the treatise *De Nat. Deorum*, III. 10.

34. 6. *Nec audimus.* Pliny (*Nat. His.* II.) says, *Animo videmus; animo cernimus; oculi, seu vasa quædam, visibilem ejus partem accipiunt atque transmittunt; sic magna cogitatio obcæcat abducto intus visu; sic in morbo comitiali aperti nihil cernunt animo caligante.*

35. 10. *Acherusia . . . . loca.* Probably a quotation from the Andromache of Ennius.

35. 26. *Plurimi.* The disciples of Epicurus and Diagoras.

36. 27. Præceptum Apollinis. Pliny says this

was not a precept of Pythian Apollo, but of Chilon, one of the seven sages of Greece; that it was inscribed in golden letters upon the temple of Apollo, may account for its being attributed to him. Hence Juvenal says,

. . . *E cœlo descendit, γνῶθι σεαυτὸν.*

37. 23. *Quinetiam ceteris .... aliunde.* Plato asserts in plain terms, the eternity and self-existence of the soul, which, as we here learn from Cicero, he infers from its being the principle of motion in man. This, it must be acknowledged, is unsatisfactory reasoning; but the opinion it was intended to prove, was held by all the philosophers. They were unanimous in maintaining the *substance* of the soul, though not its personality, to be eternal, *a parte ante*, as well as *ad partem post.* And Cicero, where he tells us that this opinion passed from Pherecydes Syrus to Pythagoras, and from Pythagoras to Plato, expresses their notion of the soul's duration by the word *sempiternus*, which, in its original and proper sense, is applicable only to that which has neither beginning nor end. Indeed none of the philosophers of ancient Greece appear to have believed a creation possible; for it was a maxim universally received among them that nothing can come from nonentity, or go to nonentity. This maxim, as held by theistical philosophers, the learned Cudworth labors to interpret in a sense agreeable to our notions of the origin of the world; but the quotations urged by himself

must convince every competent reader that on this occasion he labors in vain.

39. 8. *Nam sanguinem, bilem*, &c. Lambin thinks the reading should be *sanguis, bilis*, &c. The change does not seem necessary, as a similar construction of the accusative is used by the best writers; e. g. Plautus says:

Hos quos videtis stare hic captivos duos,
Illi qui astant, hi stant ambo, non sedent.
Capteivi, Prol. I.

and Virgil,

Urbem quam statuo vestra est.
A. I. 573.

39. 22. *Qui inscribitur "Menon."* A treatise on the subject of virtue, in which the author confutes the definitions of Menon, Aristippus, Gorgias, and Prodicus.

40. 13. *Esset.* This word is to be understood in the Platonic, not in the popular sense. Plato believed that alone *to be*, which is always the same, which has no beginning or ending.

40. 28. *Memoriâ Simonides.* There were many of this name who flourished at different times. The one here referred to, was a poet of Cea, (now Zia,) the son of Leoprepes. He excelled in various kinds of poetry, but especially in the elegiac, for which, as we learn from Horace and Quintilian, he was almost proverbially famous in antiquity. He was endowed with a remarkable memory, and some have attributed to him the invention of the art of recollecting by localizing ideas.

41. 1. *Theodectes.* Of him and of his memory, other authors give no account. There was one of the name who was a disciple of Aristotle and Plato. He was an orator and poet, and is said to have written fifty tragedies, but does not appear to be the one referred to by Cicero. In some editions we find instead of Theodectes, the name of Themistocles, who is said to have had so great a memory that he could recollect the names of all his fellow citizens.

41. 2. *Pyrrho.* A king of Epirus, who waged war against the Romans. He claimed descent from Achilles. *Legatus ad senatum est missus.* There was a double embassy; one of the Romans to Pyrrhus, the other of Pyrrhus to the Romans; the former concerning the redemption of the captives, the latter concerning the confirmation of peace. The former was the embassy of Cyneas, according to Plutarch, the latter, according to Livy, and Eutropius. Cyneas is recorded by Pliny and others, as a most extraordinary instance of the powers of memory: he is said to have been able, the day after his arrival in Rome, to salute all the senators and knights by their names.

41. 3. *Charmadas.* A disciple of Carneades, founder of the new academy, of whom his master was wont to say, "that he always said the same things in the same manner." Antony, in our author's dialogues, "*De Oratore*" II. 88, calls him and Metrodorus *summos homines et divinâ prope memoriâ.*

41. 4. *Noster Hortensius.* A distinguished Roman orator, born about the year 115 B. C. He began to plead before he was nineteen years of age, and with so much talent that Cicero said of him, "the genius of Hortensius, like the statue of Phidias, was at once beheld and approved." His memory was so remarkable, that he could repeat a whole oration in the words which he had previously conceived, without committing it to writing, and go through all the arguments of an opponent in their order.

41. 13. *Ut istos.* The disciples of Socrates. The modesty of their master was no less distinguished than his wisdom. He professed "to know only this, that he knew nothing," meaning by this declaration, which he often repeated, that he had no other intention than to convince his hearers of the narrow limits of the human understanding. Far from encouraging universal scepticism, he always spoke confidently and decidedly on moral subjects; but at the same time, he wished to expose to contempt the arrogance of those pretenders to science, who would not acknowledge themselves to be ignorant of any thing.

42. 13. *Literarum notis terminavit.* Few subjects have given rise to more discussion than the origin of alphabetic characters. The author and the era of this admirable invention are both lost in the darkness of remote antiquity. Even the nation *to which it is* due cannot now be ascertained. The

Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Phœnicians, the Persians, the Indians, have all laid claim to the honor, and such have named its inventor among the remote and probably fabulous personages that figure in the earlier ages of their history. In consequence of this uncertainty respecting the author of alphabetic writing, and the high value and extreme difficulty of the invention itself, many have been inclined to attribute this art to an immediate revelation from the deity; contending that it was communicated with other invaluable gifts from above, in remote ages, to the descendants of Abraham, and probably to the patriarch Moses, who was the author of the most ancient compositions in alphabetical writing which we at present possess.

42. 22. *Non re, sed vocabulo.* It was the opinion of the Platonists, that the stars did not wander, but moved by fixed laws. This opinion was entertained by subsequent philosophers. Cicero, (*De Nat. Deor.* II. 20,) says, "But most worthy of our admiration is the motion of these five stars, falsely called wandering; for they cannot be said to wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and have each their constant and established motions." He was so firm in this belief that he accused the Greeks of impiety for thinking differently.

42. 28. *Timæo.* A dialogue of Plato, which comprehends his whole doctrine on the subject of the formation of the universe. Through the whole

of this dialogue the author supposes two eternal and independent causes of all things; one, that by which all things are made, which is God; the other, that from which all things are made, which is matter. He distinguishes between God, matter, and the universe, and supposes the architect of the world to have formed it out of a mass of pre-existent matter. Matter, according to Plato, is an eternal and infinite principle. He particularly insists upon the notion that it had originally no form, but is capable of receiving any. He calls it the mother and receptacle of forms, by the union of which with matter, the universe becomes perceptible to the senses; and maintains that the visible world owes its forms to the energy of the divine intellectual nature. His doctrine on the subject of matter is fully explained by Cicero, *Acad. Quæst.* I. 8.

43. 4. *Sphærâ.* Archimedes formed a glass sphere, or some kind of planetarium, which, with no small degree of accuracy, represented the phenomena of the heavenly bodies. Ovid alludes to this: (*Fast.* VI. 277.)

Arte Syracosiâ suspensus in aëre clauso,
Stat globus, immensi parva figura poli.

See also note 116. 5. vol. 2, where Archimedes is again spoken of.

43. 27. *Aut Juventate.* Bentley thinks that *aut* should be omitted, as Juventate means neither meat *nor drink*, and therefore ought not to be connected

with *nectare* and *ambrosiâ*. The sentence would then be, *Non enim ambrosiâ deos aut nectare, Juventate pocula* [sc. *ambrosiæ aut nectaris*] *ministrante, lætari arbitror*. In his treatise *De Nat. Deor.* (I. 40,) our author has a similar sentence: *Ac poetæ quidem nectar, ambrosiam, epulas comparant, et aut Juventatem aut Ganymedem pocula ministrantem.*

44. 3. *Laomedonti.* Some commentators think Troi would be more correct, as Ganymedes is generally supposed to have been the son of Tros, a Trojan king. Lucian, however, calls him the son of Dardanus, and in Euripedes we find him spoken of as Λαομεδόντιον παῖδα.

45. 21. *Motum, celeritatem.* Bentley has *motus celeritatem.*

46. 2. *Maturitatem.* Some good editions have *maturationen*, which is probably more correct, as the passage seems to require a word to express, not the ripeness, but the act of ripening. Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum* I. 2,) says, *Cœlique mutationes, quibus omnia, quæ terra gignat, maturata pubescant.*

46. 7. *Quinque stellas ferri.* Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, and Venus.

46. 12. *Duabus oris.* The temperate zones, which were all the ancients considered habitable.

46. 14. *Sub axe posita.* Meaning the north pole.

46. 18. Ἀντίχθονα: h. e. *locatam ad axem contrariam.*

47. 25. *Plumbei sumus*, i. e. stupid, or heavy, a

figurative expression taken from the quality of lead. Plautus uses it in a different sense:

Verum ita sunt nostri divites:
Si quid benefacias, levior plumâ est gratia:
Si quid peccatum 'st, plumbeas iras gerunt.
Pœnulus, III. 6.

48. 6. *Adductus Socrates.* He was publicly accused by Anytus, a leather dresser, and Melitus, a rhetorician, of "not acknowledging the gods which the state acknowledges; of introducing new deities, and of violating the laws by corrupting the youth." On the day of the trial, Plato rose up to address the court in favor of his master, but he was soon commanded to sit down. Socrates then made his own defence, and unveiled, in the most powerful manner, the characters and motives of the accusers. A corrupt and unjust court, however, who had predetermined his death, listened not to the truth, and Socrates was condemned to be poisoned by hemlock. See also note 87. 18. and 88. 4. vol. II.

48. 7. *Nec patronum.* The eminent orator Lysias, composed an apology, in the name of his master, which he requested him to adopt; but Socrates excused himself by saying, that though it was eloquently written, it would not suit his character.

48. 17. *Duas esse vias.* Virgil (Æ. VI. 540) says:

Hic locus est partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera quæ ditis magni sub mœnia tendit:

Hoc iter Elysium nobis: at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara mittit.

49. 7. *Nec . . . . amittimus.* Cicero considered a future state of rewards and punishments as a consequence of the soul's immortality, deducible from the attributes of God, and the condition of man's life on earth; and thought it so probable, that we could hardly doubt of it, he says, unless it happens to our minds, when they look unto themselves, as it does to our eyes, when they look too intensely at the sun, that finding their sight dazzled, they give over looking at all.

49. 18. *Cato . . . vitâ.* Cato of Utica. He was determined not to fall into the hands of the conquering Cæsar; seeing no chance of escape or of successful resistance, he committed suicide by stabbing himself.

51. 11. *Quos equidem non despicio.* He speaks here with academic dissimulation: his manner was very different in the dialogues where he introduces the Stoic's character. The meaning of the sentence is, Crowds of my opponents, not Epicureans only, will come to dissuade you from the doctrines I have been advocating. I do not indeed fear any great danger to you from the Epicureans; not that I despise them, but because I see, without knowing why it is so, that every man of learning holds them in contempt. But even my favorite Dicæarchus, a man by no means to be disregarded, has discoursed in opposition to this immortality.

51. 16. *Quod Mitylenis sermo habetur:* i. e., Mitylene is the place where the scene of the dialogue is laid. This phraseology is common with Cicero in similar cases. Thus in his letter to Varro, communicating the Academic Questions, and prefixed to the copies of that work, he says, *Feci igitur sermonem inter nos habitum in Cumano, cum esset unâ Pomponius*, i. e., I have composed a dialogue, the scene of which is laid at Cumæ, &c.

51. 18. *Stoïci.* The Stoics fancied that the soul was a subtilized, fiery substance, which survived the body after death, and subsisted a long time, yet not eternally, but was to perish at last in the general conflagration. In which they allowed, as Cicero says, the only thing that was hard to conceive, its separate existence, yet denied whatever was not only easy to imagine, but a consequence of the other, its eternal duration.

51. 19. *Tamquam cornicibus.* Hesiod assigns nine ages of man to these birds; an exaggeration, no doubt; but most naturalists speak of their extraordinary longevity. Hence the *cornicum sæcla vetusta* of Lucretius, (Lib. V.) and *annosa cornix* of Horace, (Car. III. 17.)

51. 27. *In his enim est aliqua obscuritas.* It was an opinion of the Academics, that there is some obscurity in every thing, even the clearest.

52. 7. *Istos vero:* sc. *dimittamus.* He assents to the proposition of Marcus to dismiss the Stoics, and says, Let us dismiss them; for what can you

do with men who, in opposition to all the demonstrations of reason, freely admit what is most difficult to believe, that the soul can exist independent of the body; but deny what is not only easy to believe, but consequent to their own confession, that if it may exist some time, it may forever.

52. 15. *A Platone suo:* i. e., from Plato, whom he much admires. We are not to infer from this, that Panætius was a disciple of Plato, for they lived in very different periods; but that he was partial to the Platonic philosophy, and yet a Stoic.

52. 17. *Homerum philosophorum.* So Macrobius calls Virgil the Mantuan Homer.

53. 6. *Semotas a mente et disclusas putat.* Plato had imagined a three-fold soul; the chief, i. e., reason, he had lodged in the head, as in a tower; and being willing to separate the other two, he placed anger in the breast, and desire under the præcordia. See page 19.

53. 14. *Ut .... feram:* "so that I bear with repining, to be called more than ordinarily stupid."

53. 16. *Idque .... affert:* "and as if this were a fact, he adduces a reason why it is so."

53. 24. *Facie, patris.* His father was Q. Fabius Allobrogicus, the son of Q. Fabius Æmilianus.

54. 16. *Democritum insimulat,* i. e. Epicurus accuses Democritus of saying that the sense of pain remains after death, although the soul perishes with the body.

54. 24. *Totumque hoc leve est, qualecumque est.*

Bentley says that the force of *qualecumque* is such that the meaning of the passage would be, "and the whole of this is light, however severe it is," which would be absurd. He thinks that Cicero wrote *totumque hoc breve est, qualecumque est*, h. e. whether it be severe, as they contend, or trifling, as I myself believe, it is surely brief, because it is instantaneous.

55. 8. *Consolati sumus.* Tullia, the daughter of Cicero, died at the age of thirty-two. Her father's grief was excessive. Retired from the world and secluded from his friends, he drew up for himself a treatise of consolation, from which he professed to have received much comfort, though he wrote it at a time when in the opinion of philosophers he was not so wise as he ought to have been. In this work, he chiefly imitated Crantor, the Academic, who had left a celebrated piece on the same subject; yet he inserted also whatever pleased him from any other author who had written upon it; illustrating his precepts all the way by examples from their own history, of the most eminent Romans of both sexes, who had borne the same misfortune with remarkable fortitude. This work was much read by the primitive fathers, especially by Lactantius, to whom we are indebted for the few fragments which remain of it; for as the critics have long observed, that piece which we now see in the collections of Cicero's writings under the title of Consolatio, is undoubtedly spurious.

55. 15. *Cleombrotum.* Ovid says of him in his "Ibis," 493.

Vel de præcipiti venies in Tartara saxo,
Ut qui Socraticum de nece legit opus.

55. 17. *Platonis libro.* His "Phædon," a dialogue on the immortality of the soul.

56. 1. *Metellus ille.* Surnamed Macedonicus. Valerius Maximus says of him: "*Nasci eum in urbe terrarum principe fortuna voluit, parentes nobilissimos dedit, adjecit animi rarissimas dotes et corporis vires, ut sufficere laboribus posset,*" &c. VII. 1.

56. 2. *Quinquaginta Priamus.* Virgil alludes to the same:

Quinquaginta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum.
Æ. II. 503.

Homer also speaks of the fifty sons and twelve daughters of Priam. Iliad VI. 244.

56. 3. *Justâ uxore.* Hecuba, daughter of Cisseus, king of Thrace. She was the second wife of Priam, by whom he is said to have had nineteen children.

56. 8. *Cum in aram confugisset.* A large altar to Jupiter, the Protector, stood in the open court before the door of Priam's palace in Ilium. (Virgil Æ. II. 500—25.) Hither, according to the poets, Priam, Hecuba, and their daughters fled when the citadel was taken; and hence they were dragged with impious violence by Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, and some of them put to death. All

altars were places of refuge. The supplicants were considered as placing themselves under the protection of the deities to whom the altars were consecrated; and violence to the unfortunate, even to slaves and criminals, in such circumstances, was regarded as violence towards the deities themselves.

56. 8. *Hostilis manus.* Of Pyrrhus, son of Achilles.

56. 11. *Adstante .... laqueatis.* These and the verses which follow them are probably taken from the "Hecuba," or "Andromache," of Ennius.

56. 18. *Vitam evitari. Invitare* and *evitare* anciently meant "to deprive of life," and also "to take away."

56. 21. *Quod .... amisisset.* Ernesti supposes *eventum* and *amisisset* to be improperly connected, and that they afford no intelligible meaning. He proposes *regnum* instead of *eventum*, and in this way connects the clause with what goes before. An anonymous critic, however, quoted by Olivet, refers to a passage in Sallust, (Jug. 14.) where *amittere* is used with *egestatem*, &c., in a similar manner. If the Latinity of the passage be correct, and here seems to be the only ground of Ernesti's difficulty, *eventum* must be explained by what is before said of Priam, the loss of his children, and his own tragical death. The words *Quod ..... amisisset*, then, may be rendered, "If he [Priam] had died sooner, he would have avoided the issue, *the catastrophe*," i. e. the catastrophe before men-

tioned: or if with Bentley we read *talem* instead of *tum*, the rendering then will be, such an issue, such a catastrophe, which makes the reference more direct.

56. 25. *Coronati Neapolitani.* It was a custom of that people to wear chaplets of flowers on their heads when they wished to offer congratulations.

57. 4. *Socero.* Julius Cæsar, to whose daughter Pompey was married.

57. 6. *Exercitu . . . . incidisset.* After the disastrous battle of Pharsalia, Pompey fled for succor to Ptolemy, king of Egypt. The murder of this distinguished man by the guardians of the Egyptian monarch has been poetically described by Lucan and Plutarch each in his own manner, without incurring the charge of having exaggerated its tragic features. It remains doubtful whether Cæsar wished his feeble antagonist to be put out of the way when he was out of condition to do mischief. But even had he wished his removal, he took pains to show that he had not wished it by means of assassination.

58. 18. *Tamquam in febri.* Our author in one of his epistles says, *Is etsi mihi nuntiavit te plane febri carere*, &c., and in Horace we find,

Caret tibi pectus inani
Ambitione? caret mortis formidine et irâ.

58. 26. *Regno carere.* This cannot correctly be said of one who never reigned, but of one who

having been a king has been expelled from his kingdom, as in the case of Tarquinius Superbus.

59. 9. *Non L. Brutus.* Tarquinius, when driven from Rome, induced the inhabitants of Veii and Tarquinii to take arms against the Romans. A battle was fought beyond the Tiber; and Brutus and Aruns, the sons of Tarquinius Superbus, fell pierced by each other's spears. The body of Brutus was carried to Rome, where his colleague Valerius delivered a funeral oration upon the deceased.

59. 11. *Pater Decius.* P. Decius Mus. In a dangerous war with the Latins, it was agreed that he whose army should give way in battle, should devote himself to death for his country; the event took place in the succeeding combat, and Decius immediately plunged into the thickest part of the hostile forces, where he fell a sacrifice to his patriotism. His son of the same name, in the Etruscan war, and his grandson, in the war with Pyrrhus, performed similar acts of devotion. Lucan calls them *lustrales belli animæ.*

59. 13. *Uno bello.* The second Carthaginian war.

59. 14. *Paulum.* L. Paulus Æmilius was twice consul: in his first year he triumphed over the Illyrians: in his second he perished at Cannæ. He had a daughter Æmilia, who was the wife of Scipio Africanus, and a son, Lucius Paulus Æmilius, who *was distinguished* by two consulships and three *triumphs.*

59. 14. *Geminum Cannæ.* In the memorable battle at Cannæ between the Romans and Carthaginians, L. Paulus Æmilius commanded the right of the Romans, Terentius Varro the left, and Servilius Geminus, the consul of the preceding year, was in the centre. That the loss of the battle was mainly caused by Varro's incapacity and imprudence, is a point on which all authorities are agreed, as they likewise are on the masterly style in which Hannibal formed his order of battle, and employed the various national tactics and weapons in his army. He even knew how to make an ally of the terrible south easterly wind of Apulia, mentioned by Pliny and Horace as well as by Livy, and which often instantaneously dries the fruit and withers the foliage in whole districts. The defeat of the Romans was one of the most dreadful mentioned in history. More than 50,000 of them found their death in the action, very many were slain afterwards, and 10,000 were made prisoners.

60. 4. *Nec pluris . . . . . captam*; i. e. M. Furius Camillus, who is dead, cares no more for this civil war between Pompey and Cæsar, than I cared for the sacking of Rome in the time of Camillus, before I was born.

61. 10. *Cum Luna laboret*; "when the moon is eclipsed."

63. 18. *Ut id resonaret.* In allusion, perhaps, to an amusement called κότταβος, much practised at entertainments, especially at Athens, which con-

sists in flinging from a cup the remnant of liquor after drinking, to some distance into a copper basin placed on the floor, not letting any fall on the ground, and thus producing a loud sound. This was sometimes done, pronouncing the name of a friend or mistress, and from the sound produced, an omen was taken as to the state of that person's affections. Hence Cicero says "*pulchro Critiæ.*"

63. 19. *Pulchro Critiæ.* He was one of the thirty tyrants, and the most cruel of them all.

63. 25. *Quæ brevi consecuta est.* When Thrasybulus succeeded in liberating Athens from the dominion of the thirty tyrants.

64. 4. *Plato.* In his "Apology of Socrates."

65. 4. *Ajacem.* There were two distinguished persons of this name; one the son of Oileus, the other of Telamon. The latter is here referred to. In consequence of his disappointment at not obtaining the arms of Achilles, which were adjudged by the Greek chieftains to his rival Ulysses, he was bereaved of his understanding, (see page 124,) and whilst in this condition, committed suicide.

65. 5. *Summi regis.* Achilles.

65. 17. *Et hæc..... agatis;* "And in this manner he proceeded; but nothing pleased me more than his last words; 'it is time,' said he, 'for me to go hence to death, you to your employments of life.'"

66. 22. *Cato.* In his "*Origines.*"

66. 25. *In quos;* "in behalf of whom." Our

author often uses this preposition in such a sense. e. g. *Multa in Castorem scripta et Pollucem.*

67. 15. *Cyrenæum Theodorum.* A noted philosopher of the Cyrenaic school, and a disciple of Aristippus the younger. Many particulars are recorded of him by Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Aristippus. *Lysimachus.* He was king of Thrace, and a favorite of Alexander the Great. With great courage and ability, he was characterized by a cruel and ferocious disposition, which rendered him unworthy of his high station. He was killed in a bloody battle against Seleucus, 281 B. C.

68. 2. *Crilone.* An Athenian philosopher, who flourished B. C. 400. He was one of the most zealous disciples of Socrates, and supplied him with whatever he wanted. He had several scholars who proved great men.

68. 11. *Diogenes.* The Cynic, a famous philosopher, the son of a banker of Sinope. Being banished with his father for coining false money, he retired to Athens where he studied philosophy under Antisthenes. He added new degrees of austerity to the sect of the Cynics, and never did any philosopher carry so far a contempt for the conveniences of life. He was one of those extraordinary men who run every thing to extremity, without excepting even reason itself; and who confirm the saying that "there is no great genius without a tincture of madness." He used to call himself a vagabond who had neither house nor

country; was obliged to beg, was ill clothed, and lived from hand to mouth; and yet, says Ælian, he took as much pride in these things as Alexander could in the conquest of the world. He was not indeed a jot more humble than those who are clothed in rich apparel, and fare sumptuously every day. He looked down on all the world with scorn; he magisterially censured all mankind, and thought himself unquestionably superior to all mankind. He had great presence of mind, as appears from his smart sayings and quick repartees; Plato seems to have hit off his true character when he called him a Socrates run mad. He died at Corinth when he was about 90 years old, but authors are not agreed either as to the time or manner of his death. He had for his disciples Onesicritus, Phocion, Stilpo of Megara, and several other great men. His works are lost.

69. 13. *Ecce alius.* Ful. Ursinus says that Memnon, the son of Aurora, is here alluded to. Manutius says it is Polydorus, who was slain by Polymnestor, king of Thrace, and thrown into the sea; that the passage represents Polydorus cast upon the shore and entreating his mother, Hecuba, to bury him.

70. 3. *Cum multi;* i. e. *quamvis multi.*

70. 13. *Quæ .... sunt;* these things would be painful indeed were he sensible; without sensation they are nothing. Bentley thinks this sentence *frigid, and* inconsistent with the genius of Cicero.

He conjectures that the reading should be: "*Quæ, ut essent dura, si sentirentur; nulla sine sensu sunt.*

70. 24. *Condiunt Ægyptii.* Embalming, as an art, was carried to great perfection in Egypt, and conducted by persons specially initiated in it. According to Herodotus, the operator first proceeded to extract the brain through the nostrils by means of a crooked instrument, and filled up the cavity with balsamic ingredients. He next laid open the abdomen, and the intestines being removed, were cleaned with wine and odoriferous substances, and then returned; or they were perhaps thrown into the Nile. The cavity was filled with aromatic matter, and sewed up again. After this the body was deposited 70 days in nitre, and having been removed when these elapsed, it was washed once more and swathed in fine linen besmeared with gum. The process was now completed after the most expensive method. By another process, a quantity of oil of cedar being injected, and the body laid 70 days, as before, in nitre, the oil on expulsion brought away the intestines, and the nitre consuming the flesh, left nothing but the skin and bones, whereby embalming was also completed. When returned to the survivors, the body had acquired a fragrant odor, every member remained entire, no part had undergone any change: the beauty and appearance of the face were exactly as they had originally been; even the hairs of the eyelids and eyebrows remained in their places. Thus

says Diodorus, many of the Egyptians who keep the dead bodies of their ancestors in magnificent houses, see the real features of those who died many ages before they themselves were born, and take as much pleasure in gazing on the countenance of each, as if they still lived among them." The preservation of the dead in the dwellings of the living, and their interment within its walls, was not peculiar to the Egyptians. In Scripture it is said, that Samuel was buried in his house at Ramah: and of Joab, that "Benaiah, the son of Jehoida, went up and fell upon him and slew him, and he was buried in his own house in the wilderness." Nor are examples of this wanting in modern history, as the Chinese are said to keep the bodies of their relatives long unburied beside them; and some barbarous nations on the coast of Africa inter a deceased relative in the hut which he inhabited.

71. 1. *Persæ . . . . condunt.* "The Persians, says Herodotus, (I.) cover the body with a sufficient quantity of wax, and afterwards lay it in the ground." Speaking of the Scythians, he says, (IV.) "when their king dies, they dig a great hole in the ground of a quadrangular form, and having received the body covered with wax, they open and cleanse the belly, fill the space with bruised cypress, incense, seeds of parsley and annis." Besides the ordinary modes of embalming, immersion in honey was also practised by the ancients.

If we may credit a Roman poet, the body of Alexander the Great, which was entombed in Alexandria, had been embalmed in honey:

Duc et ad Æmathios manes ubi belliger orbis,
Conditur Hyblæo perfusus nectare ducat.
Statius.

Æmilius Probus says that the body of Agesilaus, who died on the coast of Africa, in what was called the Port of Menelaus, was covered with wax, because honey enough for embalming could not be obtained.

71. 3. *Magorum.* The Magians were a religious sect in Persia and other eastern countries, who maintained that there were two principles, one the cause of all good, the other the cause of all evil; abominating the adoration of images, they worshipped God only by fire. This religion was reformed by Zoroaster, who maintained that there was one supreme, independent Being, and under him two principles or angels, one the angel of goodness and light, and the other of evil and darkness; that there is a perpetual struggle between them which shall last to the end of the world; that then the angel of darkness and his disciples shall go into a world of their own, where they shall be punished in everlasting darkness; and the angel of light and his disciples shall also go into a world of their own, where they shall be rewarded in everlasting light.

71. 4. *Nisi a feris sint ante laniata.* Herodotus

and Strabo inform us, that the Magians did not inter the bodies of their dead, but exposed them to beasts of prey. The Hyrcanians, or natives of Irak, as we denominate it, had dogs trained, if they could require any training, to devour the dead; and the Bactrians were so tenacious of this fashion, that when Nicanor, governor for Alexander, wished to abolish it, he was very near losing the whole province. According to Justin, the Parthians exposed the dead to be devoured by dogs and birds, and afterwards buried the naked bones.

71. 22. *Quam utinam.* In many good editions we find *quæ utinam; quam* is a conjectural reading of Davis.

71. 23. *Obire;* "to meet," i. e. to avail myself of. He has had many seasonable periods for death, which he regrets to have lost.

72. 1. *Quamvis non sentiant.* Bentley rejects these words, because they are tautological.

72. 13. *Pugnæ Leuctricæ.* In which Epaminondas overcame the before invincible Lacedæmonians. This was one of the most decisive battles in the history of Greece. Yet according to Xenophon, the loss of the Lacedæmonians did not exceed 1,400. Diodorus, who states it at 4,000, has probably followed an account which greatly exaggerates it, even if it were meant to include the loss of the allies, which appears to have been very trifling. Cleombrotus, the king, and many distinguished men with him fell in this contest.

72. 14. *Curium.* M' Curius Dentatus. *Fabricium.* C. Fabricius Luscinus. *Calatinum.* A. Atilius Calatinus.

72. 16. *Maximum.* Probably M. Valerius Corvus, to whom the gentile name of Maximus was also given. *Paulum.* L. Paulus Æmilius.

72. 26. *Rhodius Diagoras.* He gained a victory at the Olympic games which has been celebrated by Pindar, (Ode VII.) and recorded in golden letters in the temple of Minerva.

74. 9. *Herodoto.* In his first book, where he says many things upon the subject of death.

74. 10. *Argiæ sacerdotis;* priestess of Argos. This personage held an important place in the religion of the Argives.

75. 5. *A Midâ captus.* Silenus, the tutor and foster-father of Bacchus, having in a state of intoxication strayed from him, was carried to Midas, and by him restored to Bacchus. See Ovid's Met. XI.

75. 9. *Cresphonte.* This tragedy of Euripides is not extant; the passage here recorded is also quoted by Plutarch.

75. 15. *In "Consolatione" Crantoris.* This was a short treatise upon the subject of grief, written by Crantor, an Academic philosopher of Soli, a town of Cilicia.

75. 24. *Causam . . . . . judicatam;* "that this question, in a course of facts, [referring to what is repeated in the preceding narrative,] has been decided by the immortal gods."

75. 25. *Alcidamas.* Of Elea in Æolia. He was contemporary with Isocrates, and lived about 400 years B. C. Two orations are extant under his name. Cicero here mentions him as the author of a discourse on the praise of death.

76. 18. *Harmodius et Aristogiton.* Among the patriotic songs of the Athenians, there are none more frequently mentioned by ancient authors, than those upon Harmodius and Aristogiton, who put to death Hipparchus and Hippias, the sons and successors of Pisistratus, king of Athens, an event which was a signal to the Athenians for recovering their liberty.

78. 2. *Velis passis*; "with crowded sails," i. e. as soon as possible.

BOOK II.

79. 1. *Neoptolemus.* Nothing more remains of the Neoptolemus here referred to. There was another of the same name, a brother of Pyrrhus, and son of Achilles; also one of Alexander's generals.

80. 25. *Genus Atticorum.* There was another set of Orators at Rome, men of parts and learning, and of the first quality; who, while they acknowledged the superiority of Cicero's genius, yet censured his diction as not truly Attic or classical; *some calling* it loose and languid, others unlik and

exuberant. These men affected a minute and fastidious correctness, pointed sentences, short and concise periods, without a syllable to spare in them; as if the perfection of oratory consisted in a frugality of words, and in crowding our sentiments in the narrowest compass. The chief patrons of this taste were M. Brutus, Asinius Pollio and Sallust, whom Seneca seems to treat as the authors of the obscure, abrupt and sententious style. Cicero often ridicules these pretenders to Attic elegance, as judging of eloquence not by the force of the art, but of their own weakness; resolving to decry what they could not attain, and to admire nothing which they could not imitate.

81. 5. *Secundo populo;* "with the people favoring him."

81. 6. *Quam nos maxime.* The Academic philosophy. Cicero tells us in his treatise "*De Finibus,*" why he was partial to it.

81. 20. *Languenti Græciæ eripiant.* The Romans at that time were accustomed to send their young men to Athens, where Philo, Antiochus, &c. flourished. The term *languenti* is applied to Greece because she no longer had such distinguished men as Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Democritus, Socrates, &c.

81. 22. *Sicut reliquas .... transtulerunt.* When Apollonius, a Greek rhetorician, first heard an oration of Cicero in the Greek language, he was so struck with admiration, that he exclaimed, "I

praise and admire you, O Cicero; but I pity the misfortune of the Grecians when I see that eloquence and erudition, which were all the good things left to them, must now be transferred by you to Rome."

82. 8. *Sequimur probabilia.* A practice peculiar to the Academics.

82. 23. *Quorum.* The Epicureans.

83. 7. *Reliquosque Socraticos.* Among the Socratic philosophers were Antisthenes, Aristippus, Phædon, Plato, Euclid, Aristotle, and others, who formed various sects. The Cynics sprang from Antisthenes, the Cyreneans from Aristippus, the Eliacs from Phædon, the Academics from Plato, the Megareans from Euclid, &c.

83. 24. *Quâ princeps usus est.* Aristotle practised different methods of teaching at different times.

83. 28. *Familiaribus nostris.* Hirtius, Dolabella, Brutus, M. Piso.

84. 5. *Academiam.* See note 122. 1.

86. 5. *Falsumque .... emitent;* "and that sentiment of Accius is false and asserted without foundation: "*Good grain, though it be planted in a sterile field, springs up and flourishes by the vigor of its own nature.*"

87. 8. *Animoque .... repugnante:* "and I require of you a tractable mind," i. e. you must not *contradict* me.

88. 11. *Metrodorus.* Of Athens, a distinguished

follower of Epicurus; he was a man of remarkable memory.

88. 21. *Hercule.* Who being unable to endure the pain occasioned by the poisoned robe sent to him by Dejanira, is represented by Ovid as preparing his own funeral pile on mount Œta, and laying himself upon it with great composure. *Met.* IX. 238.

88. 26. *Illi ipsi.* The Stoics.

89. 22. *Heu .... æstus.* These trochaic lines, Manutius says, are taken from a tragedy of Accius. The meaning is, "who, alas, will throw me from the high summit of the rock, into the salt waves."

90. 4. *Trachiniis.* The titles of the ancient tragedies were usually given to them either from the persons concerned, the business of the drama, or the place where it was transacted. The Trachiniæ is so called from Trachis, a small country of Phthiotis in Thessaly, to which place Dejanira had accompanied Hercules in his voluntary banishment, and where she remained under the protection of Ceyx, the king, during the absence of her husband on his expedition to Œchalia.

90. 9. *Junonis terror.* Juno being jealous of Alcmena who had recently given birth to Hercules by Jupiter, sent two terrific serpents to destroy the infant. Hercules, grasping them with both hands, easily strangled them.

90. 19. *Moles gigantûm.* Referring to those whom Hercules is said to have conquered in Italy;

or those whom Juno had employed against him; or those who had sprung from the blood of the Nemæan lion; or those whom he slew at the isthmus of Corinth.

90. 19. *Biformato impetu Centaurus.* By the same figure, which is familiar to the poets, Horace speaks of "*crines Paridis adulteros;*" and Cicero says "*barbara immanitas,*" i. e. *barbarorum.* The centaur is called double shaped because he is said to be composed of a man's bust upon a horse's body.

90. 19. *Centaurus.* Nessus.

90. 21. *Non Græa vis.* In allusion to Troy, which Hercules is said to have pillaged on account of the treachery of Laomedon, who refused to give him the horses he had promised; or perhaps to the island of Cos, which he is said to have plundered, Eurypilus, the king, and his whole family, having been put to death.

90. 22. *Relegata ultimis.* He came to Iberia, or Spain, in the extreme part of which he erected his two pillars, as the utmost limits of the known world. By some writers, these pillars are located at the isthmus of Corinth; Polybius, Dicæarchus, Eratosthenes, and almost all the Grecian authors, place them at the strait of Euripus; the Spaniards and Africans, at Gades.

90. 25. *O nate.* He is addressing Hyllus, his son, by Dejanira. This pathetic lamentation of Hercules, has met with universal applause from the

admirers and critics of antiquity. The translation here given seems to be almost the only specimen of Cicero's poetical abilities.

90. 26. *Nec .... piis*, i. e. Do not suffer, whilst I am dying, your affection for your mother to be exceeded by your love for me. Seize her, and with pious hands give her to my wrath.

90. 31. *Heu .... occidit:* "Alas, can it be, that like a girl I must weep, whom no one ever saw lamenting a misfortune? Has my manliness become effeminate, and by affliction sunk so low?"

91. 7. *Nunc .... ardor:* "now the acutest pangs torment me: now the burning poison [of the garment] is creeping through my limbs."

91. 10. *Nemeæus leo.* The first labor of Hercules, imposed upon him by Eurystheus, was the killing of a lion in Nemea, a wood of Achaia, whose hide was proof against any weapon.

91. 12. *Lernam.* His second labor was to destroy the Lernæan hydra which had seven heads according to Apollodorus, fifty according to Simonides, and one hundred according to Diodorus. *Excetrâ.* So called because when one head was cut off, two or three more sprung up in its place. Plautus uses the same word in his "*Persa*," I. 1. 3.

Nam cum leone, et cum excetrâ, cum cervo, cum apro Æolico,
Cum avibus Stymphalicis, cum Amazone deluctari mavelim,
Quam cum amore.

91. 13. *Bicorporem.* In allusion to the centaurs whom he killed in his pursuit of the wild boar of Erymanthus.

91. 14. *Erymanthiam.* Another labor of Hercules was to bring alive to Eurystheus a wild boar which ravaged the neighborhood of Erymanthus.

91. 16. *Tricipitem.* The last and most dangerous of his labors was to bring upon earth the three-headed dog Cerberus. Descending by a cave on mount Tænarus, he was permitted by Pluto to carry away his friends Theseus and Pirithous, who were condemned to punishment in hell; and Cerberus also was granted to his prayers, provided he made use of no arms, but only of force to drag him away. *Hydrâ generatum.* Hesiod says he was born of Typhon and Echidna. In this, as in many other statements, there is a difference of opinion among mythological writers.

91. 18. *Draconem.* At the marriage of Juno, she is said to have given to Jupiter certain fruit trees which bore golden apples. The Hesperides had the keeping of these, assisted by a dragon to watch the garden where the fruit grew. This dragon had a hundred heads and various voices. Hercules slew him and carried the apples to Eurystheus. Pliny and Solinus suppose the dragon to be no other than an arm of the sea wherewith the garden was encompassed, and which defended the entrance thereof. Varro supposes that the golden apples were nothing but sheep. Others, with more probability, say they were oranges.

91. 28. *Furtum Lemnium.* So called either because any atrocious crime was figuratively called

Lemnian from the savage character of the Lemnians, who, according to Herodotus, put to death all the children they had by the women of Attica; or because fire and Vulcan, who was a Lemnian, are often used synonymously by the poets.

92. 4. *Hæc dicit.* The tragedy from which these lines are taken is not extant. The name of it was "Prometheus Bound."

92. 5. *Titanum soboles.* Prometheus was the son of Iapetus, one of the Titans. Horace says, (*Od.* I. 3.)

Audax Iapeti genus
Ignem fraude malâ gentibus intulit.

92. 6. *Generata cœlo.* The Titans were sons of Cœlus and Terra, i. e. of Heaven and Earth, according to Hesiod and Apollodorus. They are said to have derived their name from their mother, and hence the most ancient fabulous histories have made them pass for sons of the Earth. Banier observes, that although most of the ancients have confounded giants with the Titans, they ought to be distinguished. The latter, he says, were of an illustrious family, and extended their empire over one part of the world; the others were so many banditti dispersed over Thessaly, who occasioned great trouble to the Titans. Hesiod distinguishes them from one another, and states that the giants were not born till long after the overthrow of the Titans, and after the wars which these carried on against the others. According to the learned Mr.

Briant, the Titans were those Cuthites, or sons of Chus, called giants, who were employed in building the tower of Babel, and who were afterwards dispersed.

92. 16. *Jovis satelles.* The eagle which was consecrated to Jupiter as early as the war with the Titans. On his way to that war to free his parents from the bondage of the Titans, an eagle is said to have given him an omen of future victory; on this account he chose that the bird should be sacred to him, and its wings be borne on his standards.

92. 29. *Seclis.* Æschylus says that Prometheus was bound for thirty thousand years.

94. 25. *Ratiunculas.* The Stoics were accustomed to dispute by short arguments; for instance, *Qui prudens est, temperans est; qui temperans, constans; qui constans, imperturbatus; qui imperturbatus, sine tristitiâ; qui sine tristitiâ, beatus; ergo, prudens, beatus est.* This mode of arguing was called *sorites*, or the accumulation of one proposition upon another, and the drawing a conclusion from the whole.

95. 2. *Capior:* "I am deceived."

96. 7. *Nihil est plane.* A figurative expression, "of no consequence."

96. 16. *Nihil proficientem, et laborantem.* Bentley thinks that either the construction should be *laborantem, et nihil proficientem*, or *frustra* should be inserted before *laborantem.*

97. 1. *Corinthiis*; sc. *vasis.* The Corinthian

brass of which vessels were made, was a metal held in great esteem, consisting of a mixture of gold, silver and copper.

97. 8. *Potes dicere, &c.* There are various readings of this passage. Bentley gives the following ingenious one: *num humana contemnentem potes te dicere? aut Philoctetam illum: a te enim malo discedere.*

97. 10. *Qui.* Probably referring to Prometheus, whose rock is moist with his tears. But Beroaldus thinks the passage alludes to Philoctetes, who is said to have lain in his cave ten years.

97. 18. *Pungit ....jugulum:* "pain vexes you: let it sting you to the heart. If you have no defence, submit to it."

97. 20. *Vulcaniis armis:* which were impenetrable. Allusion is here made to the armor made by Vulcan for Achilles. See *Homer's Iliad. Σ.* 470.

97. 23. *Cretum quidem leges.* Strabo says that laws were made by Minos, who gradually introduced a more civilized mode of life among the Cretans. One of their laws had reference to the dance in armor, which was called the Pyrrhic dance. Lycurgus went to Crete and transferred nearly all these laws to Sparta.

97. 24. *De Jovis sententiâ.* Minos, with a view of giving greater authority to his laws, retired into a cave at Crete, where he feigned that Jupiter, his father, dictated them to him, and every time he returned from the cave he announced some new

law. Hence Homer (*Odyss.* 19) gives him the title of Jupiter's disciple.

98. 16. *Studiosos.* *Φιλοπόνους.*

99. 6. *Eurotas.* A river of the Peloponnesus, which rose in Arcadia, flowed south through Laconia, passing by Lacedæmon, and emptied into the Laconic gulf. In this river the Spartan youth were accustomed to bathe after the fatigues of the day. The Romans used the Tiber for the same purpose.

99. 7. *Fertilitas barbara.* In allusion to the expensive ornaments and luxury in which the wives of the Trojans and Medes indulged.

99. 13. *Mora.* A division of the Lacedæmonian army, consisting of three, five, or seven hundred men, was so called.

99. 13. *Ad tibiam.* Valerius Maximus, (II. 6.) speaks of the same custom of the Spartans: *Non ante ad dimicandum descendebant, quam tibiæ concentu et anapæsti pedis modulo cohortationis calorem animo traxissent.* Thucydides says that the custom was instituted by the Lacedæmonians, that they might not appear scattered and without discipline in battle; and Aristotle, that they might easily distinguish the cowards from those who conducted themselves bravely. In some editions, we find, *quorum procedit motus ad tibiam, &c.*

99. 17. *Ferre cibaria.* The load which a Roman soldier carried is almost incredible. Young recruits were required to bear a weight of sixty

pounds, and to march in military step, that they might learn to endure the weight of the arms and provisions necessary to be carried in their expeditions. Virgil, (*G.* III. 346,) says:

Non secus ac patriis acer Romanus in armis
Injusto sub fasce viam quum carpit, et hosti
Ante exspectatum positis stat in agmine castris.

99. 18. *Ferre vallum.* Horace, (*Epod.* 9,) says:

Romanus, eheu! (posteri negabitis)
Emancipatus feminæ,
Fert vallum et arma miles.....

L. Q. Cincinnatus, according to Livy, required every soldier to appear in the field with twelve palisades, and cooked provisions for five days.

99. 23. *Expeditis armis, &c.* Adjectives are often used adverbially. Cicero means to say, that the Roman soldiers use their arms as readily as their limbs.

99. 25. *Clamor.* The Greeks were accustomed to engage in battle without noise; but the Roman soldiers rushed forward to the charge with a great shout to animate one another and intimidate the enemy.

100. 3. *Experti sumus.* As in the contest in which the young soldiers of Pompey were defeated by the veterans of Cæsar.

100. 8. *At vero ille.* The verses which follow seem to be an imitation by some Latin poet, of the passage in Homer, (*Iliad* XI.) in which Eurypylus is wounded by Paris, and asks aid of Patroclus.

100. 9. *A quo obligetur:* "by whom his wound may be dressed."

100. 12. *Priusquam .... accedi:* "Before I meet death inflicted upon me by a hostile hand, (my gushing blood can in no way be stopped,) I ask your aid if by any means my death can be averted. For the wounded fill the porches of the sons of Æsculapius, so that no access to them can be obtained."

100. 15. *Nam Æsclapii.* Podalirius and Machaon were sons of Æsculapius. The author of these lines does not follow exactly the account given by Homer. That poet represents Podalirius and Machaon unable to assist Eurypylus because one of them was wounded, and the other still fighting; but here it seems they were prevented by the great number of wounded persons brought to them for cure.

100. 25. *Si quidem homo est:* "if he has any humanity."

101. 6. *Æsopus.* A distinguished tragic actor, who flourished in the time of Cicero, and amassed great wealth by his profession. Our author says of him, (Epist. I. 7,) *Deliciæ vero tuæ, noster Æsopus.* And Horace: *Quæ gravis Æsopus, quæ doctus Roscius egit.* He is said to have lived in the most luxurious and extravagant manner.

101. 7. *Ubi fortuna.* Eurypylus is describing the movements of the Grecian army.

101. 16. Subduc .... athletæ. The name of

athletæ was, in the later period of Grecian history and among the Romans, properly confined to those persons who devoted themselves to a course of training which might fit them to excel in contests of agility and strength, and who in fact made athletic exercises their profession.

101. 21. *Cæstibus.* These were the thongs or bands of leather which were tied round the hands of boxers, in order to render their blows more powerful. The *cestus* was in use for this purpose from the earliest times. When Epeus and Eurya-lus, in the Iliad (XXIII. 684,) prepare themselves for boxing, they put on their hands thongs made of ox hide. The *cestus* used in later times in the public games seems to have been a most formidable weapon. It was frequently covered with knots and nails, and loaded with lead and iron; whence Virgil, (*Æ.* V. 404,) speaking of it says:

Tantorum ingentia septem
Terga boum plumbo insuto ferroque rigebant.

101. 24. *Gladiatores.* These were men who fought with swords in the amphitheatre and other places for the amusement of the Roman people. They are said to have been first exhibited by the Etrurians, and to have had their origin from the custom of killing slaves and captives at the funeral pyres of the deceased. A show of gladiators was called *munus*, and the person who exhibited it, *editor*, *munerator*, or *dominus*, as on page 102, line 2.

102. 12. *Samnis . . . . locoque.* A verse from

Lucilius, (Sat. IV.) who is speaking of Eserninus, and calling him contemptuously a Samnite. Many gladiators were so called, because they were armed in the same way as that people, and were particularly distinguished by the oblong *scutum*.

103. 5. *Falsâ ejus visione et specie*; i. e. by an erroneous idea, or conception of it.

103. 6. *Doloremque* [*ejus*] *omnem esse tolerabilem*. If *ejus* be the true reading, the meaning would be that of *dolorem doloris*, which is absurd. Bentley substitutes *rebus*, as opposed to *falsâ specie*.

104. 8. *Iterandum*. Some good editions have *iteradum*. In the *Acad. Quæst.* of our author, we find *Age, asta, mane, iteradum eadem et ista mihi*. So *adesdum* is frequently found in comic writers.

107. 12. *Niptris*. So salled from νίπτω. There was a play of this name by Sophocles, and a translation of it by Pacuvius, neither of which is extant. This fragment and what follows are from the translation.

107. 17. *Tamen huic*. As a comparison is here made between Sophocles and Pacuvius, Bentley thinks the reading should be *apud hunc*.

108. 26. *Zeno*. Called the Eleatic, to distinguish him from Zeno the Stoic. He was a native of Elea in Magna Græcia, and the adopted son and disciple of Parmenides.

109. 3. *Anaxarcho*. A Grecian philosopher of the Eleatic school. He was a native of Abdera, and flourished about 340 B. C. He is said ap-

parently without truth, to have expired by the cruel death of being pounded in a mortar; a torture inflicted upon him by Nicocreon, king of Cyprus, and which he endured with the greatest fortitude.

109. 6. *Calanus.* An Indian philosopher, who followed Alexander the Great, in his expedition to India.

109. 7. *Suâ voluntate.* Which was the custom in India, according to Q. Curtius and Lucan:

> *Quique suas struxere pyras, vivique calentes*
> *Conscendere rogos.*

109. 14. *Rusticanus.* Of an obscure family in the district of Arpinum.

110. 2. *Abjecto scuto.* For he could not run if he retained it, nor fight after he had thrown it away. Any coward who fled from the battle was therefore called by the Greeks Ῥιψάσπις.

111. 11. *M. Antonium.* One of the greatest orators of Rome. In the judgment of Cicero, it was owing to him and to Crassus, that Italy was the rival of Greece in the art of eloquence. He makes him one of the principal interlocutors in his dialogue on oratory; and in his treatise on Famous Orators describes at length his character as a speaker.

111. 11. *Pro se ipse.* Having obtained the quæstorship of a province in Asia, he had proceeded to Brundusium, when he was informed that he was accused of incest, and that the cause lay before Cassius the prætor, who was a very severe judge.

Declining to avail himself of the privilege belonging to those who were absent in the service of the commonwealth, against whom no accusation could be preferred, he hastened back to Rome and submitted to a trial in which he was honorably acquitted.

112. 18. *Decii.* See note 59. 11.

113. 2. *Heracleotes Dionysius.* A distinguished disciple of Plato.

113. 14. *Epigonis.* A tragedy of Æschylus, translated by Accius.

113. 15. *Audisne.... abdite.* According to some commentators, this is the exclamation of Alcmæon invoking his deceased father Amphiaraus; according to others, of some one upbraiding Alcmæon for his degeneracy.

113. 18. *Noster Posidonius.* A Grecian philosopher of the Stoic sect. He flourished 50 or 60 years B. C., and was a native of Apamea in Syria. He lived and taught philosophy at Rhodes, whence he is often considered a Rhodian. For a similar reason Apollonius of Alabanda in Caria, was called a Rhodian. Cicero attended the lectures of both these masters.

113. 19. *Narrare Pompeius.* After the successful termination of the war against Mithridates, Pompey attended the lectures of the most distinguished professors of the liberal arts at Rhodes, and made generous presents to them. He did the same at Athens.

114. 9. *Omninoque . . . . tolerabiles.* By *labores* in this sentence, is meant the gymnastic games, such as the Olympic, Pythian, &c. For *contemnendo* Bentley substitutes *contendendo.*

114. 16. *Petessunt.* An obsolete word for *petunt.* It is found in other writings of Cicero. In Plautus we find *impetrasso, reconciliasso* and many similar words.

114. 18. *Quæ flamma est?* i. e. *quod periculum est?* So in the Eunuch of Terence: *Ex flammâ te petere cibum posse arbitror.*

114. 20. *Punctis;* "votes." In ancient times, before separate tablets were used in voting, a man called *rogator,* used to mark the votes, one by one, by points on wax tablets. Horace, (*Art. Poet.* 343,) says:

> *Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci,*
> *Lectorem delectando, pariterque monendo.*

115. 14. *Neque plausum captans:* i. e. *plausumque non captans.*

116. 10. *Cimbri.* The most northern people of Germany mentioned by Pliny, Strabo, Mela and Tacitus: but they are not agreed with respect to their origin, some tracing them to the Scythians, and others to the Cimmerians. They anciently occupied the peninsula which stretches out into the German sea, and is known under the name of the Cimbric Chersonesus.

116. 10. *Celtiberi.* A powerful and celebrated people who occupied the greatest part of the inte-

rior of Spain. According to Diodorus Siculus, they were a people composed of two nations, the Iberians and the Celtes.

117. 2. *Delphinus, ut Arionem Methymnæum.* A well known fable related by Herodotus, (I. 23. 24.) and Ovid. (*Fast.* II. 83.)

117. 4. *Neptunii.* The fable says that the horses which drew the chariot of Pelops had wings, and that they had been given by Neptune; the meaning of which is, if we may believe Pindar and Palæphatus, that Pelops made use of a ship with sails to carry off Hippodamia.

BOOK III.

118. 4. *Deorum immortalium.* Apollo and his son Æsculapius, the latter having been deified on account of his skill in the healing art.

120. 9. *Imago;* "an echo." So in Horace, (*Carm.* I. 12.)

. . . *Cujus recinet jocosa*
Nomen imago.

121. 22. *Hortensio.* One of the philosophical works of Cicero, often cited, and highly commended by Augustine. It was published in the way of dialogue, in honor of his deceased friend; where in a debate of learning, he undertook, as he had often done in contests at the bar, the defence of philosophy against Hortensius, to whom he assigned the part of arraigning it. See note 41. 4.

121. 22. *De maximis rebus.* Pertaining to philosophy, of which our author treats in his *Acad. Quæst.* and books *De Finibus Bon. et Mal.*

122. 5. *In sapientem ægritudo.* The Stoics advanced many extravagant opinions concerning their wise man. For example, that he feels neither pain nor pleasure; that he exercises no pity; that he is free from faults; that he is divine; that he can neither deceive nor be deceived; that he does all things well; that he alone is great, noble, ingenious; that he is the only friend; that he alone is free; that he is a prophet, a prince and a king, and the like. These paradoxical vauntings were humorously ridiculed by Horace, *Serm.* I. *sat.* 3. The Stoics, however, did not suppose their wise man actually existed; but they formed in their imagination an image of perfection towards which every man should constantly aspire.

123. 9. *Igitur insaniunt.* It was a paradox of the Stoics, that all fools were mad. Horace says, (*Serm.* II. 3. 43.)

> *Quem mala stultitia, et quemcumque inscitia veri*
> *Cæcum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex*
> *Autumat.*

124. 26. *Ajacem* [*Telamonium*]. See note 65. 4.

125. 17. *Crantor.* A celebrated philosopher of the old Academy, who flourished 300 years B. C. He was highly esteemed for the purity of his moral doctrine, as we may infer from the praises bestowed upon him by the ancients.

125. 18. *Minime . . . corpore.* A quotation from Crantor's discourse on "Grief." Our author in his *Quæst. Acad.* IV. 44, says of this discourse, *Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus, et, ut Tuberoni Panætius præcipit, ad verbum ediscendus libellus.*

125. 21. *Ne . . . . corpore;* "I would choose never to be ill; but should I become so, let me have the power of sensation, whether an amputation or any other separation of my body is to be made; for that insensibility [which they praise] cannot be but at the expense of some unnatural wildness of mind, or stupor of body."

127. 2. *Cadit, ut serviat.* Horace, (*Epis.* I. 16. 66,) says,

Qui metuens vivet, liber mihi non erit unquam.

The same epistle contains not a few of the opinions of the Stoics.

128. 14. *Pisonis.* A distinguished Roman of the Calpurnian *gens.* He obtained the epithet of *Frugi* on account of his frugality and other virtues. He left behind him various orations, and was the author of "Historical Annals," which, though written in the meagre simplicity of the times, were reckoned of good authority.

129. 12. *Apud Homerum.* (*Iliad* IX. 646,) where Achilles replies to Ulysses and Ajax, the ambassadors of Agamemnon.

130. 21. *Callisthenis.* A Greek philosopher and historian. He attended Alexander in his expedition to the East; but his free spirit and republi-

can sentiments rendered him very unfit for the attentions and obsequiousness of a courtier. Having frequently offended Alexander by his unseasonable reflections and remonstrances, he rendered him altogether implacable by opposing his assumption of divine honors.

130. 21. *Sodalis sui.* They were both disciples of Aristotle.

132. 1. *At non similis ægrotationis est libido.* See our author's treatise *De Finibus*, III. 10.

133. 20. *Ille videtur.* Thyestes.

133. 22. *Raptis nuptiis.* Œnomaus, the father of Hippodamia, refused to marry her to any one who could not overcome him in a chariot race. Pelops was successful in a contest with him by bribing his charioteer, and thus obtained the object of his affection.

134. 16. *Dionysius.* The son of Dionysius of Syracuse, to whose authority he succeeded. Under the influence of his uncle Dion, aided by the lessons of Plato, he seemed to imbibe the true principles of philosophy. Soon, however, the courtiers gained an ascendancy over the young king, and succeeded in driving these true friends from his presence. Dionysius was twice driven from Syracuse; once by Dion into Italy, and subsequently by Timolean into Corinth. In his fallen state he was exposed to the reproaches and sarcasms of the witty. To one who asked him what he had gained *by the wisdom* of Plato, he replied, "The ability to *bear as I do,* this change of fortune."

134. 19. *Tarquinio.* Called *Superbus*, the last of the Roman kings.

135. 14. *Cyrenaici.* A sect of ancient philosophers, so called from the native city of their chief, Aristippus of Cyrene, a disciple of Socrates. One of their distinguishing tenets was, that "Pleasure is the ultimate object of human pursuit; it is only in subserviency to this that fame, friendship, and even virtue are to be desired."

135. 20. *Ei rei sustuli;* "raised or brought him up for that end." The verb *tollo* has this signification, perhaps from the practice of laying a new born infant at his father's feet that he might take it up, and thus own it as his child.

136. 25. *Quamobrem .... lucro.* A quotation from the *Phormio* of Terence, in which Demipho in conversation with his servant Geta, expresses his displeasure at the marriage of his son.

137. 13. *Quem .... risisse.* Pliny says that Crassus never laughed, and was on that account called Agelastus.

139. 17. *Videt malum nullum esse, nisi culpam.* Bentley substitutes *culpâ.* As the signification of the word is "moral evil" or "sin," there seems to be no good reason for the change. Cicero, (*Famil.* IX. 16.) says: *Nihil esse sapientis præstare, nisi culpam.*

M. T. CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM

LIBRI QUINQUE

EX EDITIONIBUS OLIVETI ET ERNESTI.

ACCEDUNT NOTÆ ANGLICÆ.

CURA

C. K. DILLAWAY, A. M.

TOM. II.

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M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM,

AD

MARCUM BRUTUM,

LIBER TERTIUS.

XVII. Pythagoras mihi sic diceret, aut Socrates, aut Plato: Quid jaces? aut quid mœres? aut cur succumbis, cedisque fortunæ? quæ pervellere te forsitan potuerit, et pungere; non poterit certe vīres frangere. Magna vis est in virtutibus. Eas excita, si forte dormiunt. Jam tibi aderit princeps fortitudo, quæ te animo tanto esse cogat, ut omnia, quæ possint homini evenire, contemnas, et pro nihilo putes. Aderit temperantia, quæ est eadem moderatio, a me quidem paulo ante appellata frugalitas; quæ te turpiter et nequiter facere nihil patiatur. Quid est autem nequius aut turpius effeminato viro? Ne justitia quidem sinet te ista facere; cui minimum esse videtur in hac causâ loci; quæ ta-

men ita dicet, dupliciter esse te injustum, cum et alienum appetas, qui, mortalis natus, conditionem postules immortalium, et graviter feras, te, quod utendum acceperis, reddidisse.

Prudentiæ vero quid respondebis, dicenti, virtutem sese esse contentam, quo modo ad bene vivendum, sic et ad beate? quæ si extrinsecus religata pendeat, et non oriatur a se, et rursus ad se revertatur, et, omnia sua complexa, nihil quærat aliunde; non intelligo, cur aut verbis tam vehementer ornanda, aut re tantopere expetenda, videatur. Ad hæc bona me si revocas, Epicure, pareo; sequor; utor te ipso duce; obliviscor etiam malorum, ut jubes, eoque facilius, quod ea ne in malis quidem ponenda censeo. Sed traducis cogitationes meas ad voluptates. Quas? Corporis, (credo) aut quæ, propter corpus, vel recordatione vel spe cogitentur. Numquid est aliud? Rectene interpretor sententiam tuam? Solent enim isti negare nos intelligere, quid dicat Epicurus. Hoc dicit: et hoc ille acriculus, me audiente, Athenis senex Zeno, istorum acutissimus, contendere, et magnâ voce dicere solebat: eum esse beatum, qui præsentibus voluptatibus frueretur, confideretque se fruiturum aut in omni aut in magnâ parte vitæ, dolore non interveniente: aut, si interveniret, si summus foret, futurum brevem; si productior, plus habiturum

jucundi, quam mali: hæc cogitantem fore beatum, præsertim si et ante perceptis bonis contentus esset, nec mortem nec deos extimesceret.

XVIII. Habes formam Epicuri vitæ beatæ, verbis Zenonis expressam, nihil ut possit negari. Quid ergo? hujusne vitæ propositio et cogitatio aut Thyesten levare poterit, aut Æetam, de quo paulo ante dixi, aut Telamonem, pulsum patriâ, exsulantem, atque egentem? in quo hæc admiratio fiebat:

"Hiccine est Telamo ille, modo quem gloria ad cœlum extulit?
Quem adspectabant; cujus ob os Graii ora obvertebant sua."

Quod si cui (ut ait idem) simul animus cum re concidit, a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non ab his voluptariis. Quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? Fac sane esse summum bonum, non dolere: (quamquam id non vocatur voluptas: sed non necesse est nunc omnia) idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? Sit sane summum malum, dolere. In eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? Quid tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur eam nos dicere voluptatem, quam tu idem, cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? Sunt hæc tua verba, necne? In eo quidem li-

bro, qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam (fungar enim jam interpretis munere, ne quis me putet fingere) dicis hæc: "Nec equidem habeo, quod intelligam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates, quæ sapore percipiuntur; detrahens eas, quæ auditu et cantibus; detrahens eas etiam, quæ ex formis percipiuntur oculis, suaves motiones, sive quæ aliæ voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu. Nec vero ita dici potest, mentis lætitiam solam esse in bonis. Lætantem enim mentem ita novi, spe eorum omnium quæ supra dixi, fore ut natura, iis potiens, dolore careat." Atque hæc quidem his verbis, quivis ut intelligat, quam voluptatem nôrit Epicurus. Deinde paulo infra, "Sæpe quæsivi," inquit, "ex iis qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent, quod in bonis relinquerent, si illa detraxissent, nisi si vellent voces inanes fundere. Nihil ab his potui cognoscere: qui si virtutes ebullire [nolent] et sapientias, nihil aliud dicent, nisi eam viam, quâ efficiantur eæ voluptates, quas supra dixi." Quæ sequuntur, in eâdem sententiâ sunt; totusque liber, qui est de summo bono, refertus et verbis et sententiis talibus. Ad hanccine igitur vitam Telamonem illum revocabis, ut leves ægritudinem? Et, siquem tuorum afflictum mœrore videris, huic acipenserem potius, quam aliquem Socraticum libellum, dabis?

hydrauli hortabere ut audiat voces potius, quam Platonis? expones, quæ spectet florida et varia? fasciculum ad nares admovebis? incendes odores? et sertis redimiri jubebis, et rosâ? Si vero aliquid etiam, tum plane luctum omnem absterseris?

XIX. Hæc Epicuro confitenda sunt, aut ea, quæ modo expressa ad verbum dixi, tollenda de libro; vel totus liber potius abjiciendus. Est enim confertus voluptatibus. Quærendum igitur, quemadmodum ægritudine privemus eum, qui ita dicat:

..... "Pol, mihi fortuna magis nunc defit, quam genus.
Namque regnum suppetebat mihi: ut scias quanto loco,
Quantis opibus, quibus de rebus, lapsa fortuna occidat."

Quid? huic calix mulsi impingendus est, ut plorare desinat, aut aliquid ejusmodi? Ecce tibi ex alterâ parte ab eodem poëtâ:

"Ex opibus summis opis egens, Hector, tuæ."

Huic subvenire debemus: quærit enim auxilium.

"Quid petam præsidî, aut exsequar? quove nunc auxilio aut fugâ
Freta sim? Arce et urbe orba sum. Quo accedam? Quo applicem?
Cui nec aræ patriæ domi stant; fractæ, et disjectæ jacent:
Fana flammâ deflagrata: tosti alti stant parietes,
Deformati, atque abiete crispâ."

Scitis, quæ sequantur: et illud in primis:

"O pater! o patria! o Priami domus!
Septum altisono cardine templum:
Vidi ego te, adstante ope barbaricâ,
Tectis cælatis, laqueatis,
Auro, ebore instructam regifice."

O poëtam egregium! quamquam ab his cantoribus Euphorionis contemnitur. Sentit, omnia repentina et necopinata esse graviora. Exaggeratis igitur regis opibus, quæ videbantur sempiternæ fore, quid adjungit?

"Hæc omnia vidi inflammari,
Priamo vi vitam evitari,
Jovis aram sanguine turpari."

Præclarum carmen: est enim et rebus, et verbis, et modis lugubre. Eripiamus huic ægritudinem. Quo modo? Collocemus in culcitâ plumeâ: psaltriam adducamus: hedychrum incendamus: demus scutellam dulciculæ potionis: aliquid videamus et cibi. Hæc tandem bona sunt, quibus ægritudines gravissimæ detrahantur? tu enim, paulo ante, ne intelligere te quidem alia ulla dicebas. Revocari igitur oportere a mœrore ad cogitationem bonorum, conveniret mihi cum Epicuro, si, quid esset bonum, conveniret.

XX. Dicet aliquis: Quid ergo? tu Epicurum

existimas ista voluisse, aut libidinosas ejus fuisse sententias? Ego vero minime: video enim ab eo dici multa severe, multa præclare. Itaque (ut sæpe dixi) de acumine agitur ejus, non de moribus. Quamvis spernat voluptates eas, quas modo laudavit, ego tamen meminero, quod videatur ei summum bonum. Non enim verbo solum posuit voluptatem, sed explanavit, quid diceret. "Saporem," inquit, "et corporum complexum, et ludos atque cantus, et formas eas, quibus oculi jucunde moveantur." Num fingo? num mentior? Cupio refelli: quid enim laboro, nisi ut veritas in omni quæstione explicetur?

At idem ait, non crescere voluptatem, dolore detracto; summamque voluptatem, nihil dolere. Paucis verbis tria magna peccata: unum, quod secum ipse pugnat: modo enim, ne suspicari quidem se quidquam bonum, nisi sensus quasi titillarentur voluptate; nunc autem, summam voluptatem esse, dolore carere: potesne magis secum ipse pugnare? Alterum peccatum, quod, cum in naturâ tria sint; unum, gaudere; alterum, dolere; tertium, nec gaudere nec dolere; hic primum et tertium putat idem esse, nec distinguit a non dolendo voluptatem. Tertium peccatum commune cum quibusdam, quod, cum virtus maxime expetatur, ejusque adipiscendæ causâ

philosophia quæsita sit, ille a virtute summum bonum separavit.

At laudat, et sæpe, virtutem. Et quidem C. Gracchus, cum largitiones maximas fecisset, et effudisset ærarium, verbis tamen defendebat ærarium. Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam? Piso ille Frugi semper contra legem frumentariam dixerat. Is, lege latâ, consularis ad frumentum accipiendum venerat. Animadvertit Gracchus in concione Pisonem stantem. Quærit, audiente populo Romano, quî sibi constet, cum eâ lege frumentum petat, quam dissuaserit? "Nolim," inquit, "mea bona, Gracche, tibi viritim dividere [liceat:] sed, si facias, partem petam." Parumne declaravit vir gravis et sapiens, lege Semproniâ patrimonium publicum dissipari? Lege orationes Gracchi: patronum ærarii esse dices.

Negat Epicurus jucunde posse vivi, nisi cum virtute vivatur. Negat ullam in sapientem vim esse fortunæ: tenuem victum antefert copioso: negat ullum esse tempus, quo sapiens non beatus sit. Omnia philosopho digna, sed cum voluptate pugnantia. Non istam dicit voluptatem. Dicat quamlibet. Nempe eam dicit, in quâ virtutis nulla pars insit. Age, si voluptatem non intelligimus, ne dolorem quidem? Nego igitur ejus

esse, qui dolore summum malum metiatur, mentionem facere virtutis.

XXI. Et queruntur quidam Epicurei, viri optimi, (nam nullum genus est minus malitiosum) me studiose dicere contra Epicurum. Ita credo, de honore aut de dignitate contendimus. Mihi summum in animo bonum videtur, illi autem in corpore: mihi in virtute, illi in voluptate. Et illi pugnant; et quidem vicinorum fidem implorant: multi autem sunt, qui statim convolent: ego sum is, qui dicam me non laborare; actum habiturum, quod egerint. Quid enim? de bello Punico agitur? de quo ipso cum aliud M. Catoni, aliud L. Lentulo videretur, nulla inter eos concertatio unquam fuit. Hi nimis iracunde agunt, præsertim cum ab his non sane animosa defendatur sententia, pro quâ non in senatu, non in concione, non apud exercitum, neque apud censores, dicere audeant. Sed cum istis alias, et eo quidem animo, nullum ut certamen instituam; verum dicentibus facile cedam. Tantum admonebo: si maxime verum sit, ad corpus omnia referre sapientem; sive (ut honestius dicam) nihil facere, nisi quod expediat; sive omnia referre ad utilitatem suam; quoniam hæc plausibilia non sunt, ut in sinu gaudeant, gloriose loqui desinant.

XXII. Cyrenaïcorum restat sententia; qui tum ægritudinem censent exsistere, si necopinato quid evenerit. Est id quidem magnum, ut supra dixi. Etiam Chrysippo ita videri scio, quod provisum ante non sit, id ferire vehementius. Sed non sunt in hoc omnia: quamquam hostium repens adventus magis aliquanto conturbat, quam exspectatus; et maris subita tempestas, quam ante provisa, terret navigantes vehementius: et ejusmodi sunt pleraque. Sed, cum diligenter necopinatorum naturam consideres, nihil aliud reperias, nisi omnia videri subita majora; et quidem ob duas causas: primum, quod, quanta sint quæ accidunt, considerandi spatium non datur: deinde, cum videtur præcaveri potuisse, si provisum esset, quasi culpâ contractum malum ægritudinem acriorem facit.

Quod ita esse dies declarat; quæ procedens ita mitigat, ut, iisdem malis manentibus, non modo leniatur ægritudo, sed in plerisque tollatur. Carthaginienses multi Romæ servierunt, Macedones, rege Perse capto: vidi etiam in Peloponneso, cum essem adolescens, quosdam Corinthios. Hi poterant omnes eadem illa de Andromachâ deplorare,

"Hæc omnia vidi" .....

Sed jam decantaverant fortasse. Eo enim erant

vultu, oratione, omni reliquo motu et statu, ut eos Argivos aut Sicyonios diceres: magisque me moverant Corinthi subito adspectæ parietinæ, quam ipsos Corinthios, quorum animis diuturna cogitatio callum vetustatis obduxerat. Legimus librum Clitomachi, quem ille, eversâ Carthagine, misit, consolandi causâ, ad captivos cives suos. In eo est disputatio scripta Carneadis, quam se ait in commentarium retulisse. Cum ita positum esset, "Videri fore in ægritudine sapientem, patriâ captâ;" quæ Carneades contra dixerit, scripta sunt. Tanta igitur calamitatis præsentis adhibetur a philosopho medicina, quanta in inveteratâ ne desideratur quidem. Nec, si aliquot annis post idem ille liber captivis missus esset, vulneribus mederetur, sed cicatricibus. Sensim enim et pedetentim progrediens extenuatur dolor; non quo ipsa res immutari soleat, aut possit: sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet, minora esse ea, quæ sint visa majora.

XXIII. Quid ergo opus est (dicet aliquis) oratione, aut omnino consolatione ullâ, quâ solemus uti, cum levare dolorem mœrentium volumus? Hoc enim fere tum habemus in promptu, nihil oportere inopinatum videri. Atqui tolerabilius feret incommodum, qui cognoverit, necesse esse

homini tale aliquid accidere. Hæc enim oratio de ipsâ summâ mali nihil detrahit: tantummodo affert, nihil evenisse, quod non opinandum fuisset. Neque tamen genus id orationis in consolando non valet: [sed id] haud sciam an plurimum. Ergo ista necopinata non habent tantam vim, ut ægritudo ex his omnis oriatur. Feriunt enim fortasse gravius: [non] id efficiunt, ut ea, quæ accidant, majora videantur. Quia recentia sunt, [videntur,] non quia repentina.

Duplex est igitur ratio veri reperiendi, non in iis solum quæ mala, sed in iis etiam quæ bona videntur. Nam aut, ipsius rei natura qualis et quanta sit, quærimus, ut de paupertate nonnunquam, cujus onus disputando levamus, docentes, quam parva et quam pauca sint, quæ natura desideret; aut a disputandi subtilitate orationem ad exempla traducimus. Hîc Socrates commemoratur, hîc Diogenes, hîc Cæcilianum illud,

"Sæpe est etiam sub palliolo sordido sapientia."

Cum enim paupertatis una eademque sit vis, quidnam dici potest, quamobrem C. Fabricio tolerabilis ea fuerit, alii negent se ferre posse? Huic igitur alteri generi similis est ea ratio consolandi, quæ docet, humana esse, quæ acciderint. Non enim solum id continet ea disputatio, ut

cognitionem afferat generis humani; sed significat, tolerabilia esse, quæ et tulerint et ferant ceteri.

XXIV. De paupertate agitur? multi patientes pauperes commemorantur. De contemnendo honore? multi inhonorati proferuntur, et quidem propter id ipsum beatiores: eorumque, qui privatum otium negotiis publicis antetulerunt, nominatim vita laudatur: nec siletur illud potentissimi regis anapæstum, qui laudat senem, et fortunatum esse dicit, quod, inglorius, sit, atque ignobilis, ad supremum diem perventurus. Similiter, commemorandis exemplis, orbitates quoque liberorum prædicantur; eorumque, qui gravius ferunt, luctus, aliorum exemplis leniuntur. Sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea, quæ acciderint, multo minora, quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. Ita fit sensim cogitantibus, ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. Atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat:

"Ego, cum genui, moriturum scivi;"

et Theseus,

"Futuras mecum commentabar miserias;"

et Anaxagoras, "Sciebam me genuisse mortalem." Hi enim omnes, diu cogitantes de rebus

humanis, intelligebant, eas nequâquam pro opinione vulgi esse extimescendas. Et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere iis qui ante meditantur, quod iis quibus medetur dies; nisi quod ratio quidem sanat illos, hos ipsa natura, intellecto eo quod remedium illud continet; malum, quod opinati sint esse maximum, nequâquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. Hoc igitur efficitur, ut ex illo necopinato plaga major sit; non ut illi putant, ut, cum duobus pares casus evenerint, is modo ægritudine afficiatur, cui ille necopinato casus evenerit. Itaque dicuntur nonnulli in mœrore, cum de hac communi hominum conditione audivissent, eâ lege esse nos natos, ut nemo in perpetuum esse posset expers mali, gravius etiam tulisse.

XXV. Quocirca Carneades (ut video nostrum scribere Antiochum) reprehendere Chrysippum solebat, laudantem Euripideum carmen illud;

"Mortalis nemo est, quem non attingat dolor,
Morbusque. [Multis] sunt humandi liberi,
Rursum creandi: morsque est [finita] omnibus,
Quæ generi humano angorem nequidquam afferunt.
Reddenda est terræ terra: tum vita omnibus
Metenda, ut fruges. Sic jubet necessitas."

Negabat genus hoc orationis quidquam omnino ad levandam ægritudinem pertinere. Id enim

ipsum dolendum esse dicebat, quod in tam crudelem necessitatem incidissemus. Nam illam quidem orationem ex commemoratione alienorum malorum ad malevolos consolandos esse accommodatam. Mihi vero longe videtur secus: nam et necessitas ferendæ conditionis humanæ quasi cum deo pugnare prohibet, admonetque esse hominem: quæ cogitatio magnopere luctum levat: et enumeratio exemplorum, non ut animum malevolorum oblectet, affertur, sed ut ille, qui mœret, ferendum sibi id censeat, quod videat multos moderate et tranquille tulisse. Omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt, nec cohærere possunt propter magnitudinem ægritudinis. Ex quo ipsam ægritudinem λύπην Chrysippus, quasi [λύσιν, id est] solutionem totius hominis, appellatam putat: quæ tota poterit evelli, explicatâ (ut principio dixi) causâ ægritudinis. Est enim nulla alia, nisi opinio et judicium magni præsentis atque urgentis mali. Itaque et dolor corporis, cujus est morsus acerrimus, perfertur, spe propositâ boni: et acta ætas honeste ac splendide tantam affert consolationem, ut eos, qui ita vixerint, aut non tangat ægritudo, aut perleviter pungat animi dolor.

XXVI. Sed ad hanc opinionem magni mali cum illa etiam opinio accesserit, Oportere, rec-

tum esse, ad officium pertinere, ferre illud, ægre quod acciderit; tum denique efficitur illa gravis ægritudinis perturbatio. Ex hac opinione sunt illa varia et detestabilia genera lugendi, pædores, muliebres lacerationes genarum, pectoris, feminum, capitis percussiones. Hinc ille Agamemnon Homericus, et idem Accianus,

"Scindens dolore identidem intonsam comam."

In quo facetum illud Bionis, perinde stultissimum regem in luctu capillum sibi evellere, quasi calvitio mœror levaretur. Sed hæc omnia faciunt, opinantes ita fieri oportere. Itaque et Æschines in Demosthenem invehitur, quod is, septimo die post filiæ mortem, hostias immolâsset. At quam rhetorice! quam copiose! quas sententias colligit! quæ verba contorquet! ut licere quidvis rhetori intelligas. Quæ nemo probaret, nisi insitum illud in animis haberemus, omnes bonos interitu suorum quam gravissime mœrere oportere. Ex hoc evenit, ut, in animi doloribus, alii solitudines captent, ut ait Homerus de Bellerophonte,

"Qui miser in campis mœrens errabat Aleis,
Ipse suum cor edens, hominum vestigia vitans."

Et Nioba fingitur lapidea, propter æternum (credo) in luctu silentium. Hecubam autem putant, propter animi acerbitatem quamdam et rabiem,

fingi in canem esse conversam. Sunt autem alii, quos, in luctu, cum ipsâ solitudine loqui sæpe delectat, ut illa apud Ennium nutrix:

"Cupido cepit miseram nunc me, proloqui
Cœlo atque terræ Medeai miserias."

XXVII. Hæc omnia, recta, vera, debita putantes, faciunt in dolore: maximeque declaratur, hoc quasi officii judicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius, aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad mœstitiam; peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere intermiserint. Pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid, in domestico luctu, hilarius ab iis factum est, aut dictum: plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctûs cum est consecuta, intellectumque nihil profici mœrendo, nonne res declarat, fuisse totum illud voluntarium? Quid ille Terentianus *Ἑαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος*, id est, ipse se puniens?

"Decrevi tantisper me minus injuriæ,
Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser."

Hic decernit, ut miser sit. Num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus?

"Malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem."

Malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit! Vides

ergo opinionis esse, non naturæ, malum. Quid, quod res ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum quotidianæ neces, interitusque multorum, sedationem mœrendi afferunt: apud quem ita dicitur:

> "Namque nimis multos, atque omni luce, cadentes
> Cernimus; ut nemo possit mœrore vacare.
> Quo magis est æquum tumulis mandare peremtos
> Firmo animo, et luctum lacrymis finire diurnis."

Ergo in potestate est abjicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. An est ullum tempus, (quoniam quidem res in nostrâ potestate est) cui non, ponendæ curæ et ægritudinis causâ, serviamus? Constabat, eos qui concidentem vulneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil tum aliud egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur, et ut salutem adipiscerentur fugâ; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum afflictari lamentarique cœpisse. Timor igitur ab iis ægritudinem potuit repellere; ratio ac sapientia vera non poterit?

XXVIII. Quid est autem, quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum, nihil profici, et frustra esse susceptum? Si igi-

tur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest. Voluntate igitur et judicio suscipi ægritudinem, confitendum est. Idque indicatur eorum patientiâ, qui, cum multa sint sæpe perpessi, facilius ferunt, quidquid accidit; obduruisseque sese contra fortunam arbitrantur; ut ille apud Euripidem:

"Si mihi nunc tristis primum illuxisset dies,
Nec tam ærumnoso navigavissem salo,
Esset dolendi causa; ut injecto equulei
Freno repente tactu exagitantur novo
Sed jam subactus miseriis obtorpui."

Defatigatio igitur miseriarum ægritudines cum faciat leniores, intelligi necesse est, non rem ipsam causam atque fontem esse mœroris.

Philosophi summi, neque dum tamen sapientiam consecuti, nonne intelligunt, in summo se malo esse? Sunt enim insipientes; neque insipientiâ ullum majus malum est: neque tamen lugent. Quid ita? Quia huic generi malorum non affingitur illa opinio, rectum esse et æquum, et ad officium pertinere, ægre ferre, quod sapiens non sis: quod idem affingimus huic ægritudini, in quâ luctus inest; quæ omnium maxima est. Itaque Aristoteles, veteres philosophos accusans, qui existimavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut glori-

osissimos fuisse: sed se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Theophrastus autem moriens accusâsse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset; hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam exiguam vitam dedisset: quorum si ætas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse, ut, omnibus perfectis artibus, omni doctrinâ hominum vita erudiretur. Querebatur igitur, se tum, cum illa videre cœpisset, exstingui.

Quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque confitetur, multa se ignorare? et multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? Neque tamen, cum se in mediâ stultitiâ (quâ nihil est pejus) hærere intelligant, ægritudine premuntur. Nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putabant lugendum viris? qualis fuit Q. Maximus efferens filium consularem; qualis L. Paulus, duobus paucis diebus amissis filiis; qualis M. Cato, prætore designato, mortuo filio; quales reliqui, quos in "Consolatione" collegimus. Quid hos aliud placavit, nisi quod luctum et mœrorem [esse] non putabant viri? Ergo id, quod alii rectum opinantes, ægritudini se solent dedere, id ii turpe putantes ægritudinem repulerunt: ex quo in-

telligitur, non in naturâ, sed in opinione, esse ægritudinem.

XXIX. Contra dicuntur hæc. Quis tam demens, ut suâ voluntate mœreat? Natura affert dolorem: cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, noster cedendum putat: premit enim, atque instat, nec resisti potest. Itaque Oileus ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Ajacis morte consolatus esset, is, cum audîsset de suo, fractus est. De cujus commutatâ mente sic dicitur:

"Nec vero tantâ præditus sapientiâ
Quisquam est, qui, aliorum ærumnam dictis allevans,
Non idem, cum fortuna mutata impetum
Convertat, clade subitâ frangatur suâ,
Ut illa ad alios dicta et præcepta excidant."

Hæc cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturæ obsisti nullo modo posse. Ii tamen fatentur, graviores ægritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. Quæ est igitur amentia, ut nos quoque idem ab aliis requiramus?

Sed plures sunt causæ suscipiendi doloris: primum illa opinio mali, quo viso atque persuaso, ægritudo insequitur necessario. Deinde etiam gratum mortuis se facere, si graviter eos lugeant, arbitrantur. Accedit superstitio muliebris quædam: existimant enim, diis immortalibus se facilius satisfacturos, si, eorum plagâ perculsi, afflic-

tos se et stratos esse fateantur. Sed, hæc inter se quam repugnent, plerique non vident. Laudant enim eos, qui æquo animo moriantur; qui alterius mortem æquo animo ferant, eos putant vituperandos: quasi fieri ullo modo possit, (quod in amatorio sermone dici solet) ut quisquam plus alterum diligat, quam se. Præclarum illud est, et, si quæris, rectum quoque et verum, ut eos, qui nobis carissimi esse debeant, æque ac nosmetipsos amemus: ut vero plus, fieri nullo pacto potest. Ne optandum quidem est in amicitiâ, ut me ille plus quam semet, ego illum plus quam me. Perturbatio vitæ, si ita sit, atque officiorum omnium, consequatur. Sed de hoc alias.

XXX. Nunc illud satis est, non attribuere ad amissionem amicorum miseriam nostram, ne illos plus, quam ipsi velint, si sentiant, plus certe, quam nosmetipsos, diligamus. Nam quod aiunt, plerosque consolationibus nihil levari, adjunguntque, consolatores ipsos confiteri se miseros, cum ad eos impetum suum fortuna converterit; utrumque dissolvitur. Sunt enim ista non naturæ vitia, sed culpæ. Stultitiam autem accusare quamvis copiose licet. Nam et qui non levantur, ipsi ad miseriam invitant; et qui suos casus aliter ferunt, atque [ut] auctores aliis ipsi fuerunt, non sunt vitiosiores, quam fere plerique,

qui avari avaros, gloriæ cupidos gloriosi, reprehendunt. Est enim proprium stultitiæ, aliorum vitia cernere, oblivisci suorum. Sed nimirum hoc maximum est experimentum, cum constet ægritudinem vetustate tolli, hanc vim non esse in die positam, sed in cogitatione diuturnâ. Nam, si et eadem res est, et idem est homo; quî potest quidquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quidquam est mutatum, neque de eo qui dolet? Cogitatio igitur diuturna, nihil esse in re mali, dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas.

XXXI. Hîc mihi afferunt mediocritates: quæ si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? Natura enim ipsa terminabit modum: sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror, ægritudinem esse opinionem mali præsentis, in quâ opinione illud insit, ut ægritudinem suscipere oporteat.

Additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio præsentis mali sit recens. Hoc autem verbum sic interpretatur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velit, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed, quamdiu in illo opinato malo vis quædam insit, et vigeat, et habeat quamdam viriditatem, tamdiu appelletur recens: ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli, Cariæ regis, uxor, quæ nobile illud Halicarnassi

fecit sepulcrum, quamdiu vixit, vixit in luctu, eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. Huic erat illa opinio quotidie recens; quæ tum denique non appellatur recens, cum vetustate exaruit.

Hæc igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere ægritudinem funditus, aut sedare, aut detrahere quam plurimum, aut supprimere, nec pati manare longius, aut ad alia mentem traducere.

Sunt, qui unum officium consolantis putent, docere, malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet. Sunt, qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici. Sunt, qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus. Sunt, qui satis putent, ostendere, nihil inopinati accidisse, nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando, detrahere illam opinionem mœrenti, si se officio fungi putet justo atque debito. Sunt etiam, qui hæc omnia genera consolandi colligant: alius enim alio modo movetur, ut fere nos omnia in Consolationem unam conjecimus: erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo tentabatur curatio. Sed sumendum tempus est, non minus in animorum morbis, quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Æschyli; cui cum dictum esset,

"Atqui, Prometheu, te hoc tenere existimo,
Mederi posse rationem iracundiæ;"

respondit,

"Si quidem qui, tempestivam medicinam admovens,
Non ad gravescens vulnus illidat manus."

XXXII. Erit igitur in consolationibus prima medicina, docere aut nullum malum esse, aut admodum parvum: altera et de communi conditione vitæ, et proprie, si quid sit de ipsius, qui mœreat [disputandum]: tertia, summam esse stultitiam frustra confici mœrore, cum intelligas, nihil posse profici. Nam Cleanthes quidem sapientem consolatur; qui consolatione non eget. Nihil enim esse malum quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam, detraxeris. Alienum autem tempus docendi. Et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando ægritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur. Quid enim dicemus? cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, (ut accepimus) eam nihil hominis esse, nec quidquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum, et quemvis bajulum, interesse; cum se Alcibiades afflictaret, lacrymansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet, turpitudinemque depelleret; quid dicemus, Cleanthe? Num in illâ re, quæ ægritudine Alcibiadem afficiebat, mali nihil fuisse? Quid? illa Lyconis, qualia sunt? qui, ægritudinem extenuans, parvis ait eam rebus moveri,

fortunæ et corporis incommodis, non animi malis. Quid ergo? illud, quod Alcibiades dolebat, non ex animi malis vitiisque constabat? Ad Epicuri consolationem satis est ante dictum.

XXXIII. Ne illa quidem consolatio firmissima est, quamquam et usitata est, et sæpe prodest: "Non tibi hoc soli." Prodest hæc quidem, ut dixi, sed nec semper, nec omnibus: sunt enim, qui respuant: sed refert, quo modo adhibeatur. Ut enim tulerit quisque eorum qui sapienter tulerunt, non quo quisque incommodo affectus sit, prædicandum est. Chrysippi ratio ad veritatem firmissima est; ad tempus ægritudinis difficilis. Magnum opus est, probare mœrenti, illum suo judicio, et quod se ita putet oportere facere, mœrere. Nimirum igitur, ut in causis non semper utimur eodem statu (sic enim appellamus controversiarum genera), sed ad tempus, ad controversiæ naturam, ad personam, accommodamus; sic, in ægritudine leniendâ, quam quisque curationem recipere possit, videndum est.

Sed, nescio quo pacto, ab eo quod erat a te propositum, aberravit oratio. Tu enim de sapiente quæsieras; cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine; aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientiâ, vixque appareat; qui nihil opinione affingat assumatque ad

ægritudinem; nec id putet esse rectum, se quam maxime excruciari, luctuque confici; quo pravius nihil esse possit. Edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quæreretur hoc tempore, num quod esset malum, nisi quod idem dici turpe posset; tamen ut videremus, quidquid esset in ægritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario judicio et opinionis errore contractum.

XXXIV. Tractatum est autem a nobis id genus ægritudinis, quod unum est omnium maximum, ut, eo sublato, reliquorum remedia ne magnopere quærenda arbitraremur. Sunt enim certa, quæ de paupertate; certa, quæ de vitâ inhonoratâ et ingloriâ dici soleant. Separatim certæ schǫlæ sunt de exsilio, de interitu patriæ, de servitute, de debilitate, de cæcitate, et de omni casu, in quo nomen poni solet calamitatis. Hæc Græci in singulas scholas, et in singulos libros, dispertiunt: opus enim quærunt: quamquam plenæ disputationes delectationis sunt. Et tamen, ut medici, toto corpore curando, minimæ etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur; sic philosophia, cum universam ægritudinem sustulit, tamen, si quis error aliunde exstitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, si quid tenebrarum offudit exsilium; aut eorum, quæ modo dixi,

si quid exstitit; singularum rerum sunt propriæ consolationes; de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles: sed ad eumdem fontem revertendum est, ægritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod inanis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non naturâ exoriatur, sed judicio, sed opinione, sed quâdam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere.

Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, ægritudo erit sublata illa mœrens: morsus tamen et contractiunculæ quædam animi relinquentur. Hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum ægritudinis nomen absit, grave, tetrum, funestum, quod cum sapientiâ esse, atque (ut ita dicam) habitare, nullo modo possit. Atqui stirpes sunt ægritudinis quam multæ, quam amaræ! quæ, ipso trunco everso, omnes elidendæ sunt, et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. Superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi est, otium. Sed ratio una omnium est ægritudinum, plura nomina. Nam et invidere ægritudinis est, et æmulari, et obtrectare, et misereri, angi, lugere, mœrere, ærumnâ affici, lamentari, sollicitari, dolere, in molestiâ esse, afflictari, desperare. Hæc omnia definiunt Stoïci: eaque verba, quæ dixi, singularum rerum sunt; non, ut videntur, easdem res significant; sed aliquid differunt: quod alio loco fortasse tractabimus. Hæ sunt illæ fibræ stirpium,

quas initio dixi, persequendæ, et omnes elidendæ, ne ulla unquam possit exsistere. Magnum opus, et difficile: quis negat? Quid autem præclarum, non idem arduum? Sed tamen id se effecturam philosophia profitetur: nos modo curationem ejus recipiamus. Verum quidem hæc hactenus. Cetera, quotiescumque voletis, et hoc loco et aliis, parata vobis erunt.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM,

AD

MARCUM BRUTUM,

LIBER QUARTUS.

De reliquis Animi Perturbationibus.

I. Cum multis locis nostrorum hominum ingenia virtutesque, Brute, soleo mirari, tum maxime his in studiis, quæ, sero admodum expetita, in hanc civitatem e Græciâ transtulerunt. Nam, cum a primo Urbis ortu, regiis institutis, partim etiam legibus, auspicia, cærimoniæ, comitia, provocationes, patrum consilium, equitum peditumque descriptio, tota res militaris, divinitus esset constituta; tum progressio admirabilis, incredibilisque cursus ad omnem excellentiam factus est, dominatu regio republicâ liberatâ. Nec vero hic locus est, ut de moribus institutisque majorum, et disciplinâ ac temperatione civitatis, loquamur. Aliis hæc locis satis accurate a nobis

dicta sunt, maximeque in iis sex libris, quos "De Republicâ" scripsimus. Hoc autem loco, consideranti mihi studia doctrinæ, multa sane occurrunt, cur ea quoque arcessita aliunde, neque solum expetita, sed etiam conservata et culta videantur. Erat enim illis pæne in conspectu præstanti sapientiâ et nobilitate Pythagoras, qui fuit in Italiâ temporibus iisdem, quibus L. Brutus patriam liberavit, præclarus auctor nobilitatis tuæ. Pythagoræ autem doctrina, cum longe lateque flueret, permanavisse mihi videtur in hanc civitatem: idque cum conjecturâ probabile est, tum quibusdam etiam vestigiis indicatur. Quis enim est, qui putet, cum floreret [in Italiâ] Græcia potentissimis et maximis urbibus, ea, quæ Magna dicta est, in hisque primum ipsius Pythagoræ, deinde postea Pythagoreorum, tantum nomen esset, nostrorum hominum ad eorum doctissimas voces aures clausas fuisse? Quinetiam arbitror, propter Pythagoreorum admirationem, Numam quoque regem Pythagoreum a posterioribus existimatum. Nam cum Pythagoræ disciplinam et instituta cognoscerent, regisque ejus æquitatem et sapientiam a majoribus suis accepissent, ætates autem et tempora ignorarent propter vetustatem, eum, qui sapientiâ excelleret, Pythagoræ auditorem fuisse crediderunt.

II. Et de conjecturâ quidem hactenus. Vestigia autem Pythagoreorum quamquam multa colligi possunt, paucis tamen utemur, quoniam non id agitur hoc tempore. Nam, cum carminibus soliti illi esse dicantur et præcepta quædam occultius tradere, et mentes suas, a cogitationum intentione, cantu fidibusque ad tranquillitatem traducere; gravissimus auctor in "Originibus" dixit Cato, morem apud majores hunc epularum fuisse, ut deinceps, qui accubarent, canerent ad tibiam clarorum virorum laudes atqŭe virtutes. Ex quo perspicuum est, et cantus tum fuisse rescriptos vocum sonis, et carmina.

Quamquam id quidem etiam XII. tabulæ declarant, condi jam tum solitum esse carmen: quod ne liceret fieri ad alterius injuriam, lege sanxerunt. Nec vero illud non eruditorum temporum argumentum est, quod et deorum pulvinaribus, et epulis magistratuum, fides præcinunt: quod proprium ejus fuit, de quâ loquor, disciplinæ. Mihi quidem Appii Cæci carmen, quod valde Panætius laudat epistolâ quâdam, quæ est ad Q. Tuberonem, Pythagoreum videtur. Multa etiam sunt in nostris institutis ducta ab illis; quæ prætereo, ne ea, quæ peperisse ipsi putamur, aliunde didicisse videamur. Sed, ut ad propositum redeat oratio: quam brevi tempore, quot et

quanti poëtæ, qui autem oratores, exstiterunt! facile ut appareat, nostros omnia consequi potuisse, simul ut vellè cœpissent. Sed de ceteris studiis alio loco et dicemus, si usus fuerit, et sæpe diximus.

III. Sapientiæ studium vetus id quidem in nostris: sed tamen, ante Lælii ætatem et Scipionis, non reperio, quos appellare possim nominatim: quibus adolescentibus, Stoïcum Diogenem et Academicum Carneadem video ad senatum ab Atheniensibus missos esse legatos, qui cum reipublicæ nullam unquam partem attigissent, essetque eorum alter Cyrenæus, alter Babylonius, nunquam profecto scholis essent excitati, neque ad illud munus electi, nisi in quibusdam principibus, temporibus illis, fuissent studia doctrinæ: qui cum cetera literis mandarent, alii jus civile, alii orationes suas, alii monumenta majorum, hanc amplissimam omnium artium bene vivendi disciplinam vitâ magis quam literis persecuti sunt. Itaque illius veræ elegantisque philosophiæ, quæ, ducta a Socrate, in Peripateticis adhuc permansit, et idem alio modo dicentibus Stoïcis, cum Academici eorum controversias disceptarent, nulla fere sunt, aut pauca admodum Latina monumenta, sive propter magnitudinem rerum, occupationemque hominum, sive etiam,

quod imperitis ea probari posse non arbitrabantur: cum interim, illis silentibus, C. Amafinius exstitit dicens: cujus libris editis, commota multitudo contulit se ad eamdem potissimum disciplinam; sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis; sive quod invitabat illecebris blandæ voluptatis; sive etiam, quia nihil prolatum erat melius, illud, quod erat, tenebant. Post Amafinium autem multi ejusdem æmuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt: quodque maximum argumentum est, non dici illa subtiliter, quod etiam facile ediscantur, et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse disciplinæ putant.

IV. Sed defendat quod quisque sentit: sunt enim judicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus; nulliusque unius disciplinæ legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophiâ necessario pareamus, quid sit in quâque re maxime probabile, semper requiremus. Quod, cum sæpe alias, tum nuper in Tusculano, studiose egimus. Itaque, expositis tridui disputationibus, quartus dies hoc libro concludetur. Ut enim in inferiorem ambulationem descendimus (quod feceramus idem superioribus diebus), acta res est sic.

Marcus. Dicat, si quis vult, quâ de re disputari velit. *Auditor.* Non mihi videtur omni ani-

mi perturbatione posse sapiens vacare. *Marcus.* Ægritudine quidem hesternâ disputatione videbatur; nisi forte temporis causâ assentiebare. *Auditor.* Minime vero: nam mihi egregie probata est oratio tua. *Marcus.* Non igitur existimas cadere in sapientem ægritudinem? *Auditor.* Prorsus non arbitror. *Marcus.* Atqui, si ista perturbare animum sapientis non potest, nulla poterit. Quid enim? metusne conturbet? At earum rerum est absentium metus, quarum præsentium est ægritudo. Sublatâ igitur ægritudine, sublatus est metus. Restant duæ perturbationes, lætitia gestiens, et libido; quæ si non cadent in sapientem, semper mens erit tranquilla sapientis. *Auditor.* Sic prorsus intelligo. *Marcus.* Utrum igitur mavis? statimne nos vela facere, an quasi e portu egredientes paululum remigare?

V. *Auditor.* Quidnam est istuc? non enim intelligo. *Marcus.* Quia Chrysippus et Stoïci, cum de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt: illa eorum perexigua oratio est, quâ medeantur animis, nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur. Peripatetici autem, ad placandos animos, multa afferunt: spinas partiendi et definiendi prætermittunt. Quærebam igitur, utrum pande-

rem vela orationis statim, an eam ante paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem. *Auditor.* Isto modo vero. Erit enim hoc totum, quod quæro, ex utroque perfectius. *Marcus.* Est id quidem rectius: sed post requires, si quid fuerit obscurius. *Auditor.* Faciam equidem. Tu tamen, ut soles, dices ista ipsa obscura planius, quam dicuntur a Græcis. *Marcus.* Enitar equidem: sed intento opus est animo, ne omnia dilabantur, si unum aliquod effugerit.

Quoniam, quæ Græci πάθη vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet, quam morbos; in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagoræ primum, deinde Platonis, descriptionem sequar; qui animum in duas partes dividunt; alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem. In participe rationis ponunt tranquillitatem, id est, placidam quietamque constantiam: in illâ alterâ motus turbidos tum iræ, tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi. Sit igitur hic fons. Utamur tamen, in his perturbationibus describendis, Stoïcorum definitionibus et partitionibus; qui mihi videntur in hac quæstione versari acutissime.

VI. Est igitur Zenonis hæc definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a rectâ ratione, contra naturam, animi commotio. Qui-

dam brevius, perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem: sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturæ constantiâ. Partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci, et ex duobus opinatis malis: ita esse quatuor. Ex bonis libidinem et lætitiam, ut sit lætitia præsentium bonorum, libido futurorum: ex malis metum et ægritudinem nasci censent; metum, futuris; ægritudinem, præsentibus. Quæ enim venientia metuuntur, eadem afficiunt ægritudine instantia.

Lætitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido, ad id quod videtur bonum, illecta et inflammata rapiatur; lætitia, ut, adepta jam aliquid concupitum, efferatur, et gestiat. Naturâ enim omnes ea, quæ bona videntur, sequuntur, fugiuntque contraria. Quamobrem simul objecta species cujuspiam est, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. Id cum constanter prudenterque fit, ejusmodi appetitionem Stoïci βούλησιν appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem. Eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente, quam sic definiunt: Voluntas est, quæ quid cum ratione desiderat: quæ autem, rationi adversa, incitata est vehementius, ea libido est, vel cupiditas effrenata; quæ in omnibus stultis invenitur.

Itemque, cum ita movemur, ut in bono simus

aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. Nam, cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur: cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exsultat, tum illa lætitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest; quam ita definiunt, Sine ratione animi elationem. Quoniamque, ut bona naturâ appetimus, sic a malis naturâ declinamus; quæ declinatio cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur; eaque intelligatur in solo esse sapiente: quæ autem sine ratione, et cum exanimatione humili atque fractâ, nominetur metus. Est igitur metus rationi adversa cautio. Præsentis autem mali sapienti affectio nulla est. Stultis autem ægritudo est ea, quâ afficiuntur in malis opinatis, animosque demittunt, et contrahunt, rationi non obtemperantes. Itaque hæc prima definitio est, ut ægritudo sit animi, adversante ratione, contractio. Sic quatuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiæ, quoniam ægritudini nulla constantia opponitur.

VII. Sed omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur, non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostrâ sint potestate. Est igitur ægritudo opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur; lætitia, opinio recens

boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum esse videatur: metus, opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur: libido, opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque adesse. Sed quæ judicia, quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat; metus recessum quemdam animi et fugam; lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam. Opinationem autem, quam in omnes definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse imbecillam assensionem.

Sed singulis perturbationibus partes ejusdem generis plures subjiciuntur: ut ægritudini, invidentia (utendum est enim, docendi causâ, verbo minus usitato; quoniam invidia non in eo, qui invidet, solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur), æmulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, mœror, ærumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, afflictatio, desperatio, et si quæ sunt de genere eodem. Sub metum autem subjecta sunt pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, conturbatio, formido. Voluptati malevolentia [lætans malo alieno], delectatio, jactatio, et similia. Libidini ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, indigentia, de-

siderium, et cetera ejusmodi. Hæc autem definiunt hoc modo.

VIII. Invidentiam esse dicunt ægritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quæ nihil noceant invidenti: nam si quis doleat ejus rebus secundis, a quo ipse lædatur, non recte dicitur invidere; ut si Hectori Agamemnon. Qui autem, cui alterius commoda nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat his frui, is invidet profecto. Æmulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit: nam et imitatio virtutis, æmulatio dicitur (sed eâ nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis); et est æmulatio ægritudo, si eo, quod concupierit, alius potiatur, ipse careat.

Obtrectatio autem est ea, quam intelligi zelotypiam volo, ægritudo ex eo quod alter quoque potiatur eo, quod ipse concupiverit. Misericordia est ægritudo ex miseriâ alterius, injuriâ laborantis: nemo enim parricidæ aut proditoris supplicio misericordiâ commovetur. Angor, ægritudo premens. Luctus, ægritudo ex ejus, qui carus fuerit, interitu acerbo. Mœror, ægritudo flebilis. Ærumna, ægritudo laboriosa. Dolor, ægritudo crucians. Lamentatio, ægritudo cum ejulatu. Sollicitudo, ægritudo cum cogitatione. Molestia, ægritudo permanens. Afflictatio, ægri-

tudo cum vexatione corporis. Desperatio, ægritudo sine ullâ rerum exspectatione meliorum. Quæ autem subjecta sunt sub metu, ea sic definiunt: Pigritiam, metum consequentis laboris: Pudorem et terrorem, metum concutientem, ex quo fit, ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur: Timorem, metum mali appropinquantis: Pavorem, metum mentem loco moventem (ex quo illud Ennii,

"Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat"):

Exanimationem, metum subsequentem, et quasi comitem pavoris: Conturbationem, metum excutientem cogitata: Formidinem, metum permanentem.

IX. Voluptatis autem partes hoc modo describunt, ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo: Delectatio, voluptas suavitate auditûs animum deleniens: et, qualis est hæc aurium, tales sunt oculorum, et tactionum, et odorationum, et saporum; quæ sunt omnes unius generis, ad perfundendum animum tamquam illiquefactæ voluptates. Jactatio est voluptas gestiens, et se efferens insolentius. Quæ autem libidini subjecta sunt, ea sic defini-

untur, ut Ira sit libido pœniendi ejus, qui videatur læsisse injuriâ: Excandescentia autem sit ira nascens, et modo exsistens, quæ θύμωσις Græce dicitur: Odium, ira inveterata: Inimicitia, ira ulciscendi tempus observans: Discordia, ira acerbior, intimo odio et corde concepta: Indigentia, libido inexplebilis: Desiderium, libido ejus, qui nondum adsit, videndi. Distinguunt illud etiam, ut sit libido earum rerum, quæ dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam; quæ κατηγορήματα dialectici appellant; ut habere divitias, capere honores. Indigentia, rerum ipsarum est, ut honorum, ut pecuniæ.

Omnium autem perturbationum fontem esse dicunt Intemperantiam; quæ est a totâ mente et a rectâ ratione defectio, sic aversa a præscriptione rationis, ut nullo modo appetitiones animi nec regi nec contineri queant. Quemadmodum igitur temperantia sedat appetitiones, et efficit ut eæ rectæ rationi pareant; conservatque considerata judicia mentis; sic, huic inimica, intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammat, conturbat, incitat. Itaque et ægritudines, et metus, et reliquæ perturbationes omnes, gignuntur ex eâ.

X. Quemadmodum, cum sanguis corruptus est, aut pituita redundat, aut bilis, in corpore *morbi* ægrotationesque nascuntur; sic pravarum

opinionum conturbatio, et ipsarum inter se repugnantia, sanitate spoliat animum, morbisque perturbat. Ex perturbationibus autem primum morbi conficiuntur, quæ vocant illi νοσήματα, eaque, quæ sunt eis morbis contraria, quæ habent ad res certas vitiosam offensionem atque fastidium: deinde ægrotationes, quæ appellantur a Stoïcis ἀῤῥωστήματα, hisque item oppositæ contrariæ offensiones. Hoc loco nimium operæ consumitur a Stoïcis, maxime a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo. Quâ oratione prætermissâ minime necessariâ, ea, quæ rem continent, pertractemus. Intelligatur igitur, perturbationem, jactantibus se opinionibus inconstanter et turbide, in motu esse semper: cum autem hic fervor concitatioque animi inveteraverit, et tamquam in venis medullisque insederit, tum exsistit et morbus, et ægrotatio, et offensiones eæ, quæ sunt eis morbis ægrotationibusque contrariæ.

XI. Hæc, quæ dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt; eaque oriuntur ex libidine et lætitiâ. Nam, cum est concupita pecunia, nec adhibita continuo ratio, quasi quædam Socratica medicina, quæ sanaret eam cupiditatem; permanat in venas, et inhæret in visceribus illud malum; exsistitque morbus, et

ægrotatiò, quæ avelli inveterata non possit: eique morbo nomen est Avaritia. Similiterque ceteri morbi; ut gloriæ cupiditas, ut mulierositas (ut ita appellem eam, quæ Græce φιλογυνεία dicitur), ceterique similiter morbi ægrotationesque nascuntur. Quæ autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu; ut odium mulierum, quale in Μισογύνῳ Attilii est; ut in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui Μισάνθρωπος appellatur; ut inhospitalitas est. Quæ omnes ægrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum, quas fugiunt et oderunt.

Definiunt autem animi ægrotationem, Opinationem vehementem de re non expetendâ, tamquam valde expetendâ, inhærentem et penitus insitam. Quod autem nascitur ex offensione, ita definiunt, Opinionem vehementem de re non fugiendâ, inhærentem, et penitus insitam, tamquam fugiendâ. Hæc autem opinatio est judicare se scire, quod nesciat.

Ægrotationi autem talia quædam subjecta sunt, avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, ligurritio, vinolentia, cupedia, et si qua similia. Est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecuniâ, quasi valde expetendâ, inhærens, et penitus insita. Similisque est ejusdem generis definitio reliquarum. Offensionum autem definitiones *sunt* ejusmodi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehe-

mens, valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhærens, et penitus insita. Similiterque definitur et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti; et, ut Timonis, generis humani.

XII. Atque, ut ad valetudinis similitudinem veniamus, eâque collatione utamur aliquando, sed parcius quam solent Stoïci: ut sunt alii ad alios morbos procliviores (itaque dicimus gravedinosos quosdam, quosdam torminosos, non quia jam sint, sed quia sæpe sint); sic alii ad metum, alii ad aliam perturbationem. Ex quo in aliis anxietas, unde anxii; in aliis iracundia dicitur, quæ ab irâ differt: estque aliud iracundum esse, aliud iratum; ut differt anxietas ab angore: neque enim omnes anxii, qui anguntur aliquando; nec, qui anxii, semper anguntur: ut inter ebrietatem et ebriositatem interest; aliudque est amatorem esse, aliud amantem. Atque hæc aliorum ad alios morbos proclivitas late patet: nam pertinet ad omnes perturbationes. In multis etiam vitiis apparet: sed nomen res non habet. Ergo et invidi, et malevoli, et lividi, et timidi, et misericordes, quia proclives ad eas perturbationes, non quia semper, feruntur. Hæc igitur proclivitas ad suum quodque genus, a similitudine corporis, ægrotatio dicatur, dum ea intelligatur ad

ægrotandum proclivitas. Sed hæc in bonis rebus, quod alii ad alia bona sunt aptiores, facilitas nominetur, in malis proclivitas, ut significet lapsionem: in neutris habeat superius nomen.

XIII. Quo modo autem in corpore est morbus, et ægrotatio, et vitium; sic in animo. Morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem. Ægrotationem morbum cum imbecillitate: vitium, cum partes corporis inter se dissident: ex quo pravitas membrorum, distortio, deformitas. Itaque illa duo, morbus et ægrotatio, ex totius valetudinis [corporis] conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur: vitium autem, integrâ valetudine, ipsum ex se cernitur. Sed, in animo, tantummodo cogitatione possumus morbum ab ægrotatione sejungere. Vitiositas autem est habitus aut affectio in totâ vitâ inconstans, et a se ipsâ dissentiens. Ita fit, ut, in alterâ, corruptione opinionum morbus efficiatur et ægrotatio; in alterâ, inconstantia et repugnantia. Non enim omne vitium partes habet dissentientes; ut eorum, qui non longe a sapientiâ absunt, affectio est illa quidem discrepans sibi ipsa, dum est insipiens, sed non distorta, nec prava. Morbi autem et ægrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis: sed, perturbationes sintne ejusdem partes, quæstio est. Vi-

tia enim affectiones sunt manentes: perturbationes autem, moventes, ut non possint affectionum manentium partes esse.

Atque ut, in malis, attingit animi naturam corporis similitudo, sic in bonis: sunt enim in corpore præcipua, pulchritudo, vires, valetudo, firmitas, velocitas: sunt item in animo. Ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se, e quibus constamus; sanitas sic animi dicitur, cum ejus judicia opinionesque concordant. Eaque animi est virtus; quam alii ipsam temperantiam dicunt esse, alii obtemperantem temperantiæ præceptis, et eam subsequentem, nec habentem ullam speciem suam: sed, sive hoc, sive illud sit, in solo esse sapiente. Est autem quædam animi sanitas, quæ in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum conturbatio mentis aufertur. Et, ut corporis est quædam apta figura membrorum, cum coloris quâdam suavitate; eaque dicitur pulchritudo; sic, in animo, opinionum judiciorumque æquabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quâdam et stabilitate virtutem subsequens, aut virtutis vim ipsam continens, pulchritudo vocatur. Itemque, viribus corporis et nervis et efficacitati similes, similibus verbis, animi vires nominantur. Velocitas autem corporis celeritas appellatur; quæ eadem ingenii

etiam laus habetur, propter animi multarum rerum brevi tempore percursionem.

XIV. Illud animorum corporumque dissimile, quod animi valentes morbo tentari non possunt; corpora possunt. Sed corporum offensiones sine culpâ accidere possunt, animorum non item: quorum omnes morbi et perturbationes ex ad spernatione rationis eveniunt. Itaque in hominibus solum exsistunt: nam bestiæ simile quid-dam faciunt, sed in perturbationes non incidunt. Inter acutos autem et inter hebetes interest, quod ingeniosi, ut æs Corinthium in æruginem, sic illi in morbum et incidunt tardius, et recreantur ocyus; hebetes non item. Nec vero in omnem morbum ac perturbationem animus ingeniosi cadit: non enim [multa] efferata, et immania: quædam autem humanitatis quoque habent primam speciem, ut misericordia, ægritudo, metus. Ægrotationes autem morbique animorum difficilius evelli posse putantur, quam summa illa vitia, quæ virtutibus sunt contraria. Morbis enim manentibus, vitia sublata esse non possunt, quia non tam celeriter sanantur, quam illa tolluntur.

Habes ea, quæ de perturbationibus enucleate disputant Stoïci, quæ Logica appellant, quia diseruntur subtilius. Ex quibus quoniam, tam-

quam e [scrupulosis] cotibus, enavigavit oratio, reliquæ disputationis cursum teneamus; modo satis illa dilucide dixerimus, pro rerum obscuritate. *Auditor.* Prorsus satis: sed, si qua diligentius erunt cognoscenda, quæremus alias: nunc vela, quæ modo dicebas, exspectamus, et cursum.

XV. *Marcus.* Quando et aliis locis de virtute diximus, et sæpe dicendum erit (pleræque enim quæstiones, quæ ad vitam moresque pertinent, a virtutis fonte ducuntur) quando igitur virtus est affectio animi constans conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos in quibus est, et ipsa per se, suâ sponte, separatâ etiam utilitate, laudabilis; ex eâ proficiscuntur honestæ voluntates, sententiæ, actiones, omnisque recta ratio; quamquam ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Hujus igitur virtutis contraria est vitiositas (sic enim malo, quam malitiam, appellare eam, quam Græci κακίαν appellant; nam malitia certi cujusdam vitii nomen est; vitiositas, omnium), ex quâ concitantur perturbationes, quæ sunt (ut paulo ante diximus) turbidi animorum concitatique motus, aversi a ratione, et inimicissimi mentis vitæque tranquillæ. Important enim ægritudines anxias atque acerbas; animosque affligunt et debilitant metu. Iidem inflammant appetitione nimiâ, quam

tum cupiditatem, tum libidinem dicimus, impotentiam quamdam animi, a temperantiâ et moderatione plurimum dissidentem. Quæ si quando adepta est id quod ei fuerat concupitum, tum fert alacritatem, ut nihil [ipsi] constet, quod agat; ut ille, qui voluptatem animi nimiam summum esse errorem arbitratur. Eorum igitur malorum in unâ virtute posita sanatio est.

XVI. Quid autem est non miserius solum, sed fœdius etiam et deformius, quam ægritudine quis afflictus, debilitatus, jacens? Cui miseriæ proximus est is, qui appropinquans aliquod malum metuit, exanimatusque pendet animi. Quam vim mali significantes, poëtæ impendere apud inferos saxum Tantalo faciunt,

> "Ob scelera, animique impotentiam, et superbiloquentiam."

Ea communis pœna stultitiæ est: omnibus enim, quorum mens abhorret a ratione, semper aliquis talis terror impendet.

Atque ut hæ tabificæ mentis perturbationes sunt (ægritudinem dico et metum), sic hilariores illæ, cupiditas, avide semper aliquid expetens, et inanis alacritas, id est, lætitia gestiens, non multum differunt ab amentiâ. Ex quo intelligitur, *qualis* ille sit, quem tum moderatum, alias mo-

destum, temperantem, alias constantem continentemque, dicimus. Nonnunquam hæc eadem vocabula ad frugalitatis nomen, tamquam ad caput, referre volumus. Quod nisi eo nomine virtutes continerentur, nunquam ita pervulgatum illud esset, ut jam proverbii locum obtineret, "hominem frugi omnia recte facere." Quod idem cum Stoïci de sapiente dicunt, nimis admirabiliter nimisque magnifice dicere videntur.

XVII. Ergo is, quisquis est, qui moderatione et constantiâ quietus animo est, sibique ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat, is est sapiens, quem quærimus; is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lætabile ad efferendum, videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum in rebus humanis, cui æternitas omnis, totiusque mundi nota sit magnitudo? Nam quid, aut in studiis humanis, aut in tam exiguâ brevitate vitæ, magnum sapienti videri potest, qui semper animo sic excubat, ut ei nihil improvisum accidere possit, nihil inopinatum, nihil omnino novum? Atque idem ita acrem in omnes partes aciem intendit, ut semper videat sedem sibi ac locum sine molestiâ atque angore vivendi,

ut quemcumque casum fortuna invexerit, hunc apte et quiete ferat. Quod qui faciet, non ægritudine solum vacabit, sed etiam perturbationibus reliquis omnibus. His autem vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute beatos efficit: idemque concitatus, et abstractûs ab integrâ certâque ratione, non constantiam solum amittit, verum etiam sanitatem.

Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse esse dicunt, sed adhibent modum quemdam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. Modum tu adhibes vitio? an vitium nullum est, non parere rationi? an ratio parum præcipit, nec bonum illud esse, quod aut cupias ardenter, aut adeptus efferas te insolenter? nec porro malum, quo aut oppressus jaceas, aut, ne opprimare, mente vix constes? eaque omnia aut nimis tristia, aut nimis læta, errore fieri? Qui si error stultis extenuetur die, ut, cum res eadem maneat, aliter ferant inveterata, aliter recentia; sapientes ne attingat quidem omnino. Etenim quis erit tandem modus iste? Quæramus enim modum ægritudinis, in quo operæ plurimum ponitur. Ægre tulisse P. Rutilium fratris repulsam consulatûs, scriptum apud Fannium est. Sed tamen transîsse videtur modum, quippe qui ob eam causam a vitâ recesserit. Moderatius igitur ferre debuit. Quid

si, cum id ferret modice, mors liberorum accessisset? Nata esset ægritudo nova, sed ea modica: magna tamen facta esset accessio. Quid si deinde dolores graves corporis, si bonorum amissio, si cæcitas, si exsilium, si pro singulis malis ægritudines accederent? Summa ea fieret, quæ non sustineretur.

XVIII. Qui modum igitur vitio quærit, similiter facit, ut si posse putet eum, qui se e Leucatâ præcipitaverit, sustinere se, cum velit. Ut enim id non potest; sic animus perturbatus et incitatus nec cohibere se potest, nec, quo loco vult, insistere omnino: quæque crescentia perniciosa sunt, eadem sunt vitiosa nascentia. Ægritudo autem, ceteræque perturbationes, amplificatæ, certe pestiferæ sunt. Igitur, etiam susceptæ, continuo in magnâ pestis parte versantur. Etenim ipsæ se impellunt, ubi semel a ratione discessum est: ipsaque sibi imbecillitas indulget; in altumque provehitur imprudens, nec reperit locum consistendi. Quamobrem nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam intemperantiam. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum: quod cum ipsum per se odiosum est, tum eo molestius, quia sunt in lubrico; incitataque ve-

mel, proclive labuntur, sustinerique nullo modo possunt.

XIX. Quid? quod iidem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos exstirpandas putamus, non modo naturales esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a naturâ datas? quorum est talis oratio. Primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant: cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt; multoque, et in hostem et in improbum civem, vehementiores iratorum impetus esse: leves autem ratiunculas eorum qui ita cogitarent; "Prœlium rectum est hoc fieri: convenit dimicare pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patriâ." Hæc nullam habent vim, nisi irâ excanduit fortitudo. Nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliquâ acerbitate iracundiæ: oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiæ; quæ etiam si non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. Virum denique videri negant, qui irasci nesciat: eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis nomine appellant.

Nec vero solum hanc libidinem laudant (est enim ira, ut modo definivi, ulciscendi libido), sed ipsum illud genus vel libidinis vel cupiditatis

ad summam utilitatem esse dicunt a naturâ datum: nihil enim quemquam, nisi quod libeat, præclare facere posse. Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset: quærentibusque respondebat, Miltiadis tropæis se e somno suscitari. Cui non sunt auditæ Demosthenis vigiliæ? qui dolere se aiebat, si quando opificum antelucanâ victus esset industriâ. Philosophiæ denique ipsius principes nunquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. Ultimas terras lustrâsse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem, accepimus. Ubi enim quid esset, quod disci posset, eo veniendum judicaverunt. Num putamus hæc fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse?

XX. Ipsam ægritudinem, quam nos, ut tetram et immanem belluam, fugiendam esse diximus, non sine magnâ utilitate a naturâ dicunt constitutam, ut homines castigationibus, reprehensionibus, ignominiis, affici se in delicto dolerent. Impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis qui et ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore. Morderi est melius conscientiâ: ex quo est illud e vitâ ductum ab Afranio: nam, cum dissolutus filius,

"Heu me miserum!"

tum severus pater,

"Dummodo doleat aliquid, doleat quod lubet.

Reliquas quoque partes ægritudinis utiles esse dicunt, misericordiam ad opem ferendam, et calamitates hominum indignorum sublevandas: ipsum illud æmulari, obtrectare, non esse inutile, cùm aut se non idem videat consecutum, quod alium, aut alium idem, quod se: metum vero si quis sustulisset, omnem vitæ diligentiam sublatam fore, quæ summa esset in eis, qui leges, qui magistratus, qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent. Hæc tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse, nec opus esse; ut in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optimam existiment. Quæ cum exponunt, nihilne tibi videntur, an aliquid, dicere? *Auditor.* Mihi vero dicere aliquid; itaque exspecto, quid ad ista.

XXI. *Marcus.* Reperiam fortasse: sed illud ante. Videsne, quanta fuerit apud Academicos verecundia? Plane enim dicunt, quod ad rem pertineat. Peripateticis respondetur a Stoïcis. Digladientur illi, per me licet; cui nihil est necesse, nisi ubi sit illud quod verisimillimum videatur, anquirere. Quid est igitur, quod occurrat

in hac quæstione, quo possit attingi aliquid verisimile, quo longius mens humana progredi non potest? Definitio perturbationis, quâ recte Zenonem usum puto. Ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit aversa a ratione, contra naturam, animi commotio: vel, brevius, ut perturbatio sit appetitus vehementior; vehementior autem intelligatur is, qui procul absit a naturæ constantiâ.

Quid ad has definitiones possim dicere? Atqui hæc pleraque sunt prudenter acuteque dicerentium: illa quidem ex rhetorum pompâ, "ardores animorum, cotesque virtutum." An vero vir fortis, nisi stomachari cœperit, non potest fortis esse? Gladiatorium id quidem; quamquam in eis ipsis videmus sæpe constantiam. Colloquuntur, congrediuntur, queruntur, aliquid postulant, ut magis placati quam irati esse videantur. Sed in illo genere sit sane Pacidianus aliquis hoc animo, ut narrat Lucilius,

"Occidam illum equidem, et vincam, si id quæritis,
inquit.
Verum illud credo fore, in os prius accipiam ipse,
Quam gladium in stomacho, surâ, ac pulmonibu' sisto.
Odi hominem: iratus pugno: nec longiu' quidquam
Nobis, quam dextræ gladium dum accommodet alter:
Usque adeo, studio atque odio illius, efferor irâ."

XXII. At, sine hac gladiatoriâ iracundiâ, videmus progredientem apud Homerum Ajacem

multâ cum hilaritate, cum depugnaturus esset cum Hectore: cujus, ut arma sumsit, ingressio lætitiam attulit sociis, terrorem autem hostibus; ut ipsum Hectorem, (quemadmodum est apud Homerum) toto pectore trementem, provocâsse ad pugnam pœniteret. Atque hi, collocuti inter se, priusquam manum consererent, leniter et quiete, nihil ne in ipsâ quidem pugnâ iracunde rabioseve fecerunt. Ego ne Torquatum quidem illum, qui hoc cognomen invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse; nec Marcellum apud Clastidium ideo fortem fuisse, quia fuerit iratus. De Africano quidem, quia notior est nobis propter recentem memoriam, vel jurare possum, non illum iracundiâ tum inflammatum fuisse, cum in acie M. Halienum Pelignum scuto protexit, gladiumque hosti in pectus infixit: de L. Bruto fortasse dubitârim, an, propter infinitum odium tyranni, effrenatius in Aruntem invaserit: video enim utrumque cominus ictu cecidisse contrario. Quid igitur huc adhibetis iram? An fortitudo, nisi insanire cœperit, impetus suos non habet? Quid? Herculem, quem in cœlum ista ipsa, quam vos iracundiam esse vultis, sustulit fortitudo, iratumne censes conflixisse cum Erymanthio apro, aut leone Nemeæo? An etiam Theseus Marathonii tauri cornua cŏmprehendit *iratus*? Vide, ne fortitudo minime sit rabiosa,

sitque iracundia tota levitatis: neque enim est illa fortitudo, quæ rationis est expers.

XXIII. Contemnendæ res sunt humanæ: negligenda mors est: patibiles et dolores et labores putandi. Hæc cum constituta sunt judicio atque sententiâ, tum est robusta illa et stabilis fortitudo; nisi forte, quæ vehementer, acriter, animose fiunt, iracunde fieri suspicamur. Mihi, ne Scipio quidem ille, pontifex maximus, qui hoc Stoicorum verum esse delaravit, "nunquam privatum esse sapientem," iratus videtur fuisse Ti. Graccho tum, cum consulem languentem reliquit, atque ipse privatus, ut si consul esset, qui rempublicam salvam esse vellet, se sequi jussit. Nescio, ecquid ipsi nos fortiter in republicâ fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus.

An est quidquam similius insaniæ, quam ira? quam bene Ennius initium dixit insaniæ. Color, vox, oculi, spiritus, impotentia dictorum atque factorum, quam partem habent sanitatis? Quid Achille Homerico fœdius? quid Agamemnone, in jurgio? nam Ajacem quidem ira ad furorem mortemque perduxit. Non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam. Satis est instructa, armata, parata, per sese. Nam isto modo quidem licet dicere, utilem vinolentiam ad fortis-

tudinem, utilem etiam dementiam, quod et insani et ebrii multa faciunt sæpe vehementius. Semper Ajax fortis: fortissimus tamen in furore:

"Nam facinus fecit maximum, cum, Danais inclinantibus,
Summam rem perfecit manus, prœlium restituit insaniens."

XXIV. Dicamus igitur utilem insaniam? Tracta definitionem fortitudinis: intelliges, eam stomacho non egere. Fortitudo est igitur affectio animi, legi summæ in perpetiendis rebus obtemperans; vel conservatio stabilis judicii in eis rebus, quæ formidolosæ videntur, subeundis, et repellendis; vel scientia rerum formidolosarum, contrariarumque, perferendarum aut omnino negligendarum, conservans earum rerum stabile judicium: vel, brevius, ut Chrysippus: (nam superiores definitiones erant Sphæri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoïci: sunt enim omnino omnes fere similes; sed declarant communes notiones, alia magis aliâ.) Quo modo igitur Chrysippus? "Fortitudo est," inquit, "scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi, in patiendo ac perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore." Quamvis licet insectemur *istos*, ut Carneades solebat, metuo, ne soli philo-

sophi sint. Quæ enim istarum definitionum non aperit notionem nostram, quam habemus omnes de fortitudine, tectam atque involutam? quâ apertâ, quis est, qui aut bellatori, aut imperatori, aut oratori, quærat aliquid, neque eos existimet sine rabie quidquam fortiter facere posse?

Quid? Stoïci, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista colligunt? Remove perturbationes, maximeque iracundiam: jam videbuntur monstra dicere. Nunc autem ita dissérunt, sic se dicere, omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne cœnum. At non semper. Commove: senties. Sic iracundus non semper iratus est. Lacesse: jam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore? cum liberis? cum familiâ? an tum quoque est utilis? Est igitur aliquid, quod perturbata mens melius possit facere, quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? Bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in [moribus] vitia, quod nullum erat iracundiâ fœdius, iracundos solos [morosos] nominaverunt.

XXV. Oratorem vero irasci minime decet: simulare non dedecet. An tibi irasci tum videmur, cum quid in causis acrius et vehementius dicimus? Quid? cum, jam rebus transactis et

præteritis, orationes scribimus, num irati scribimus?

"Ecquis hoc animadvertit? Vincite".....

num aut egisse unquam iratum Æsopum, aut scripsisse existimamus iratum Accium? Aguntur ista præclare, et ab oratore quidem melius, si modo est orator, quam ab ullo histrione: sed aguntur leniter, et mente tranquillâ. Libidinem vero laudare, cujus est libidinis? Themistoclem mihi et Demosthenem profertis: additis Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem. Quid? vos studia libidinem vocatis? quæ vel optimarum rerum, ut ea sunt quæ profertis, sedata tamen et tranquilla esse debent. Jam ægritudinem laudare, unam rem maxime detestabilem, quorum est tandem philosophorum? At commode dixit Afranius,

"Dummodo doleat aliquid, doleat quod lubet."

Dixit enim de adolescente perdito ac dissoluto: nos autem de constanti viro ac sapienti quærimus. Et quidem ipsam illam iram centurio habeat, aut signifer, vel ceteri, de quibus dici non necesse est, ne rhetorum aperiamus mysteria. Utile est enim uti motu animi, qui uti ratione non potest: nos autem (ut testificor sæpe) de sapiente quærimus.

XXVI. At etiam æmulari utile est, obtrectare, misereri. Cur misereare potius, quam feras opem, si id facere possis? An, sine misericordiâ, liberales esse non possumus? Non enim suscipere ipsi ægritudines propter alios debemus; sed alios, si possumus, levare ægritudine. Obtrectare vero alteri, aut, illâ vitiosâ æmulatione quæ rivalitati similis est, æmulari, quid habet utilitatis? cum sit æmulantis, angi alieno bono, quod ipse non habeat; obtrectantis autem, angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat. Quî id approbari possit, te ægritudinem suscipere pro experientiâ, si quid habere velis? nam solum habere velle, summa dementia est.

Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit? quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? in quo ira, non iracundus? in quo angor, non anxius? in quo timor, non timidus? Libidinosum igitur, et cupidum, et iracundum, et anxium, et timidum, censemus esse sapientem? de cujus excellentiâ multa quidem dici quamvis fuse lateque possint; sed brevissime illo modo, Sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam, cognitionemque, quæ cujusque rei causa sit: ex quo efficitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiora virtute ducat. In hanc tu igitur, tamquam in mare, quod est ventis subjectum,

perturbationem cadere tibi dixisti videri? Quid est, quod tantam gravitatem constantiamque perturbet? an improvisum aliquid, aut repentinum? quid potest accidere tale ei, cui nihil subitum est, quod homini evenire possit? Nam, quod aiunt, nimia resecari oportere, naturalia relinqui; quid tandem potest esse naturale, quod idem nimium esse possit? Sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus: quæ evellenda et extrahenda penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda, sunt.

XXVII. Sed, quoniam suspicor, te non tam de sapiente quam de te ipso quærere (illum enim putas omni perturbatione esse liberum, te vis); videamus, quanta sint, quæ a philosophiâ remedia morbis animorum adhibeantur. Est enim quædam medicina certe; nec tam fuit hominum generi infensa atque inimica natura, ut corporibus tot res salutares, animis nullam, invenerit. De quibus hoc etiam est merita melius, quod corporum adjumenta adhibentur extrinsecus, animorum salus inclusa in his ipsis est. Sed quo major est in eis præstantia et divinior, eo majore indigent diligentiâ. Itaque bene adhibita ratio cernit, quid optimum sit; neglecta, multis implicatur erroribus.

Ad te igitur mihi jam convertenda omnis ora-

tio est: simulas enim quærere te de sapiente: quæris autem fortasse de te. Earum igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variæ sunt curationes: nam neque omnis ægritudo unâ ratione sedatur. Alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti, alia invidenti, adhibenda medicina. Est etiam in omnibus quatuor perturbationibus illa distinctio: Utrum ad universam perturbationem (quæ est adspernatio rationis, aut appetitus vehementior), an ad singulas, ut ad metum, libidinem, reliquasque, melius adhibeatur oratio: et, utrum illud non videatur ægre ferendum, ex quo suscepta sit ægritudo; an omnium rerum tollenda omnino ægritudo; ut, si quis ægre ferat, se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse; an hominem ægre ferre nihil oportere. Nimirum hoc melius; ne, si forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit ægritudini concedendum: ægritudine autem sublatâ, propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur.

XXVIII. Sed omnis ejusmodi perturbatio, animi placatione, abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas, nec bonum illud esse, ex quo lætitia aut libido oriatur; nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut ægritudo. Verumtamen hæc est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas, ipsas perturbationes per

se esse vitiosas, nec habere quidquam aut naturale aut necessarium; ut ipsam ægritudinem leniri videmus, cum objicimus mœrentibus imbecillitatem animi effeminati; cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur: quod quidem solet eis etiam accidere, qui illa mala esse censent, ferenda tamen æquo animo arbitrantur. Putat aliquis, esse voluptatem bonum; alius autem, pecuniam: tamen et ille ab intemperantiâ, et hic ab avaritiâ, avocari potest. Illa autem altera ratio et oratio, quæ simul et opinionem falsam tollit, et ægritudinem detrahit, est ea quidem [subtilior,] sed raro proficit; neque est ad vulgus adhibenda. Quædam autem sunt ægritudines, quas levare illa medicina nullo modo possit; ut si quis ægre ferat, nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis; propter mala is quidem angatur; sed alia quædam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quæ possit esse omnium, etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium, philosophorum. Inter omnes enim convenire oportet, commotiones animorum, a rectâ ratione aversas, esse vitiosas, ut, etiam si mala sint illa, quæ metum ægritudinemve; bona, quæ cupiditatem lætitiamve, moveant; tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. Constantem enim quemdam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia prementem,

illum esse, quem magnanimum et fortem virum dicimus. Talis autem nec mœrens, nec timens, nec cupiens, nec gestiens, esse quisquam potest: eorum enim hæc sunt, qui eventus humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt.

XXIX. Quare omnium philosophorum (ut ante dixi) una ratio est medendi, ut nihil, quale sit illud quod perturbet animum, sed de ipsâ sit perturbatione dicendum. Itaque primum, in ipsâ cupiditate, cum id solum agitur, ut ea tollatur, non est quærendum, bonum illud necne sit, quod libidinem moveat: sed libido ipsa tollenda est: ut, sive, quod honestum est, id sit summum bonum, sive voluptas, sive horum utrumque conjunctum, sive illa tria genera bonorum; tamen, etiam si virtutis ipsius vehementior appetitus sit, eadem sit omnibus ad deterrendum adhibenda oratio. Continet autem omnem sedationem animi humana in conspectu posita natura; quæ quo facilius expressa cernatur, explicanda est oratione communis conditio lexque vitæ. Itaque, non sine causâ, cum Orestem fabulam doceret Euripides, primos tres versus revocâsse dicitur Socrates:

"Neque tam terribilis ulla fando [oratio] est,
Nec sors, nec îrâ cœlitum invectum malum,
Quod non natura humana patiendo efferat."

Est autem utilis, ad persuadendum, ea, quæ acciderint, ferri et posse et oportere, enumeratio eorum qui tulerunt: etsi ægritudinis sedatio et hesternâ disputatione explicata est, et in "Consolationis" libro, quem in medio (non enim sapientes eramus) mœrore et dolore conscripsimus: quodque vetat Chrysippus, ad recentes quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere, id nos fecimus; naturæque vim attulimus, ut magnitudini medicinæ doloris magnitudo concederet.

XXX. Sed ægritudini, de quâ satis est disputatum, finitimus est metus. De quo pauca dicenda sunt. Est enim metus, ut ægritudo præsentis, sic ille futuri, mali. Itaque nonnulli ægritudinis partem quamdam metum esse dicebant: alii autem metum præmolestiam appellabant, quod esset quasi dux consequentis molestiæ. Quibus igitur rationibus instantia feruntur, eisdem contemnuntur sequentia: nam videndum est in utrisque, ne quid humile, submissum, molle, effeminatum, fractum, abjectumque, faciamus. Sed, quamquam de ipsius metûs inconstantiâ, imbecillitate, levitate, dicendum est; tamen multum prodest, ea, quæ metuuntur, ipsa contemnere. Itaque, sive casu accidit, sive consilio, percommode factum est, quod eis de rebus, quæ *maxime* metuuntur, de morte et de dolore, primo

et proximo die disputatum est. Quæ si probata sunt, metu magnâ ex parte liberati sumus. Ac de malorum opinione, hactenus.

XXXI. Videamus nunc de bonorum, id est, de lætitiâ et de cupiditate. Mihi quidem, in totâ ratione eâ quæ pertinet ad animi perturbationes, una res videtur causam continere, omnes eas esse in nostrâ potestate, omnes judicio susceptas, omnes voluntarias. Hic igitur error est eripiendus, hæc detrahenda opinio: atque, ut, in malis opinatis, [tolerabiliora;] sic, in bonis, sedatiora sunt efficienda ea, quæ magna et lætabilia dicuntur. Atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum: ut, si jam difficile sit persuadere, nihil earum rerum, quæ perturbent animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda; aliâque ratione malevolus, aliâ amator, aliâ rursus anxius, aliâ timidus, corrigendus.

Atque erat facile, sequentem eam rationem quæ maxime probatur de bonis et malis, negare unquam lætitiâ affici posse insipientem, quod nihil unquam haberet boni. Sed loquimur nunc more communi. Sint sane ista bona, quæ putantur, honores, divitiæ, voluptates, cetera; tamen in eis ipsis potiundis exsultans gestiensque lætitia turpis est; ut, si ridere concessum sit,

vituperetur tamen cachinnatio. Eodem enim vitio est effusio animi in lætitiâ, quo, in dolore, contractio; eâdemque levitate cupiditas est in appetendo, quâ lætitia in fruendo; et, ut nimis afflicti molestiâ, sic nimis elati lætitiâ, jure judicantur leves. Et, cum invidere ægritudinis sit, malis autem alienis voluptatem capere, lætitiæ; utrumque, immanitate et feritate quâdam proponendâ, castigari solet. Atque, ut [diffidere] decet, timere non decet; sic gaudere decet, lætari non decet; quoniam, docendi causâ, a gaudio lætitiam distinguimus. Illud jam supra diximus, contractionem animi recte fieri nunquam posse, elationem posse: aliter enim Nævianus ille gaudet Hector,

..... "Lætu' sum
Laudari me abs te, pater, laudato viro:"

aliter ille apud Trabeam,

"Lena, delenita argento, nutum observabit meum,
Quid velim, quid studeam. Adveniens digito impellam januam:
Fores patebunt. De improviso Chrysis ubi me adspexerit,
Alacris obviam mihi veniet, complexum exoptans meum.
Mihi se dedet."

Quam hæc pulchra putet, ipse jam dicet:

"Fortunam ipsam anteibo fortunis meis."

XXXII. Hæc lætitia quam turpis sit, satis est diligenter attendentem penitus videre. Et, ut turpes sunt, qui efferunt se lætitiâ tum cum fruuntur venereis voluptatibus; sic flagitiosi, qui eas inflammato animo concupiscunt. Totus vero iste, qui vulgo appellatur amor, (nec, hercule, invenio, quo nomine alio possit appellari) tantæ levitatis est, ut nihil videam, quod putem conferendum. Quem Cæcilius,

..... "Deum qui non summum putet,
Aut stultum, aut rerum esse imperitum existimet:
Cui in manu sit, quem esse dementem velit,
Quem sapere, quem [sanari,] quem in morbum injici,
Quem contra amari, quem arcessier, quem expeti."

O præclaram emendatricem vitæ poëticam! quæ amorem, flagitii et levitatis auctorem, in concilio deorum collocandum putet. De comœdiâ loquor, quæ, si hæc flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino. Quid ait ex tragœdiâ princeps ille Argonautarum?

"Tu me amoris magi' quam honoris, servavisti gratiâ."

Quid ergo? hic amor Medeæ quanta miseriarum excitavit incendia! Atque ea tamen, apud alium poëtam, patri dicere audet, se conjugem habuisse

"Illum, amor quem dederat, qui plus pollet, potiorque est patre."

XXXIII. Sed poëtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Jovem. Ad magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus; qui amorem negant stupri esse, et in eo litigant cum Epicuro, non multum (ut opinio mea fert) mentiente. Quis est enim iste amor amicitiæ? Cur neque deformem adolescentem quisquam amat, neque formosum senem? Mihi quidem hæc in Græcorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. Bene ergo Ennius,

"Flagitii principium est nudare inter cives corpora."

Qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt; eoque magis, quod seipsi continent et coërcent. Atque, ut muliebres amores omittam, quibus majorem licentiam natura concessit; quis aut de Ganymedis raptu dubitat, quid poëtæ velint? aut non intelligit, quid apud Euripidem et loquatur et cupiat Laius? quid denique homines doctissimi et summi poëtæ de se ipsi et carminibus edant et cantibus? Fortis vir in suâ republicâ cognitus, quæ de juvenum amore scripsit Alcæus? nam Anacreontis quidem tota poësis est amatoria. Maxime vero omnium flagrâsse amore Rheginum Ibycum, apparet ex scriptis.

XXXIV. Atque horum omnium libidinosos esse amores videmus. Philosophi sumus exorti (et auctore quidem nostro Platone, quem non injuriâ Dicæarchus accusat), qui amori auctoritatem tribueremus. Stoïci vero et sapientem amaturum esse dicunt; et amorem ipsum, conatum amicitiæ faciendæ ex pulchritudinis specie, definiunt. Qui si quis est in rerum naturâ sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine curâ, sine suspirio; sit sane: vacat enim omni libidine: hæc autem de libidine oratio est. Sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit, aut non multum, ab insaniâ, qualis in Leucadiâ est:

"Si quidem sit quisquam deus, cui ego sim curæ:"

(at id erat deis omnibus curandum, quemadmodum hic frueretur voluptate amatoriâ!)

"Heu me infelicem!"

Nihil verius. Probe et ille,

"Sanusne es, qui temere lamentare?"

Sic insanus videtur etiam suis. At quas tragœdias efficit!

"Te, Apollo sancte, fer opem, teque, omnipotens Neptune, invoco;
Vosque adeo, venti."

Mundum totum se, ad amorem suum sublevan-

dum, conversurum putat: Venerem unam excludit, ut iniquam:

"Nam quid ego te appellem, Venus?"

Eam, præ libidine, negat curare quidquam: quasi vero ipse non propter libidinem tanta flagitia et faciat et dicat.

XXXV. Sic igitur affecto hæc adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat, ostendat, quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihil sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel alio modo perfici, vel omnino negligi, possit. Abducendus est etiam nonnunquam ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas, negotia: loci denique mutatione (tamquam ægroti [non] convalescentes) sæpe curandus est. Etiam novo quodam amore veterem amorem, tamquam clavo clavum, ejiciendum putant. Maxime autem admonendus, quantus sit furor amoris. Omnibus enim ex animi perturbationibus, est profecto nulla vehementior: ut, si jam ipsa illa accusare nolis, stupra dico et corruptelas et adulteria, incesta denique, quorum omnium accusabilis est turpitudo; sed, ut hæc omittas, perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore fœda per se est. Nam, ut illa præteream, quæ sunt furoris; hæc ipsa per sese quam habent levitatem, quæ videntur esse mediocria!

..... "injuriæ,
Suspiciones, inimicitiæ, inducíæ,
Bellum, pax rursum. Incerta hæc si tu postules
Ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas,
Quam si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias."

Hæc inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis, quem non ipsâ pravitate deterreat? Est enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi judicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. Etenim, si naturalis amor esset; et amarent omnes, et semper amarent, et idem amarent; neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas, deterreret.

XXXVI. Ira vero, cum diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniæ non habet: cujus impulsu exsistit etiam inter fratres tale jurgium:

"Quis homo te exsuperavit [unquam] gentium impudentiâ?
Quis autem malitiâ te?"

Nôsti, quæ sequuntur: alternis enim versibus intorquentur inter fratres gravissimæ contumeliæ; ut facile appareat, Atrei filios esse, ejus, qui meditatur pœnam in fratrem novam:

"Major mihi moles, majus miscendum malum,
Qui illius acerbum cor contundam et comprimam."

Quæ igitur hæ erunt moles? audi Thyestem ipsum:

> "Impius hortatur me frater, ut meos malis miser
> Manderem natos."

Eorum viscera apponit: quid est enim, quo non progrediatur [ira? eodem, quo furor.] Itaque iratos proprie dicimus exîsse de potestate, id est, de consilio, de ratione, de mente. Horum enim potestas in totum animum esse debet. His aut subtrahendi sunt ii, in quos impetum conantur facere, dum se ipsi colligant; (quid est autem se ipsum colligere, nisi dissipatas animi partes rursum in suum locum cogere?) aut rogandi orandique sunt, ut, si quam habent ulciscendi vim, differant in tempus aliud, dum defervescat ira. Defervescere autem certe significat ardorem animi invitâ ratione excitatum. Ex quo illud laudatur Archytæ, qui, cum villico factus esset iratior, "Quo te modo," inquit, "accepissem, nisi iratus essem!"

XXXVII. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt? (potest utilis esse insania?) aut naturalem? An quidquam esse potest secundum naturam, quod sit repugnante ratione? Quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, aut alius alio magis iracundus esset; aut finem haberet, prius

quam esset ulta, ulciscendi libido; aut quemquam pœniteret, quod fecisset per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui, cum interemisset Clitum, familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit: tanta vis fuit pœnitendi. Quibus cognitis, quis est, qui dubitet, quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitârit, quin ægrotationes animi (qualis est avaritia, gloriæ cupiditas) ex eo, quod magni æstimetur ea res, ex quâ animus ægrotat, oriantur? Unde intelligi debet, perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione.

Et, si fidentia, id est, firma animi confisio, scientia quædam est, et opinio gravis, non temere assentiens; diffidentia quoque est metus exspectati et impendentis mali. Et, si spes est exspectatio boni, mali exspectationem esse necesse est metum. Ut igitur metus, sic reliquæ perturbationes sunt in malo. Ergo ut constantia scientiæ, sic perturbatio erroris est. Qui autem naturâ dicuntur iracundi, aut misericordes, aut invidi, aut tale quid, ii sunt constituti quasi malâ valetudine animi; sanabiles tamen: ut [de Socrate] dicitur. Cum multa in conventu vitia collegisset in eum Zopyrus, qui se naturam cujusque ex formâ perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent;

ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi insita, sed ratione a se dejecta, diceret.

Ergo, ut optimâ quisque valetudine affectus potest videri, ut naturâ ad aliquem morbum proclivior; sic animus alius ad alia vitia propensior. Qui autem non naturâ, sed culpâ, vitiosi esse dicuntur, eorum vitia constant e falsis opinionibus rerum bonarum ac malarum; ut sit alius ad alios motus perturbationesque proclivior. Inveteratio autem (ut in corporibus) ægrius depellitur, quam perturbatio: citiusque repentinus oculorum tumor sanatur, quam diuturna lippitudo depellitur.

XXXVIII. Sed, cognitâ jam causâ perturbationum, quæ omnes oriuntur ex judiciis opinionum et voluntatibus, sit jam hujus disputationis modus. Scire autem vos oportet, cognitis, quoad possunt ab homine cognosci, bonorum et malorum finibus, nihil a philosophiâ posse aut majus aut utilius optari, quam hæc, quæ a nobis hoc quatriduo disputata sunt. Morte enim contemtâ, et dolore ad patiendum levato, adjunximus sedationem ægritudinis, quâ nullum homini malum majus est. Etsi enim omnis animi perturbatio gravis est, nec multum differt ab amentiâ; tamen ita ceteros, cum sint in aliquâ perturbatione aut

metûs aut lætitiæ aut cupiditatis, commotos modo et perturbatos dicere solemus; at eos, qui se ægritudini dediderunt, miseros, afflictos, ærumnosos, calamitosos. Itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de ægritudine, et de ceteris perturbationibus, disputaremus. In eâ est enim fons miseriarum et caput. Sed et ægritudinis, et reliquorum animi morborum, una sanatio est: omnes opinabiles esse et voluntarios, eâ reque suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. Hunc errorem, quasi radicem malorum omnium, stirpitus philosophia se extracturam pollicetur. Demus ergo nos huic excolendos; patiamurque nos sanari. His enim malis insidentibus, non modo beati, sed ne sani quidem esse possumus. Aut igitur negemus quidquam ratione confici, cum contra nihil sine ratione recte fieri possit; aut, cum philosophia ex rationum collatione constet, ab eâ, si et boni et beati volumus esse, omnia adjumenta et auxilia petamus bene beateque vivendi.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUÆSTIONUM,

AD

MARCUM BRUTUM,

LIBER QUINTUS.

Virtutem, ad beate vivendum, se ipsâ esse contentam.

I. Quintus hic dies, Brute, finem faciet Tusculanarum disputationum; quo die est a nobis, eâ de re quam tu ex omnibus maxime probas, disputatum. Placere enim tibi admodum sensi, et ex eo libro, quem ad me accuratissime scripsisti, et ex multis sermonibus tuis, virtutem, ad beate vivendum, se ipsâ esse contentam. Quod etsi difficile est probatu, propter tam varia et tam multa tormenta fortunæ; tale tamen est, ut elaborandum sit, quo facilius probetur. Nihil est enim omnium quæ in philosophiâ tractantur, quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur. Nam, cum ea causa impulerit eos qui primi se ad phi-

losophiæ studium contulerunt, ut, omnibus rebus posthabitis, totos se in optimo vitæ statu exquirendo collocarent; profecto spe beate vivendi tantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt. Quod si ab iis inventa et perfecta virtus est, et si præsidii ad beate vivendum in virtute satis est; quis est, qui non præclare et ab illis positam, et a nobis susceptam, operam philosophandi arbitretur? Sin autem virtus, subjecta sub varios incertosque casus, famula fortunæ est, nec tantarum virium est, ut se ipsa tueatur; vereor, ne non tam virtutis fiduciâ nitendum nobis ad spem beate vivendi, quam vota facienda videantur.

Equidem eos casus, in quibus me fortuna vehementer exercuit, mecum ipse considerans, huic incipio sententiæ diffidere, interdum et humani generis imbecillitatem fragilitatemque extimescere. Vereor enim, ne natura, cum corpora nobis infirma dedisset, iisque et morbos insanabiles et dolores intolerabiles adjunxisset, animos quoque dederit et corporum doloribus congruentes, et separatim suis angoribus et molestiis implicatos. Sed in hoc me ipse castigo, quod, ex aliorum et ex nostrâ fortasse mollitiâ, non ex ipsâ virtute, de virtutis robore existimo. Illa enim, si modo est ulla virtus (quam dubitationem avunculus tuus, Brute, sustulit); omnia, quæ cadere

in hominem possunt, subter se habet: eaque despiciens, casus contemnit humanos; culpâque omni carens, præter se ipsam, nihil censet ad se pertinere. Nos autem, omnia adversa tum venientia metu augentes, tum mœrore præsentia, rerum naturam, quam errorem nostrum, damnare malumus.

II. Sed et hujus culpæ, et ceterorum vitiorum peccatorumque nostrorum, omnis a philosophiâ petenda correctio est. Cujus in sinum cum a primis temporibus ætatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos compulisset, his gravissimis casibus in eumdem portum, ex quo eramus egressi, magnâ jactati tempestate, confugimus. O vitæ philosophia dux! o virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum! quid, non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset? Tu urbes peperisti: tu dissipatos homines in societatem vitæ convocâsti: tu eos inter se primo domiciliis, deinde conjugiis, tum literarum et vocum communione, junxisti: tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinæ fuisti. Ad te confugimus: a te opem petimus: tibi nos, ut antea magnâ ex parte, sic nunc penitus, totosque tradimus. Est autem unus dies, bene et ex præceptis tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponendus. Cujus igitur *potius* opibus utamur, quam tuis? quæ et

vitæ tranquillitatem largita nobis es, et terrorem mortis sustulisti.

Ac philosophia quidem tantum abest, ut proinde, ac de hominum est vitâ merita, laudetur; ut, a plerisque neglecta, a multis etiam vituperetur. Vituperare quisquam vitæ parentem, et hoc parricidio se inquinare, audet? et tam impie ingratus esse, ut eam accuset, quam vereri deberet, etiam si minus percipere potuisset? Sed, ut opinor, hic error, et hæc indoctorum animis offusa caligo est, quod tam longe retro respicere non possunt; nec eos, a quibus vita hominum instructa primis sit, fuisse philosophos arbitrantur. Quam rem antiquissimam cum videamus, nomen tamen confitemur esse recens.

III. Nam sapientiam quidem ipsam quis negare potest non modo re esse antiquam, verum etiam nomine? quæ divinarum humanarumque rerum, tum initiorum causarumque cujusque rei, cognitione, hoc pulcherrimum nomen apud antiquos assequebatur. Itaque et illos septem, qui a Græcis Σοφοὶ, *Sapientes* a nostris, et habebantur et nominabantur, et multis ante sæculis Lycurgum, (cujus temporibus Homerus etiam fuisse ante hanc urbem conditam traditur) etiam heroïcis ætatibus Ulyssem et Nestorem, accepimus et fuisse et habitos esse sapientes. Nec vero Atlan

sustinere cœlum, nec Prometheus affixus Caucaso, nec stellatus Cepheus cum uxore, genero, filiâ, traderetur, nisi cœlestium divina cognitio nomen eorum ad errorem fabulæ traduxisset. A quibus ducti deinceps omnes, qui in rerum contemplatione studia ponebant, sapientes et habebantur et nominabantur: idque eorum nomen usque ad Pythagoræ manavit ætatem; quem, (ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis) Phliuntem ferunt venisse, eumque cum Leonte, principe Phliasiorum, docte et copiose disseruisse quædam. Cujus ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quæsivisse ex eo, quâ maxime arte confideret: at illum artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse *philosophum*. Admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis, quæsîsse, Quinam essent philosophi, et quid inter eos et reliquos interesset? Pythagoram autem respondisse: "similem sibi videri vitam hominum, et mercatum eum qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Græciæ celebritate. Nam, ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronæ peterent; alii emendi aut vendendi quæstu et lucro ducerentur; esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxime ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quærerent, sed visendi causâ venirent, studioseque *perspicerent*, quid ageretur, et quo modo: ita

nos, quasi in mercatûs quamdam celebritatem ex urbe aliquâ, sic in hanc vitam ex aliâ vitâ et naturâ profectos, alios gloriæ servire, alios pecuniæ; raros esse quosdam, qui, ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis, rerum naturam studiose intuerentur: hos se appellare *sapientiæ studiosos*" (id est enim *philosophos*): "et, ut illic liberalissimum esset spectare, nihil sibi acquirentem, sic, in vitâ, longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque præstare."

IV. Nec vero Pythagoras nominis solum inventor, sed rerum etiam ipsarum amplificator fuit. Qui, cum post hunc Phliasium sermonem in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Græciam, quæ Magna dicta est, et privatim et publice, præstantissimis et institutis et artibus. Cujus de disciplinâ aliud tempus fuerit fortasse dicendi. Sed ab antiquâ philosophiâ, usque ad Socratem, qui Archeläum, Anaxagoræ discipulum, audierat, numeri motusque tractabantur, et unde omnia orirentur, quove recederent: studioseque ab his siderum magnitudines, intervalla, cursus, anquirebantur, et cuncta cœlestia. Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coëgit de vitâ et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis, quærere. Cujus multiplex ratio dispu-

tandi, rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis memoriâ et literis consecrata, plura genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum. E quibus nos id potissimum consecuti sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus, et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quæreremus. Quem morem cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias sæpe, et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam consuetudinem disputaremus. Et quatridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad te perscriptum libris misimus: quinto autem die, cum eodem loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus.

V. *Auditor.* Non mihi videtur, ad beate vivendum, satis posse virtutem. *Marcus.* At, hercule, Bruto meo videtur; cujus ego judicium (pace tuâ dixerim) longe antepono tuo. *Auditor.* Non dubito. Nec id nunc agitur, tu illum quantum ames: sed hoc, quod mihi dixi videri, quale sit, de eo a te disputari volo. *Marcus.* Nempe negas, ad beate vivendum, satis posse virtutem? *Auditor.* Prorsus nego. *Marcus.* Quid? ad recte, honeste, laudabiliter, postremo ad bene vivendum, satisne est præsidii in virtute? *Auditor.* Certe satis. *Marcus.* Potes igi-

tur, aut qui male vivat, non eum miserum dicere, aut, quem bene fateare, eum negare beate vivere? *Auditor.* Quidni possim? nam etiam in tormentis recte, honeste, laudabiliter, et ob eam rem bene vivi potest, dummodo intelligas, quid nunc dicam "bene:" dico enim, constanter, graviter, sapienter, fortiter. Hæc etiam in equuleum conjiciuntur, quo vita non adspirat beata.

Marcus. Quid igitur? solane beata vita, quæso, relinquitur extra ostium limenque carceris, cum constantia, gravitas, fortitudo, sapientia, reliquæque virtutes, rapiantur ad tortorem, nullumque recusent nec supplicium nec dolorem? *Auditor.* Tu, si quid es facturus, nova aliqua conquiras, oportet. Ista me minime movent, non solum quia pervulgata sunt; sed multo magis, quia, tamquam levia quædam vina nihil valent in aquâ, sic Stoïcorum ista magis gustata, quam potata, delectant. Velut iste chorus virtutum, in equuleum impositus, imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissimâ dignitate, ut ad eas cursim perrectura beata vita, nec eas a se desertas passura, videatur. Cum autem animum ab istâ picturâ imaginibusque virtutum, ad rem veritatemque traduxeris, hoc nudum relinquitur, Positne quis beatus esse, quamdiu torqueatur?

Quamobrem hoc nunc quæramus. Virtutes autem, noli vereri, ne expostulent, et querantur

se a beatâ vitâ esse relictas. Si enim nulla virtus prudentiâ vacat, prudentia ipsa hoc videt, non omnes bonos esse etiam beatos: multaque de M. Atilio, Q. Cæpione, M. Aquillio, recordatur; beatamque vitam, si imaginibus potius uti, quam rebus ipsis placet, conantem ire in equuleum, retinet [ipsa prudentia]; negatque ei cum dolore et cruciatu quidquam esse commune.

VI. *Marcus.* Facile patior te isto modo agere; etsi iniquum est præscribere mihi te, quemadmodum a me disputari velis. Sed quæro, utrum aliquid actum superioribus diebus, an nihil, arbitremur? *Auditor.* Actum vero, et aliquantum quidem. *Marcus.* Atqui, si ita est, profligata jam hæc, et pæne ad exitum adducta, quæstio est. *Auditor.* Quo tandem modo? *Marcus.* Quia motus turbulenti, jactationesque animorum incitatæ, et impetu inconsiderato elatæ, rationem omnem repellentes, vitæ beatæ nullam partem relinquunt. Quis enim potest, mortem aut dolorem metuens (quorum alterum sæpe adest, alterum semper impendet), esse non miser? Quid, si idem (quod plerumque fit) paupertatem, ignominiam, infamiam timet; si debilitatem, cæcitatem; si denique (quod non singulis hominibus, sed potentibus populis, sæpe contigit) servitutem; potest, ea timens, esse quisquam beatus? Quid,

qui non modo ea futura timet, verum etiam fert sustinetque præsentia? Adde eodem exsilia, luctus, orbitates. Qui rebus his fractus ægritudine eliditur, potest tandem esse non miserrimus? Quid vero illum, quem libidinibus inflammatum et furentem videmus, omnia rabide appetentem cum inexplebili cupiditate, quoque affluentius voluptates undique hauriat, eo gravius ardentiusque sitientem; nonne recte miserrimum dixeris? Quid? elatus ille levitate, inanique lætitiâ exsultans et temere gestiens, nonne tanto miserior, quanto sibi videtur beatior? Ergo, ut hi miseri, sic contra illi beati, quos nulli metus terrent, nullæ ægritudines exedunt, nullæ libidines incitant, nullæ futiles lætitiæ exsultantes languidis liquefaciunt voluptatibus. Ut maris igitur tranquillitas intelligitur, nullâ ne minimâ quidem aurâ fluctus commovente; sic animi quietus et placatus status cernitur, cum perturbatio nulla est, quâ moveri queat. Quod si est, qui vim fortunæ, qui omnia humana, [quæ cuique accidere possunt,] tolerabilia ducat, ex quo nec timor eum nec angor attingat; idemque si nihil concupiscat, nullâ efferatur animi inani voluptate; quid est, cur is non beatus sit? et, si hæc virtute efficiuntur, quid est, cur virtus ipsa per se non efficiat beatos?

VII. *Auditor.* Atqui alterum dici non potest,

quin ii, qui nihil metuant, nihil angantur, nihil concupiscant, nullâ impotenti lætitiâ efferantur, beati sint: itaque id tibi concedo: alterum autem jam integrum non est. Superioribus enim disputationibus effectum est, vacare omni animi perturbatione sapientem. *Marcus.* Nimirum igitur confecta res est: videtur enim ad exitum venisse quæstio. *Auditor.* Propemodum id quidem. *Marcus.* Verumtamen mathematicorum iste mos est, non est philosophorum. Nam geometræ, cum aliquid docere volunt, si quid ad eam rem pertinet eorum quæ ante docuerunt, id sumunt pro concesso et probato: illud modo explicant, de quo ante nihil scriptum est. Philosophi, quamcumque rem habent in manibus, in eam, quæ conveniunt, congerunt omnia, etsi alio loco disputata sunt. Quod ni ita esset, cur Stoïcus, si esset quæsitum, satisne ad beate vivendum virtus posset, multa diceret? cui satis esset, respondere, se ante docuisse, nihil bonum esse, nisi quod honestum esset: hoc probato, consequens esse, beatam vitam virtute esse contentam: et, quo modo hoc sit consequens illi, sic illud huic; ut, si beata vita virtute contenta sit, nisi honestum quod sit, nihil aliud sit bonum. Sed tamen non agunt sic. Nam et de honesto, et de summo bono, separatim libri sunt: et, cum ex eo *efficiatur,* satis magnam in virtute ad beate viven-

dum esse vim, nihilominus hoc agunt separatim. Propriis enim et suis argumentis et admonitionibus tractanda quæque res est, tanta præsertim.

Cave enim putes, ullam a philosophiâ vocem emissam clariorem, ullumve esse philosophiæ promissum uberius aut majus. Nam quid profitetur? o dii boni! perfecturam se, qui legibus suis paruisset, ut esset contra fortunam semper armatus; ut omnia præsidia haberet in se bene beateque vivendi; ut esset semper denique beatus. Sed videro, quid efficiat. Tantisper hoc ipsum magni æstimo, quod pollicetur. Nam Xerxes quidem, refertus omnibus præmiis donisque fortunæ, non equitatu, non pedestribus copiis, non navium multitudine, non infinito pondere auri contentus, præmium proposuit ei, qui invenisset novam voluptatem. Quâ ipsâ non fuisset contentus: neque enim unquam finem inveniet libido. Nos, vellem, præmio elicere possemus, qui nobis aliquid attulisset, quo hoc firmius crederemus.

VIII. *Auditor.* Vellem id quidem: sed habeo paululum, quod requiram. Ego enim assentior, eorum quæ posuisti, alterum alteri consequens esse, ut, quemadmodum, si quod honestum sit, id solum sit bonum, sequatur, vitam beatam virtute confici; sic, si vita beata in virtute sit, nihil esse, nisi virtutem, bonum. Sed Brutus tuus, auctore

Aristo et Antiocho, non sentit hoc: putat enim, etiam si sit bonum aliquod præter virtutem. *Marcus.* Quid igitur? contra Brutumne me dicturum putas? *Auditor.* Tu vero, ut videtur: nam præfinire non est meum.

Marcus. Quid cuique igitur consentaneum sit, alio loco. Nam ista mihi et cum Antiocho sæpe, et cum [Aristo] nuper, cum Athenis imperator apud eum diversarer, dissensio fuit. Mihi enim non videbatur quisquam esse beatus posse, cum in malis esset; in malis autem sapientem esse posse, si essent ulla corporis aut fortunæ mala. Dicebantur hæc, quæ scripsit etiam Antiochus locis pluribus: virtutem ipsam per se beatam vitam efficere posse, neque tamen beatissimam: deinde ex majore parte plerasque res nominari, etiam si qua pars abesset, ut vires, ut valetudinem, ut divitias, ut honorem, ut gloriam; quæ genere, non numero, cernerentur: item beatam vitam, etiam si ex aliquâ parte clauderet, tamen ex multo majore parte obtinere nomen suum.

Hæc nunc enucleare non ita necesse est; quamquam non constantissime dici mihi videntur. Nam et, qui beatus est, non intelligo, quid requirat, ut sit beatior (si est enim quod desit, ne beatus quidem est): et, quod ex majore parte unamquamque rem appellari spectarique dicunt, *est,* ubi id isto modo valeat: cum vero tria

genera malorum esse dicant; qui duorum generum malis omnibus urgeatur, ut omnia adversa sint in fortunâ, omnibus oppressum corpus et confectum doloribus, huic paulumne ad beatam vitam deesse dicemus, non modo ad beatissimam? Hoc illud est, quod Theophrastus sustinere non potuit. Nam, cum statuisset, verbera, tormenta, cruciatus, patriæ eversiones, exsilia, orbitates, magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum; non est ausus elate et ample loqui, cum humiliter demisseque sentiret.

IX. Quam bene, non quæritur: constanter quidem certe. Itaque mihi placere non solet, consequentia reprehendere, cum prima concesseris. Hic autem, elegantissimus omnium philosophorum et eruditissimus, non magnopere reprehenditur, cum tria genera dicit bonorum: vexatur autem ab omnibus, primum in eo libro, quem scripsit de Vitâ Beatâ, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is, qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit. In eo etiam putatur dicere, in rotam beatam vitam non escendere. Non usquam id quidem dicit omnino: sed, quæ dicit, idem valent. Possum igitur, cui concesserim, in malis esse dolores corporis, in malis naufragia fortunæ, huic succensere dicenti, non omnes bonos esse beatos, cum in omnes bonos ea,

quæ ille in malis numerat, cadere possint? Vexatur idem Theophrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum, quod, in Callisthene suo, laudârit illam sententiam,

"Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia."

Negant ab ullo philosopho quidquam dictum esse languidius. Recte id quidem: sed nihil intelligo dici potuisse constantius. Si enim tot sunt in corpore bona, tot extra corpus in casu atque fortunâ; nonne consentaneum est, plus fortunam, quæ domina rerum sit et externarum et ad corpus pertinentium, quam consilium, valere?

An malumus Epicurum imitari? qui multa præclare sæpe dicit: quam enim sibi constanter convenienterque dicat, non laborat. Laudat tenuem victum. Philosophi id quidem; sed si Socrates aut Antisthenes diceret, non is, qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse dixerit. Negat, quemquam jucunde posse vivere, nisi idem honeste, sapienter, justeque vivat. Nihil gravius, nihil philosophiâ dignius; nisi idem hoc ipsum, honeste, sapienter, juste, ad voluptatem referret. Quid melius, quam "fortunam exiguam intervenire sapienti?" Sed hoc isne dicit, qui, cum dolorem non modo maximum malum, sed solum *malum* etiam dixerit, toto corpore opprimi possit

doloribus acerrimis tum, cum maxime contra fortunam glorietur? quod idem melioribus etiam verbis Metrodorus, "Occupavi," inquit, "te, Fortuna, atque cepi: omnesque aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad me adspirare non posses." Præclare, si Aristo Chius, aut si Stoïcus Zeno diceret, qui, nisi quod turpe esset, nihil malum duceret. Tu vero, Metrodore, qui omne bonum in visceribus medullisque condideris, et definieris, summum bonum firmâ corporis affectione, exploratâque spe contineri, fortunæ aditus interclusisti? quo modo? isto enim bono jam exspoliari potes.

X. Atqui his capiuntur imperiti: et, propter hujusmodi sententias, istorum hominum est multitudo. Acute autem disputantis illud est, non, quid quisque dicat, sed quid cuique dicendum sit, videre. Velut, in eâ ipsâ sententiâ, quam in hac disputatione suscepimus, omnes bonos semper beatos volumus esse. Quid dicam bonos, perspicuum est. Omnibus enim virtutibus instructos et ornatos, cum sapientes, tum viros bonos, dicimus. Videamus, qui dicendi sint beati. Equidem hos existimo, qui sint in bonis, nullo adjuncto malo. Neque ulla alia huic verbo, cum beatum dicimus, subjecta notio est, nisi, secretis malis omnibus, cumulata bonorum complexio. Hanc assequi virtus, si quidquam præter ipsam boni est, non

potest. Aderit enim malorum (si mala illa ducimus) turba quædam, paupertas, ignobilitas, humilitas, solitudo, amissio suorum, graves dolores corporis, perdita valetudo, debilitas, cæcitas, interitus patriæ, exsilium, servitus denique. In his tot et tantis, atque etiam quæ plura possunt accidere, potest esse sapiens: nam hæc casus importat, qui in sapientem potest incurrere. At si ea mala sunt, quis potest præstare, sapientem semper beatum fore, cum vel in omnibus his uno tempore esse possit?

Non igitur facile concedo, neque Bruto meo, neque communibus magistris, neque veteribus illis, Aristoteli, Speusippo, Xenocrati, Polemoni, ut, cum ea, quæ supra enumeravi, in malis numerent, iidem dicant, semper beatum esse sapientem. Quos si titulus hic delectat insignis et pulcher, Pythagorâ, Socrate, Platone, dignissimus; inducant animum, illa, quorum splendore capiuntur, vires, valetudinem, pulchritudinem, divitias, honores, opes contemnere, eaque, quæ his contraria sint, pro nihilo ducere. Tum poterunt clarissimâ voce profiteri, se neque fortunæ impetu, nec multitudinis opinione, nec dolore, neque paupertate terreri: omniaque sibi in sese esse posita; neque esse quidquam extra suam potestatem, quod ducant in bonis.

[Namque et] hæc loqui, quæ sunt magni cujus-

dam et alti viri, et eadem, quæ vulgus, in malis et bonis numerare, concedi nullo modo potest: quâ gloriâ commotus Epicurus exoritur, cui etiam (si diis placet) videtur semper sapiens beatus. Hic dignitate hujus sententiæ capitur: sed nunquam id diceret, si ipse se audiret. Quid est enim, quod minus conveniat, quam ut is, qui vel summum vel solum malum dolorem esse dicat, idem censeat, "Quam hoc suave est!" tum, cum dolore crucietur, dicturum esse sapientem? Non igitur ex singulis vocibus philosophi spectandi sunt, sed ex perpetuitate atque constantiâ.

XI. *Auditor.* Adducis me, ut tibi assentiar. Sed tua quoque, vide, ne desideretur constantia. *Marcus.* Quonam modo? *Auditor.* Quia legi tuum nuper quartum de Finibus. In eo mihi videbare, contra Catonem disserens, hoc velle ostendere, (quod mihi quidem probatur) inter Zenonem et Peripateticos nihil præter verborum novitatem interesse. Quod si ita est, quid est causæ, quin, si Zenonis rationi consentaneum sit, satis magnam vim in virtute esse ad beate vivendum, liceat idem Peripateticis dicere? Rem enim opinor spectari oportere, non verba.

Marcus. Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum: et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando, aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus

impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus. Quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi. Verumtamen, quoniam de constantiâ paulo ante diximus, non ego hoc loco id quærendum puto, verumne sit, quod Zenoni placuerit, quodque ejus auditori, Aristoni, bonum esse solum, quod honestum esset: sed, si ita esset, tum ut hoc totum, beate vivere, in unâ virtute poneretur. Quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens: quam sibi conveniat, ipse viderit. Gloriâ quidem hujus sententiæ quis est illo viro dignior? Nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus: etsi Zeno Citieus, advena quidem, et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuâsse se in antiquam philosophiam videtur.

XII. Hujus sententiæ gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur; apud quem sæpe hæc oratio usurpata est, ut nihil præter virtutem diceretur bonum: velut, in "Gorgiâ," Socrates, cum esset ex eo quæsitum, Archeläum, Perdiccæ filium, qui tum fortunâtissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret? "Haud scio," inquit: "nunquam enim cum eo collocutus sum." Ain' tu? an tu aliter id scire non potes? "Nullo modo." Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno *potes* dicere, beatusne sit? "An ego possim,

cum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?" Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas? "Ita prorsus existimo, bonos, beatos; improbos, miseros." Miser ergo Archeläus? "Certe, si injustus." Videturne omnem hic beatam vitam in unâ virtute ponere? Quid vero in Epitaphio? quo modo idem? Nam, "cui viro," inquit, "ex se ipso apta sunt omnia, quæ ad beate vivendum ferunt, nec, suspensa aliorum aut bono casu aut contrario, pendere ex alterius eventis, et errare coguntur; huic optime vivendi ratio comparata est. Hic est ille moderatus, hic fortis, hic sapiens, hic, et nascentibus et cadentibus cum reliquis commodis, tum maxime liberis, parebit et obediet præcepto illi veteri:"

"Neque enim lætabitur unquam nec mœrebit nimis,
Quod semper in se ipso omnem spem reponet sui."

XIII. Ex hoc igitur Platonis quasi quodam sancto augustoque fonte nostra omnis manabit oratio.

Unde igitur rectius ordiri possumus, quam a communi parente, naturâ? quæ, quidquid genuit, non modo animal, sed etiam quod ita ortum esset e terrâ, ut stirpibus suis niteretur, in suo quodque genere perfectum esse voluit. Itaque et arbores et vites, et ea quæ sunt humiliora, neque se tollere a terrâ altius possunt; alia semper virent,

alia, hieme nudata, verno tempore tepefacta frondescunt: neque est ullum, quod non ita vigeat interiore quodam motu, et suis in quoque seminibus inclusis, ut aut flores aut fruges fundat, aut baccas; omniaque in omnibus, quantum in ipsis sit, nullâ vi impediente, perfecta sint.

Facilius vero etiam in bestiis, quod his sensus a naturâ est datus, vis ipsius naturæ perspici potest. Namque alias bestias, nantes, aquarum incolas esse voluit; alias, volucres, cœlo frui libero; serpentes quasdam; quasdam esse gradientes; earum ipsarum partim solivagas, partim congregatas; immanes alias, quasdam autem cicures; nonnullas abditas, terrâque tectas. Atque earum quæque, suum tenens munus, cum in disparis animantis vitam transire non possit, manet in lege naturæ. Et, ut bestiis aliud alii præcipui a naturâ datum est, quod suum quæque retinet, nec discedit ab eo; sic homini multo quiddam præstantius; etsi præstantia debent ea dici, quæ habent aliquam comparationem. Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divinâ, cum alio nullo, nisi cum ipso deo, (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest.

Hic igitur, si est excultus, et si ejus acies ita curata est, ut ne cæcaretur erroribus; fit perfecta mens, id est, absoluta ratio; quod est idem virtus. Et, si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest, et quod in

suo genere expletum atque cumulatum est, idque virtutis est proprium; certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, item cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi. Quid enim deest, ad beate vivendum, ei qui confidit suis bonis? aut, qui diffidit, beatus esse quî potest?

XIV. At diffidat necesse est, qui bona dividit tripertito. Quî enim poterit aut corporis firmitate aut fortunæ stabilitate confidere? Atqui, nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono, beatus esse nemo potest. Quid ergo ejusmodi istorum est? ut mihi Laconis illud dictum in hos cadere videatur; qui glorianti cuidam mercatori, quod multas naves in omnem oram maritimam dimisisset, "Non sane optabilis quidem ista," inquit, "rudentibus apta, fortuna." An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo genere, quo vita beata completur, si id possit amitti? Nihil enim interarescere, nihil exstingui, nihil cadere debet eorum, in quibus vita beata consistit. Nam, qui timebit ne quid ex his deperdat, beatus esse non poterit.

Volumus enim, eum, qui beatus sit, tutum esse, inexpugnabilem, septum atque munitum; non ut

parvo metu præditus sit, sed ut nullo. Ut enim innocens is dicitur, non qui leviter nocet, sed qui nihil nocet; sic sine metu is habendus est, non qui parum metuit, sed qui omnino metu vacat. Quæ est enim alia fortitudo, nisi animi affectio, cum in adeundo periculo et in labore ac dolore patiens, tum procul ab omni metu?

Atque hæc certe non ita se haberent, nisi omne bonum in unâ honestate consisteret. Quî autem illam maxime optatam et expetitam securitatem (securitatem autem nunc appello vacuitatem ægritudinis, in quâ vita beata posita est) habere quisquam potest, cui aut adsit aut adesse possit multitudo malorum? Quî autem poterit esse celsus et erectus, et ea, quæ homini accidere possunt, omnia parva ducens, (qualem sapientem esse volumus) nisi omnia sibi in se posita censebit? An Lacedæmonii, Philippo minitante per literas, se omnia, quæ conarentur, prohibiturum, quæsiverunt, num se esset etiam mori prohibiturus: vir is, quem quærimus, non multo facilius tali animo reperietur, quam civitas universa? Quid? ad hanc fortitudinem, de quâ loquimur, temperantiâ adjunctâ, quæ sit moderatrix omnium commotionum, quid potest ad beate vivendum deesse ei, quem fortitudo ab ægritudine et a metu vindicet; temperantia tum a libidine avocet, tum insolenti

alacritate gestire non sinat? Hæc efficere virtutem ostenderem, nisi superioribus diebus essent explicata.

XV. Atqui, cum perturbationes animi miseram, sedationes autem vitam efficiant beatam; duplexque ratio perturbationis sit, quod ægritudo et metus in malis opinatis, in bonorum autem errore lætitia gestiens libidoque versetur; cum hæc omnia cum consilio et ratione pugnent; his tu tam gravibus concitationibus, tamque ipsis inter se dissentientibus atque distractis, quem vacuum, solutum, liberum videris, hunc dubitabis beatum dicere? Atqui sapiens semper ita affectus est: semper igitur sapiens beatus est. Atque etiam omne bonum lætabile est: quod autem lætabile, id prædicandum, et præ se ferendum: quod tale autem, id etiam gloriosum: si vero gloriosum, certe laudabile: quod autem laudabile, profecto etiam honestum: quod bonum igitur, id honestum. At quæ isti bona numerant, ne ipsi quidem honesta dicunt. Solum igitur bonum, quod honestum: ex quo efficitur, honestate unâ vitam contineri beatam. Non sunt igitur ea bona dicenda, nec habenda, quibus abundantem licet esse miserrimum.

An dubitas, quin præstans valetudine, viribus, formâ, acerrimis integerrimisque sensibus, adde

etiam, si libet, pernicitatem, et velocitatem, da divitias, honores, imperia, opes, gloriam: si fuerit is, qui hæc habet, injustus, intemperans, timidus, hebeti ingenio, atque nullo; dubitabisne eum miserum dicere? Qualia igitur ista bona sunt, quæ qui habeat, miserrimus esse possit? Videamus, ne, ut acervus ex sui generis granis, sic beata vita ex sui similibus partibus effici debeat. Quod si ita est; ex bonis, quæ sola honesta sunt, efficiendus est beatus. Ea mixta ex dissimilibus si erunt, honestum ex his effici nihil poterit: quo detracto, quid poterit beatum intelligi? Etenim quidquid est, quod bonum sit, id expetendum est: quod autem expetendum, id certe approbandum: quod vero approbâris, id gratum acceptumque habendum: ergo etiam dignitas ei tribuenda est. Quod si ita est, laudabile sit necesse est: bonum igitur omne laudabile: ex quo efficitur, ut, quod sit honestum, id sit solum bonum. Quod ni ita tenebimus, multa erunt, quæ nobis bona dicenda sint.

XVI. Omitto divitias; quas, cum quivis, quamvis indignus, habere possit, in bonis non numero. Quod enim est bonum, id non quivis habere potest.. Omitto nobilitatem, famamque popularem, stultorum improborumque consensu excitatam. Hæc, quæ sunt minima, tamen bona

dicantur, necesse est: candiduli dentes, venusti oculi, color suavis, et ea, quæ Euryclea laudat, Ulyssi pedes abluens, lenitudo orationis, mollitudo corporis. Ea si bona ducemus, quid erit in philosophi gravitate, quam in vulgi opinione stultorumque turbâ, quod dicatur aut gravius, aut grandius?

At enim eadem Stoïci præcipua, vel producta dicunt, quæ bona isti. Dicunt illi quidem: sed his vitam beatam compleri negant: hi autem sine iis esse nullam putant: aut, si sit beata, beatissimam certe negant. Nos autem volumus beatissimam: idque nobis Socraticâ illâ conclusione confirmatur. Sic enim princeps ille philosophiæ disserebat: "Qualis cujusque animi affectus esset, talem esse hominem: qualis autem ipse homo esset, talem ejus esse orationem: orationi autem facta similia, factis vitam." Affectus autem animi in bono viro laudabilis: et vita igitur laudabilis boni viri, et honesta ergo, quoniam laudabilis: ex quibus, bonorum beatam vitam esse, concluditur.

Etenim, pro deorum atque hominum fidem! parumne cognitum est superioribus nostris disputationibus, an delectationis et otii consumendi causâ locuti sumus, sapientem ab omni concitatione animi (quam perturbationem voco) semper vacare? semper in animo ejus esse placidissimam

pacem? Vir igitur temperatus, constans, sine metu, sine ægritudine, sine alacritate ullâ, sine libidine, nonne beatus? At semper sapiens talis: semper igitur beatus. Jam vero quî potest vir bonus non ad id, quod laudabile sit, omnia referre, quæ agit, quæque sentit? Refert autem omnia ad beate vivendum: beata igitur vita laudabilis; nec quidquam sine virtute laudabile: beata igitur vita virtute conficitur.

XVII. Atque hoc sic etiam concluditur: Nec in miserâ vitâ quidquam est prædicabile aut gloriandum; nec in eâ quæ nec misera sit nec beata. Et est in aliquâ vitâ prædicabile aliquid, aut gloriandum, ac præ se ferendum: ut Epaminondas,

"Consiliis nostris laus est attonsa Laconum:"

ut Africanus,

"A sole exoriente, supra Mæoti' paludes,
Nemo est, qui factis me æquiperare queat."

Quod si est, beata vita glorianda et prædicanda, et præ se ferenda est: nihil est enim aliud, quod prædicandum, et præ se ferendum sit. Quibus positis, intelligis, quid sequatur: et quidem, nisi ea vita beata est, quæ est eadem honesta; sit aliud necesse est melius vitâ beatâ. Quod erit enim honestum, certe fatebuntur esse melius.

Ita erit beatâ vitâ melius aliquid; quo quid potest dici perversius? Quid? cum fatentur satis magnam vim esse in vitiis ad miseram vitam, nonne fatendum est, eamdem vim in virtute esse ad beatam vitam? Contrariorum enim contraria sunt consequentia. Quo loco quæro, quam vim habeat libra illa Critolai, qui cum in alteram lancem animi bona imponat, in alteram corporis et externa; tantum propendere illam bonorum animi lancem putet, ut terram et maria deprimat.

XVIII. Quid ergo aut hunc prohibet, aut etiam Xenocratem illum gravissimum philosophorum, exaggerantem tantopere virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abjicientem, in virtute non beatam modo vitam, sed etiam beatissimam, ponere? Quod quidem nisi [sit,] virtutum interitus consequetur. Nam, in quem cadit ægritudo, in eumdem metum cadere necesse est: est enim metus futuræ ægritudinis sollicita exspectatio: in quem autem metus, in eumdem formido, timiditas, pavor, ignavia: ergo, ut idem vincatur interdum, nec putet ad se præceptum illud Atrei pertinere,

"Proinde ita parent se in vitâ, ut vinci nesciant."

Hic autem vincetur, ut dixi: nec modo vincetur, sed etiam serviet. At nos virtutem semper libe-

ram volumus, semper invictam. Quæ nisi sunt, sublata virtus est.

Atqui, si in virtute satis est præsidii ad bene vivendum, satis est etiam ad beate. Satis est enim certe in virtute, ut fortiter vivamus: si fortiter, etiam ut magno animo, et quidem ut nullâ re unquam terreamur, semperque simus invicti. Sequitur, ut nihil pœniteat, nihil desit, nihil obstet. Ergo omnia profluenter, absolute, prospere: igitur beate. Satis autem, ad fortiter vivendum, virtus potest: satis ergo etiam ad beate. Etenim, ut stultitia, etsi adepta est quod concupivit, nunquam se tamen satis consecutam putat; sic sapientia semper eo contenta est quod adest, neque eam unquam sui pœnitet.

XIX. Similemne putas C. Lælii unum consulatum fuisse, et eum quidem cum repulsâ, cum L. Cinnæ quatuor? (si, cum sapiens et bonus vir, qualis ille fuit, suffragiis præteritur, non populus a bono consule potius, quam ille a malo populo, repulsam fert). Sed tamen utrum malles, te, si potestas esset, semel, ut Lælium, consulem, an, ut Cinnam, quater? Non dubito, tu quid responsurus sis. Itaque video, cui committam. Non quemvis hoc idem interrogarem: responderet enim alius fortasse, se non modo quatuor consulatus uni anteponere, sed unum diem Cinnæ

multorum et clarorum virorum totis ætatibus. Lælius, si digito quem attigisset, pœnas dedisset. At Cinna, collegæ sui, consulis Cn. Octavii, præcidi caput jussit, P. Crassi, L. Cæsaris, nobilissimorum hominum, quorum virtus fuerat domi militiæque cognita, M. Antonii, omnium eloquentissimi, quos ego audierim, C. Cæsaris, in quo mihi videtur fuisse specimen humanitatis, salis, suavitatis, leporis. Beatusne igitur, [qui] hos interfecit? Mihi, contra, non solum eo videtur miser, quod ea fecit, sed etiam quod ita se gessit, ut ea facere ei liceret: etsi peccare nemini licet: sed sermonis errore labimur: id enim licere dicimus, quod cuique conceditur.

Utrum tandem beatior C. Marius, tum, cum Cimbricæ victoriæ gloriam cum collegâ Catulo communicavit, pæne altero Lælio, (nam hunc illi duco simillimum) an cum, civili bello victor, iratus, necessariis Catuli deprecantibus, non semel respondit, sed sæpe, "Moriatur?" in quo beatior ille, qui huic nefariæ voci paruit, quam is, qui tam scelerate imperavit. Nam, cum accipere quam facere præstat injuriam, tum morti jam ipsi adventanti paulum procedere obviam (quod fecit Catulus), quam (quod Marius) talis viri interitu sex suos obruere consulatus, et contaminare extremum tempus ætatis.

XX. Duodequadraginta annos tyrannus Syracusanorum fuit Dionysius, cum V. et XX. natus annos dominatum occupavisset. Quâ pulchritudine urbem, quibus autem opibus præditam, servitute oppressam tenuit civitatem? Atqui de hoc homine a bonis auctoribus sic scriptum accepimus, summam fuisse ejus in victu temperantiam, in rebusque gerendis virum acrem et industrium, eumdem tamen maleficum naturâ et injustum. Ex quo omnibus, bene veritatem intuentibus, videri necesse est miserrimum. Ea enim ipsa, quæ concupierat, ne tum quidem, cum omnia se posse censebat, consequebatur. Qui cum esset bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus, (etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit) abundaretque æqualium familiaritatibus, et consuetudine propinquorum, haberet etiam, more Græciæ, quosdam adolescentes amore conjunctos; credebat se eorum nemini; sed his, quos ex familiis locupletum servos delegerat, quibus nomen servitutis ipse detraxerat, et quibusdam convenis, et feris barbaris, corporis custodiam committebat. Ita, propter injustam dominatûs cupiditatem, in carcerem quodammodo ipse se incluserat. Quinetiam, ne tonsori collum committeret, tondere filias suas docuit. Ita sordido ancillarique artificio regiæ virgines, ut tonstriculæ, tondebant barbam et *capillum* patris. Et tamen ab his ipsis, cum jam

essent adultæ, ferrum removit; instituitque, ut candentibus juglandium putaminibus barbam sibi et capillum adurerent. Cumque duas uxores haberet, Aristomachen, civem suam, Doridem autem Locrensem, sic noctu ad eas ventitabat, ut omnia specularetur et perscrutaretur ante. Et, cum fossam latam cubiculari lecto circumdedisset, ejusque fossæ transitum ponticulo ligneo conjunxisset; eum ipsum, cum forem cubiculi clauserat, detorquebat. Idemque, cum in communibus suggestis consistere non auderet, concionari ex turri altâ solebat. Atque is, cum pilâ ludere vellet (studiose enim id factitabat), tunicamque poneret, adolescentulo, quem amabat, tradidisse gladium dicitur. Hîc cum quidam familiaris jocans dixisset: "Huic quidem certe vitam tuam committis," arrisissetque adolescens, utrumque jussit interfici; alterum, quia viam demonstravisset interimendi sui; alterum, quia dictum id risu approbavisset. Atque, eo facto, sic doluit, ut nihil gravius tulerit in vitâ. Quem enim vehementer amârat, occiderat. Sic distrahuntur in contrarias partes impotentium cupiditates. Cum huic obsecutus sis, illi est repugnandum. Quamquam hic quidem tyrannus ipse judicavit, quam esset beatus.

XXI. Nam, cum quidam ex ejus assentatori-

bus, Damocles, commemoraret in sermone copias ejus, opes, majestatem dominatûs, rerum abundantiam, magnificentiam ædium regiarum; negaretque unquam beatiorem quemquam fuisse; "Visne igitur," inquit, "Damocle, quoniam hæc te vita delectat, ipse eamdem degustare, et fortunam experiri meam?" Cum se ille cupere dixisset, collocari jussit hominem in aureo lecto, strato pulcherrime textili stragulo, magnificis operibus picto; abacosque complures ornavit argento auroque cælato. Tum ad mensam eximiâ formâ pueros delectos jussit consistere, eosque, nutum ejus intuentes, diligenter ministrare. Aderant unguenta, coronæ: incendebantur odores: mensæ conquisitissimis epulis exstruebantur. Fortunatus sibi Damocles videbatur. In hoc medio apparatu, fulgentem gladium, e lacunari setâ equinâ aptum, demitti jussit, ut impenderet illius beati cervicibus. Itaque nec pulchros illos ministratores adspiciebat, nec plenum artis argentum; nec manum porrigebat in mensam: jam ipsæ defluebant coronæ: denique exoravit tyrannum, ut abire liceret, quod jam beatus nollet esse. Satisne videtur declarâsse Dionysius, nihil esse ei beatum, cui semper aliquis terror impendeat? Atque ei ne integrum quidem erat, ut ad justitiam remigraret, civibus libertatem et jura redderet: *iis enim* se, adolescens, in improvidâ ætate, irre-

tierat erratis, eaque commiserat, ut salvus esse non posset, si sanus esse cœpisset.

XXII. Quantopere vero amicitias desideraret, quarum infidelitatem extimescebat, declaravit in Pythagoreis duobus illis; quorum cum alterum vadem mortis accepisset; alter, ut vadem suum liberaret, præsto fuisset ad horam mortis destinatam; "Utinam ego," inquit, "tertius vobis amicus adscriberer!" Quam huic erat miserum, carere consuetudine amicorum, societate victûs, sermone omnino familiari! homini præsertim docto a puero, et artibus ingenuis erudito. Musicorum vero perstudiosum accepimus, poëtam etiam tragicum; quam bonum, nihil ad rem: in hoc enim genere, nescio quo pacto, magis quam in aliis, suum cuique pulchrum est. Adhuc neminem cognovi poëtam (et mihi fuit cum Aquinio amicitia), qui sibi non optimus videretur. Sic se res habet: te tua, me delectant mea. Sed, ut ad Dionysium redeamus; omni cultu et victu humano carebat: vivebat cum fugitivis, cum facinorosis, cum barbaris: neminem, qui aut libertate dignus esset, aut vellet omnino liber esse, sibi amicum arbitrabatur.

Non ego jam cum hujus vitâ (quâ tetrius, miserius, detestabilius, excogitare nihil possum)

Platonis aut Archytæ vitam comparabo, doctorum hominum et plane sapientium.

XXIII. Ex eâdem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedem: cujus ego, quæstor, ignoratum ab Syracusanis, cum esse omnino negarent, septum undique et vestitum vepribus et dumetis, indagavi sepulcrum. Tenebam enim quosdam senariolos, quos in ejus monumento esse inscriptos acceperam; qui declarabant, in summo sepulcro sphæram esse positam cum cylindro. Ego autem, cum omnia collustrarem oculis (est enim ad portas Agragianas magna frequentia sepulcrorum) animadverti columellam non multum e dumis eminentem, in quâ inerat sphæræ figura et cylindri. Atque ego statim Syracusanis (erant autem principes mecum) dixi, me illud ipsum arbitrari esse, quod quærerem. Immissi cum falcibus multi purgârunt et aperuerunt locum. Quo cum patefactus esset aditus, ad adversam basim accessimus. Apparebat epigramma, exesis posterioribus partibus versiculorum, dimidiatis fere. Ita nobilissima Græciæ civitas, quondam vero etiam doctissima, sui civis unius acutissimi monumentum ignorâsset, nisi ab homine Arpinate didicisset. Sed redeat, unde aberravit, oratio.

Quis est omnium, qui modo cum Musis, id est, cum humanitate et cum doctrinâ, habeat aliquod commercium, qui se non hunc mathematicum malit, quam illum tyrannum? Si vitæ modum actionemque quærimus; alterius mens rationibus agitandis exquirendisque alebatur, cum oblectatione sollertiæ; qui est unus suavissimus pastus animorum: alterius in cæde et injuriis, cum et diurno et nocturno metu. Age, confer Democritum, Pythagoram, Anaxagoram. Quæ regna, quas opes, studiis eorum et delectationibus antepones? Etenim, quæ pars optima est in homine, in eâ situm esse necesse est illud, quod quæris, optimum. Quid est autem in homine, sagaci ac bonâ mente melius? Ejus bono fruendum est igitur, si beati esse volumus. Bonum autem mentis est virtus: ergo hac beatam vitam contineri necesse est. Hinc omnia, quæ pulchra, honesta, præclara sunt, (ut supra dixi; sed dicendum idem illud paulo uberius videtur) plena gaudiorum sunt. Ex perpetuis autem plenisque gaudiis cum perspicuum sit vitam beatam exsistere, sequitur, ut ea exsistat ex honestate.

XXIV. Sed, ne verbis solum attingamus ea quæ volumus ostendere, proponenda quædam quasi moventia sunt, quæ nos magis ad cognitionem intelligentiamque convertant. Sumatur

enim nobis quidam præstans vir optimis artibus: isque animo parumper et cogitatione fingatur. Primum ingenio eximio sit, necesse est, (tardis enim mentibus virtus non facile comitatur) deinde ad investigandam veritatem studio incitato. Ex quo triplex ille animi fetus exsistet; unus in cognitione rerum positus, et in explicatione naturæ; alter in descriptione expetendarum fugiendarumve rerum; tertius in judicando, quid cuique rei sit consequens, quid repugnans: in quo inest omnis tum subtilitas disserendi, tum veritas judicandi.

Quo tandem igitur gaudio affici necesse est sapientis animum, cum his habitantem pernoctantemque curis? ut, cum totius mundi motus conversionesque perspexerit; sideraque viderit innumerabilia, cœlo inhærentia, cum ejus ipsius motu congruere, certis infixa sedibus; septem alia suos quæque tenere cursus, multum inter se aut altitudine aut humilitate distantia, quorum vagi motus rata tamen et certa sui cursûs spatia definiant; (horum nimirum adspectus impulit illos veteres, et admonuit, ut plura quærerent: inde est indagatio nata initiorum, et tamquam seminum, unde essent omnia orta, generata, concreta: quæque cujusque generis, vel inanimi vel animantis, vel muti vel loquentis, origo, quæ vita, qui interitus, quæque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo *atque* mutatio: unde terra, et quibus librata pon-

deribus, quibus cavernis maria sustineantur; in quâ omnia delata gravitate, medium mundi locum semper expetant, qui est idem infimus in rotundo.)

XXV. Hæc tractanti animo, et noctes et dies cogitanti, exsistit illa a deo Delphis præcepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat, conjunctamque cum divinâ mente se sentiat; ex quo insatiabili gaudio completur. Ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et naturâ deorum studium incendit illius æternitatis imitandæ; neque se in brevitate vitæ collocatam putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas, et necessitate nexas, videt: quibus, ab æterno tempore fluentibus in æternum, ratio tamen mensque moderatur.

Hæc ille intuens atque suspiciens, vel potius omnes partes orasque circumspiciens, quantâ rursus animi tranquillitate humana et citeriora considerat! Hinc illa cognitio virtutis exsistit: efflorescunt genera partesque virtutum: invenitur, quid sit, quod natura spectet extremum in bonis, quid in malis ultimum; quo referenda sint officia; quæ degendæ ætatis ratio deligenda. Quibus et talibus rebus exquisitis, hoc vel maxime efficitur, quod hac disputatione agimus, ut virtus, ad beate vivendum, sit se ipsâ contenta.

Sequitur tertia, quæ per omnes partes sapientiæ manat et funditur, quæ rem definit, genera

dispertit, sequentia adjungit, perfecta concludit, vera et falsa dijudicat, disserendi ratio et scientia; ex quâ cum summa utilitas exsistit ad res ponderandas, tum maximè ingenua delectatio, et digna sapientiâ. Sed hæc otii. Transeat idem iste sapiens ad rempublicam tuendam. Quid eo possit esse præstantius, cùm contineri prudentiâ utilitatem civium cernat, justitiâ nihil in suam domum inde derivet, reliquis utatur tot tam variisque virtutibus? Adjunge fructum amicitiarum; in quo doctis positum est cum consilium omnis vitæ, consentiens et pæne conspirans, tum summa jucunditas e quotidiano cultu atque victu. Quid hæc tandem vita desiderat, quo sit beatior? cui, refertæ tot tantisque gaudiis, fortuna ipsa cedat, necesse est. Quod si gaudere talibus bonis animi, id est, virtutibus, beatum est, omnesque sapientes iis gaudiis perfruuntur; omnes eos confiteri beatos esse, necesse est.

XXVI. *Auditor.* Etiamne in cruciatu atque tormentis? *Marcus.* An tu me in violâ putabas, aut in rosâ, dicere? an Epicuro, qui tantummodo induit personam philosophi, et sibi ipse hoc nomen inscripsit, dicere licebit, (quod quidem, ut habet se res, me tamen plaudente dicit) nullum sapienti esse tempus, etsi uratur, torqueatur, secetur, quin *possit* exclamare, "Quam pro nihilo puto!" cum

præsertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum voluptate; hæc nostra honesta, turpia, irrideat; dicatque, nos, in vocibus occupatos, inanes sonos fundere; neque quidquam ad nos pertinere, nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur. Huic ergo, (ut dixi) non multum differenti a judicio ferarum, oblivisci licebit sui? et tum fortunam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum ejus et malum in potestate fortunæ, tum dicere, se beatum in summo cruciatu atque tormentis, cum constituerit, non modo summum malum esse dolorem, sed etiam solum?

Nec vero illa sibi remedia comparavit ad tolerandum dolorem, firmitatem animi, turpitudinis verecundiam, exercitationem consuetudinemque patiendi, præcepta fortitudinis, duritiam virilem; sed unâ se dicit recordatione acquiescere præteritarum voluptatum: ut, si quis, æstuans, cum vim caloris non facile patiatur, recordari velit, se aliquando, in Arpinati nostro, gelidis fluminibus circumfusum fuisse. Non enim video, quo modo sedare possint mala præsentia præteritæ voluptates.

Sed, cum is dicat, semper beatum esse sapientem, cui dicere hoc, si sibi constare vellet, non liceret; quidnam faciendum est his, qui nihil expetendum, nihil in bonis ducendum, quod honestate careat, existimant? Me quidem auctore,

etiam Peripatetici veteresque Academici balbutire desinant aliquando; aperteque et clarâ voce audeant dicere, beatam vitam in Phalaridis taurum descensuram.

XXVII. Sint enim tria genera bonorum, ut jam a laqueis Stoïcorum (quibus usum me pluribus quam soleo, intelligo) recedamus. Sint sane illa genera bonorum, dum corporis et externa jaceant humi, et tantummodo, quia sumenda sint, appellentur bona. Alia autem illa divina longe lateque se pandant, cœlumque contingant, ut, ea qui adeptus sit, cur eum beatum modo, et non beatissimum etiam, dixerim? Dolorem vero sapiens extimescet? is enim huic maxime sententiæ repugnat. Nam contra mortem nostram atque nostrorum, contraque ægritudinem, et reliquas animi perturbationes, satis esse videmur superiorum dierum disputationibus armati et parati. Dolor esse videtur acerrimus virtuti adversarius: is ardentes faces intentat: is fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam, se [debilitaturum] minatur. Huic igitur succumbet virtus? huic beata sapientis et constantis viri vita cedet? Quam turpe! o dii boni! Pueri Spartiatæ non ingemiscunt, verberum dolore laniati. Adolescentium greges Lacedæmone vidimus ipsi, incredibili contentione certantes pugnis, calcibus,

unguibus, morsu denique, ut exanimarentur prius, quam se victos faterentur. Quæ barbaria Indiâ vastior aut agrestior? In eâ tamen gente primum ii, qui sapientes habentur, nudi ætatem agunt, et Caucasi nives hiemalemque vim perferunt sine dolore: cumque ad flammam se applicaverunt, sine gemitu aduruntur. Mulieres vero [in Indiâ], cum est [cujusvis] earum vir mortuus, in certamen judiciumque veniunt, quam plurimum ille dilexerit: plures enim singulis solent esse nuptæ. Quæ est victrix, ea, læta, prosequentibus suis, unâ cum viro in rogum imponitur: illa, victa, mœsta discedit. Nunquam naturam mos vinceret: est enim ea semper invicta. Sed nos umbris, deliciis, otio, languore, desidiâ, animum infecimus: opinionibus maloque more delenitum mollivimus. Ægyptiorum morem quis ignorat? quorum imbutæ mentes pravitatis erroribus, quamvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim, aut aspidem, aut felem, aut canem, aut crocodilum, violent; quorum etiam si imprudentes quidpiam fecerint, pœnam nullam recusent.

De hominibus loquor. Quid bestiæ? non frigus, non famem, non montivagos atque silvestres cursus, lustrationesque, patiuntur? Non pro suo partu ita propugnant, ut vulnera excipiant? nullos impetus, nullos ictus reformident?

Omitto, quæ perferant, quæque patiantur ambitiosi, honoris causâ; laudis studiosi, gloriæ gratiâ; amore incensi, cupiditatis. Plena vita exemplorum est. Sed adhibeat oratio modum; et redeat illuc, unde [deflexit.]

XXVIII. Dabit, dabit, inquam, se in tormenta vita beata: nec justitiam, temperantiam, in primisque fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam prosecuta, cum tortoris os viderit, consistet; virtutibusque omnibus sine ullo animi terrore ad cruciatum profectis, resistet extra fores (ut ante dixi) limenque carceris. Quid enim eâ fœdius, quid deformius solâ relictâ, comitatu pulcherrimo segregatâ? quod tamen fieri nullo pacto potest: nec enim virtutes sine beatâ vitâ cohærere possunt, nec illa sine virtutibus. Itaque eam tergiversari non sinent; secumque rapient, ad quemcumque ipsæ dolorem cruciatumque ducentur. Sapientis est enim proprium, nihil, quod pœnitere possit, facere, nihil invitum; splendide, constanter, graviter, honeste omnia; nihil ita exspectare, quasi certo futurum; nihil, cum acciderit, admirari, ut inopinatum ac novum accidisse videatur; omnia ad suum arbitrium referre; suis stare judiciis. Quo quid sit beatius, mihi certe in mentem venire non potest.

Stoïcorum quidem facilis conclusio est; qui

cum finem bonorum esse senserint, congruere naturæ, cumque eâ convenienter vivere; cum id sit in sapiente situm, non officio solum, verum etiam potestate; sequatur necesse est, ut, cujus in potestate summum bonum, in ejusdem vita beata sit. Ita fit semper vita beata sapientis. Habes, quæ fortissime de beatâ vitâ dici putem, et, quo modo nunc est, (nisi quid tu melius attuleris) etiam verissime.

XXIX. *Auditor.* Melius equidem afferre nihil possum: sed a te impetrârim libenter, nisi molestum sit, (quoniam te nulla vincula impediunt ullius certæ disciplinæ, libasque ex omnibus, quodcumque te maxime specie veritatis movet) quod paulo ante Peripateticos veteremque Academiam hortari videbare, ut sine retractatione libere dicere auderent, sapientes esse semper beatissimos; id velim audire, quemadmodum his putes consentaneum esse id dicere. Multa enim a te contra istam sententiam dicta sunt, et Stoïcorum ratione conclusa.

Marcus. Utamur igitur libertate, quâ nobis solis in philosophiâ licet uti, quorum oratio nihil ipsa judicat, sed habetur in omnes partes, ut ab aliis possit ipsa per sese, nullius auctoritate adjunctâ, judicari. Et, quoniam videris hoc velle,

ut, quæcumque dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii; quod quidem Carneadem disputare solitum accepimus: sed is, ut contra Stoïcos, quos studiosissime semper refellebat, et contra quorum disciplinam ingenium ejus exarserat: nos illud quidem cum pace agemus. Si enim Stoïci fines bonorum recte posuerunt, confecta res est: necesse est semper beatum esse sapientem. Sed quæramus unamquamque reliquorum sententiam, si fieri potest, ut hoc præclarum quasi decretum beatæ vitæ possit omnium sententiis et disciplinis convenire.

XXX. Sunt autem hæ de finibus, ut opinor, retentæ defensæque sententiæ: primum simplices quatuor: Nihil bonum, nisi honestum, ut Stoïci: Nihil bonum, nisi voluptas, ut Epicurus: Nihil bonum, nisi vacuitas doloris, ut Hieronymus: Nihil bonum, nisi naturæ primis bonis aut omnibus aut maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoïcos disserebat. Hæc igitur simplicia; illa mixta. Tria genera bonorum, maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa tertia, ut Peripatetici; nec multo veteres Academici secus: voluptatem cum honestate Dinomachus et Callipho copulavit: indolentiam autem honestati Peripateticus Dio-

dorus adjunxit. Hæ sunt sententiæ, quæ stabilitatis aliquid habeant: nam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Herilli, nonnullorumque aliorum, evanuerunt.

Hi quid possint obtinere, videamus, omissis Stoïcis, quorum satis videor defendisse sententiam. Et Peripateticorum quidem explicata causa est, præter Theophrastum, et si qui, illum secuti, imbecillius horrent dolorem et reformidant. Reliquis quidem licet facere id, quod fere faciunt, ut gravitatem dignitatemque virtutis exaggerent. Quam cum ad cœlum extulerint (quod facere eloquentes homines copiose solent), reliqua ex collatione facile est conterere atque contemnere. Nec enim licet iis, qui laudem cum dolore petendam esse dicant, negare, eos esse beatos, qui illam adepti sint. Quamquam enim sint in quibusdam malis, tamen hoc nomen beati longe et late patet.

XXXI. Nam, ut quæstuosa mercatura, fructuosa aratio dicitur, non si altera semper omni damno, altera omni tempestatis calamitate, semper vacat; sed si multo majore ex parte exstat in utrâque felicitas; sic vita, non solum si undique referta bonis est, sed si multo majore et graviore ex parte bona propendent, beata recte dici potest. Sequetur igitur, horum ratione, vel ad supplicium, beata vita virtutem; eumque ea

descendet in taurum, Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone auctoribus; nec eam, minis aut blandimentis corrupta, deseret. Eadem Calliphontis erit Diodorique sententia; quorum uterque honestatem sic complectitur, ut omnia, quæ sine eâ sint, longe et retro ponenda censeat. Reliqui habere se videntur angustius: enatant tamen; Epicurus, Hieronymus, et si qui sunt, qui desertum illum Carneadem curent defendere. Nemo est enim, qui eorum bonorum animum putet esse judicem, eumque condocefaciat, ut ea, quæ bona malave videantur, possit contemnere. Nam quæ tibi Epicuri videtur, eadem erit Hieronymi et Carneadis causa, et, hercle, omnium reliquorum. Quis enim parum est contra mortem aut dolorem paratus? Ordiamur ab eo, si placet, quem mollem, quem voluptarium, dicimus.

Quid? is tibi mortemne videtur, an dolorem, timere? qui eum diem, quo moritur, beatum appellat; maximisque doloribus affectus, eos ipsos inventorum suorum memoriâ et recordatione confutat: nec hæc sic agit, ut ex tempore quasi effutire videatur. De morte enim ita sentit, ut, dissoluto animante, sensum exstinctum putet: quod autem sensu careat, nihil ad nos id judicet pertinere. Item de dolore certa habet, quæ sequatur; cujus magnitudinem brevitate consolatur, *longinquitatem* levitate. Quid tandem isti grandi-

loqui contra hæc duo, quæ maxime angunt, melius habent, quam Epicurus? An ad cetera, quæ mala putantur, non et Epicurus et reliqui philosophi satis parati videntur? Quis non paupertatem extimescit? neque tamen quisquam philosophorum.

XXXII. Hic vero ipse quam parvo est contentus! nemo de tenui victu plura dixit. Etenim, quæ res pecuniæ cupiditatem afferunt, ut amori, ut ambitioni, ut quotidianis sumtibus, copiæ suppetant; cum procul ab iis omnibus rebus absit, cur pecuniam magnopere desideret, vel potius curet omnino? An Scythes Anacharsis potuit pro nihilo pecuniam ducere; nostrates philosophi facere non poterunt? Illius epistola fertur his verbis: "Anacharsis Hannoni salutem. Mihi amictui est Scythicum tegmen; calceamentum, solorum callum; cubile, terra; pulpamentum, fames: lacte, caseo, carne, vescor. Quare, ut ad quietum me licet venias. Munera autem ista, quibus es delectatus, vel civibus tuis vel diis immortalibus dona." Omnes fere philosophi omnium disciplinarum, nisi quos a rectâ ratione natura vitiosa detorsisset, eodem hoc animo esse potuerunt.

Socrates, in pompâ cum magna vis auri argentique ferretur, "Quam multa non desidero!" in-

quit. Xenocrates, cum legati ab Alexandro quinquaginta ei talenta attulissent, quæ erat pecunia temporibus illis, Athenis præsertim, maxima; abduxit legatos ad cœnam in Academiam; iis apposuit tantum, quod satis esset, nullo apparatu. Cum postridie rogarent eum, cui numerari juberet; "Quid? vos hesternâ," inquit, "cœnulâ non intellexistis, me pecuniâ non egere?" Quos cum tristiores vidisset, XXX. minas accepit, ne adspernari regis liberalitatem videretur.

At vero Diogenes liberius, ut Cynicus, Alexandro roganti, ut diceret, si quid opus esset, "Nunc quidem paululum," inquit, "a sole." Offecerat videlicet apricanti. Et hic quidem disputare solebat, quanto regem Persarum vitâ fortunâque superaret: sibi nihil deesse; illi nihil satis unquam fore: se ejus voluptates non desiderare, quibus nunquam satiari ille posset, suas eum consequi nullo modo posse.

XXXIII. Vides, credo, ut Epicurus cupiditatum genera diviserit, non nimis fortasse subtiliter, utiliter tamen: partim esse naturales et necessarias; partim naturales, et non necessarias: partim neutrum: necessarias satiari posse pæne nihilo; divitias enim naturæ parabiles esse: secundum autem genus cupiditatum, nec ad potiendum difficile esse censet, nec vero ad carendum:

tertias, quod essent plane inanes, neque necessitatem modo, sed ne naturam quidem attingerent, funditus ejiciendas putavit.

Hoc loco multa ab Epicureis disputantur; eæque voluptates singillatim extenuantur: quarum genera non contemnunt; [non] quærunt tamen copiam. Nam et obscœnas voluptates (de quibus multa ab illis habetur oratio) faciles, communes, in medio sitas, esse dicunt: easque si natura requirat, non genere, aut loco, aut ordine, sed formâ, ætate, figurâ, metiendas putant: ab iisque abstinere minime esse difficile, si aut valetudo aut officium aut fama postulet: omninoque genus hoc voluptatum optabile esse, si non obsit; prodesse nunquam. Totumque hoc de voluptate sic ille præcepit, ut voluptatem ipsam per se, quia voluptas sit, semper optandam expetendamque putet; eâdemque ratione dolorem, ob id ipsum quia dolor sit, semper esse fugiendum: itaque hac usurum compensatione sapientem, ut voluptatem fugiat, si ea majorem dolorem effectura sit; et dolorem suscipiat, majorem efficientem voluptatem; omniaque jucunda, quamquam sensu corporis judicentur, ad animum referri tamen. Quocirca corpus gaudere tamdiu, dum præsentem sentiat voluptatem; animum et præsentem percipere pariter cum corpore, et prospicere venientem, nec præteritam præterfluere sinere: ita perpetuas

et contextas voluptates in sapiente fore semper, cum exspectatio speratarum voluptatum, perceptarum memoriæ jungeretur. Atque iis similia ad victum etiam transferuntur; extenuanturque magnificentia et sumtus epularum, quod parvo cultu natura contenta sit.

XXXIV. Etenim quis hoc non videt, desideriis ista condiri omnia? Darius, in fugâ, cum aquam turbidam et cadaveribus inquinatam bibisset, negavit unquam se bibisse jucundius. Nunquam videlicet sitiens biberat. Nec esuriens Ptolemæus ederat; cui cum peragranti Ægyptum, comitibus non consecutis, cibarius in casâ panis datus esset, nihil visum est illo pane jucundius. Socratem ferunt, cum usque ad vesperum contentius ambularet, quæsitumque esset ex eo, quare id faceret, respondisse, se, quo melius cœnaret, opsonare ambulando famem. Quid? victum Lacedæmoniorum in phiditiis nonne videmus? ubi cum tyrannus cœnavisset Dionysius, negavit se jure illo nigro, quod cœnæ caput erat, delectatum. Tum is, qui illa coxerat; "Minime mirum; condimenta enim defuerunt." "Quæ tandem?" inquit ille. "Labor in venatu, sudor, cursus ab Eurotâ, fames, sitis: his enim rebus Lacedæmoniorum epulæ condiuntur." Atque hoc non *ex hominum* more solum, sed etiam ex bestiis,

intelligi potest, quæ, ut quidquid objectum est, quod modo a naturâ non sit alienum, eo contentæ, non quærunt amplius. Civitates quædam universæ, more doctæ, parsimoniâ delectantur, ut de Lacedæmoniis paulo ante diximus. Persarum a Xenophonte victus exponitur; quos negat ad panem adhibere quidquam, præter nasturtium. Quamquam, si quædam etiam suaviora natura desideret, quam multa ex terrâ arboribusque gignuntur, cum copiâ facili, tum suavitate præstanti! Adde siccitatem, quæ consequitur hanc continentiam in victu: adde integritatem valetudinis. Confer sudantes, ructantes, refertos epulis, tamquam opimos boves: tum intelliges, qui voluptatem maxime sequantur, eos minime consequi; jucunditatemque victûs esse in desiderio, non in satietate.

XXXV. Timotheum, clarum hominem Athenis, et principem civitatis, ferunt, cum cœnavisset apud Platonem, eoque convivio admodum delectatus esset, vidissetque eum postridie, dixisse: "Vestræ quidem cœnæ, non solum in præsentia, sed etiam postero die, jucundæ sunt." Quid, quod ne mente quidem recte uti possumus, multo cibo et potione completi? Est præclara epistola Platonis ad Dionis propinquos, in quâ scriptum est his fere verbis: "Quo cum venissem, vita illa

beata, quæ ferebatur, plena Italicarum Syracusiarumque mensarum, nullo modo mihi placuit; bis in die saturum fieri, nec unquam pernoctare solum, ceteraque, quæ comitantur huic vitæ, in quâ sapiens nemo efficietur unquam, moderatus vero multo minus. Quæ enim natura tam mirabiliter temperari potest?"

Quo modo igitur jucunda vita potest esse, a quâ absit prudentia, absit moderatio? Ex quo Sardanapali, opulentissimi Assyriæ regis, error agnoscitur, qui incidi jussit in busto,

"Hæc habeo, quæ edi, quæque exsaturata libido
Hausit: at illa jacent multa et præclara relicta."

"Quid aliud," inquit Aristoteles, "in bovis, non in regis, sepulcro inscriberes?" Hæc habere se mortuum dicit, quæ ne vivus quidem diutius habebat, quam fruebatur. Cur igitur divitiæ desiderentur? aut ubi paupertas beatos esse non sinat? Signis, (credo) tabulis, ludis. Si quis est, qui his delectetur, nonne melius tenues homines fruuntur, quam illi, qui his abundant? Est enim earum omnium rerum nostrâ in urbe summa in publico copia. Quæ qui privati habent, nec tam multa, et raro vident, cum in sua rura venerunt. Quos tamen pungit aliquid, cum, illa unde habeant, recordantur. Dies me deficiat, si velim paupertatis causam defendere:

aperta enim res est; et quotidie nos ipsa natura admonet, quam paucis, quam parvis rebus egeat, quam vilibus.

XXXVI. Num igitur ignobilitas, aut humilitas, aut etiam popularis offensio, sapientem beatum esse prohibebit? Vide, ne plus commendatio in vulgus, et hæc, quæ expetitur, gloria, molestiæ habeat, quam voluptatis. Leviculus sane noster Demosthenes, qui illo susurro delectari se dicebat aquam ferentis mulierculæ (ut mos in Græciâ est), insusurrantisque alteri, "Hic est ille Demosthenes." Quid hoc levius? At quantus orator! Sed apud alios loqui videlicet didicerat, non multum ipse secum.

Intelligendum est igitur, nec gloriam popularem ipsam per sese expetendam, nec ignobilitatem extimescendam. "Veni Athenas," inquit Democritus; "neque me quisquam ibi agnovit." Constantem hominem et gravem! qui glorietur, a gloriâ se abfuisse! An tibicines, iique qui fidibus utuntur, suo, non multitudinis arbitrio, cantus numerosque moderantur; vir sapiens, multo arte majore præditus, non, quid verissimum sit, sed quid velit vulgus, exquiret? An quidquam stultius, quam, quos singulos, sicut operarios barbarosque, contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos? Ille vero nostra ambi-

tiones .evitatesque contemnet, honoresque populi, etiam ultro delatos, repudiabit: nos autem eos nescimus, antequam pœnitere cœpit, contemnere. Est apud Heraclitum physicum de principe Ephesiorum Hermodoro. Universos, ait, Ephesios esse morte multandos, quod, cum civitate expellerent Hermodorum, ita locuti sint: "Nemo de nobis unus excellat: sin quis exstiterit, alio in loco, et apud alios, sit." An hoc non ita fit omni in populo? Nonne omnem exsuperantiam virtutis oderunt? Quid? Aristides (malo enim Græcorum, quam nostra, proferre) nonne ob eam causam expulsus est patriâ, quod præter modum justus esset? Quantis igitur molestiis vacant, qui nihil omnino cum populo contrahunt! Quid est enim dulcius otio literato? iis dico literis, quibus infinitatem rerum atque naturæ, et in hoc ipso mundo cœlum, terras, maria, cognoscimus.

XXXVII. Contemto igitur honore, contemtâ etiam pecuniâ, quid relinquitur, quod extimescendum sit? Exsilium, (credo) quod in maximis malis ducitur. Id si propter alienam et offensam populi voluntatem malum est; quam sit ea contemnenda, paulo ante dictum est. Sin abesse patriâ miserum est; plenæ miserorum provinciæ sunt; ex quibus admodum pauci in patriam revertuntur. At multantur bonis exsules. Quid

tum? parumne multa de tolerandâ paupertate dicuntur? Jam vero exsilium, si rerum naturam, non ignominiam nominis, quærimus, quantum demum a perpetuâ peregrinatione differt? in quâ ætates suas philosophi nobilissimi consumserunt, Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, Aristoteles, Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Carneades, Panætius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, innumerabiles alii; qui, semel egressi, nunquam domum revertêre.

At enim non erit sine ignominiâ. Ignominia afficere poterit sapientem? de sapiente enim hæc omnis oratio est, cui jure id accidere non possit: nam jure exsulantem consolari non oportet.

Postremo, ad omnes casus facillima ratio est eorum, qui ad voluptatem ea referunt, quæ sequuntur in vitâ; ut, quocumque hæc loco suppeditent, ibi beate queant vivere. Itaque, ad omnem rationem, Teucri vox accommodari potest,

"Patria est, ubicumque est bene."

Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. Totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. Quid T. Albucius? nonne animo æquissimo Athenis exsul philosophabatur? cui tamen illud ipsum non accidisset, si, in republicâ quiescens, Epicuri legibus

paruisset. Quî enim beatior Epicurus, quod in patriâ vivebat, quam, quod Athenis, Metrodorus? aut Plato Xenocratem vincebat, aut Polemo Arcesilam, quo esset beatior? Quanti vero ista civitas æstimanda est, ex quâ boni sapientesque pelluntur? Demaratus quidem, Tarquinii, regis nostri, pater, tyrannum Cypselum quod ferre non poterat, fugit Tarquinios Corintho; et ibi suas fortunas constituit, ac liberos procreavit. Num stulte anteposuit exsilii libertatem domesticæ seruituti?

XXXVIII. Jam vero motus animi, sollicitudines, ægritudinesque, oblivione leniuntur, traductis animis ad voluptatem. Non sine causâ igitur Epicurus ausus est dicere, semper in pluribus bonis esse sapientem, quia semper sit in voluptatibus. Ex quo effici putat ille, quod quærimus, ut sapiens semper beatus sit.

Etiamne, si sensibus carebit oculorum, si aurium? Etiam; nam ista ipsa contemnit. Primum enim, horribilis ista cæcitas quibus tandem caret voluptatibus? cum quidam etiam disputent, ceteras voluptates in ipsis habitare sensibus: quæ autem adspectu percipiantur, ea non versari in oculorum ullâ jucunditate. Ut ea, quæ gustemus, olfaciamus, tractemus, audiamus, in eâ ipsâ, ubi *sentimus*, parte versentur; in oculis tale nihil fit.

Animus accipit, quæ videmus. Animo autem multis modis variisque delectari licet, etiam si non adhibeatur adspectus. Loquor enim de docto homine et erudito, cui vivere est, cogitare. Sapientis autem cogitatio non ferme ad investigandum adhibet oculos advocatos. Etenim, si nox non adimit vitam beatam, cur dies nocti similis adimat? nam illud Antipatri Cyrenaïci est quidem paulo obscœnius; sed non absurda sententia est: cujus cæcitatem cum muliercula lamentarentur, "Quid agitis?" inquit: "an vobis nulla videtur voluptas esse nocturna?" Appium quidem veterem illum, qui cæcus annos multos fuit, et ex magistratibus, et ex rebus gestis intelligimus, in illo suo casu, nec privato nec publico muneri defuisse. C. Drusi domum compleri a consultoribus solitam accepimus; cum, quorum res esset, sua ipsi non videbant, cæcum adhibebant ducem.

XXXIX. Pueris nobis, Cn. Aufidius prætorius et in senatu sententiam dicebat, nec amicis deliberantibus deerat, et Græcam scribebat historiam, et videbat in literis. Diodotus Stoïcus, cæcus, multos annos domi nostræ vixit. Is vero, (quod credibile vix esset) cum in philosophiâ, multo etiam magis assidue quam antea, versaretur, et cum fidibus Pythagoreorum more utere-

tur, cumque ei libri noctes et dies legerentur, quibus in studiis oculis non egebat; tum (quod sine oculis fieri posse vix videtur) geometriæ munus tuebatur, verbis præcipiens discentibus, unde, quo, quamque lineam scriberent. Asclepiadem ferunt, non ignobilem Eretricum philosophum, cum quidam quæreret, quid ei cæcitas attulisset, respondisse, puero ut uno esset comitatior. Ut enim vel summa paupertas tolerabilis sit, si liceat, quod quibusdam Græcis quotidie; sic cæcitas ferri facile possit, si non desint subsidia valetudinum.

Democritus, luminibus amissis, alba scilicet et atra discernere non poterat: at vero bona, mala; æqua, iniqua; honesta, turpia; utilia, inutilia; magna, parva, poterat: et, sine varietate colorum, licebat vivere beate; sine notione rerum, non licebat. Atque hic vir impediri etiam animi aciem adspectu oculorum arbitrabatur: et, cum alii sæpe, quod ante pedes esset, non viderent, ipse infinitatem omnem peregrinabatur, ut nullâ in extremitate consisteret. Traditum est etiam, Homerum cæcum fuisse. At ejus picturam, non poësim, videmus. Quæ regio, quæ ora, qui locus Græciæ, quæ species formæ, quæ pugna, quæ acies, quod remigium, qui motus hominum, qui ferarum, non ita expictus est, ut, quæ ipse non viderit, nos ut videremus, effecerit? Quid

ergo aut Homero ad delectationem animi ac voluptatem, aut cuiquam docto, defuisse unquam arbitramur?

An, ni ita se res haberet, Anaxagoras, aut hic ipse Democritus, agros et patrimonia sua reliquissent; huic discendi quærendique divinæ delectationi toto se animo dedissent? Itaque augurem Tiresiam, quem sapientem fingunt poëtæ, nunquam inducunt deplorantem cæcitatem suam: at vero Polyphemum Homerus, cum immanem ferumque finxisset, cum ariete etiam colloquentem facit, ejusque laudare fortunas, quod, quâ vellet, ingredi posset, et, quæ vellet, attingere. Recte hic quidem: nihilo enim erat ipse Cyclops, quam aries ille, prudentior.

XL. In surditate vero quidnam est mali? Erat surdaster M. Crassus: sed aliud molestius, quod male audiebat, etiam si (ut mihi videbatur) injuriâ. [Epicurei] nostri Græce fere nesciunt, nec Græci Latine. Ergo hi in illorum, et illi in horum, sermone surdi: omnesque [id] nos in iis linguis quas non intelligimus, quæ sunt innumerabiles, surdi profecto sumus. At vocem citharœdi non audiunt: ne stridorem quidem serræ tum, cum acuitur: aut grunnitum, cum jugulatur sus; nec, cum quiescere volunt, fremitum murmurantis maris. Et, si cantus eos forte de-

lectant, primum cogitare debent, antequam hi sint inventi, multos beate vixisse sapientes: deinde multo majorem percipi posse legendis his, quam audiendis, voluptatem. Tum, ut paulo ante cæcos ad aurium traducebamus voluptatem, sic licet surdos ad oculorum. Etenim, qui secum loqui poterit, sermonem alterius non requiret.

Congerantur in unum omnia, ut idem oculis et auribus captus sit: prematur etiam doloribus acerrimis corporis; qui primum per se ipsi plerumque conficiunt hominem: sin forte, longinquitate producti, vehementius tamen torquent, quam ut causa sit, cur ferantur; quid est tandem, dii boni! quod laboremus? Portus enim præsto est, [quoniam mors ibidem est] æternum nihil sentienti receptaculum. Theodorus Lysimacho mortem minitanti, "Magnum vero," inquit, "effecisti, si cantharidis vim consecutus es." Paulus Persæ deprecanti, ne in triumpho duceretur: "In tuâ id quidem potestate est." Multa primo die, cum de ipsâ morte quæreremus, non pauca etiam postero, cum ageretur de dolore, sunt dicta de morte: quæ qui recordetur, haud sane periculum est, ne non mortem aut optandam, aut certe non timendam, putet.

XLI. Mihi quidem, in vitâ servanda videtur illa lex, quæ in Græcorum conviviis obtinetur:

"Aut bibat," inquit, "aut abeat." Et recte. Aut enim fruatur aliquis pariter cum aliis voluptate potandi; aut, ne sobrius in violentiam vinolentorum incidat, ante discedat. Sic injurias fortunæ, quas ferre nequeas, defugiendo relinquas. Hæc eadem, quæ Epicurus, totidem verbis dicit et Hieronymus.

Quod si ii philosophi, quorum ea sententia est, ut virtus per se ipsa nihil valeat; omneque, quod honestum nos et laudabile esse dicimus, id illi cassum quiddam, et inani vocis sono decoratum esse dicant; et tamen semper beatum censent esse sapientem; quid tandem a Socrate et Platone profectis philosophis faciendum putes? quorum alii tantam præstantiam in bonis animi esse dicunt, ut ab his corporis et externa obscurentur: alii autem hæc ne bona quidem ducunt; in animo reponunt omnia. Quorum controversiam solebat, tamquam honorarius arbiter, judicare Carneades. Nam, cum, quæcumque bona Peripateticis, eadem Stoïcis commoda viderentur; neque tamen Peripatetici plus tribuerent divitiis, bonæ valetudini, ceteris rebus generis ejusdem, quam Stoïci; cum ea, re, non verbis, ponderarentur; causam esse dissidendi negabat. Quare hunc locum ceterarum disciplinarum philosophi quemadmodum obtinere possint, ipsi viderint. Mihi tamen gratum est, quod de sapi-

entium perpetuâ bene vivendi facultate dignum quiddam philosophorum voce profitentur.

Sed, quoniam mane est eundum, has quinque dierum disputationes memoriâ comprehendamus. Equidem me etiam conscripturum arbitror; (ubi enim melius uti possumus hoc, cuicuimodi est, otio?) ad Brutumque nostrum hos libros alteros quinque mittemus; a quo non modo impulsi sumus ad philosophicas scriptiones, verum etiam lacessiti. In quo quantum ceteris profuturi simus, non facile dixerimus: nostris quidem acerbissimis doloribus, variisque et undique circumfusis molestiis, alia nulla potuit inveniri levatio.

NOTES.

4. 20. *Quid dicat Epicurus.* There is nothing that has a fairer show of honesty than the moral doctrine of Epicurus. Gassendus pretends that the pleasure in which this philosopher has fixed the sovereign good, was nothing else but the highest tranquillity of mind, in conjunction with the most perfect health of body; but Horace, Plutarch and almost all the fathers of the church, give us a very different account of it. Indeed, the nature of this pleasure in which the chief happiness is supposed to be seated, is a grand problem in the morals of Epicurus. Hence there were two kinds of Epicureans; the rigid, who understood the notion of pleasure in the best sense, and placed all their happiness in the pure pleasures of the mind, resulting from the practice of virtue; and the loose or remiss, who took the words of their chief in a gross sense, and placed all their happiness in bodily pleasures or debauchery.

4. 28. *Productior;* "of longer continuance."

5. 8. *Telamonem.* The son of Æacus, and father of Ajax and Teucer. He was the first to

ascend the walls of Troy, for which act he received a crown from Laomedon, and his daughter Hesione in marriage. Being driven from Ægina, where his father reigned, he went to Salamis, where he was married to Glauca, daughter of the king of that place.

5. 11. *Hiccine.... sua.* These trochaic lines are taken from a tragedy of Ennius. Cicero, in one of his epistles (*Fam.* IX.) speaks of himself in the same manner: *In eo igitur, inquis, convivio, Cicero ille, quem spectabant, cujus ob os Graii ora obvertebant sua.* The ancients often used the preposition *ob* for *ad.* Ennius says: *Acherontem obibo;* and also *Omnes occisi occensique in nocte serenâ;* i. e. *accensi.*

5. 21. *In eo igitur qui non est. Eo* must be referred to *dolere.* The meaning of the sentence is, "Does it follow, that he who is without pain, if he be free from evil, enjoys the greatest good?"

7. 10. *Qui ita dicat.* What follows, is another quotation from Ennius.

7. 12. *Pol.* An abbreviation of *ædepol* and *æpol,* for *per ædem Pollucis.* So *ædastor* or *ecastor* for *per ædem Castoris;* and in the *Phormio* of Terence we find *ecere* for *per ædem Cereris.*

7. 18. *Ex opibus .... tuæ.* The words of Andromache, the wife of Hector. After the death of her husband and the destruction of Troy, she was taken captive by the Greeks. The quotation is from the "Hecuba" or "Andromache" of Ennius.

8. 2. *O pater!* Andromache is not invoking her own father Eetion, king of Thebe, in Mysia, but Priam, the father of her husband.

8. 7. *Cantoribus.* The scenic performers. Horace says,

> *Si plausoris eges aulæa manentis et usque*
> *Sessuri, donec cantor, vos plaudite, dicat.*

8. 8. *Euphorionis.* A poet of Chalcis in Eubœa. His poetry was esteemed in Rome, and translated or imitated by Gallus. Hence Virgil, (*E.* X. 50.) says,

> *Ibo, et Chalcidico quæ sunt mihi condita versu*
> *Carmina, pastoris Siculi modulabor avenâ.*

8. 14. *Aram.* See note 56. 8. vol. I. and also Virgil *Æ.* II. 512.

8. 19. *Scutellam.* A kind of oblong drinking vessel, so called from *scutum*, which was of a similar shape, and therefore differed from the *clypeus*, which was round.

10. 3. *C. Gracchus.* Of the Sempronian *gens*, and brother of Tiberius Gracchus, whom he resembled in many respects. Both were distinguished for genius and eloquence, were tribunes of the people, advocated the adoption of the agrarian laws in opposition to the senate, and were put to death by violence.

10. 7. *Piso Frugi.* See note 128. 14. *Legem frumentariam;* "the law for the gratuitous distribution of corn."

10. 16. *Lege Sempronid.* So called from C.

Sempronius Gracchus, who was the author of it. Laws among the Romans usually bore the names of the tribunes who proposed them.

10. 17. *Orationes Gracchi.* Some fragments of these remain. Cicero speaks of them in his work *De Claris Oratoribus.*

10. 21. *Tenuem victum.* Epicurus is said to have lived in a very frugal manner. In one of his letters he says, *Mitte mihi casei paululum, ut cum epulari voluero, possim.* Seneca, though a stoic philosopher, bears this testimony to him: "I the more freely quote the maxims of Epicurus, in order to convince those who became his followers from the hope of screening their vices, that to whatsoever sect they attach themselves, they must live virtuously. Even at the entrance of the garden they will find this inscription: 'The hospitable keeper of this mansion, where you will find pleasure the highest good, will present to you liberally barley cakes and water from the spring. These gardens will not provoke your appetite by artificial dainties, but satisfy it with natural supplies. Will you not then be well entertained?'"

11. 8. *Et illi..... egerint;* "And they (the Epicureans) are contending for their opinions, and imploring the assistance of their neighbors; many, indeed, of these are ready to fly to their aid. For my part, I can declare that I am indifferent about the matter, and shall acquiesce in whatever they may do."

11. 13. *Catoni.* Marcus Porcius Cato, the Censor. See note 9. 1, vol. I.

11. 14. *Lentulo.* Other authors tell us that P. Scipio Nascica was the opponent of Cato in this matter.

11. 24. *Nisi quod expediat;* sc. *sibi.*

11. 26. *Ut in sinu gaudeant;* "to rejoice secretly."

12. 21. *Romæ servierunt.* Perhaps in the time of Atilius Regulus, when there was a question respecting an exchange of captives; or when Carthage was destroyed by Scipio, and many of her citizens of both sexes were sold as slaves.

12. 22. *Rege Perse.* The last king of Macedonia. His war with the Romans terminated in his own ruin and that of his kingdom.

12. 23. *Quosdam Corinthios.* Sent thither after the destruction of Corinth by L. Mummius.

13. 6. *Clitomachi.* A native of Carthage. He became a disciple of Carneades at Athens, and succeeded him in the chair of the new Academy. He wrote 400 books upon philosophical subjects. According to Cicero, he taught that there is no certain criterion by which to judge of the truth of those reports which we receive from the senses; and that therefore a wise man will either wholly suspend his assent, or decline giving a peremptory opinion; but that, nevertheless, men are strongly impelled by nature to follow probability. His moral doctrine established a natural alliance be-

tween pleasure and virtue. He was a professed enemy to rhetoric, and thought no place should be allowed in society, to so dangerous an art.

13. 8. *Carneadis.* An eminent Greek philosopher; the founder as well as an illustrious ornament of the third, or new Academy. He was a native of Cyrene, and born probably about 214 B. C. He excited the admiration of his auditors by the subtlety of his reasoning, and the fluency of his language. Although he opposed the doctrine of the Stoics concerning the gods, he did it, as Cicero says, not to destroy the belief of superior powers, but merely to prove that their theological system was unsatisfactory. As the foundation of morals, he taught that the ultimate object of life is the enjoyment of those things towards which we are directed by the principles of nature.

14. 18. *Socrates commemoratur.* Apuleius says, *Paupertas fuit in Aristide justa, in Phocione benigna, in Epaminondâ strenua, in Socrate sapiens, in Homero diserta.*

14. 19. *Diogenes.* See note 68. 11. vol. I.

14. 19. *Cœcilianum illud.* Of Statius Cœcilius, a Roman comic poet. See note 25. 5. vol. I.

14. 22. *C. Fabricio.* A Roman commander, eminent for valor and integrity. He was consul B. C. 282. He contemned riches during the whole of his life, and died so poor that a dowry was given to his daughters from the public treasury. He is particularly distinguished for his conduct as

ambassador to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who attempted to gain him over to his cause by magnificent presents. These Fabricius rejected with indignation and contempt, which excited the surprize of the monarch who was accustomed to suppose every man venal that approached a court.

15. 4. *Multi patientes pauperes.* Among these may be enumerated P. Valerius Publicola, an eminent Roman, who, after occupying many lucrative offices, did not amass money sufficient to defray the expense of his funeral, which was paid by the public; and Menenius Agrippa, who after obtaining the honors of a triumph for a complete victory which he and his colleague, P. Posthumius, gained over the Sabines, died at an advanced age, with a character highly esteemed for wisdom and integrity, but so poor that his relations intended to bury him in a private manner. The people, however, assessed themselves at two ounces of brass each, in order to procure for him a magnificent funeral; and when the senate, unwilling to sanction this mode of raising money, decreed a sum for the purpose, out of the treasury, the people refused to receive back their money, but ordered it to be paid to the children of the deceased. There was also M. Atilius Regulus, a celebrated Roman general, who whilst carrying on the war in Africa with great success, asked for his recall, upon the plea, that he was possessed of a farm of seven acres, from which his family derived their subsistence; and being in-

formed that his servants were carrying off his stock, he must return to save his family from starving. The plea was overruled by an order that they should be maintained by the public during his absence upon the service of his country. See also note 90. 4. vol. II.

15. 9. *Potentissimi regis.* Agamemnon, in the *Iphigenia in Aulis* of Euripides, (I. 16,) where he says,

> "I envy thee old man;
> I envy all who pass their lives secure
> From danger; to the world, to fame unknown;
> But those to greatness raised, I envy not."
> *Potter's Trans.*

15. 24. *Anaxagoras.* A philosopher of Clazomene. In the ardent pursuit of knowledge, he left his native country, where he possessed a patrimony sufficient for securing him distinction and independence, and went to reside at Athens. Having surrendered his lands to his relations, "he devoted himself wholly," as Cicero says, (*Tusc.* V. 24.) "to the divine pleasure of learning and inquiry." He diligently applied himself to the study of eloquence and poetry, and was particularly conversant with the works of Homer, whom he admired as the best preceptor, not only in writing, but in morals. Anaxagoras afterwards acquired high reputation as a teacher of philosophy, and had among his pupils some of the illustrious men of the age in which he lived; such were Euripides

the tragedian, and Pericles, the orator and statesman. He died B. C. 428. Cicero asserts, though not without some inconsistency, in regard to what he has before said of Thales, that Anaxagoras was the first who taught that the arrangement and order of all things was contrived and accomplished by the understanding and power of an infinite mind. Plutarch confirms this account. "The Ionic philosophers," says he, "who appeared before Anaxagoras, made fortune, or blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous or necessary motion of the particles of matter, the first principle in nature; but Anaxagoras affirmed that a pure mind, perfectly free from all material concretions, governs the universe."

17. 24. *Aut non tangat ægritudo, aut perleviter pungat animi dolor.* *Ægritudo* and *animi dolor* signify the same thing; Bentley, therefore, thinks the reading should be *aut non attingat omnino, aut perleviter pungat animi dolor.*

18. 6. *Agamemnon Homericus.* See *Iliad* X. 15.

18. 7. *Accianus.* In the "Agamemnon," a tragedy of Accius.

18. 9. *Bionis.* A philosopher of Borysthenes, who flourished in the reign of Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedon. He was of mean extraction, being the son of a Lacedæmonian harlot, and when young, was sold as a slave to an orator, who afterwards gave him his freedom, and left him large possessions. Thus endowed, he went to Athens, and devoted himself to the study of philosophy.

He was skilled in geometry, music, poetry rhetoric. Several of his repartees, for which was famous, are preserved; Horace, (*Epis.* II is supposed to allude to him:

> *Denique non omnes eadem mirantur amantque:*
> *Carmine tu gaudes; hic delectatur lambis;*
> *Ille Bioneis sermonibus, et sale nigro.*

18. 13. *In Demosthenem.* In the oration aga Ctesiphon.

18. 21. *Bellerophonte.* The son of Glau Under a charge of homicide, he was forced to tire to the court of Prœtus, king of Argos, wh he was accused by Sthenobœa, or as Homer says, Antæa, the wife of Prœtus, of an attempt upon chastity. For this insult, Prœtus sent him to Joba his father-in-law, with private instructions to him to death. Jobates employed him in several d gerous expeditions against the Solymi and Amazo from which he returned victorious. Hav thus ingratiated himself with Jobates, he obtai his daughter in marriage, and a settlement in a t tile part of Lycia. From Homer's account, wh represents him as "hated by the gods, and w dering in the Aleian plains, a prey to melanch and avoiding all commerce with men," he see to have become insane and to have died in t state. To his various exploits Homer and ot writers have annexed the story of his killing triform monster called the *Chimæra*, by the ass ance of the winged horse *Pegasus*, granted to h

by Minerva, and trained for his use. In explanation of this fable, Bochart suggests, that in the expedition of Bellerophon against the Solymi, he overcame them, and also their three gods, which they painted on their ensigns in the several forms of a lion, a goat, and a dragon; these he probably joined together on his own in memory of his conquest, and this gave birth to the fable of his killing the monster *Chimæra.*

18. 23. *Qui miser . . . vitans.* See *Iliad.* VI. 201.

19. 3. *Apud Ennium.* In his *Medea.* This tragedy is said to have been borrowed from Euripides. Ennius wrote another, called *Medea Exul.* But few fragments of either remain.

19. 20. *Ipse se puniens.* Menedemus, an old man in the comedy of Terence called Eautonti morumenos, who devoted himself to hard and incessant labor upon his farm as a penance, because his son being unable to endure his father's harsh treatment had left him to serve as a soldier in Asia. Horace (*Sat.* I. 2. 20.) in reference to the case says:

Ita ut pater ille, Terenti
Fabulâ quem miserum nato vixisse fugato
Inducit, non se pejus cruciaverit atque hic.

19. 22. *Chremes.* Another old man talking with Menedemus, in the above-mentioned comedy of Terence. See the passage, Act. I. 1. 95.

19. 25. *Malo . . . deputem.* See the same comedy, I. 1. 83.

20. 2. *Apud Homerum. Iliad,* XIX. 226.

20. 6. *Namque .... diurnis.* These are the words of Ulysses. See *Iliad*, XIX. 226.

20. 14. *Concidentem vulneribus.* After the disastrous battle of Pharsalia, Pompey sought refuge at the court of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, but was assassinated in the barge which was to convey him there.

20. 17. *Hostium.* The Egyptians.

21. 6. *Ille apud Euripidem.* Theseus.

22. 3. *Theophrastus autem moriens.* This distinguished Greek philosopher was born at Eresium, a maritime town of Lesbos, B. C. 371. His works comprehended a variety of subjects, and were numerous; of the few which remain, the most famous is entitled "Characters," describing the different moral classes of men. Towards the close of his life, which was prolonged to the age of 85 years, he became very infirm, and was conveyed from place to place in a carriage. In contemplating the shortness of life, he expresses great regret, complaining that long life was granted to stags and crows, to whom it was of little value, but was denied to men, who, if it were of longer duration, might attain the summit of science. His last advice to his disciples was, that since it is the lot of man to die as soon as he begins to live, they should take greater pains to enjoy life as it passes, than to acquire posthumous fame.

22. 5. *Cervis.* Though the stag, compared with many other quadrupeds, may be justly considered

long lived, since it is supposed in some instances to arrive at the age of thirty-five or forty years, yet it is by no means possessed of the longevity anciently attributed to it, which is merely a popular prejudice, sufficiently contradicted by the experience of later ages. Indeed, it should not be forgotten, that Aristotle opposed the common prejudice, and contended that the nature of the animal afforded no probable argument in favor of its longevity.

22. 19. *Q. Maximus.* Q. Fabius Maximus, called Cunctator, on account of his great prudence in war. When he was consul the second time, he had to contend with Hannibal, and to his skill and well-timed caution, the safety of the state was owing. By Ennius, Fabius is described as

"Unus qui nobis cunctando restituit rem."

and by Cicero he is represented as not less useful in the *toga* than at the head of the army.

22. 19. *Filium consularem.* Q. Fabius Maximus, son of the preceding; his own merits assisted by his father's popularity, enabled him to obtain many distinguished offices. He was at different times curule ædile, prætor, and consul. His father survived him, and pronounced his funeral oration from the rostrum.

22. 20. *L. Paulus.* Of the Æmilian family; he was born about the year of Rome 530, and was twice consul. He lived, says Plutarch, in an age that abounded with great men, and took pains to

be inferior to none of them. His first military command was in Spain, whither he went as prætor in the war with Antiochus, to quell a general revolt, in effecting which he succeeded. In his first consulate, B. C. 182, he triumphed over the Ligurians: in his second, B. C. 168, he subdued Perseus, king of Macedonia, from which circumstance he obtained the name of Macedonicus. His character, says a judicious biographer, was that of a genuine Roman adorned with letters, and humanized by philosophy.

22. 20. *Duobus filiis.* One of his two sons by his second marriage died five days before his triumph, the other three days after it. "Fortune," says he, "by placing my triumph between the funerals of my two children, as though she meant to divert herself with human events, overwhelms me indeed with trouble and sorrow; but ascertains a full security to my country, having emptied her whole quiver upon me. She has taken a pleasure in exposing the conqueror and the conquered alike as a spectacle to all mankind, with this difference indeed, that the conquered Perseus has still his children, but those of the conqueror, Paulus Æmilius, are no more. But the public happiness alleviates my grief for my domestic misfortunes."

24. 24. *Nam .... reprehendunt;* "for they who are not relieved by consolation bespeak their own misery; and they who bear their misfortunes with less fortitude than they recommend to others, are on a footing with many who, being covetous, find

fault with those that are so; or being vain glorious, condemn those who are fond of glory."

25. 1. *Qui avari avaros.* Horace (*Sat.* I. 3. 25.) says,

> *Cum tua pervideas oculis mala lippus inunctis,*
> *Cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutum,*
> *Quam aut aquila, aut serpens Epidaurius?* . . .

25. 13. *Mediocritates:* "moderate griefs."

25. 26. *Artemisia.* She was remarkable for her conjugal affection; as an evidence of this, she erected a most stately monument to the memory of her husband Mausolus, king of Caria, calling it from his name, Mausoleum. It was sixty-three feet long, almost four hundred and eleven feet in compass, and about thirty-five feet high, surrounded by thirty-six columns, that were ornamented in a wonderful manner. Pliny has described it, *Lib.* XXXVI. 5. Afterwards the same name was given to all costly monuments.

27. 5. *Altera* . . . [*disputandum*]: "next to that is to speak of the common condition of life, and with a view, if possible, to the state of the person particularly who may be in grief."

27. 26. *Lyconis.* A peripatetic philosopher. There were also a Pythagorean and a poet of this name.

30. 11. *Contractiunculæ* . . . . . *Hanc.* Bentley reads *contractiuncula quædam*, that *hanc* may be referred to this word. For if it be referred to *ægritudo*, Cicero will appear to admit that grief is natu-

ral which he has been endeavoring in this discussion to disprove.

BOOK IV.

32. 6. *Legibus.* Cicero, (*Leg.* I. 6.) defines a law to be that *quæ scripto sancit quod vult, aut jubendo, aut vetando.* The fault of this definition is, that it refers to the object of a law, which is an accident, rather than to that which constitutes its essential character. A law is a rule or command of the sovereign power in a state, addressed to and enforced upon the members of such state; and this is the sense of *Lex* in the Roman writers.

33. 20. *Propter Pythagoreorum admirationem.* Such as Archytas of Tarentum, Alcmæon and Philolaus of Crotona, Hippasus of Metapontus.

33. 25. *Et tempora ignorarent.* Numa began to reign B. C. 712, and died after a reign of 43 years. Pythagoras flourished in Greece about 609 B. C. in the reign of Tarquin. He could not, therefore be a Pythagorean, who died so many years before Pythagoras came into Italy.

34. 7. *Cantu fidibusque.* Next to numbers music had the chief place in the preparatory exercises of the Pythagorean school, by means of which the mind was to be raised above the dominion of the passions, and inured to contemplation. Pythagoras applied music to the cure of diseases, both bodily

and mental. It was the custom of his school to compose their minds for rest in the evening, and to prepare themselves for action in the morning, by suitable airs which they performed upon the lute or other stringed instruments. The music was however always accompanied with verse, so that it may be doubted, whether the effect was to be ascribed more to the musician than to the poet. It is said of Clinias a Pythagorean, that whenever he perceived himself inclined to anger, spleen, or other restless passions, he took up his lute, and that it never failed to restore the tranquillity of his mind. Of Pythagoras himself, it is related, that he checked a young man, who, in the midst of his revels, was meditating some act of Bacchanalian madness, by ordering the musician, who who had inflamed his passions by Phrygian airs, to change the music on a sudden, into the slow and solemn Doric mood.

In looking over the list of illustrious men who have sprung from the school of Pythagoras, it appears that the love and cultivation of music was so much a part of their discipline that almost every one of them left a treatise behind him upon the subject.

34. 10. *Canerent ad tibiam.* Sallust says the same of the Spaniards, and Tacitus of the Germans. Valerius Maximus, (II. 1.) in reference to the custom says, " *Quid hoc more splendidius ? .... quas Athenas, quam scholam huic domesticæ disci-*

plinæ prætulimus? inde oriebantur Camilli, Scipiones," &c.

34. 16. *Alterius injuriam.* Cicero, in the fragments of his treatise "*De Republicâ,*" gives the words of this law: *Si quis actitaverit, sive carmen condiderit, quod infamiam flagitiumve alteri precetur, capite punitor.* And Horace (*Sat.* II. 1. 80.) in reference to it, says:

> *Sed tamen ut monitus caveas, ne forte negoti*
> *Incutiat tibi quid sanctarum inscitia legum:*
> *Si mala condiderit in quem quis carmina, jus est*
> *Judiciumque.*

34. 23. *Tuberonem.* Q. Ælius Tubero, grandson of L. Æmilius Paulus. Our author in his "*Brutus,*" says of him, *Ut vitæ severus, et constans, et fortis, ita oratione durus, incultus, horridus.*

35. 11. *Esse legatos.* They were sent from Athens to Rome, to obtain the remission of a fine of five hundred talents which had been laid on the Athenians for injury done to Oropus, a city of Bœotia.

35. 13. *Alter Cyrenæus.* Carneades.

36. 23. *In inferiorem ambulationem;* i. e. into the Academy, which name was given to the lower part of the gymnasium in Cicero's Tusculan villa, the upper part being called the Lyceum.

36. 26. *Dicat, si quis vult.* In allusion, perhaps, to a custom of Gorgias of Leontium, who was so great an orator, that in public assemblies he would undertake to declaim upon any subject proposed to

him. He was a disciple of Empedocles, and one of the earliest writers on the art of rhetoric. In consequence of a display of his eloquence at the Olympic and Pythian games, a golden statue was erected to his honor, at Delphi.

37. 2. *Ægritudine.* This word depends upon *vacare* understood.

37. 3. *Temporis causâ.* It was during the government of Cæsar.

38. 2. *Dialecticorum remis.* Logicians adopt a nervous and concise mode of speaking, and may be figuratively said to go, like rowers, but a short distance from the shore: the Peripatetics on the other hand, prefer a more fluent style of oratory, and may therefore be said to crowd sail.

44. 6. *Intimo*; "deeply rooted."

46. 4. *Φιλογυνεία*; "the love of women." The poet Euripides, after his second marriage, became somewhat noted for his hatred of women. Hence he obtained the name of *Μισογύης*. His editor, Barnes, however, strenuously defends him from the charge implied in this appellation, observing, that if he has described some females with all the vices incident to human nature, he has delineated many others with all the virtues that can adorn their sex; and Sophocles is said to have observed that the hatred which he expressed against women was confined to the stage.

46. 9. *Timone.* An Athenian remarkable for his misanthropy. When asked why he loved the

young Alcibiades, while he detested all the rest of the human race, he replied, "It is because I see that he will be the ruin of the Athenians." He carefully avoided all sorts of company, yet went one day to an assembly of the people, and cried with a loud voice, "That he had a fig tree on which several persons had hanged themselves; but as he intended to cut it down, in order to build a house where it stood, he gave them notice of it, that if any of them had a mind to hang themselves, they must do it speedily." Shakspeare has formed a tragedy on his story, which see.

47. 3. *Ut Hippolyti.* See the story of Phædra and Hippolytus.

48. 20. *Non enim .... dissentientes.* This passage has caused much doubt amongst commentators. Bentley reads *non e. o. v. pares habet dissensiones;* "all vices have not the same discord; for those men who have approached nearest to wisdom, are indeed at variance with each other, but are not of such depraved and distorted minds as those who are overwhelmed with folly and vice."

50. 12. *Æs Corinthium.* This metal in its rough or polished state was among the last to receive rust. It consisted of a mixture of gold, silver, and copper, and was held in high estimation.

52. 4. *Tum fert alacritatem.* Some good editions have *tum eâ effertur alacritate*, which seems to correspond better with the style of Cicero.

56. 10. *Leves .... fortitudo;* "that those rea-

sons are of little weight which depend upon reflections such as 'It is a just war; it becomes us to fight for our laws, our liberties, and our country.' These have no force unless our courage is warmed by anger."

57. 5. *Miltiadis tropæis.* The Athenian commander who was the victor in the memorable battle of Marathon. The circumstances of this event, as they were handed down for the admiration of successive ages, were discolored and exaggerated, and they cannot now be exactly ascertained. According to the best accounts, the number of Persians was about 120,000, and of the Athenians, about 10,000. The Persians were strong, not only in numbers, but in the terror of their name, in the renown of their conquests, in the recollection of the flight from Sardis, in the recent destruction of Eretria. If Miltiades deserved praise for having perceived the hollowness of these advantages, and if he balanced them by the superiority of his military skill, the Athenians, also earned their fame by the boldness with which they faced a danger which they could not despise. After he had gained this victory, Miltiades, was entrusted with a strong armament for the reduction of some of the islands which had taken part with the Persians. He sailed to Paros and laid siege to its capital; but his attempt to gain the place was unsuccessful. The disappointment of the Athenians was so great, that he was accused of treason before the assembly of

the people, who, forgetting his past services by which they had been delivered from a foreign yoke, condemned him to death. The capital penalty was afterwards commuted for a fine of fifty talents. As he could not immediately raise this sum, he was cast into prison, where he soon after died.

57. 7. *Demosthenis vigiliæ.* Demosthenes in his youth labored under several natural infirmities and defects, which were likely to impede his progress in his profession, and which he was therefore determined to overcome. His voice was weak and stammering, his pronunciation indistinct, and his gesture ungraceful. To surmount these disadvantages, he shut himself up in a cave that he might study with less distraction, and remained there two or three months at a time. He likewise exercised his voice on the sea-shore, that he might accustom himself to a tumultuous assembly, and in walking up hill with pebbles in his mouth, that he might correct a defect in his utterance; he practised at home before a mirror, and took lessons of an eminent actor, that he might check and reform an ungraceful motion to which he was subject: by these various means, steadily pursued, he not only overcame his defect, but acquired distinguished excellence both in elocution and action.

57. 12. *Lustrâsse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem.* Pythagoras visited Egypt, and remained there twenty-two years, availing himself of all possible means of information with regard to the re-

condite doctrines of the Egyptian priests, as well as their astronomy and geometry, and Egyptian learning in its most unlimited extent. He also visited Phœnicia, and conversed with the prophets and philosophers who were there. Democritus travelled in Egypt, then went to Ethiopia to converse with the gymnosophists of that country, and from thence passed over into Asia, where he resided for some time among the Persian Magi: it it is also said that his curiosity led him into India. Plato, that he might obtain all the knowledge which the age in which he lived could supply, travelled into every country which was likely to answer any useful purpose in this respect. In Egypt, it is said, he acquired his opinions concerning the origin of the world, and learned the doctrines of the transmigration and immortality of the soul; but it is more probable that he learned the latter doctrine from Socrates, and the former from Pythagoras.

59. 11. *Illa . . . virtutum;* "those which the Peripatetics call the 'ardors of the mind,' and the 'whetstones of virtue,' savour of the pomp of rhetoricians."

59. 18. *Pacidianus.* [*Placideianus.*] A celebrated gladiator, of whom Lucilius in another passage says,

> *Cum Placideiano hic componitur, optumu' longe*
> *Post homines natos gladiator qui fuit unus.*

59. 20. *Occidam . . . . irâ;* "I will kill him and conquer, if you wish it, says Pacidianus; but this I believe, that I myself shall be wounded in the

face, before I can pierce my sword into his stomach, his leg or his lungs: I hate the man; I fight enraged; and ask no more delay than is required for him to seize his sword; so far am I urged on by my eagerness and my hatred of him."

59. 27. *Apud Homerum.* See *Iliad,* VII. Cicero was the first Roman, Lucretius excepted, who discussed in Latin, the philosophy of Greece; and the several treatises which issued from his pen on that subject, enriched the language, and enlarged the ideas of his countrymen. Of Grecian literature in all its branches, he had a profound and extensive knowledge. The perspicuity with which he states the tenets of the respective schools, the frequency with which he quotes or alludes to passages in their philosophers, orators and poets, prove that their writings had not only passed through his hands, but were still retained in his memory. He could write and speak the Greek tongue with fluency; but some errors which he has committed suggest a suspicion that his knowledge of it was more specious than solid, and that he was inferior in critical skill, to his friend Atticus.

60. 5. *Provocâsse ad pugnam.* When Hector had challenged the Grecian leaders to single combat, Ajax Telamonius was chosen by lot to accept the challenge. The names of the competitors for the honor of fighting with Hector, were Agamemnon, Diomedes, the two Ajaces, Idomeneus, Merion, Eurypylus, Thoas, and Ulysses.

60. 9. *Torquatum.* Manlius Torquatus, so called because he slew a Gaul in single combat and took his golden chain from him.

60. 11. *Marcellum.* Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who was consul B. C. 222. Soon after his election, he was obliged to take the field against the enemies of the republic, and was selected by Viridomarus, king of the Gauls, for single combat. Having succeeded in this, he consecrated his spoils to Jupiter Feretrius, which being thought propitious to his designs, he attacked the enemy, and gained a complete victory. For this a triumph was decreed to him, of which the noblest ornaments were the *spolia opima.* The greatness of this distinction may be inferred from the lines which are referred to him in Virgil's prospective view of the Trojan progeny: (*Æ.* VI. 855.)

Adspice ut insignis spoliis Marcellus opimis
Ingreditur, victorque viros supereminet omnes.

Marcellus was distinguished in many other battles, and received the highest offices of honor from his fellow citizens. In the 60th year of his age he was a second time called upon to oppose Hannibal. He displayed, as usual, his great military talents in his operations against this general, but was not sufficiently vigilant against the snares of his adversary. He imprudently separated himself from his camp, and was killed in ambuscade, in his fifth consulship, being the year 208 B. C.

60. 19. *Aruntem.* During the consulate of

Brutus and Valerius, Tarquin and his partizans made some vigorous efforts to regain the throne of Rome; being joined by the Veientes, the avowed enemies of the Romans, they advanced towards the city. They were met by the consuls at the head of the Roman forces, the command of the horse being assumed by Brutus, and that of the infantry by Valerius. The horse of Aruns, one of Tarquin's sons, came forward to the charge; and as the hostile armies approached each other, Aruns discovered Brutus attended by his lictors; inflamed with resentment he exclaimed, "There is the enemy of my family, the usurper of my father's throne." He then immediately advanced to a personal encounter, and Brutus flew to meet him. Actuated by passion more than by cool courage, these two champions, neglecting the means of personal defence, transfixed each other with their spears, and fell dead from their horses.

60. 27. *Marathonii tauri.* Theseus slew the Marathonian bull which Hercules had brought from Crete to Eurystheus. Hence Ovid says, (*Met.* VII. 433.)

. . . . *Te, maxime Theseu,*
Mirata est Marathon Cretæi sanguine tauri.

61. 9. *Ille.* Nascica.

61. 12. *Consulem languentem.* P. Mucius Scævola.

61. 15. *Ecquid ipsi nos.* In reference, probably, to his suppression of Catiline's conspiracy.

61. 22. *Achille Homerico.* Who, boiling with rage, draws his sword against Agamemnon. See *Iliad*, I. Homer has been blamed for making his hero, Achilles, of too brutal and unamiable a character. Dr. Blair, in vindication of him says, "Achilles is passionate, indeed, to a great degree; but he is far from being a contemner of laws and justice. In the contest with Agamemnon, though he carries it on with too much heat, yet he has reason on his side. He was notoriously wronged, but he submits, and resigned Briseis peaceably when the heralds came to demand her; only he will fight no longer under the command of a leader who had offended him. Besides his wonderful bravery and contempt of death, he has several qualities of a hero. He is open and sincere. He loves his subjects, and reveres the gods. He is distinguished by strong friendships and attachments; he is, throughout, high spirited, gallant and honorable; and allowing for a degree of ferocity which belonged to the times, and enters into the characters of most of Homer's heroes, he is, upon the whole, abundantly fitted to raise high admiration, though not pure esteem."

61. 22. *Agamemnone.* See *Iliad*, I. Of the contest between Achilles and Agamemnon, Horace says, (*Epist.* I. 2. 13.)

Hunc amor, ira quidem communiter urit utrumque.

62. 5. *Danais inclinantibus.* When Hector,

after the rout of the Greeks, attempted to burn their fleet, Ajax alone resisted. See *Iliad*, 15. Ajax himself declares this in Ovid. See *Met.* XIII. 93.

Nempe ego mille meo protexi pectore puppes,
Spem vestri reditus.

62. 17. *Sphæri.* A Stoic philosopher of Bosphorus. He left behind him three books concerning Lycurgus and Socrates, and one concerning the Eretrian philosophers, who were so called from Menedemus, a native of Eretrea.

64. 3. *Ecquis .... Vincite.* A quotation from a tragedy of Accius. The meaning of the passage is, "Do we think that Æsop, the actor, was angry, when he uttered these words, or that Accius was in anger when he wrote them?"

64. 4. *Æsopum.* See note 101. 6. vol. I.

64. 17. *Afranius.* He was a cotemporary with Terence, and much commended by Quintilian for the purity of his diction.

67. 20. *Heri usi summus.* In the third book of the Tusculan disputations. *Paupertatis malum.* As it is foreign to the object of the disputation, to admit that poverty is an evil, we read in some good editions, *paupertatis nomen tollitur.* Seneca, (*Epist.* II.) says *Honesta, inquit Epicurus, res est læta paupertas. Illa vero non est paupertas, si læta est; cui enim cum paupertate bene convenit, dives est.*

68. 28. *Prementem;* "despising." Bentley has *spernentem.*

69. 13. Sive, quod honestum est. According to the Stoics.

69. 14. *Sive voluptas.* According to the Epicureans. *Sive horum utrumque.* Which was the opinion of Dinomachus and Callipho.

69. 15. *Sive illa tria.* Of the mind, body and fortune, according to Plato and Aristotle.

69. 16. *Si virtutis ipsius.* Horace says, (*Epist.* I. 6. 15.)

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui;
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.

70. 6. *Mœrore et dolore.* On account of the death of his daughter.

70. 18. *Quibus . . . . sequentia;* i. e. the reasons which make present evils tolerable, make those which are to come, of little weight.

70. 27. *Primo et proximo die.* In the first and second of these books.

72. 20. *Digito impellam.* A similar passage occurs in Terence, (*Eun.* II. 2. 53.)

Qui mihi nunc uno digitulo forem aperis fortunatus,
Ne tu istanc faxo calcibus sæpe insultabis frustra.

73. 10. *Deum . . . expeti.* These lines are translated by Cæcilius from Euripides.

73. 19. *Princeps ille Argonautarum.* Jason, in the Medea of Ennius, a favorite tragedy among the ancients. Cicero, (*De Finibus* I.) says *Quis tam inimicus pœne nomini Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam, aut Antiopam Pacuvii, spernat.*

73. 23. *Apud alium.* Probably Accius, for he was the author of a tragedy called Medea.

74. 12. *Nudare inter cives.* Thucydides says that the Lacedæmonians stripped themselves when about to contend. Plato, (*De Rep.* V.) permits even the women to engage naked in the exercises of the gymnasium.

74. 25. *Ibycum.* One of the nine celebrated Greek lyric poets. He flourished in the 60th Olympiad, and was the author of various works, of which only fragments remain. He fell among robbers, and having been mortally wounded besought some cranes that were flying by to bear witness and avenge his death. Some time after, his murderers seeing some cranes pass by them in the midst of the city, whispered in jest to each other, "Here are the avengers of Ibycus." This speech being reported to the magistrates, the robbers were put to the torture, when they confessed the fact and were hung. Hence came the proverb *Ibyci grues* against villains whose crimes were accidentally discovered. The following verse of Ausonius on the subject, is well known:

Ibycus ut periit, vindex fuit altivolans grus.

75. 4. *Dicæarchus.* Of Messene: he was a disciple of Aristotle and acquired distinction by his philosophical disputations and historical writings. See *Tus. Quæst.* I. 10, and note 19. 13.

75. 13. *Leucadiâ.* The name of a play by Turpilius, an old comic poet, in which a lover is introduced whose passion has taken away his senses.

75. 14. *Si quidem . . . amatoriâ!* "*If there be any god whose care I am;* (as if all the gods must take care that he enjoys his amatory propensities!)"

75. 19. *Sanusne es.* This is said by another character in the same play, who is reproving the lover.

75. 20. *Quas tragœdias efficit;* i. e. How tragical he becomes!

77. 1. *Injuriæ . . . insanias.* The words of Parmeno, in the "Eunuch" of Terence.

77. 23. *Major mihi moles,* &c. The words of Atreus, who is exasperated against his brother Thyestes; they are probably borrowed from Ennius, or Accius, as they both wrote of Thyestes.

78. 18. *Archytæ.* A Pythagorean philosopher, cotemporary with Plato. His astronomical and geographical knowledge is celebrated by Horace in a beautiful ode, recording also his death, which was occasioned by a shipwreck on the coast of Apulia, where his unburied corpse was found.

Te maris et terræ numeroque carentis arenæ
Mensorem cohibent, Archyta,
Pulveris exigui prope littus parva Matinum
Munera: nec quidquam tibi prodest
Aerias tentâsse domos, animoque rotundum
Percurrisse polum, morituro!

Car. I. 28.

79. 4. *Clitum.* Brother to the nurse of Alexander the Great. He followed that prince in his conquests, and saved his life, by cutting off the hand

of Rosaces, who raised an axe to kill him, at the passage of the Granicus. Alexander, who had a great regard for him, some time after invited him to supper; Clitus, at the end of the repast, being heated with wine, disparaged the exploits of that prince, in order to magnify those of Philip, his father. This so enraged Alexander, that he killed him with his own hands, for which rash act he was afterwards so afflicted, that he attempted his own life.

79. 25. *Zopyrus.* The tutor of Alcibiades; he was skilled in physiognomy.

BOOK IV.

82. 5. *Ex eo libro.* In allusion to a treatise on the subject of virtue, which Brutus wrote and sent to Cicero.

83. 14. *Casus, in quibus.* Referring, probably, to his exile, to the destruction of his house and other property, and to the loss of his dearly beloved daughter.

83. 26. *Avunculus tuus.* Cato Uticensis, so called from the place of his death; he was a brother of Servilia, the mother of Brutus.

85. 15. *Confitemur esse recens.* When a race of self created preceptors arose in Greece, who assumed the name of "Sophists," or wise men, their

arrogant pretensions gave great offence to such as were capable of distinguishing between real and counterfeit wisdom, and led them to adopt an appellation more suitable to the character of men who modestly professed themselves to be in the *pursuit*, rather than in the *possession* of truth and wisdom, viz. that of philosophers. Cicero ascribes the invention of this term to Pythagoras, and gives an account, in the next section, of the manner in which it was introduced. The example of Pythagoras was followed by every man of eminence, the name Sophists being retained only by those who, with a pomp of words, made a magnificent display of wisdom upon a very slight foundation of knowledge.

85. 21. *Illos septem.* Their names were Solon, Thales, Chilo, Pittacus, Cleobulus, Bias and Periander. The history of these persons, who were called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, was originally, without doubt, plain and simple; but it has been rendered obscure and uncertain by traditionary reports. The following is said to be the incident to which their appellation was at first owing. In the third year of the 49th Olympiad, certain youths of Ionia, purchasing from a fisherman of Miletus a large draught of fish which he had brought to shore, found in the net a golden tripod of great value. Upon this, a dispute arose between the fisherman and the purchasers; the former maintaining that he had only sold them the capture of

fish; the latter asserting that they had bought the chance of the draught, whatever it might be. The question was referred to the citizens of Miletus, who were of opinion, that in an affair so extraordinary, the Delphic oracle should be consulted. The answer of the oracle was, "To the wisest." In obedience to this answer, the Milesians unanimously adjudged the tripod to Thales. He modestly declined the honor, and sent it to Bias, a wise man of Priene; from him it was passed on through several hands till it came to Solon, the Athenian legislator, who judging that the character of "the wisest" could not properly belong to any human being, sent the prize of wisdom to Delphos, to be dedicated to Apollo. This story has in it something fabulous, and the circumstances attending it are differently related by different writers. Brucker thinks it more probable that in some public assembly, a tripod was proposed as an honorary prize to the man who should recite in verse, the most excellent maxims of political and moral wisdom, and that the sages who engaged in this generous contest, afterwards agreed to dedicate the prize to Apollo. In confirmation of this conjecture, it is alleged, from a passage in Plato's Protagoras, that the wise men of this period met together to frame concise precepts and maxims for the conduct of life; and agreed to send such sentences as were thought most valuable, to Delphos, to be inscribed *in* the temple.

85. 23. *Multis ante sæculis.* He flourished 150 years before the building of the city of Rome, about 900 B. C. The seven wise men of Greece about 565 B. C.

85. 24. *Homerus.* Without leaning to the faith of those who have denied the existence of Homer, it is worth while to notice here the remarkable circumstance of his existence having been called in question. Both learning and ingenuity have been employed in attempting to prove that neither the Iliad nor the Odyssey were the production of a single genius, but composed by the rhapsodists who recited those poems in detached parts; and that the name of Homer, which in the Eolian dialect of Greek signifies "blind" was either applied to some personage, wholly fanciful, or by way of eminence, to some strolling declaimer of the Iliad, who may have executed parts of the poem, but cannot be supposed to be the author of the whole. In opposition to all skepticism regarding Homer, every candid mind will agree, that the settled and prevailing belief of antiquity is not to be made light of in such a question. It is true that Homer's birthplace, as well as his age, are disputed; but such controversies are not apt to be started about imaginary beings. It is unreasonable to say, that a poet so illustrious as Homer, if he had been the acknowledged author of the Iliad, must have been known to his contemporaries. Only a few scattered anecdotes of Shakspeare himself have reached the

present day. In an age such as the probable age of Homer, had a man of genius a better chance of finding contemporary biographers? To adduce all the proof that could be given of great poets being neglected by their contemporaries, would, unhappily, be to write the history of the greater part of them.

86. 1. *Affixus Caucaso.* This part of the history of Prometheus, and his subsequent deliverance either by Hercules or Jupiter himself, abounds with fictions which are supposed to contain some ancient facts under this fabulous disguise. M. Bannier supposes this to be merely a continuation of the history of the Titans. Prometheus, as he conjectures, was not exempt from the persecutions which harassed the other Titans. When he returned into Scythia, which he durst not quit so long as Jupiter lived, that god is said to have bound him to Caucasus. Prometheus being addicted to astrology, frequently retired to mount Caucasus as to a kind of observatory, where he contemplated the stars; and was, as it were, preyed upon by continual pinings on account of the solitary and melancholy life which he led. This is supposed to have given rise to the fable of the eagle or vulture that incessantly preyed upon his liver.

86. 2. *Stellatus Cepheus.* Cepheus, his wife Cassiope, his daughter Andromeda, and his son-in-law Perseus, were enrolled among the stars. Cicero,

(*De Nat. Deo.* II. 43.) says: *Minorem autem Septemtrionem Cepheus passis palmis a tergo subsequitur.*

Namque ipsum ad tergum Cynosuræ vertitur Arcti.

Hunc antecedit

Obscura specie stellarum Cassiopea.
Hanc autem illustri versatur corpore propter
Andromeda, aufugiens aspectum mœsta parentis.

86. 20. *Mercatum eum.* During the celebration of the Olympic games, there were frequent fairs for traffic in merchandize, &c. The great concourse of people assembled rendered these occasions advantageous for such a purpose.

86. 23. *Nobilitatem coronæ.* The only prize given to the conqueror in the Olympic games, was a garland of wild olive. The prize in the Isthmian games consisted at first of a garland of pine leaves and afterwards of a wreath of ivy, but in the end the ivy was again superseded by a pine garland. Simple as such rewards were, a victor in these games gained the greatest distinction and honor among his countrymen, and a victory not only rendered the individual who obtained it a subject of admiration, but shed lustre over his family, and the whole town or community to which he belonged.

87. 14. *In Italiam venisset.* Being unable to endure the tyranny of Polycrates, he retired into the eastern part of Italy, then called Magna Græcia, and established his sect, denominated from this

circumstance the "Italic sect," or "Italic school." See note 57. 12.

87. 14. *Exornavit eam Græciam.* Such were the reputation and influence of Pythagoras at Crotona, that he was treated with great respect, and people of all classes assembled to hear his discourses; insomuch that the manners of the citizens were soon totally changed from great luxury and licentiousness, to strict sobriety and frugality. It is said that 600 persons were prevailed upon to submit to the severe discipline which he required, and to throw their effects into a common stock for the benefit of the whole fraternity. The influence of his philosophy extended from Crotona to many other cities of Magna Græcia, and obtained for Pythagoras from his followers a degree of respect little short of adoration.

87. 18. *Socratem.* His favorite maxim was "whatever is above us, doth not concern us." He estimated the value of knowledge by its utility, and recommended the study of geometry, astronomy, and other sciences, only so far as they admit of a practical application to the purposes of human life. His great object in all his conferences and discourses was to lead men into an acquaintance with themselves; to convince them of their follies and vices; to inspire them with the love of virtue, and to furnish them with useful moral instructions. Cicero might therefore very justly say of Socrates, that he was the first who called down philosophy from

heaven, and introduced her into the public walks and domestic retirements of men, that she might instruct them concerning life and manners.

88. 2. *Platonis memoriâ et literis.* But Plato did not strictly adhere to the method of his master Socrates, and his followers wholly deserted it; for instead of the Socratic modesty of affirming nothing and examining every thing, they turned philosophy, as it were, into an art; and formed a system of opinions which they delivered to their disciples as the peculiar tenets of their sect.

88. 4. *Quo Socratem usum.* While Socrates professed to know nothing, he used to sift out the several doctrines of all the pretenders to science, and then tease them with a series of questions, so contrived, as to reduce them by the course of their answers, to an evident absurdity, and the impossibility of defending what they had at first affirmed.

89. 7. *Hæc .... beata;* i. e. These habits of living [*constanter, graviter, sapienter, fortiter*] are sometimes exhibited by him who is upon the rack, a situation to which a happy life does not aspire.

90. 4. *Atilio.* M. Atilius Regulus. There are few more favorite themes for poets and orators in Roman history, than the heroism and martyrdom of Regulus. An embassy was despatched from Carthage to Rome during the war between those cities, with proposals for peace, or at least for an exchange of prisoners. The ambassadors were accompanied by Regulus, who had been for five

years a captive. He is said to have refused to enter the city, regarding himself as a Carthaginian slave; to have sought the leave of his new masters before he could be prevailed upon to attend the deliberations of the senate, and there to have opposed the exchange of prisoners with no less vehemence than the propositions for peace. It is recorded of him, that his counsels determined the wavering resolutions of the senate; that no persuasions to remain prevailed with him in comparison with his honor and his oath, and that he was put to death, on returning to Carthage, with all the refinements of African cruelty. Dio Cassius, however, treats the martyrdom of Regulus as a piece of pure fictitious martyrology; and the calumnies against Carthage, in which the Romans constantly indulged, render it probable that the received story had exceedingly slight foundation in fact. At all events the rationale of this heroism it seems not very easy to discover, considering that three years later, the same exchange of prisoners, to have prevented which is reckoned proof of such high merit in Regulus, was actually acceded to by the Romans, with greatly more disadvantage to their affairs.

90. 4. *Cæpione.* Various accounts are given of him. Justin says he was put to death for stealing gold from Tolosa, (now Toulouse) when as consul he conquered the Tectosages; others say it was on account of a defeat by the Cimbrians when he *he was* consul in Gaul. Cicero, in his oration for

heaven, and introduced her into the public walks and domestic retirements of men, that she might instruct them concerning life and manners.

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94. 8. *Imperator.* In the fifty-sixth year of his age, Cicero was sent as proconsul to Cilicia. His success there, though not splendid, was sufficient for the protection of the province, and as complete as the occasion seems to have required. It was then customary, even in very moderate triumphs, for the army to hail their general *imperator*, and Cicero received this honor. In his applying to the senate for a supplication, and entertaining hopes of a triumph, the admirer of his virtue must regret to find an instance of his vanity. Cato opposed the decree with many expressions of regard for the truly valuable parts of his character, but deemed such honors too cheaply given. The offence which Cicero expresses on this occasion, was unworthy of himself, and forms a displeasing contrast both to his former noble conduct, and to the candid and manly sentiments of Cato on that occasion.

94. 28. *Tria genera malorum.* Of mind, body, and fortune.

96. 2. *Scholis;* "disputations."

96. 3. *Callisthene.* The name of a book which he published on the death of his friend Callisthenes.

96. 16. *Philosophi . . . . dixerit;* i. e. That is indeed the sentiment of a philosopher; but it would come with more consistency from Socrates or Antisthenes, than from Epicurus, who confines all good to pleasure.

96. 17. *Antisthenes.* A disciple of Socrates and another of the Cynic sect. In his discourses, he

censured the manners of the age with a degree of harshness which procured him the surname of the "Dog." He expressed the utmost contempt for pleasure, as the greatest evil, and declared that he would rather be mad than addicted to a voluptuous manner of living.

97. 3. *Metrodorus.* A disciple of Epicurus.

98. 13. *Communibus magistris.* Antiochus and Aristo, who were common masters of Cicero and Brutus.

98. 14. *Speusippo.* A nephew and successor of Plato in the Academy; he taught eight years, and was succeeded by Xenocrates, the most rigid of the philosophers. Next came Polemo, who, after a youth of dissipation was induced by Xenocrates to devote himself to philosophy. Horace, (*Sat.* II. 3. 253,) says:

> . . . *Quaero, faciamne quod olim*
> *Mutatus Polemon? Ponas insignia morbi,*
> *Fasciolas, cubital, focalia, potus ut ille*
> *Dicitur ex collo furtim carpsisse coronas,*
> *Postquam est impransi correptus voce magistri?*

98. 17. *Quos . . . ducere;* i. e. If they are charmed with this beautiful and illustrious title which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, who despised the goods of the body and fortune, they should determine to disregard strength, health, beauty, riches, honors, power, with the splendor of which they are captivated, and to consider of no value those things which are the opposites of these.

99. 25. *Tabellis obsignatis agis mecum;* i. e. You appeal to my own writings. When any one advanced an opinion different from that which he had before expressed, tablets were produced in his own hand writing, containing his former words. M. Antonius, the orator, said he never committed an oration to writing, as by omitting this, he could deny without fear of contradiction, what he had said inconsiderately before.

99. 26. *Testificaris.* A judicial word for *testes facis.*

100. 1. *Nos in diem vivimus;* i. e. We defend our opinions until another day brings us something more probable; we say anything which has struck our minds by its probability; so that we alone are at liberty.

100. 15. *Verborum opifex.* Zeno, the chief of the Stoics, was the inventor of new words rather than of new things. Cicero, in his treatise *De Naturâ Deorum*, (III.) says, *Et magnam molestiam suscepit, dum vult vocabulorum causas explicare.*

100. 20. *In "Gorgiâ."* A dialogue of that name by Plato.

100. 21. *Archelăum.* A king of Macedon.

101. 6. *In Epitaphio.* Another dialogue of Plato.

101. 7. *Nam .... comparata est;* "For, says Socrates, "he who possesses within himself every thing necessary for a happy life, and depends not upon the good or ill success of others, or upon foreign events, has acquired the best mode of life."

101. 8. *Apta;* for *pendentia.*

103. 17. *Non . . . . fortuna;* "A fortune which depends on ropes, is not very desirable."

107. 2. *Euryclea.* The nurse of Ulysses. In one of the plays of Sophocles, and in another of Pacuvius, she is introduced in the act of washing the feet of Ulysses, after his return from the Trojan war. See also Homer's Odyssey, XI.

108. 15. *Attonsa Laconum.* He twice fought with the Lacedæmonians; once at Leuctra, a small town of Bœotia, against Cleombrotus; afterwards at Mantinea, a city of Arcadia, against Agesilaus. In both contests he was victorious, but in the latter he died of his wounds.

108. 17. *A sole . . . . queat.* These verses in which Scipio is boasting, are from Ennius.

109. 7. *Libra illa.* Under the similitude of a balance, Critolaus was accustomed to show how much the goods of the mind are superior to those of the body and of fortune. Cicero (*De Fin.* V. 30.) says: *Audebo igitur cetera, quæ secundum naturam sunt, bona appellare, nec fraudare suo veteri nomine, quam aliquid potius novum exquirere; virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in alterâ libræ lance ponere. Terram, mihi crede, ea lanx, et maria deprimet.* In this passage it will be seen that our author, as he takes his figure from Homer, has, like Homer, supposed the excellency to preponderate, not by sinking, as the heaviest things do, when put into a scale

against anything that is lighter, but by rising up. He is explaining the notions of the Greek Peripatetics, especially of Plato, with whom this figure is very familiar.

110. 16. *C. Lælii.* Called Sapiens. He was distinguished by his friendship with the second Scipio Africanus. Cicero, in his treatise "*De Amicitiâ*," represents him as explaining the real nature of friendship, with its attendant pleasures. He was an eminent orator, and a successful cultivator of polite literature.

110. 23. *Cinnam.* L. Cornelius Cinna was an aspiring demagogue, who raised himself to the highest honors of the state by attaching himself during the civil commotions, to the popular faction. He has been described as one who, having attempted what no good man would have dared, performed what none but a very brave man could have effected.

110. 23. *Quater.* He was indeed four times consul, but was deposed from his first consulship, and killed by his own soldiers, in his fourth.

111. 3. *Cn. Octavii.* Cinna was elected consul A. U. 667, during the tyranny of Sylla, though he had been the avowed friend of Marius. He had no sooner entered upon his office, than he drove Sylla from Rome to his army in Asia. He then attempted to strengthen his party by incorporating a number of new citizens into the ancient tribes from the allies. This was opposed by his colleague Octa-

vius, and the senators, who yet held the honor of citizenship in high estimation: a bloody battle was fought in the forum between the two parties, in which Cinna was defeated. He and six tribunes who had sided with him, were expelled the city. Not long after, having induced many to join him, he returned and entered Rome victorious, with Marius and other leaders of his party. At first they seemed contented with the destruction of Octavius, but afterwards put to death the most highly respected, honorable, and eloquent men of Rome. Merula, who was invested with the most sacred priestly office, that of *flamen dialis*, died on the altar of Jupiter, whose servant he was; Octavius was slain in the consular chair in his robes of office; Catulus, who had once been Marius's colleague in the Cimbrian war, was driven to self murder by the rigor of the unfeeling old man. The rage of slaughter lasted five days and nights in succession.

111. 15. *Marius.* This personage, who soon proved himself so eminently fitted to ride the waves of military democracy, combined with many qualities of the good old Roman character, the coarse and earthy soul of a peasant struggling into eminence; and exhibited, from the entrance of his career, the low and grovelling cunning, as well as the stubborn remorselessness of nature, which seem natural properties of the mean yet energetic spirit, exclusively intent on self-aggrandisement. He was a

protégé of the family of Metellus; his father, a sturdy peasant of the old breed in a village of the neighborhood of Arpi, having been one among the clients of that family. Marius died in the 70th year of his age, sixteen days after he had been made consul for the seventh time, A. U. C. 666. Rome seemed to rejoice at the fall of a man whose ambition had proved fatal to so many of her citizens. His only qualifications were those of a great general; and with these he rendered himself the most illustrious and powerful of the Romans, because he was the only one whose ferocity seemed capable of opposing the barbarians of the north.

111. 16. *Cimbricæ victoriæ.* The Cimbrians were totally defeated by the valor and policy of Marius and Catulus, A. U. C. 653, as they were endeavoring to enter Italy through Noricum, now the Tyrol; 120,000 being killed, and 60,000 taken prisoners. How highly the Romans estimated this victory, may be deduced from the triumph, and other singular honors which they decreed to Marius and Catulus, as well as from the monuments which these caused to be erected in memory of the transaction. Those Cimbrians who escaped the dreadful slaughter, probably returned to their own country, for they are said afterwards to have sent a submissive embassy to Augustus, and are likewise mentioned by an author of later date, as the most warlike of all the northern Germans down to Claudian's time; but their name was sunk either

in that of the Teutones, or of the Saxons, who, being their neighbors, joined with them in their excursions, and gradually became more powerful.

111. 21. *Nefariæ voci.* Plutarch says that Catulus put an end to his existence by suffocation.

112. 2. *Dionysius.* The elder.

112. 15. *Alius alio modo.* Xenophon says that Dionysius was the son of Hermocrates, a noble Syracusan; Plutarch says that he was married to the daughter of Hermocrates.

112. 26. *Artificio.* Bentley substitutes *officio*, because the daughters of Dionysius did not profess to be barbers, but were compelled by their father to perform the duties. Horace, (*Sat.* II. 6. 108.) says:

> . . . *Nec non vernaliter ipsis*
> *Fungitur officiis.*

and Plautus, (*Cistellaria* IV. 1.) *Faciendum est puerile officium.*

113. 3. *Duas uxores.* To both of whom he was married on the same day. Aristomache was a daughter of Hipparinus.

113. 10. *Cummunibus suggestis.* For other incidents in the life of Dionysius, see Plutarch's life of Dion.

114. 1. *Damocles.* Horace, (*Car.* III. 1. 17.) in allusion to the account here given of this personage, says:

Districtus ensis cui super impiâ
Cervice pendet, non Siculæ dapes
Dulcem elaborabunt saporem;
Non avium citharæque cantus
Somnum reducent. . . .

114. 14. *Coronæ.* The use of chaplets at festival entertainments sprang from Greece, and owed its origin to the practice of tying a wooden fillet tight round the head, for the purpose of mitigating the effects of intoxication. Thus Mercury, in the Amphitryon of Plautus (III. 4. 16,) says,

Capiam coronam mihi in caput; assimilabo me esse ebrium.

But as luxury increased, they were made of various flowers or shrubs, such as were supposed to prevent intoxication; of roses, (which were the choicest), violets, myrtle, ivy, philyra, and even parsley. The Romans were not allowed to wear these crowns in public, "*in usu promiscuo*," (which was contrary to the practice of the Greeks,) and those who attempted to do so were punished by imprisonment.

115. 5. *Pythagoreis duobus illis.* Damon and Pythias.

115. 13. *Poëtam.* Dionysius wished to be regarded as a poet, an honor which, no doubt was readily conferred upon him by servile flatterers, but Philoxenus spoke freely of the merit of the verses of his royal master, and as a reward for his integrity, was committed to prison. Dionysius

however, liberated him the next day, and then inviting him to a splendid entertainment, read some other verses which he thought would not fail of the poet's approbation; in this however he was disappointed. Philoxenus, when he had heard the lines, turned to the guards and desired them to carry him back to the prison.

115. 17. *Aquinio.* Probably the same to whom Catullus refers, (XIV. 18.)

Nam si luxerit, ad librariorum
Curram scrinia: Cæsios, Aquinios,
Suffenum, omnia colligam venena.

116. 3. *Humilem homunculum.* Plutarch informs us that Archimedes was nearly related by his father, to Hiero the Syracusan king, with whom he lived in habits of intimate friendship; but that his mother was of obscure origin, a circumstance which may account for the degrading terms which our author here applies to him.

116. 4. *A pulvere et radio;* i. e. devoted to mathematical studies; a mode of speech taken from the use of the radius in describing geometrical figures in the dust.

116. 5. *Archimedem.* One of the most eminent of the ancient mathematicians, born at Syracuse in Sicily, about 287 B. C. It is reported that he was indebted to Egypt for much of his knowledge; but other accounts indicate that he conferred more knowledge than he received from that celebrated

nation: and, in particular, Diodorus mentions that Egypt was indebted to him for the invention of the screw pump, for drawing off water. Livy, (XXIV.) calls him "*Unicus spectator cœli siderumque, mirabilior tamen inventor ac machinator bellicorum tormentorum*, &c. He was eminent for mechanical invention, but still more so for the investigation of abstract truths, and the formation of conclusive demonstrations in the branches of pure geometry. It is said that he was often so deeply engaged in mathematical speculations as to neglect both his food and the care of his person: and at the bath he would sometimes draw geometrical figures in the ashes, and sometimes upon his own body, when it was anointed according to the custom of that time. Every lover of philosophic merit must regret to learn that when Syracuse was taken by storm, Archimedes being ignorant of the fact, was run through the body, when engaged in drawing a geometrical figure upon the sand. As Marcellus had given express orders that both his person and his house should be held sacred, this appears to have happened through ignorance, and therefore removes a great part of the odium from the Roman name. His death happened 212 B. C.

116. 13. *Agragianas.* Through which they went to Agragas, now Agrigentum, a city on the southern coast of Sicily.

116. 14. *Columellâm.* He valued himself so

much upon the discovery of the ratio between the sphere and the containing cylinder, that, indifferent to all his other inventions, he ordered his friends to engrave upon his tomb a cylinder containing a sphere, with an inscription explanatory of its nature and use. Cicero, when he was quæstor in Sicily, about 140 years after the death of Archimedes, discovered this monument in a neglected state, and overrun with briars and brambles, which he ordered to be cleared away.

116. 25. *Arpinate.* The place of Cicero's birth was Arpinum, a city anciently of the Samnites, now part of the kingdom of Naples. It had the honor also, of producing the great C. Marius, which gave occasion to Pompey to say, in a public speech, "That Rome was indebted to this corporation for two citizens, who had, each in his turn, preserved it from ruin."

118. 3. *Tardis mentibus. Comitor*, which usually governs the accusative, is sometimes found with the dative by a Greek construction.

118. 6. *Triplex animi fetus.* The three divisions of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic.

119. 5. *Delphis præcepta.* Apollo is said to have placed upon the doors of the Delphic temple, the inscription "Know thyself."

120. 5. *Sed hæc otii;* "such are its effects in retirement."

120. 24. *Ut habet se res.* Bentley reads *ut ut*

[h. e. *utcumque*] *habet se res*, although Epicurus may be inconsistent in so doing, and may contradict his own opinions. So in Terence, (*Heaut.* 1. 2.) *Ut ut erat, mansum tamen oportuit;* and (*Phorm.* III. 2.) *Sed ut ut hæc sunt, tamen hoc faciam.*

121. 17. *Dicit recordatione.* When Epicurus perceived his end approaching, he wrote a will, in which he bequeathed his garden and its appurtenances to Hermachus, and in succession to the future professors of his philosophy. On the last day of his life, he informed his friend Hermachus, that his pain was extreme, but he added, "All this is counterbalanced by the satisfaction of mind which I derive from the recollection of my discourses and discoveries."

121. 20. *Gelidis fluminibus.* In our author's treatise *De Legibus*, (I.) he speaks of two rivers near Arpinum, called Fibrenus and Liris.

122. 11. *Cœlumque contingant*, i. e. *excellant.* So in Horace, (*Od.* I. 1. 36,) *Sublimi feriam sidera vertice.*

123. 4. *Nudi ætatem agunt.* In allusion to the gymnosophists, a sect of Indian philosophers who voluntarily submitted to strange austerities. They were more distinguished by severity of manners than by the cultivation of science, and more resembled modern monks than ancient philosophers. Among the Hindoos are many devotees who subject themselves to the most extravagant

penances. Some will keep their arms constantly stretched over their heads till they become withered and incapable of motion; others keep them crossed over their breasts during life; while others, by keeping their hands constantly shut, have them quite pierced through by the growth of their nails. Some chain themselves to trees or particular spots of ground, which they never quit; others resolve never to lie down, but sleep leaning against a tree; the most curious penance perhaps on record, is that of a Jogey, who measured the distance between Benares and Juggernaut with the length of his body, lying down and rising alternately.

123. 7. *Mulieres vero.* Among the Hindoos the custom of burning the dead prevails universally; and the practice of wives burning themselves along with their deceased husbands was formerly very common, though now much less so. At present it is totally prohibited in the British dominions; and even the Mohammedans endeavor to discountenance a practice so barbarous, though many of their governors are accused of conniving at it through motives of avarice. The miserable enthusiasts who devote themselves to this dreadful death, suffer with the greatest fortitude. Mr. Holwel gives an account of one who, being told of the pain she must suffer, (with a view to dissuade her,) put her finger into the fire and kept it there for a considerable time; after which she put fire on the palm of

her hand, with incense upon it, and fumigated the brahmins who were present.

123. 13. *Illa, victa, mœsta discedit.* Bentley thinks these words should be in the plural number, because Cicero has just said, "*plures singulis solent esse nuptæ.*" But the words *illa victa* have the same signification as *quæcumque ex illis est victa*, whether there be two or more. In expressions of this kind, *illa* has the force of the plural number.

123. 20. *Ibim.* This celebrated bird was brought up in the temples of ancient Egypt with a degree of respect bordering on adoration, and was carefully embalmed after death. These honors, say some, were paid, because it was habituated to devour serpents, which have become dangerous to the country; according to others, because there was some relation between its plumage and the phases of the moon; lastly, some were of opinion that its appearance announced the annual increase of the Nile. It is as large as a hen, with white plumage, except the end of the wing quills, which are black. The last wing-coverts have elongated and slender barbs, of a black color, with violet reflexions, and thus cover the wings and tail. The bill and feet are black as well as all the naked part of the head and neck. In the young subject, however, this part is covered, at least on its upper face, with small blackish plumes. The species is found throughout the whole extent of Africa.

123. 20. *Aut aspidem.* Different cities in Egypt worshipped different beasts; from this circumstance many of their names are derived, as Leontopolis, Cynopolis, and Lycopolis, from the lion, dog, and wolf. See some allusions to this superstition in Juvenal, *Sat.* XV.

126. 18. *Ut Hieronymus.* A Peripatetic philosopher; in his opinion of the chief good, however, he seems to have differed from the Peripatetics.

127. 2. *Aristonis.* A Stoic philosopher, the disciple of Zeno, the chief of the Stoics, from whom he differed but little. He rejected logic as of no use, and natural philosophy as being above the reach of the human understanding. There is a saying of his recorded, which might render the doctrine of Aristippus less odious than it ordinarily is. He used to say, "that a philosopher might do those of his hearers a prejudice, who put wrong interpretations upon good meaning; as for example, that the school of Aristippus might send out debauchees, and that of Zeno, Cynics;" which seems to imply that this philosopher never produced this effect but when it was misunderstood. He should also have added that every teacher is therefore obliged to forbear laying down ambiguous maxims, or to prevent false glosses being put upon them.

127. 2. *Pyrrhonis, Herilli.* The former was the famous skeptic, who affected to doubt of every

thing; the latter, according to some, was of Chalcedon, according to others, of Carthage, and a disciple of Zeno, though he afterwards wrote against his master.

127. 12. *Reliqua ex collatione.* Aristotle and the Peripatetics considered riches and other gifts of fortune as worthless in comparison with virtue. (See Cicero *De Fin.* V.)

128. 9. *Carneadem.* He thought that the ultimate object of life is the enjoyment of those things towards which we are directed by the principles of nature. See note 13. 8.

128. 28. *Isti grandiloqui.* The Peripatetics and Stoics.

129. 1. *Quæ maxime angunt.* Pain and death.

129. 5. *Quisquam philosophorum; sc. illam extimescit.*

129. 7. *Parvo est contentus.* See note 10. 21.

129. 13. *Anacharsis.* A Scythian philosopher, cotemporary with Solon. His letter to Crœsus, king of the Lydians is still extant.

129. 17. *Scythicum tegmen.* Justin says that the use of woollen garments was unknown to the Scythians, and that their clothing was the skins of wild beasts.

129. 20. *Quare . . . . venias;* "You may therefore come to me, as to one undisturbed by wants."

130. 1. *Xenocrates.* When sent with others, as an ambassador to Philip of Macedon, he was the

only one who would not be corrupted by the gifts of that monarch.

130. 6. *Cui numerari juberet;* i. e. to whom he wished the money to be given which they had brought from Alexander.

130. 14. *Videlicet.* Alexander was so struck with this answer, that he said "If I were not Alexander, I should wish to be Diogenes."

132. 8. *Darius, in fugâ.* Into which he was driven by Alexander. By that victory one hundred and ten thousand Persians are said to have been slain.

132. 19. *In phiditiis.* To suppress the magnificence and extravagance of public tables, Lycurgus ordained that all the citizens should eat together of the same common food which the law prescribed, and expressly forbade all private eating at their own houses. By this settlement of public and common meals, and by this frugality and simplicity in eating, he depreciated the value of riches, and made them of no use as means of procuring the luxuries of life. Each table accommodated about 15 persons; and every person furnished every month a bushel of flour, eight measures of wine, five pounds of cheese, two and a half pounds of figs, and a small sum of money for preparing and cooking the food. Every person, without discrimination, was obliged to attend at the common meal.

132. 21. *Jure illo nigro.* The most exquisite of

all their eatables was that which they called "black broth;" the old men preferred it to every thing else upon the table. Dionysius, however, thought otherwise, and complained of it as insipid; upon which he was told that the seasoning was wanting. When the tyrant inquired "What seasoning?" he was told "fatigue in hunting, sweat, a race on the banks of Eurotas, hunger and thirst." These were the ingredients with which they seasoned their food.

132. 25. *Eurotâ.* See note 99. 6. vol. I.

133. 1. *Ut quidquid .... contentæ:* "are satisfied with anything that is thrown to them, provided it be not unnatural."

133. 26. *Dionis.* Of Syracuse. After restoring that city to its liberty, and defeating the plans of Dionysius, he perished by the treacherous conduct of an Athenian, who was his intimate friend. The Syracusans afterwards cherished his memory as their deliverer, and honored him with a public monument.

134. 11. *Jussit in busto.* Athenæus gives this epitaph entire, and says there was a statue with that inscription in Anchiale, a city of Cilicia. Cicero says in his treatise *De Finibus*, (II.) "If the pleasures of the body, even when past, give delight, I cannot imagine why Aristotle so much ridiculed the epitaph of Sardanapalus, in which that Assyrian monarch boasts that he had carried

off with him all his pleasures: "for," said Aristotle "if he could enjoy those pleasures only during the very moment in which he was tasting them in his life time, how could they remain with him after death? Therefore the pleasures of the body are momentary and instantaneous, and oftener give us reason to repent of them, than to indulge their remembrance."

134. 25. *Pungit aliquid.* An allusion perhaps to the conduct of Verres, a prætor at Rome, and afterwards proprætor in Sicily, in the administration of which province he made himself infamous by his excessive avarice, sensuality and cruelty. He is said to have carried home from Sicily all the statues and pictures he could find. As these were obtained by robbery, the recollection of his villainy must have haunted him.

135. 14. *Non multum ipse secum;* "he had conversed but little with himself;" i. e. he had not yet learned to judge of himself independently of popular opinion.

135. 27. *Ille.* The wise man.

136. 2. *Nos .... contemnere;* "but we know not how to despise those honors of the people, until the people have begun to repent of having conferred them upon us."

136. 4. *Heraclitum.* A philosopher of Ephesus. It has been reported that he was perpetually shedding tears on account of the vices of mankind, and

particularly of his countrymen; but the fable has probably as little foundation in truth as that of the perpetual laughing of Democritus. Juvenal, (*Sat.* X. 28,) says:

> *Jamne igitur laudas, quod de sapientibus alter*
> *Ridebat, quoties a limine moverat unum*
> *Protuleratque pedem: flebat contrarius alter?*

136. 11. *Aristides.* Called the just. He was banished for ten years from Athens by the *ostracism*, a law by which the majority of the Athenian assembly might expel any citizen, however inoffensive or meritorious had been his conduct, who by his present power and influence, seemed capable of disturbing the equality of republican governments. He was recalled by the people in the sixth year of his exile.

137. 6. *Lacydes.* A Greek philosopher of Cyrene, a disciple of Arcesilaus, whom he succeeded in the Academic chair.

137. 23. *T. Albucius.* A Roman philosopher of the Epicurean sect, who flourished about 120 B. C. Having been educated at Athens, he became so attached to Grecian manners, that he preferred being regarded as a Greek rather than a Roman. According to Cicero, (*De Finibus* I. 3. and *De Oratore*, III. 43,) *Scævola* often rallied him on account of this affectation. Thus he compares his style to a kind of inlaid or mosaic work:

"How neatly are his polished words inlaid!
Not nicer skill the artist has displayed,
Whose patient hand, on smooth, mosaic ground,
Figures that live and speak, has strewed around."

He was proprætor in Sardinia, and on his return from thence, being accused of peculation in his office, was sentenced to exile. He withdrew to Athens, and devoted his remaining days to the study of philosophy.

138. 3. *Aut Plato . . . . beatior;* i. e. Was Plato, because he was an Athenian, happier than Xenocrates, who was of Chalcedon? or Polemo, who was an Athenian, happier than Arcesilaus of Pitane?

138. 4. *Quanti . . . pelluntur?* Referring, probably to Athens, from which city Socrates, Themistocles, Aristides, Alcibiades and others were banished. Some commentators suppose Rome to be meant.

138. 6. *Demaratus.* A merchant of Corinth, who migrated into Etruria, and was married to a distinguished woman of that place, by whom he had two sons, Lucumo and Aruns. The former of these sons was afterwards called L. Tarquinius Priscus, and became a king of Rome.

139. 13. *Appium.* Appius Claudius Cæcus, who was consul A. U. 446, and 457. In the year 473, when the senate seemed inclined to make peace and enter into an alliance with Pyrrhus, Appius was carried to the senate in a chair, having, because

of his blindness, left it for many years. His speech is in Plutarch's life of Pyrrhus. See also Cicero's treatise *De Senectute*, VI. and XI.

139. 16. *C. Drusi.* A distinguished lawyer, brother of M. Drusus who was consul A. U. 641.

139. 20. *Cn. Aufidius prætorius.* Called prætorian probably to distinguish him from the consul of the same name, whom he in his old age adopted from the Aurelian family. Some commentators suppose the word *cæcus* to have been accidentally left out, and that the reading should be *prætorius, cæcus, et in senatu*, &c., for if Aufidius was not blind, what was there remarkable in his doing what Cicero relates of him?

139. 23. *Videbat in literis;* "was acquainted with literature," if *videbat* be the right word to use when speaking of a blind man. Bentley reads *vivebat*, i. e. passed his life in literary pursuits. Cicero, (*Fam.* IX. 26,) says, *Quid ergo faciam? te consulo, qui philosophum audis. Angar? excruciemne me? quid assequar? deinde quem ad finem? Vivas, inquis, in literis.* And again, (*Fam.* XIII. 28,) *Est enim in eo, cum virtus et probitas et summum officium summaque observantia, tum studia illa nostra, quibus antea delectabamur, nunc etiam vivimus.*

139. 23. *Diodotus Stoïcus.* He was the preceptor of Cicero in various departments of learning, but particularly in logic.

140. 5. *Asclepiadem.* A Greek philosopher of

the Eliac school, born at Phlia, in Peloponnesus, who flourished about 350 B. C. He and his intimate friend Menedemus, left their country for the sake of enjoying Plato's company at Athens, and gained a subsistence by grinding in the night in one of the public prisons, that they might be able to spend the day in the academy. In advanced life Asclepiades lost his sight, an affliction which he bore with cheerfulness.

140. 10. *Si liceat:* [*mendicare*] i. e. if it be allowed to obtain a subsistence by begging.

140. 13. *Democritus.* Of Abdera. It is said he deprived himself of sight because he thought his mind would be in a better state for contemplation, if relieved from beholding objects presented by the eyes. Cicero mentions this in his treatise *De Finibus.* The account is probably fabulous. See note 20. 14. vol. I.

141. 4. *Anaxagoras.* See note 15. 24. of this volume.

141. 10. *Polyphemum Homerus.* See the Odyssey, I. 105.

141. 17. *M. Crassus.* See note 14. 7. vol. I.

141. 18. *Male audiebat;* "he heard himself spoken ill of," on account of his avarice. As his love of riches was more predominant than that of glory, Crassus never imitated the ambitious conduct of his colleagues, but was satisfied with the province of Syria, which seemed to promise an

inexhaustible source of wealth. Few among the ancients seem to have followed so systematically the plans of pecuniary profit, and none among the Romans to have obtained so great a mass of property; hence he obtained the name of Crassus the rich. He was at times exceedingly prodigal of his wealth; once he gave a sumptuous entertainment to the people at 10,000 tables, and bestowed upon each guest corn enough to supply his family for three months. He was likewise ready on almost every occasion to lend his money to his friends without interest, which showed a mind superior to the principle of common avarice.

142. 1. *Antequam hi sint inventi.* Music is probably nearly coeval with our race, or at least with the first attempts to preserve the memory of transactions. To the Egyptian Mercury, or Thoth, who is called Trismegistos, or thrice illustrious, is ascribed the invention of the lyre, which had at first only three strings; to these Terpander is said to have added four, Simonides one, and Timotheus one. The single flute which they called Photinx, is also ascribed to the Egyptians. Its shape was that of a horn, of which, no doubt it was originally made. "Before the invention of these instruments," as Dr. Burney justly observes, "music could have been little more than metrical, as no other instruments except those of percussion, were known. When the art was first discovered of refining and

sustaining tones, the power of music over mankind was probably irresistible, from the agreeable surprise which soft and lengthened sounds must have occasioned."

142. 16. *Theodorus.* See note 67. 15. vol. I. *Lysimacho.* See note 67. 16. vol. I.

142. 18. *Cantharidis.* A venomous fly of the kind of cantharides, shining like gold, and breeding in the tops of ashes, olives, &c. Papirius Carbo is said to have taken one after his impeachment, when L. Licinius Crassus became so distinguished for the great skill and eloquence he displayed in his pleadings.

142. 19. *Persæ.* The last king of Macedon. Having been taken captive by *Cn. Octavius*, the Roman admiral, he was conveyed to the camp of Paulus Æmilius, whom he besought to save him from the disgrace of being led in triumph by the victor. *In tuâ id quidem potestate est*, i. e. You are not reduced to this necessity; for he is not led in triumph whose mind is not depressed by adverse fortune; it is in your power to prevent this.

142. 20. *Primo die;* i. e. In the first book of the *Tusculan Disputations.*

143. 26. *Hunc locum*; "this point," i. e. this question concerning a happy life.

144. 10. *Lacessiti.* In that book upon the subject of virtue which Brutus wrote and sent to Cicero.

The words in the text thus inclosed [ ] are considered spurious, or are rendered doubtful by being variously written in different MSS. or for some other cause are a subject of disagreement among critics.

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

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